The Forgotten Trope: Metonymy in Poetic Action by Matzner, Sebastian
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 













Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
This electronic theses or dissertation has been 









The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information 
derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk 
providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 
Unported License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/  
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in 
any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings 
































A doctoral thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
















This thesis seeks to advance literary theory and in particular the theory of poetic language 
by developing a theory of metonymy as a literary trope. After a critical assessment of 
available views on metonymy, the first part of the thesis sets out to explore and analyse the 
aesthetic status, structure and poetic function of metonymy on the basis of concrete literary 
material. Premised on the notion of poetic language as defamiliarisation and following the 
establishment of an operational definition of metonymy, a corpus of ancient Greek texts, 
chiefly from lyric poetry and tragedy, is examined and metonymic occurrences are isolated. 
Contrasting categories of metonymy are established as they emerge from the corpus and 
analysed in their individual structure and shared characteristics. Further examples from 
German poetry are adduced for illustration and comparison as and where appropriate. On 
this basis, a general theory of metonymy as a literary trope is developed, centred on the 
notion of contiguity as proposed by Jakobson but now re-interpreted as lexical contiguity: 
by way of revising the theory of semantic fields, it is suggested that metonymy is best 
understood as a shift within a semantic field, conceptualising the field itself as the result of 
regular collocations in ordinary usage. This proposition indicates why metonymy’s 
defamiliarising effects appear less intense than those of metaphor, explains the relevance of 
grammatical categories for metonymy and clarifies the relationship between metaphor and 
metonymy. The second part of the thesis refines this theory and considers some of its 
further implications in literary practice by assessing what happens to metonymy in 
translation, that is, under the impact of changed linguistic, syntactic and cultural contexts. 
The conclusion offers reflections on the impact of the new theory on tropology and stylistics 
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One of the fundamental tools of semiotics is the distinction between  
metaphor and metonymy. D’you want me to explain it to you?” 
“It’ll pass the time,” he said. 
 
David Lodge, 






Wer das Dichten will verstehen,  
muss ins Land der Dichtung gehen. 
 
He who wants to understand poetising, 
Must travel to the land of poetry. 
 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe,  







This thesis sets out to make a contribution to literary theory and in particular to advance the 
theory of poetic language. Its aim is the development and formulation of a theory of 
metonymy as a literary trope to complement existing theories of metaphor. As the title 
indicates, metonymy has largely been overlooked by scholarship, especially insofar as 
metonymy ‘in poetic action’ is concerned, that is, metonymy as manifest in concrete 
metonyms occurring in poetic texts. Chapter 1 will set out in due detail how metonymy has 
come to be ‘the forgotten trope’ and why a theory of metonymy based on the evaluation of 
actual metonyms in poetry is indeed a desideratum. First, a few methodological remarks. 
 
Tropology, the study of tropes, and stylistics, the study of literary devices more generally, 
occupy a peculiar place in modern scholarship. Landfester points out that  
as a study of the ways in which language is used and shaped, stylistics is situated 
within the disciplines of languages and literature [‘Philologie’] at the border 
between literary and linguistic studies. Insofar as it is concerned with the 
linguistic elements of a specific language, it is considered a sub-discipline of 
linguistics; if, on the other hand, individual texts become the object of enquiry, it 
becomes associated with literary studies.1  
Landfester suggests that this interdisciplinarity has potential advantages, which are all too 
often lost. Instead of drawing simultaneously on both branches of scholarship, scholars of 
different languages and literatures have parted company by giving preference to one over 
the other. Scholars of modern languages and literatures have entrusted stylistic studies to 
linguistics, following the discipline’s surge in theoretical sophistication and popularity 
between the 1960s and 1980s, while most classicists have been less than responsive to the 
new developments in linguistics and, instead, have continued to consider style as the 
province of literary criticism,2 largely pursued in a mode that conserves and perpetuates the 
tradition of classical rhetoric.3 
                                                        
1
 ‘Die Stilistik als Wissenschaft von der Art und Weise der Sprachverwendung oder Sprachgestaltung ist 
innerhalb der Philologie eine Wissenschaft an der Grenze zwischen Literaturwissenschaft und 
Sprachwissenschaft. Sofern sie die sprachlichen Elemente einer Einzelsprache erforscht, versteht sie sich als 
eine Teildisziplin der Sprachwissenschaft; wenn dagegen einzelne Texte ihr Objekt sind, gerät sie in den Bann 
der Literaturwissenschaft.‘ Landfester 1997, 1. 
2
 See Landfester 1997, 1.  
3
 ‘[Research in s]tylistics ... is rarely conducted systematically. Within Classics, it takes its cues from, and 
continues more or less directly, the system of categories established for stylistics by ancient rhetoric.’(‘Die 
Stilistik ... wird nur selten systematisch betrieben. Innerhalb der Klassischen Philologie knüpft sie mehr oder 
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However, even within Classics, the traditional home of ‘rhetoric’ at universities, research 
dedicated exclusively to specific categories of literary style (as opposed to studies into the 
specific style of individual authors) has become increasingly rare. In his book on Pindar’s 
style, now ninety years old, Dornseiff suggested a cultural-historical explanation for this 
phenomenon:  
The diligent reader will see in each and every poet all such tropes as metonymy, 
synecdoche, hypallage, but for fear of seeming pedantic – who would want to 
have counted a poet’s rhetorical figures? – they are covered up in bashful 
silence wherever Romanticism has had an influence. The period from about 
1750 until [the triumph of] Romanticism did away with normative poetics. But 
apprehension about the fatal authoritative power of these ancient-roman(ce) 
norms [‘antik-romanische Normen’] has exercised a long-enduring influence. The 
fear of being taken for a ‘Magister’ à la Opitz has largely precluded any objective 
engagement (with a clear conscience) with the various artistic means of 
heightened idiom, that is, with the maligned surface. After all, it had taken such 
a profound revolution for our literature to rid itself of didactic poetics. ... Since 
[the rise of] Symbolist poetry we have more aware and sharper senses for this 
side of poetic expression.4 
Taking Landfester’s and Dornseiff’s acute remarks as a starting point, let us set out the 
nature, scope and perspective of this study.  
 
The fundamental conviction at the heart of this thesis is that theorising literary phenomena 
should be inductive and based on the evaluation of empirical evidence. That is to say, our 
theory of metonymy will be developed on the basis of actual metonymic occurrences 
isolated from a corpus of poetic texts. Given that we are dealing with a range of isolated 
                                                                                                                                                                            
weniger direkt an das Kategoriensystem der antiken rhetorischen Stilistik an.‘ Landfester 1997, xi). Landfester 
goes so far as to argue that ‘[t]he “Handbook of Literary Rhetoric” by Heinrich Lausberg of 1960 has sanctioned 
this position to the present day and has thereby prevented [the emergence of] a linguistics-based stylistics‘ 
(‘Das “Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik“ von Heinrich Lausberg aus dem Jahre 1960 hat diese Stellung bis 
in die Gegenwart hin sanktioniert und damit eine sprachwissenschaftlich gestützte Stilistik verhindert.‘ 
Landfester 1997, 1). 
4
 ‘Alle die τρόποι wie Metonymie, Synekdoche, Hypallage wird der genaue Leser bei jedem Dichter sehen, aber 
aus Furcht, pedantisch zu erscheinen – man will doch einem Dichter nicht seine rhetorischen Figuren 
nachgerechnet haben –, werden sie überall, wo die Romantik eingewirkt hat, schamhaft verschwiegen. Die Zeit 
von etwa 1750 bis zur Romantik hat die Regeln gebenden Poetiken beseitigt. Aber die Scheu vor der 
lebentötenden autoritativen Kraft jener antik-romanischen Normen hat lange nachgewirkt. Die Angst, für 
einen Magister der Opitzzeit zu gelten, hat es weithin verhindert, daß man sich sachlich und ruhigen Gewissens 
mit den verschiedenen Kunstmitteln der gehobenen Sprache, d.h. mit der verpönten Oberfläche beschäftigte. 
Es hatte eben einer so tiefen Umwälzung bedurft, bis unsere Literatur sich der erlernbaren Poetik entledigt 
hatte. ... Seit der symbolistischen Dichtung haben wir bewußtere, geschärftere Sinne für diese Seite des 




examples from different sources, we are neither interpreting specific individual texts in the 
traditional sense of literary scholarship, nor studying specific linguistic elements from the 
traditional perspective of linguistics. In other words, the literary scholar should not expect 
to find a comprehensive interpretation of each and every passage in the light of its literary 
and historical context, nor should the linguistician expect a full, quantitative corpus study 
that includes every metonym in all the texts examined. Our aim is neither to offer 
exhaustive interpretations of the selected passages nor to submit elements of ordinary 
language to linguistic explication. Our concern is with literary aesthetics, with a specific 
phenomenon of poetic language. The aim is to establish how metonymy, as a trope, 
functions – in its structural mechanisms and in its poetic effects. As such, this study stands in 
intimate connection with both conventional literary studies and linguistics but does not, or 
not exactly, share the customary interests or methods of either. Among much else, we have 
not attempted a comprehensive, quantitative evaluation of the entire corpus but instead 
offer a selection of revealing examples; these examples are then qualitatively analysed. At 
times, this analysis reaches out to, and draws on, the broader context of a work in order to 
illustrate, paradigmatically, the potential wider ramifications of individual instances; more 
often, the discussion stays focused on short sequences. It would have been impossible to do 
justice to the full potential of each passage cited and to adduce sufficient material to 
support all the theoretical claims made and to maintain a focused argument. Our ambition 
here is nothing more (and nothing less) than fundamental research: the aim is to formulate 
the basic principle of metonymy, to distinguish its fundamental varieties, and to provide a 
nuanced framework which will enable readers to interpret literary texts in which metonyms 
occur with greater precision and insight. 
 
The thesis, then, is focused precisely on ‘the maligned surface’, as Dornseiff called it, that is, 
on verbal particularities of poetic texts, and it is indeed indebted to a particular post-
Symbolist way of thinking about poetry: Russian Formalism.5 At the height of the Symbolist 
movement in Russia, when criticism had exhausted itself in divining the mystical meanings 
of poetic words, both poetry and theory took a turn towards language in its materiality. 
Futurist poetry dismissed not only realistic modes of art but the entire referential side of 
                                                        
5
 Erlich 1981 and Steiner 1984 and 1995 offer comprehensive accounts of the historical development and key 
tenets of Russian Formalism. 
10 
 
language, considering words as self-sufficient and self-validating artistic entities regardless 
of any spiritual or social message.6 Inspired by this new approach, Formalist critics turned 
their attention to artistic effects created by phonetic, rhythmic, morphological and syntactic 
structures as the primary carriers of a literary work’s aesthetic value. Shklovsky’s essay Art 
as Technique (1917) is often seen as the founding manifesto of this school of criticism since 
it was the first to elaborate its core principle: defamiliarisation (ostranenie; literally: ‘making 
things strange’). According to Shklovsky, the use of unfamiliar, unexpected, striking 
expressions and formulations ‘removes objects from the automatism of perception’7 and 
presents whatever is at issue in a fresh, new way. In his view, what distinguishes poetry 
from other discourses is a formal criterion, namely the stylisation of language beyond and 
against the conventions that govern its ordinary, daily usage: ‘[t]he language of poetry is … a 
difficult, roughened, impeded language. … [W]e can define poetry as attenuated, tortuous 
speech. Poetic speech is formed speech.’8 Consequently, it was considered to be the 
primary task of literary criticism to elucidate the different ways in which ‘speech’ can be 
‘formed’, that is to say, what the aesthetic effects are of different forms of defamiliarised 
language. In Eichenbaum’s words: ‘the object of literary science, as literary science, ought to 
be the investigation of the specific properties of literary material.’9 These ‘specific 
properties’, usually referred to as ‘literary devices’, can only be understood when 
contrasted with ordinary language use. Accordingly, the Formalist movement saw the 
interface of linguistics and aesthetic analysis as the quintessential locus of literary studies: 
Formalists came up with their own characteristic orientation toward linguistics, a 
discipline contiguous with poetics in regard to material under investigation, but 
one approaching that material from a different angle and with different kinds of 
problems to solve. … Formalists simultaneously freed themselves from the 
traditional correlation of ‘form-content’ and from the conception of form as an 
outer cover or as a vessel into which a liquid (the content) is poured. The facts 
testified that the specificity of art is expressed not in the elements that go to 
make up a work but in the special way they are used.10 
                                                        
6
 Symbolism itself did, of course, already carry the seeds for these developments; a good example is 
Mallarmé’s (reported) dictum: ‘One does not write poems with ideas, but with words’ (‘Ce n'est pas avec des 
idées qu'on fait des vers, c'est avec des mots’, Delacroix 1927, 93). 
7
 Shklovsky 1917, 16. 
8
 Shklovsky 1917, 19-20.  
9
 Eichenbaum 1926, 7. 
10
 Eichenbaum 1926, 8-9. 
11 
 
The exclusive focus on the structural modalities of literary aesthetics at the expense of all 
other elements soon provoked criticism. As early as 1928, critics like Bakhtin would 
reprimand Formalists for inattention to the sociological and ideological context of literary 
works.11 Moreover, even within the broader Formalist movement the pioneering members 
of OPOJAZ in Petrograd/Leningrad,12 including Shklovsky, Eichenbaum and Tynjanov, soon 
found that their insistence on the autonomy of artistic forms and their reduction of 
artworks to a collection of devices was deemed problematic by their Muscovite 
colleagues.13 The Moscow Linguistic Circle, including Bogatryev, Jakobson and Vinokur, 
moved away from this absolutist position. In particular, Jakobson, soon to become a central 
figure in the development of structuralism, insisted that equating a poetic work with its 
aesthetic dimension was erroneous. Instead, he argued that ‘a poetic work is not confined 
to aesthetic function alone, but has in addition many other functions ... often closely related 
to philosophy, social didactics etc.’14 And Jakobson and Tynjanov duly agreed that, though 
literary criticism should be a ‘systematic science’ and not an ‘episodic and anecdotal genre’, 
the pursuit of a ‘scholastic “formalism” which replaces analysis by terminology and the 
classification of phenomena’ was equally misguided.15 
 
Rehearsing these developments and debates serves to clarify both the potential and the 
limitations of a study like ours. By way of bridging the gap between approaches to stylistics 
in Classics (on the one hand) and modern literatures and languages (on the other), we shall 
draw both on the classical tradition of rhetoric and on linguistics as well as on key concepts 
of Russian Formalism. Inevitably, categorisation and attempts to develop a precise 
terminology will feature prominently – the following pages may indeed at times recall the 
work of a ‘“Magister” à la Opitz’. It should, therefore, be stressed at the outset that these 
classifications are not offered as an end in themselves but rather intended to be an aid to 
future critical practice. Again, as we seek to establish a better understanding of a distinctive 
phenomenon in poetic language, we are obliged to privilege and foreground the formal-
aesthetic dimension of literature at the expense of the content or historical context of 
                                                        
11
 See Bakhtin/Medvedev 1928. 
12
 OPOJAZ: Obshchestvo Izucheniia Poeticheskogo Jazyka (‘Society for the Study of Poetic Language’). 
13
 For the notion that poetry is a sum of literary and artistic devices that the artist manipulates to construct his 
work, see for instance Shklovsky 1925, 2. 
14
 Jakobson 1935, 83. 
15
 Jakobson/Tynjanov 1928, 79.  
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individual works. This decision is pragmatic, not dogmatic. The theoretical understanding of 
metonymy established here will, it is hoped, enlarge the toolkit available to literary scholars 
so that future studies of literary works will be able to elaborate the formal-aesthetic 
dimension of texts more precisely and more concisely, alongside discussions of substance 
and context. For this purpose, however, no theoretical framework is more relevant than 
Russian Formalism and, in this sense, we can only agree with Steiner’s verdict:  
Russian Formalism was without a doubt a transitional and transitory period in 
the history of literary study. But insofar as the literary-theoretical paradigms it 
inaugurated are still with us, it stands not as a mere historical curiosity but as a 
vital presence in the critical discourse of our day.16 
Accordingly, throughout this thesis, the discussion of metonymy is conducted, whenever 
appropriate, in terms of the central Formalist concept of defamiliarisation. I would not wish 
to argue that the same case might not be made in other terms or that defamiliarisation is 
the definitive feature of poetry tout court. 
 
While grounded in the tradition of classical rhetoric and informed by Formalist theory, the 
fundamental basis of our theorising will be concrete, empirical evidence from literary texts. 
The texts chosen for evaluation and analysis are taken from ancient Greek lyric and tragic 
poetry, supplemented by literary translations of these texts into German from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I shall also discuss some examples from the German 
poetry of these poet-translators themselves, as and where appropriate, for further 
illustration.  
 
The selection of authors and texts has been guided by two desiderata: first, a range of 
metonymic instances and, secondly, a range of literary translations. The resulting corpus, 
then, consists of texts with a high degree of defamiliarised language which have been 
particularly popular among German philhellenists. I have undertaken full assessment of the 
following texts: Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone, Aeschylus’ Agamemnon and 
Eumenides, Euripides’ Iphigenia among the Taurians and Pindar’s Olympian Odes and 
Pythian Odes. I have conducted further selective readings of other Pindaric Odes and Greek 
tragedies, prompted by critical observations on the main texts and by discussions of the 
                                                        
16
 Steiner 1984, 280. 
13 
 
style of individual authors in the secondary literature. In addition, I have examined 
translations and adaptations of the main texts by Jenisch, Goethe, Schiller, Hölderlin, 
Humboldt, Droysen, Gedike, Solger, Stolberg, Boeckh and Wilamowitz – both in comparison 
with the Greek originals and as literary works in their own right. However (to restate the 
point), although this entire corpus has been assessed, my discussion makes no attempt at 
any comprehensive coverage, but confines itself to particular instructive samples.  
 
The mixed corpus, combining ancient Greek and ‘modern’ German texts, may seem peculiar, 
but the choice is quite deliberate: this study is tentatively universalist in the sense that it 
aims at extrapolating mechanisms and structures of non-ordinary language usage that can 
be found in any language.17 In other words, the principles we are interested in are inherent 
possibilities of language in general; where properties and features specific to a particular 
language appear to arise, this is noted. Meanwhile, the comparative approach and the 
combination of material from a classical and a modern language serve both a 
methodological and a disciplinary purpose. In terms of methodology: they extend the 
variety of metonymic instances available for analysis; they enable us to cross-check our 
arguments and validate any theoretical hypotheses developed on the basis of the Greek 
texts; and they add a further dimension to our enquiry, by raising the question of what 
happens to metonyms in translation. In disciplinary terms, it is hoped that the mixed corpus 
will also contribute to closing the gap between discussions of style in Classics on the one 
hand, and in modern literatures and languages on the other. After all, ‘[l]iterary-theoretical 
debates are debates that concern language and literature as a whole; as such, they are 
debates to which a specialist in Greek language and literature should feel able to make a 
contribution.‘18  
 
General issues apart, particular and important complications arise when one confronts 
instances of presumed tropical usage in a ‘dead’ language such as ancient Greek. How are 
we to know that a term is used tropically, that we are dealing with actual defamiliarisation 
in ancient Greek, as opposed to expressions that merely appear unfamiliar to us as non-
                                                        
17
 Or, at the very least, in any Indo-European language. To comment on linguistic details in languages from 
other language families is beyond my competence. However, it is hard to imagine convincing arguments that 
would undermine the potential applicability of the theory developed here to non-Indo-European languages.  
18
 Silk 1995, 115. 
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native speakers? Methodologically, ‘Sprachgefühl’, the intuitive sense of what is 
linguistically appropriate, is a highly questionable criterion here. A soundly based discussion 
of non-ordinary, tropical usage must be based on a reliable knowledge of ordinary usage. In 
spoken languages, ordinary usage is determined pragmatically by native speakers in terms 
of the predominant daily usage of these and other native speakers at a given time.  Owing 
to the lack of native speakers of ancient Greek, we must reconstruct ordinary usage on the 
basis of extant literature and general principle. Our discussion of metonymic occurrences in 
ancient Greek texts, therefore, must subsume the establishment of the ordinary usage of 
the term/s in question in order to demonstrate and analyse (metonymic) deviance from it. 
This reconstruction of normal usage in classical Greek is primarily based on the principle of 
distribution:19 normality can be established positively by the citation of evidence which (a) 
comes from ‘reliable’ authors, i.e. authors whose general language usage makes them least 
likely to contain defamiliarised, poetic expressions,20 and (b) is available in sufficient 
quantity (or distributional variety) to be deemed significant. Unavailability of such evidence 
indicates, ex silentio, deviant, non-ordinary usage.21  
 
Two more clarifications are in order. Unlike the vast majority of those who have contributed 
to the literature currently available on the topic, we are not concerned with the cognitive-
conceptual aspect of metonymy. Needless to say, concepts and words are intricately linked, 
but here our concern is with aesthetic effect. Our discussion will therefore be centred on 
‘usage’ and ‘terminology’ rather than on ‘concepts’ and ‘meaning’.22 By the same token, our 
interest in aesthetic effect means that this study will be focused on ‘live’ metonyms, as 
opposed to ‘dead’ metonyms and clichéd metonyms. As with ‘dead’ metaphor, in any 
language there are innumerable expressions which can be traced back to an extension of a 
                                                        
19
 On the concept of and procedures for such ‘literary lexicography’, see Silk 1974, 33-56 and 82-84 as well as 
Silk 1983 for further illustration. 
20
 The most reliable writers in this respect are authors of non-literary prose such as Aristotle or the Hippocratic 
corpus. Making due allowance for the possibility of individual instances of ‘poetic’ expressions, we can also 
draw on literary-prose authors such as Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon or Lysias. Because of its fundamental 
and foundational place in the development of Greek literary idiom, we can also include Homeric usage as, 
effectively, a standard in its own right; see Silk 1974, 41-44. 
21
 In principle, such issues might arise for a native speaker of modern German (which this researcher is), when 
faced with literary German texts from two centuries ago. In practice, problems arising (discussed where 
appropriate) are few and marginal. 
22
 Where this dimension needs to be reflected in our discussion, I will speak of the ‘conceptual content’ of 
words, following the suggestion by Silk that ‘[t]he term “conceptual” is convenient, although the antithesis 
could be misleading. Concepts and words are not opposites nor happily separable.’ Silk 1974, 9. 
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term’s earlier semantic scope along the lines of metonymy but which have long since 
entered general, ordinary usage. ‘Buckingham Palace announced this morning...’ or ‘I’ll have 
another glass’ will hardly strike any contemporary English speaker as remarkable cases of 
metonymy. In current English, ‘Buckingham Palace’ effectively denotes ‘the sovereign’ 
(when not denoting a residence), just as ‘a glass’ effectively denotes ‘a drink’ (when not 
denoting a container). Similarly, developed literary traditions abound in metonyms that 
occur so frequently in poetic texts that their aesthetic effect is significantly reduced. From 
‘sword’ evoking military force to ‘crown’ implying royal prerogative, there are manifold 
examples of expressions that are etymologically metonyms but effect-ively not tropical in 
the strict sense of deviant, unfamiliar language usage. Our concern is with synchronic 
aesthetics rather than historical linguistic developments. Therefore, while examination of 
metonymic clichés will sometimes be a relevant adjunct to our theorising, we omit any 
discussion of metonymy in a diachronic perspective.23 However, the (sometime) relevance 
of metonymic cliché, as well as the frequent contextual embeddedness of metonyms into 
other, non-tropical forms of stylised language, makes it essential to distinguish between two 
different kinds of deviance from the economy and norm of ordinary language. To that end, 
we differentiate poetic ‘elevation’ from ‘heightening’, by which it is understood that 
‘[e]levation is in general a matter of conventional stylization and formal dignity, heightening 
of ad hoc intensification and enhanced meaning.’24  
 
A few words should also be said about an entity of fundamental methodological importance 
to this study: ‘the reader’. The Formalist notion of tropes as literary devices is grounded in 
perceptible deviance from ordinary usage, and perceptibility implies a perceiving subject. 
Culler, citing Genette, summarises this fundamental proposition concisely: 
The rhetorical figure, says Genette [in Figures], ‘is nothing other than an 
awareness of the figure, and its existence depends wholly on the reader being 
conscious, or not being conscious, of the ambiguity of the discourse before him’. 
One has a rhetorical figure when the reader perceives a problem in the text and 
takes certain rule-governed steps to devise a solution.25 
                                                        
23
 For an exemplary study of ‘dead’ metaphor and metonymy, together with an up-to-date introduction to 
recent cognitive-conceptual approaches and corpus linguistic studies in the field, see Allan 2008. 
24
 Silk 2010, 435. For a discussion of the two concepts in more detail, see ibid. 434-439. 
25
 Culler 1975, 180. 
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What we are trying to establish in this study is not so much what exactly readers understand 
when they encounter the metonyms chosen for discussion, but how these metonymic 
occurrences deviate from ordinary usage and how readers make sense of them. That is to 
say, we are not concerned with the consciousness of individual readers, past or present, but 
with the general potential inherent in a distinct form of language use.26 In these terms, ‘the 
reader’ is in no sense a historical entity nor should his or her ‘readings’ or his or her way of 
reading be taken as an accurate representation of what concrete readers experience on 
encountering a metonym. Our ‘reader’ is a deliberate construction, a heuristic tool for 
exploration, which lays open in full the processes that may (or may not) occur, consciously 
or unconsciously, in concrete reading acts. Rather than being an external entity that 
approaches a text, this ‘reader’ is constructed by the potential inherent in language. Just as 
the ‘author’ as a historical entity with a cultural and biographical background has been 
complemented in recent literary criticism by the concept of the ‘author function’, 
understood as a function of a written work which ultimately forms part of its determinative 
structure, so our ‘reader’ is more akin to a ‘reader function’. Stripped of race, gender, sexual 
identity, class and any other criteria that are bound to affect concrete historical acts of 
reading, our ‘reader’ is the abstraction and sum of the possible readings that readers with 
full linguistic competence in the given language might conduct in their attempt to make 
sense of the text.27 The central point of reference that guides our ‘readings’ is the linear 
movement of the text and the expectations which are built up and then fulfilled or 
                                                        
26
 In this sense, our ‘reader’ is similar to the one that forms the basis of Budelmann’s study of the language of 
Sophocles. Budelmann explains: ‘I do not … try to develop a detailed and universally valid psychological,  
behavioural or other kind of model of audience or reader response, as, in their different ways, narratologists 
following Gérard Genette, reception theorists like Wolfgang Iser or Hans Robert Jauss, students of semiotics 
like Umberto Eco, anthropologists like Victor Turner, scholars in the semiotics of theatre or psychoanalytic 
critics have done. … my emphasis throughout this book will be on Sophoclean language and kinds of possible 
response, rather than on detailed accounts of the spectators’ and readers’ precise reactions. There is too much 
that is different from one spectator or reader to the next to make the latter a worthwhile project.’ Budelmann 
2000, 10-11. 
27
 Compare, again, Budelmann: ‘I will ... refrain not only from trying to account for the processes in the 
spectators’ brains, but also from claiming that anything I say is true for all spectators in the same way. When I 
speak, for instance, as I will, about certain spectators “being surprised by” or “wondering about” certain 
features of a sentence, I do not suggest that each of them is in a state of shock or that they all have the 
mentality of crossword-solvers. ... Everything I say about the spectators’ possible reactions ... should be 
understood as tentative and should be granted a certain margin of variation.’ Budelmann 2000, 22. 
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frustrated in this process, including in particular an expectation of grammatical and 
semantic coherence.28 
 
Finally, two points of guidance on issues of practical concern to the flesh-and-blood reader 
of this thesis. The first concerns the obvious difficulty that comes with discussing the poetic 
idiom of a foreign language. Throughout, I quote all passages under discussion in the 
original language (using the edition of each text referenced in the bibliography along with 
abbreviations for Greek authors and their works following the LSJ standard), together with a 
standard translation (with the translator referenced in the accompanying footnote). I have 
supplied additional ‘literal’ translations where I felt that no available translation adequately 
represents the poetically relevant specifics of the respective passage; these are placed in 
square brackets and marked ‘[lit.: ...]’. Where no translator is referenced in the footnote, I 
have supplied a translation of my own. The fact that the entire second part of this study is 
dedicated to the special problem of metonymy in translation makes it seem almost 
facetious to point out that none of the translations is intended to replace the original but 
only to offer some guidance to the reader. Secondly, I make use of various typographical 
means to highlight the tropically used terms of a sequence. Metonymic elements of a 
sequence are set in italics, metaphorical elements are underlined. A dashed line indicates 
terms that may under certain interpretative conditions be read metaphorically, whereas a 
dotted line draws attention to an altogether different phenomenon that requires 
independent discussion. 
  
                                                        
28
 Linear movement, however, need not necessarily correspond to strict ‘linearity’ in the sense of a reader’s 
rigidly word-by-word and line-by-line progress. Actual reading of course can and does include both the 
retrospective revision of larger passages as well as prospective glances ahead. But such reading acts are still 
‘linear’ in the sense that they remain fundamentally progressive: they follow, overall, a directed forward 
movement and progressively incorporate new information into a previously established framework. Neither 
the fact that (a) this framework is itself subject to readjustment as the reading progresses (including the 
revision of earlier passages) nor that (b) information pertinent to a sequence may come from words that do 
not immediately follow the sequence poses a problem for our theorising per se. As and where necessary, our 
discussion of individual passages will reflect this suitably broad notion of ‘linearity’. 
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Part I – Theory of Metonymy 
1. Theoretical Positions  
Poetic language is a key area of investigation in literary studies, usually in the close reading 
of individual texts but also as an area of theory in its own right. Even so, to single out the 
phenomenon of metonymy and to dedicate an entire study to understanding its structure, 
functions and poetic effects may seem arbitrary. A look into any handbook from the 
rhetorical tradition reveals a plethora of tropes and figures that have not received any 
analytical treatment by literary critics beyond a brief description and a handful of stock 
examples. Yet even a quick glance at the history of tropology in poetics and rhetoric shows 
that from the earliest reflections on poetic language some forms of non-ordinary language 
usage have been deemed more significant and worthy of more extensive treatment than 
others. Genette has noted in his essay ‘La rhétorique restrainte’29 (‘Rhetoric Restrained’) 
that the history of rhetoric is marked by a movement of contraction: from a comprehensive 
art of oratory (in classical antiquity) to a mere science of tropes and figures, from which 
then, in a further process of ‘tropical reduction’,30 an ever smaller set of key phenomena is 
singled out and credited with a greater structural significance in the organisation of the 
ramified system of tropes and figures. This set of what one might call ‘master tropes’31 
initially comprises metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony; then a triad emerges in 
which either of the last two is no longer present, followed by a binary model in which 
metaphor and metonymy stand out as polar opposites with synecdoche subsumed under 
one or other of them.32 Finally, Genette notes, 
[t]he age-old tendency of rhetoric to reduction seems … to have culminated in 
an absolute valorization of metaphor, bound up with the idea of the essential 
metaphoricity of poetic language – and language in general.33 
 
                                                        
29
 Genette 1972. 
30
 Genette 1972, 105. 
31
 The term was coined, albeit for rather different purposes, by Burke (see Burke 1945, 503-517). Here and in 
what follows, we will use the term to refer to tropes which are seen as paradigmatic in terms of their inner 
structure to the extent that other tropes can be subsumed under them as specific variations of that structure. 
32
 Cf. Genette 1972, 104-118. We shall return to the issue of synecdoche’s affiliation in chapter 5.5 
‘Synecdoche’; see below, pp. 142-154. 
33
 Genette 1972, 118. 
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Genette’s observations highlight the fact that metonymy has already been foregrounded by 
rhetoricians and literary critics for some time, even if it has never attracted anything like the 
degree of interest or analytical penetration that marks the study of metaphor. More 
importantly, however, Genette’s study points to two developments in earlier and current 
thinking about tropes and figures which are formative for the position of metonymy in 
scholarly discourse, which shape the initial framework of any closer investigation into the 
phenomenon of metonymy in poetic action, and which explain why a systematic study is 
indeed called for: the structuralist turn in tropology, on the one hand; and the question of 
the organisation and conceptualisation of the tropical space, the ‘black box’ of the poetic 
function of language, on the other.  
 
Genette’s analysis indicates that despite the rhetorical tradition’s lack of interest in 
metonymy as a trope in its own right, it has long featured as a ‘master trope’ and has been 
increasingly recognised as central to a general understanding of tropical language, 
particularly in association with and counter-distinction from metaphor. The developing 
sense of a binary opposition between metaphor and metonymy at the centre of poetic 
language can be traced among formalist and structuralist scholars. Arguably inspired by 
Eichenbaum, who was the first to extend this primary opposition between metaphor and 
metonymy to a structural paradigm by associating the former with poetry and the latter 
with prose,34 Jakobson widened the application of the terms metaphor and metonymy to 
various non-verbal discourses.35 Jakobson claimed that metaphor characterised lyric poetry, 
Romanticism, Chaplin’s films, and Freudian dream symbols, while metonymy was embodied 
in epic poetry, realist novels, Griffith’s films, and Freudian dream projections. His 
identification of substitution, paradigm, and metaphor on the one hand, and of 
combination, syntagm, and metonymy on the other,36 has led to an extension of the 
understanding and scholarly use of the two terms from specific modes of language usage to 
a universal structural schema in which metaphor and metonymy represent patterns of 
interrelation between elements in any one given semiotic system.  
 
                                                        
34
 Eichenbaum 1923. 
35
 In his seminal article ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances’ (Jakobson 1956). 
36
 Jakobson 1956, 243-244. 
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Heeding Jakobson’s advice, scholars from virtually all disciplines of the humanities have 
applied his theory to one symbolic system after another – from language and literary 
narratives to film, dramaturgy, advertisements, visual art, historiography, folklore and 
psychoanalysis.37 While this development has, for the first time, brought metonymy under 
the spotlight of scholarly interest, it is fair to say that the outcome for literary study has 
been negligible. After the initial blow of being deemed unworthy of explicit 
acknowledgement by Aristotle, and having consequently been treated only marginally 
through the centuries by his literary-theoretical successors, metonymy’s reinvention as a 
tool of structuralist analysis after a bimillennial sleep in the rhetorical handbooks has turned 
out to be effectively a death sentence for any prospects of close attention to its status as a 
literary trope. If there was hardly any tropological criticism of metonymy before, it now 
ceased almost entirely, and every critical discussion of the term took place under the new 
notion of metonymy as a structural-semiotic paradigm. The outcome is a stark discrepancy 
between (a) the pervasiveness of the new technical (in fact, horribile dictu, metaphorical) 
usage of the term ‘metonymy’ in structuralist studies – as inspired by Jakobson both within 
and beyond the field of literary studies – and (b) the continuing absence of any theoretical 
conceptualisation of the structure, function and effects of actual metonyms in literary texts. 
Metonymy may have gained more significance and a wider usage but the transfer of the 
term from rhetoric to semiotics has left it as insufficiently defined and analysed as ever: ‘To 
date, despite a number of studies, there is no widely accepted definition of metonymy 
which distinguishes it clearly from metaphor, and attempts to clarify the relationship 
between the two ... have proved inconclusive’.38   
 
Our concern is with literary applications. However, rather than discarding this currently 
dominant strand of thinking about metonymy as irrelevant to our purposes, we shall revisit 
the topic towards the end of this thesis and contrast the theoretical insights gained from our 
analyses of metonymic occurrences in literary texts with the implicit and explicit notions of 
metonymy as a semiotic pattern in Jakobson-inspired structuralist studies.39 Suffice it to say 
here that it is, at the very least, ironic that this transfer should have taken place prior to a 
                                                        
37
 For a bibliography of works that ‘develop, apply or challenge’ Jakobson’s theory, see Bohn 1984. 
38
 Allen 2008, 11. 
39
 See below, pp. 246-259. 
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sustained investigation into metonymy in its original signification as a phenomenon of 
tropical language. What matters at this stage is to note that, although long earmarked as (in 
one way or another) of central relevance to tropology as a whole, metonymy has had its 
most extensive discussion to date in the context of its structuralist redefinition, and on the 
basis of an assumed bipolar opposition of metaphor and metonymy as structural-semiotic 
paradigms. While the problems resulting from this broadening of the term’s scope can be 
postponed for the time being, the notion of a bipolar opposition of metaphor and 
metonymy requires closer attention before we can approach metonymy in its own right. 
 
Jakobson’s bipolar model of metaphor and metonymy as structural opposites and Genette’s 
observations on the new perception of metaphor as the only true ‘master trope’ which 
essentially represents the whole of poetic language are startling in their incompatibility. 
They do, however, represent the two general views that pervade the literature on poetic 
usage and in their incompatibility contribute to the general impression of fuzziness in this 
field;40 for what is hardly ever explicitly addressed is the question how the whole field of 
operations that constitutes the poetic function of language is structured and organised. It 
would seem that almost two millennia after Quintilian’s dry remark on the unending battle 
fought by grammarians and philosophers on the genera, species, number, and classification 
of the tropes,41 there is now less rather than more clarity on this topic in literary criticism. 
On the contrary, the confusion about the classification and number of tropes and ‘master 
tropes’ is now made worse by an indiscriminate use of ‘trope’ and ‘figure’ in the discussion 
of linguistic creativity. Sojcher, for instance, cited by Genette as a proponent of metaphor 
monism, writes: 
                                                        
40
 Compare and contrast Stanford’s notion that ‘in none of its contexts does μετονομάζειν suggest any of the 
significance of the term μετωνυμία as afterwards applied to metonymy, a particular kind of metaphor’ 
(Stanford 1936, 4; our italics) and Goheen’s view that ‘the classical distinction of metaphors and similes from 
synecdoches and metonymies ... involves chiefly a difference of degree in the same kind of effect and is largely 
a matter of intensity in the specific instance’ (Goheen 1951, 108; our italics) with Wellek and Warren’s 
assertion that ‘we may divide the tropes of poetry most relevantly into figures of contiguity and figures of 
similarity. The traditional figures of contiguity are metonymy and synecdoche’ (Wellek/Warren 1949, 199; our 
italics) as well as Ullmann’s position that ‘[t]wo objects or ideas may be associated with one another in two 
ways: by similarity or by “contiguity” ... Simile and metaphor arise from the former whereas metonymy and 
allied figures spring from the latter’ (Ullmann 1964, 177; our italics). 
41
 Circa quem inexplicabilis et grammaticis inter ipsos et philosophis pugna est quae sint genera, quae species, 
qui numerus, quis cuique subiiciatur. Quint. Inst. 8.6.1 (‘An endless battle has raged round this, both by the 
grammarians among themselves and by the philosophers, as to the genera, species, number and classification 
of tropes.’ Trans. Russell).  
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If poetry is a space that opens up in language, if through it words speak again 
and meaning becomes significant again, it is because there is between everyday 
language and rediscovered speech a shift of meaning, metaphor. Metaphor is no 
longer, from this point of view, a figure among others, but the figure, the trope 
of tropes.42 
Deguy, also cited by Genette, argues similarly in an article entitled ‘Pour une théorie de la 
figure généralisée’ that: 
metaphor and metonymy belong, beneath their secondary difference, to the 
same dimension – for which the term metaphoricity may generally serve.43 
What happens here, and in many other works on the topic, is a twofold confusion of 
categories and levels of discussion: one resulting from the (relatively modern) failure to 
distinguish between figure and trope, the other from the (relatively ancient) failure to 
distinguish different levels of structural analysis in non-ordinary language usage.  
 
Tropes and Figures 
Let us first consider the confusion between figure and trope, prevalent even in Genette’s 
own polemic on the decline of rhetoric.44  If poetic language as a whole can be understood 
in a formalist way as defamiliarised language, then this defamiliarising deviation from 
ordinary language usage can occur on various levels and in different ways. When coining the 
term and developing the concept of defamiliarisation, Shklovsky sketched the different 
areas in which this poetic activity can take place: 
In studying poetic speak [sic] in its phonetic and lexical structure as well as in its 
characteristic distribution of words and in the characteristic thought structures 
compounded from the words, we find everywhere the artistic trademark – that 
is, we find material obviously created to remove the automatism of perception; 
the author’s purpose is to create the vision which results from that 
deautomatised perception.45  
                                                        
42
 Sojcher 1969, 58; italics in the original. 
43
 Deguy 1969, 861. 
44
 Genette uses both terms indiscriminately in his discussion, sometimes calling metonymy a figure, sometimes 
a trope. Thus he writes, for instance, that ‘[t]o reduce every metonymy (and a fortiori every synecdoche) to a 
pure spatial relation is obviously to restrict the play of these figures to their physical or sensory aspect alone ’ 
(Genette 1972, 109-110; our italics) and then ‘By definition, every trope consists of a substitution of terms … 
[T]o say “sail” for “ship” [i.e. use a metonymy/synecdoche] is to make the sail the substitute, and therefore the 
equivalent of the ship.’ (Genette 1972, 120; our italics). For a discussion of the French ‘tradition’ of blurring the 
lines between tropes and figures (including Fontanier, Dumarsais and Genette), see Ricoeur 1975, 52-55. 
45
 Shklovsky 1917, 19; our italics. 
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From the beginning, ancient criticism was sensitive to this ‘artistic trademark’ of deviance 
from ordinary usage but also sought to establish systematically the different forms such 
deviation could take.46 The differentiation between tropes and figures is an important 
analytical achievement of the ancient critics and should not be discarded by casual and 
indiscriminate usage of ‘figurative’ and ‘tropical’, as is all too common among modern 
critics. The precise development of the distinction cannot indeed be traced for lack of 
surviving textual evidence.47 The distinction is not present in early theory but appears more 
or less clearly defined in the rhetorical writings of Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus;48 it 
then features as a critically discussed orthodoxy in Quintilian.49 It must be admitted that, in 
their choice of examples, the ancient critics themselves repeatedly blur the lines which they 
are themselves drawing.50 What their observations highlight, however, is the difference 
between what might be called the internal and the external generation of a semantic 
surplus achieved through stylised language usage. Cicero’s definitions of tropes and figures 
run as follows: 
Ornari orationem Graeci putant, si verborum immutationibus utantur, quos 
appellant τρόπους, et sententiarum orationisque formis, quae vocant σχήματα ... 
The Greeks consider that language is embellished if such changes of words are 
employed as they call tropes, and such figures of thought and language they call 
postures …51 
σχήματα enim quae vocant Graeci, ea maxime ornant oratorem eaque non tam 
in verbis pingendis habent pondus quam in illuminandis sententiis. 
For what the Greeks call postures or figures are the greatest ornaments of 
oratory. They are not so important in heightening the colour of words, as in 
throwing ideas into a stronger light.52 
                                                        
46
 The terms most frequently used in ancient criticism evincing this sensitivity are κύριος/κυρίως (e.g. Arist. 
Rhet. 1404b6, 1410b12; Arist. Poet. 1457b3; D.H. Comp. 21) and κυριολογία/κυριολεξία (e.g. Trypho Trop. 
728.5; Longin. De Subl. 28.1), all of which denote ordinary, standard language usage as the backdrop for the 
discussions of deviant usages at issue. 
47
 'We have only fragmentary knowledge of literary and rhetorical theory between Aristotle and authors of the 
first century B.C., a period including Theophrastus' On Style (περὶ λέξεως) and the development of the theories 
of styles, tropes, and figures, which we see in the works of Cicero and his contemporaries' (Innes 1995, 313-
314). The theory of tropes is likely to be a Hellenistic development; see Barwick 1957, 88-111 and Russell 1981, 
143-147. 
48
 See Schenkeveld 1964, 147. 
49
 See Quint. Inst. 9.1.1-18. 
50
 See e.g. Silk 1974, 218. 
51
 Cic. Brut. 69; trans. Hendrickson. 
52
 Cic. Brut. 141; trans. Hendrickson. Cf. also the similar definition in 275. 
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Formantur autem et verba et sententiae paene innumerabiliter, quod satis scio 
notum esse vobis; sed inter conformationem verborum et sententiarum hoc 
interest, quod verborum tollitur, si verba mutaris, sententiarum permanet, 
quibuscumque verbis uti velis. 
Now there are almost countless ways of shaping both words and thoughts into 
figures, as I am well aware that you know. But between the figures of speech 
and the figures of thought there is this difference, that a figure of speech 
disappears if you change the words, while a figure of thought remains no matter 
what words you choose to employ.53 
What are the crucial differences? Tropes are based on some sort of ‘change’ that affects 
individual words (verborum immutationibus) while figures, subdivided into figures of 
thought (sententiarum … formis, in Greek σχήματα τῆς διανοίας) and figures of speech 
(orationis formis, in Greek σχήματα τῆς λέξεως), are all about the conformation of a given 
idea. Figures of thought do this in a way that concerns the meaning of a larger unit, a 
sentence or comparable sequence, without being dependent on individual words in their 
linguistic materiality; they are abstract, intellectual structures.54 Figures of speech, on the 
other hand, depend entirely on the precise word used, since the conformation is achieved 
by exploiting verbal properties (phonetic, syntactic, etymological, and so on).55 Tropes differ 
from both of them. Quintilian defines tropes as verbi vel sermonis a propria significatione in 
aliam cum virtute mutatio (‘a shift of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another, 
in a way that has positive value’)56 and counter-distinguishes them specifically from the 
figures: 
Est igitur tropos sermo a naturali et principali significatione tralatus ad aliam 
ornandae orationis gratia, vel, ut plerique grammatici finiunt, dictio ab eo loco in 
quo propria est tralata in eum in quo propria non est: ‘figura’, sicut nomine ipso 
patet, conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se 
offerente ratione. 
 
                                                        
53
 Cic. De Or. 3.200; trans. May/Wisse.  
54
 Cf. Auct. ad. Her. 4.18: Sententiarum exornatio est quae non in verbis, sed in ipsis rebus quandam habet 
dignitatem. (‘A figure of thought derives a certain distinction from the idea, not from the words.’ Trans. 
Caplan; or rather: ‘Embellishment of ideas is that kind of embellishment which involves a certain distinction 
not in the words used but in the content itself’).  
55
 Cf. Auct. ad. Her. 4.18: Verborum exornatio est quae ipsius sermonis insignita continetur perpolitione. (‘It is a 
figure of diction if the adornment is comprised of the fine polish of the language itself.’ Trans. Caplan). Note 
that neither this passage nor the one quoted in the note above has the technical term figura (‘figure’) in the 
Latin original, which instead speaks of exornatio (‘embellishment’) of either sententiae (‘ideas’) or verba 
(‘words’); however, this terminological issue does not affect the principle which lies behind the distinction and 
is what matters for our argument here. 
56
 Quint. Inst. 8.6.1; trans. Russell.  
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The name of trope is applied to the transference of expressions from their 
natural and principal signification to another, with a view to the embellishment 
of style or, as the majority of grammarians define it, the transference of words 
and phrases from the place which is strictly theirs to another to which they do 
not properly belong. A figure, on the other hand, as is clear from the name itself, 
is the term employed when we give our language a conformation other than the 
obvious and ordinary.57  
Quintilian thus also indicates that the key characteristic of tropes lies in a shift or change in 
the meaning of words resulting from their usage outside their normal context, which 
precludes an interpretation according to their standard usage (dictio ab eo loco … in eum in 
quo propria non est). Figures, on the other hand, characteristically transform the mode of 
expression; the given expression differs from ordinary forms of unstructured or unstylised 
usage but does not affect the meaning of the words it contains.58 Quintilian makes it clear 
that, unlike tropes, figures are not a subversion of the normal semantic economy of 
language but rather assume the natural properties of words: 
ita loquimur tamquam omnis sermo habeat figuram. Itemque eadem figura 
dicitur ‘cursitare’ qua ‘lectitare’, id est eadem ratione declinari. Quare illo 
intellectu priore et communi nihil non figuratum est. 
we speak as if every kind of language possessed a figure: for example ‘cursitare’ 
‘lectitare’ are said to have the same figure, that is to say, they are identical in 
formation. Therefore in the first and common sense of the word everything is 
expressed by figures.59 
It is the exploitation of the natural, unchanged properties of words and their meanings that 
constitutes figurative language in the narrow sense:  
Sed si habitus quidam et quasi gestus sic appellandi sunt, id demum hoc loco 
accipi schema oportebit quod sit a simplici atque in promptu posito dicendi modo 
poetice vel oratorie mutatum. 
If, on the other hand, the name is to be applied to certain attitudes, or I might 
say gestures of language, we must interpret schema in the sense of that which is 
poetically or rhetorically altered from the simple and obvious method of 
expression.60 
                                                        
57
 Quint. Inst. 9.1.4; trans. Russell.  
58
 Cf. Quint. Inst. 9.1.7: nam et propriis verbis et ordine conlocatis figura fieri potest. (‘For a figure does not 
necessarily involve any alteration either of the order or the strict sense of words.’ Trans. Russell). 
59
 Quint. Inst. 9.1.12; trans. Russell. However, to go so far as to conclude from the valuable insight that figures 
are, as opposed to tropes, operative on the basis of the properties of ordinary language that all language is 
figurative is not only a logical fallacy but one which renders the entire category of figurality useless for 
criticism. 
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 Quint. Inst. 9.1.13; trans. Russell.  
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On the basis of these ancient attempts to come to terms with the two main modes of poetic 
language, ‘tropes’ and ‘figures’ might be provisionally defined as follows:  
 
Figures prominently deploy a given word or group of words while assuming their current 
meaning, whereas tropes redefine their meaning, since they entail a ‘turn’ away from their 
meaning in ordinary usage to an unforeseen, new meaning that must be inferred to render 
the sequence comprehensible.61 While both of these two modes of poetic usage tend 
towards defamiliarisation through deviance from ordinary language usage, the semantic 
surplus of figures is external to the meaning of the words in question; it is generated by 
exploiting, and thereby rendering visible, their given properties (phonetic structure, 
syntactic position, and so on) in correspondence with their context and in amplification of 
the ordinary meaning of these words. The semantic surplus of tropes, on the other hand, is 
internal; it affects the meaning of the words, and is generated by using words in a way and 
context that invests the ordinary word with a new, extraordinary meaning without which no 
sense can be made of the sequence.62 
 
Maintaining such a distinction between figure and trope is a necessary first step, whereby 
we avoid the recent tendency, rightly criticised by Genette, to reduce every phenomenon of 
poetic language to metaphor. Even if the ancient critics who first introduced this 
differentiation are deficient in terms of coherence of definitions or consistency of examples, 
the field of poetic language is far too complex to justify its abandonment. Its importance for 
the present enquiry is fundamental, and it requires us to reject the absolutism of 
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 For this eponymous ‘turn’ cf. Trypho’s observation that tropes are not just any manner (τρόπος) of speaking 
that differs from the daily usage of language but one that is marked by a characteristic turn (τροπή): τρόπος δέ 
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that involves a turning away from the ordinary’). The notion of this turn as a deviance from ordinary usage has 
remained the essential defining feature of tropicality: ‘A trope is deviant usage – that is, a known word or 
phrase used, in context, deviantly from any normal usage of that word or phrase.’ Silk 2003, 122. 
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casting metaphor as a phenomenon sui generis: ‘Tropes on the other hand are superficial and artificial 
manipulations of uninspired words and have little imaginative or emotional force. Tropes are arbitrary devices 
of style: metaphors are necessities of expression. True metaphors are essentially of one indivisible order – the 
order of strokes of genius. They cannot be categorized like tropes; they can hardly even be analysed like tropes 
for the manifestations of genius are inscrutable.’ Stanford 1936, 21. The neo-Romantic prejudice that pervades 
Stanford’s discussion of metaphor is as unmistakable as its unhelpfulness for any attempt at illuminating 
phenomena of poetic language for the purpose of practical criticism. 
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statements such as Sojcher’s ‘Metaphor is no longer a figure among others, but the figure, 
the trope of tropes’63 or Deguy’s efforts to establish a ‘théorie de la figure généralisée’64 
(‘generalised theory of the figure’) which would include the tropes metaphor and 
metonymy. In particular, it is inconceivable that metaphor could be both the figure of 
figures and trope of tropes. Such a status can be granted to metaphor only if it is perversely 
understood as encompassing every imaginable deviance from ordinary language usage.65  
 
The classification of metaphor and metonymy as tropes and an awareness of their 
characteristic features and their difference in kind from figures – all this is a necessary 
prerequisite for any more specific theorising. However, the basic distinction between 
ordinary and deviant usage, and the consequential subdivision of poetic language into 
figurative and tropical usage, are only the first steps in mapping the field. While the order of 
the figural space – that is, the further differentiation of various individual forms of figurative 
usage into figures of speech and figures of thought – has at least been sketched by the 
ancient critics,66 the structural organisation of the different forms of tropical usage is still 
largely unclear and seldom addressed. This continuing obscurity of the tropical space has 
seriously handicapped attempts to understand metaphor, metonymy and their relationships 
with all other tropes, from Aristotle up to the present.  
 
Tropicality, the Tropical Space and the Tropes 
Given, now, the elementary distinction between ordinary and deviant/poetic usage and the 
structural differentiation between figurative and tropical language, we need to distinguish 
further the different levels on which the structural analysis of tropical usage takes place. It is 
precisely the recurrent failure to do so which has not only led to the inexplicabilis pugna 
that Quintilian deplored but ultimately also to the current unproductive co-existence of the 
incompatible views of metaphor monism criticised by Genette and the metaphor-metonymy 
binarism of Jakobson. The three levels that need to be distinguished are: 
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 Sojcher 1969, 58; italics in the original. 
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 Deguy 1969. 
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 Which seems to be what Sojcher effectively does when he equates the entire space of poetic language 
opened up by deviance from ordinary language usage with metaphor; see Sojcher 1969, 58. 
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 For further elucidation of the difference between figures of speech and thought see e.g. Quint. Inst. 9.1.15-
18 and 9.2-3. 
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(1) The level of tropicality 
What is under discussion here is the question of what makes a trope a trope: that is, what 
qualities and characteristics define the general nature of the tropical space as such and all 
of its constituent tropes.  
 
(2) The level of the tropical space 
Here the question of the order and structure of the tropical space is addressed. The various 
phenomena of poetic usage that differ structurally from figurative language, and that are to 
be identified as tropes, can stand in various possible relations to each other; they can all be 
thought of as independent and distinct tropical phenomena, or they can be seen as 
revealing cognate traits which bring them into some sort of hierarchy according to their 
structural relatedness.  
 
(3) The level of tropes 
Finally, metaphor and metonymy and all the other tropes can, and should, be discussed in 
their own right as distinct, specific, individual tropes. 
 
Awareness of these three distinct levels of theorising about tropes makes it obvious that 
when Deguy suggests that  
metaphor and metonymy belong, beneath their secondary difference, to the 
same dimension – for which the term metaphoricity may generally serve67 
he is using the partial and privileging term ‘metaphoricity’ to describe a characteristic of a 
higher order, one that is common to both metaphor and metonymy. The ‘same dimension’ 
to which both individual tropes belong is the tropical space (second level), whereas what 
metaphor and metonymy have in common ‘beneath their secondary difference’ on that 
tropical space is therefore their ‘tropicality’ (first level). From the false equation of 
‘tropicality’ and ‘metaphoricity,’68 a confused argument is constructed: the order of the 
tropical space (second level) is that of a pyramid, with metaphor (third level) as the purest 
embodiment of the structural principle (second level) that underlies all other tropes (first 
level).  
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 Deguy’s case is representative for most theorists who hold a metaphor monist view based on ‘the idea of 
the essential metaphoricity of poetic language’ (Genette 1972, 118). 
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The originator of this confusion is Aristotle in his discussion of metaphor in the Poetics. In 
his initial classification of eight categories of words, Aristotle gives the impression that 
μεταφορά here comprises more than metaphor as one particular trope.69 This is confirmed 
later, in the much-discussed passages on the four different kinds of metaphor,70 where he 
defines metaphor as ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορά (‘the transference of a term from one 
thing to another’),71 a definition so broad that it covers all phenomena of the tropical space 
and thus defines tropicality (first level) rather than metaphoricity (third level). More 
specifically, under μεταφορά Aristotle subsumes examples of metaphor in its narrow sense 
as one particular trope alongside instances of other tropical phenomena that later ancient 
criticism would classify as hyperbole and metonymy;72 to this extent, he seems to imply 
indeed a notion of metaphor as the ‘master trope’ that structures the entire tropical space 
(second level). Famously, however, he identifies (and commends) metaphor’s logical basis in 
resemblance, which in the philosopher’s eyes makes it a token of genius;73 and this 
characterisation is too specific to subsume any other trope but metaphor in the narrow 
sense (third level). Aristotle’s treatment of metaphor in the Rhetoric is also geared to 
explicating metaphor as a particular trope.74 What follows from all of this is that Aristotle’s 
praise of metaphor, largely based on the philosopher’s admiration of its logic, elevated it 
right from the start to a predominant position in any discussion of tropical language, while 
his own confusing use of the same term, μεταφορά, for different phenomena on different 
levels has bedevilled the study of tropes and the tropical space throughout the centuries. 
 
Mapping the Tropical Space 
The discussion above has shown that Genette’s analysis of the development of tropology 
needs to be amended in the sense that the ruling tendency is not, in fact, linear reduction 
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 See Arist. Poet. 21, 1457b1-3; this categorisation is in itself problematic since it equates modes of usage 
(ordinary, κύριον, and metaphorical, μεταφορά) with status in usage (marginal, γλῶττα, and ornamental, 
κόσμος) and formal status (made-up, πεποιημένον, lengthened, ἐπεκτεταμένον, shortened, ὑφῃρημένον, and 
adjusted, ἐξηλλαγμένον). 
70
 See Arist. Poet. 21, 1457b7-32. 
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 Arist. Poet. 21, 1457b7; trans. Halliwell. 
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ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν. Arist. Poet. 1459a5-8 (‘by far the most important point 
is facility with metaphor. This alone is a sign of natural ability, and something one can never learn from 
another: for the successful use of metaphor entails the perception of similarities.’; trans. Halliwell). 
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 See Arist. Rhet. 1405a8-10 and 1410b17-20. 
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but rather a circular movement of inflation and deflation in conceptualising the tropical 
space: a movement from Aristotle, who discussed tropes and tropicality under the 
generalised notion of metaphor, to the diversification of the tropical space by the rhetorical 
tradition, to modern attempts to reduce the multitude of tropes by subsuming them under 
an ever decreasing set of ‘master tropes’, to the eventual metaphor monism in which 
tropicality, the tropical space and the individual tropes are again, as in Aristotle, ultimately 
all metaphorical. After two millennia, one might say, tropologists are back to where they 
started. Levin summarises the contemporary situation as follows: 
This problem of definition and hence of scope is one that has troubled and 
embarrassed theorists and rhetoricians for over two millennia and is perhaps 
inescapable given the number and complexity of possible figurative relations. 
Playing major contributory roles in this complexity are the figures [sic] of 
metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche. Although the relations subsisting among 
them are not entirely clear, it is generally agreed that they cluster at the center 
of the figural space. That they are central needs no urging. That they are 
proximately related is evidenced by attempts that have been made to effect 
reductions among them.  … Finally, how shifting and open to arbitrary definition 
are the boundaries between the various major tropes [sic] is amply attested in 
the essay of Genette.75 
While the systematic study of tropes is undoubtedly one of the most intricate areas of 
literary theory, it seems defeatist to capitulate in the face of problems of definition and 
scope. As we have argued, establishing and maintaining a clear distinction between 
figurative and tropical language (pace Levin) is needed to promote a better understanding 
of poetic language in general. Likewise, if we are to resolve this age-old inexplicabilis pugna, 
it is essential to move beyond arbitrary re-definitions and the speculative shifting of 
boundaries and begin a systematic analysis of the order and structure of the tropical space. 
 
The main obstacle here is the fact that scrutiny of individual tropes has always focused 
almost exclusively on metaphor, leaving metonymy (and indeed all other tropes) largely as 
metaphor’s counter-distinct but under-determined and ill-defined Other, and thereby 
making metaphor the seemingly obvious yet ultimately arbitrary paradigm for all attempts 
to theorise tropical language as a whole. What is required above all is a mapping of the 
tropical space on the basis of the general criteria of tropicality that establish this space 
along with a comparative assessment of the individual tropes that fill this space. Our 
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discussion of the difference between tropes and figures has pointed to the framing criterion 
of tropicality as the neutral foundation for all subsequent theorising on individual tropes. 
The question now is: how far can we identify similarities and differences between the 
individual tropes that exceed their common trait as non-ordinary usage involving a re-
semanticisation of a word’s conventional meaning? It is only through an empirically 
supported, structural comparison of different tropes that we can shed light on the relations 
subsisting among them. The case studies of metonymic occurrences in this thesis will 
provide empirical evidence for just such a contrastive comparison, and will, in particular, be 
offered as a definitive point of reference for a worked-out theory of metonymy, which is 
itself, in turn, a prerequisite for a proper assessment of the relationship between metaphor, 
metonymy and the other tropes.  
 
At this stage of the enquiry, however, the first need is to establish a directional notion of 
metonymy and to formulate a set of operational criteria and preliminary questions to guide 
our specific analyses. In this connection, further theoretical reflection is in order before we 
let the tropes speak for themselves. 
 
As suggested earlier, the order of the tropical space can be conceptualised in different ways 
according to the various possible relations in which the individual tropes can stand to each 
other: they might be distinct and independent tropical phenomena; alternatively, they 
might reveal cognate traits which bring them into some sort of hierarchy based on a 
structural relatedness. This hierarchy itself might prove to be either multipolar, bipolar or 
monistic. It follows that an adequate theory of metonymy will show whether metonymy is 
indeed a subordinate trope to metaphor: that is, whether metonymy is ultimately to be 
seen as structurally similar to but more limited and less effectual than metaphor while still 
being describable with the same terms and concepts that are used to characterise 
metaphor.76 Alternatively, metonymy will be shown to function in an essentially different 
way, which requires a different descriptive and analytical framework; should this be the 
case, the corollary will be that metonymy has to be understood either as metaphor’s bipolar 
counter-trope or else (simply) as one distinct trope amongst others. On this second 
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scenario, the question whether the tropical space is bipolar or multipolar can then be 
answered by a further determination: do the remaining tropes show a structural affinity 
that would allow us to subsume them to either metonymy or metaphor? 
 
It follows, again, that we can properly make use of analytical tools and frameworks already 
developed by theorists of metaphor as provisional guides for theorising metonymy. The 
seeming applicability of theory developed for the study of metaphor would imply structural 
similarities between the two tropes, whereas inapplicability would serve to characterise 
metonymy ex negativo and thereby highlight relevant starting points for further 
investigations into the specific idiosyncrasies of metonymy. The following survey of 
developments in the study of metaphor should thus yield a preliminary set of markers for 
the analysis of metonymic occurrences in our corpus. 
 
Developments in Theory of Metaphor  
From Aristotle’s definition of metaphor (and tropical language in general) as ὀνόματος 
ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορά (‘the transference of a term from one thing to another’) onwards,77 
metaphor and indeed all tropes have essentially been conceived of as linguistic 
substitutions. On this view, metaphorical and all tropical language is seen as a secondary 
order to the general linguistic system of signs which repeats the relationship between res 
and verbum (aliquid stat pro aliquo; ‘something stands for something’); in Quintilian’s 
words: in tropis ponuntur verba alia pro aliis, ut in μεταφορᾷ, μετονυμίᾳ … (‘With tropes, 
one word is substituted for another as, for example, with metaphor, metonymy …’).78 The 
concept of metaphor as a more or less mechanical replacement of one word by another on 
the basis of their similarity or an underlying analogy was first decisively challenged by 
Richards’s introduction of ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ as analytical tools to identify the components 
that constitute metaphor. Richards defines the tenor as (referring to) the underlying idea 
and principal subject in a metaphorical compound, that which is at issue, while the vehicle 
denotes the element which is related by similarity or analogy to whatever is at issue but is in 
itself extraneous to the subject.79 It is the development of these terms that enabled 
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Richards to characterise the implicit bipartite structure of metaphor beyond simply calling 
metaphor an elliptical simile80 and allowed him to make a key observation, namely that: 
in many of the most important uses of metaphor, the co-presence of the vehicle 
and tenor results in a meaning (to be clearly distinguished from the tenor) which 
is not attainable without their interaction. That the vehicle is not normally a 
mere embellishment of a tenor which is otherwise unchanged but that the 
vehicle and tenor in co-operation give a meaning of more varied powers than 
can be ascribed to either.81 
Richards’s theory led to a paradigmatic shift from the age-old substitutional view of 
metaphor to a new interactional view, which has since become predominant in 
understanding metaphor’s mechanisms and dynamics.  
 
On the basis of Richards’s model, albeit in his own terminology of ‘frame’ (Richards’s ‘tenor’) 
and ‘focus’ (Richards’s ‘vehicle’), Black sought to further illuminate the nature of the 
‘interplay between focus and frame.’82 Richards had rejected the assumption of a mere 
substitution and, with it, the necessary implication of a one-to-one equivalence of the two 
elements involved, stressing instead the irreducible newness of the meaning emerging from 
the interaction of the two. Black goes further and argues that, as far as this new meaning 
brought forth by interaction is concerned, it is often closer to the truth ‘to say that the 
metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently 
existing.’83 Black postulates that every word is part of a ‘system of ideas’84 and that 
metaphor exploits patterns of implications which make it possible 
that the principal subject is ‘seen through’ the metaphorical expression – or, if 
we prefer, that the principal subject is ‘projected upon’ the field of the 
subsidiary subject.85  
However, seeing the principal subject (tenor) through the lens of the subsidiary subject 
(vehicle) automatically re-organises the system of ideas of both subjects: ‘If to call a man a 
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wolf is to put him in a special light, we must not forget that the metaphor makes the wolf 
seem more human than he otherwise would.’86 The relationship between tenor and vehicle, 
in short, is one of real and mutual interaction in which both are equally affected. In Black’s 
view ‘metaphor selects, emphasises, suppresses, and organises features of the principal 
subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject.’87  
 
This last statement makes clear that Black’s view of interaction in metaphor is essentially 
conceptual and is concerned with the reactions and modifications between the conceptual 
content of the two constitutive elements. It is Brooke-Rose’s merit to have drawn attention 
to hitherto disregarded philological aspects of the study of metaphor by emphasising that 
‘metaphor is expressed in words, and a metaphoric word reacts on other words to which it 
is syntactically and grammatically related.’88 Through a systematic evaluation of a 
representative corpus of English poetry, Brooke-Rose develops a plethora of categories that 
describe the various formal configurations in which the interaction between tenor and 
vehicle can occur and illustrates how it is different grammatical and syntactical operations 
that establish the link between both elements and thereby structurally shape their 
interaction. In so doing, she disproves Black’s claim that ‘“metaphor” must be classified as a 
term belonging to “semantics” and not to “syntax” – or to any physical inquiry about 
language’89 and shows that metaphor in fact occupies a space between syntax and 
‘semantics’. 
 
A concern to move away from a conceptual discussion, with its focus on conceptual content, 
towards a verbal orientation focusing on words and their micro-context also characterises 
Silk’s formulation of interaction as a critical concept.90 His assessment of examples from 
Greek and English poetry adds to Brooke-Rose’s observations on the importance of 
grammatical and syntactical linkages but, more importantly, shifts the focus to terminology 
as the key area of interaction. While grammar clearly facilitates the linkages that effect the 
interaction of tenor and vehicle, Silk stresses that it is the interruption of an otherwise 
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terminologically coherent sequence by terminologically extraneous material that is essential 
to the phenomenon of metaphor.91 As opposed to Black’s conceptual notion of the vehicle 
as a different, subsidiary ‘system of ideas’ through which the principal subject is seen, here 
the vehicle is understood as a word or sequence of words that is terminologically 
incongruous with the terminology used in ordinary language for the subject at issue, and 
which therefore stands out in the micro-context of the metaphor in question. Metaphors 
involve a ‘terminological barrier ... between tenor and vehicle.’92 Silk’s terminological 
interaction theory allows him to integrate the primary criterion of metaphor as a literary 
trope, namely its deviance from ordinary language usage, with its much-discussed logical 
basis: 
In metaphor, the deviant item or sequence (the vehicle) is distinct from the non-
deviant sequence in its vicinity (the tenor) terminologically, and the relation 
between the two terminologies, in whole or part, is one of analogy, comparison 
or similarity. As an operational definition of metaphor, I suggest: a deviantly 
used word or sequence of words whose adequate explication (sc. explanation by 
paraphrase or expansion) into non-deviant usage involves overt analogy, 
comparison or simile).93 
 
While the study of metaphor has thus seen a fundamental change in the paradigm that 
traditionally governed its conceptualisation, namely the replacement of the substitutionalist 
view by the interaction theory, in the general perception of metonymy, faute de mieux, the 
outdated substitution theory still widely prevails. In order to capitalise on the theoretical 
advances in the study of metaphor for the development of a theory of metonymy and also 
to elucidate the relationship between metaphor and metonymy by assessing the 
transferability and applicability of these theoretical tools and concepts, a series of questions 
will be kept in mind when we consider metonymic occurrences from the text corpus. How 
can metonymic deviance from ordinary language usage be characterised? Do metonyms 
display an implicit bipartite structure like metaphor? Can the terms ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ be 
used to analyse the structure and mechanisms of metonyms? Do the different components 
at play in metonymy, if there is indeed a plurality of components, interact? If so, do they 
interact in a way similar to that observed in metaphor? On which level or levels does any 
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such interaction take place? How and by what means would the components then be linked 
and brought into interaction? Are there patterns of grammatical linkages to be observed 
that are comparable to the categories elaborated by Brooke-Rose?94 What is the logical 
relation between the constituent components (if indeed there are two or more 
components) of a metonym?  
 
‘Contiguity’ and its (Dis)contents: Characterising Metonymy 
So far no attempt has been made to quote or provide any definition of metonymy, which is, 
after all, the principal object of this study. This is not an oversight. It is important to adopt a 
largely inductive approach as a safeguard against developing a theory of metonymy on the 
basis of unchallenged, traditional preconceptions. But as the present enquiry is now about 
to move from establishing a theoretical framework to contextual analysis, and thus to move 
from speaking about metonymy essentially ex negativo (in its potential opposition to 
metaphor) to the concrete analysis of actual metonyms in literary texts, the time has come 
to introduce (and problematise) positive characterisations of metonymy from the rhetorical 
tradition and modern scholarship. However inductive our approach, we do need at least a 
provisional notion of metonymy in order to identify examples in the text corpus. 
 
Although discussion of examples which one might consider to be prima facie metonyms 
regularly occurs under various headings in ancient criticism,95 metonymy is only rarely 
discussed explicitly in its own right by the ancients. As noted earlier, Aristotle does not 
distinguish clearly between ‘tropical’ and ‘metaphorical’, and while some of his remarks are 
obviously directed at metaphor as a particular trope he never focuses on metonymy. 
Trypho, who writes in the first century BC, is the first to use μετωνυμία in extant Greek 
literature, but he clearly uses it as an already established term.96 Trypho’s discussion of 
metonymy begins with the words μετωνυμία ἐστὶ λέξις ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμωνύμου τὸ συνώνυμον 
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δηλοῦσα (‘metonymy is an expression that explains a synonym by a homonym’).97 This 
‘definition’ is barely worth the name: given the indeterminate nature of all the three key 
terms used, it is hardly more than a serial tautology of the substitution view and says 
nothing more than that metonymy is somehow conceived of as being based on the 
replacement of one word by another to which it is effectively fully equivalent. If one had no 
preconception of metonymy and was given nothing but this definition it would be virtually 
impossible to identify concrete examples of metonymy; it is only the examples which follow 
Trypho’s definition that give a vague idea of what he is talking about. The same vagueness 
marks the majority of definitions provided by other Greek rhetoricians98 as also, for 
instance, Quintilian’s description: metonymia, quae est nominis pro nomine positio 
(‘metonymy, which is the substitution of one name for another’).99 By way of modest 
qualification, Quintilian goes on to offer examples of metonymic expression which are, 
rather superficially, classified as either widely used (vulgo audimus) or as adjusting the level 
of expression by rendering it more learned (eruditus est sermo) or more socially acceptable 
(magis decet).100  
 
What remains obscure in all these attempted definitions is the nature of this alleged 
substitution and in particular the relationship between the elements involved in it. What 
appears to be assumed is an equivalence of the substitute and the substituted that 
effectively amounts to synonymy. The assumption invites at once objections: why should 
such a device of poetic diction be noticed by the reader? and indeed why should it be used 
by the poet in the first place? Cicero’s treatment of metonymy in De Oratore illustrates the 
point. Cicero distinguishes metonymy from the creation of new words (neologism) and the 
transfer of old words (metaphor) and is then left to ‘define’ metonymy rather paradoxically 
as ornandi causa proprium proprio commutatum (‘for the sake of imparting distinction, one 
proper word is substituted for another’).101 But, how would anyone notice that one proper 
term has been exchanged for another? How would this differ from the choices in vocabulary 
that lie behind ordinary non-tropical utterance? The confusion follows inevitably from the 
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co-existence of mutually exclusive conceptualisations of metonymy: as a substitution, with 
the implicit claim of synonymity, and at the same time as a trope, with the implicit claim of 
non-ordinary, deviant, and therefore, perceptibly im-proper usage – non ut dictum est in eo 
genere intellegitur, sed ut sensum est (‘a word is understood not as said, but as 
supposed’),102 as Cicero himself goes on to remark. 
 
Cicero gets closer to tackling this issue in his Orator where he distinguishes metaphor 
(tralatio) and metonymy (immutatio) by describing the former in the Aristotelian manner as 
a transfer by resemblance from one thing to another and the latter as a substitution in 
which the proper word is replaced by another word, which has the same meaning (idem 
significet) but is ‘taken from a somewhat suitable sphere’ (sumptum ex re aliqua 
consequenti).103 The Auctor ad Herennium goes further in his definition: denominatio est 
quae ab rebus propinquis et finitimis trahit orationem qua possit intellegi res quae non suo 
vocabulo sit appellata (‘Metonymy is the figure [read: trope] which draws from an object 
closely akin or associated an expression suggesting the object meant, but not called by its 
own name’).104 Here at last an ancient theorist moves away from the assumption of 
synonymity and, after asserting the tropical trait of deviation from terminologically normal 
usage (non suo vocabulo), characterises the relationship between the terms deviantly used 
and the ones one would expect to be used in normal usage as a relationship of proximity 
(propinquis et finitimis).  
 
Consequens (‘corresponding’, ‘suitable’), propinquus (‘near’, ‘neighbouring’), finitimus 
(‘bordering’, ‘adjoining’): these key terms used by Roman rhetoricians to describe the 
relationship between the ‘substituting’ and the ‘substituted’ element in metonymy find 
their echo in the modern term used wherever definitions of metonymy are attempted: 
‘contiguity.’ This term, made particularly popular through the structuralist re-appropriation 
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of metonymy,105 also features prominently in what is arguably the most comprehensive 
attempt to date to define metonymy as a phenomenon of poetic language: 
Metonymy may be defined as a trope whose logical basis is one of association or 
contiguity. An operational definition might be: a word or sequence of words 
whose explication can be made to use all the tropical items untropically but 
without any similarity marker (‘like’, ‘as’ or whatever). If you are faced with a 
deviant usage wherein each word is literally possible in an expanded context in a 
sense approximating to that of its given use, you have metonymy.106  
This operational definition, by Silk, highlights metonymy’s tropical nature in characterising it 
as deviant usage, introduces a notion of discourse compression at play in this trope 
equivalent to the widespread understanding of metaphor as a compressed simile,107 and 
distinguishes metonymy from metaphor as not being logically based on analogy or 
similarity. It seems to be generally acknowledged that ‘contiguity’ is for metonymy what 
‘analogy’ is for metaphor; a comparison of Silk’s definition of metonymy with his definition 
of metaphor cited above also suggests this. Yet, while ‘analogy’ as a logical relation is a 
readily definable term, ‘contiguity’ seems almost as elusive a notion as metonymy itself. On 
reflection, it soon becomes obvious that ‘contiguity’ is nothing more than an umbrella term 
for the various notions floated by the Roman rhetoricians (consequens, propinquus, 
finitimus), albeit with the reassuring flavour of academic abstraction. So what is meant 
when the ‘logical basis’ is described as being one of ‘association or contiguity’? Is there any 
one logic of association? Genette rightly asks: ‘what kind of “contiguity” could be 
maintained by the heart and courage, the brain and intelligence, the bowels and mercy?’108 
 
It is striking that there has not yet been any sustained attempt to explain what exactly can 
be meant by ‘contiguity’. Philosophers speak of contiguity when referring to two events or 
objects that lie directly side by side in space and time without being connected by causality 
or any other principle.109 In psychology, association by contiguity refers to the principle that 
ideas, memories, and experiences are linked when one is frequently experienced with the 
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other.110 How can ‘contiguity’ then be defined in a literary-linguistic context? While 
philosophy and psychology are concerned with conceptual and actual entities, that is, 
thoughts, experiences, (perceptions of) things that may occur together in space and time 
and are thereby associated (spatial and temporal contiguity), contiguity in the field of 
language and literature can best be understood as lexical contiguity: thoughts, experiences, 
(perceptions of) things that occur together as words in language. On reflection, it seems 
clear that, as in philosophy and psychology, the link between whatever is in contiguity with 
something else can be nothing but that contiguity itself: this is a relation based solely on 
frequently experienced togetherness, without the necessary involvement of any logical 
principle as such. Ancient criticism tried to come to terms with this relation of contiguity by 
creating countless sub-classifications of various different causal-logical relationships 
between the two elements involved in the alleged metonymic ‘substitution’: place and 
inhabitant, individual and group, producer and product, container and contained, cause and 
effect, and so forth. Most of the classical authors who address the issue produce a more or 
less extensive list of this kind but the varying selection of categories chosen by each of them 
makes these lists seem both arbitrary and limitless – characteristics that usually imply the 
inadequacy of a classificatory system.111 The categories of the ancients and of the rhetorical 
handbook tradition remain on the superficial level of a purely content-based taxonomy and 
fail to formulate a structural principle which would adequately describe a verbal 
phenomenon such as metonymy.112 In literary and linguistic scholarship the closest one gets 
to such a word-oriented concept of contiguity is the theory of semantic fields. 
 
Lexical Contiguity: Metonymy and the Theory of Semantic Fields 
The concept of semantic fields was developed by German and Swiss scholars, within 
twentieth-century descriptive linguistics, as a way of coming to terms with the structuring of 
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vocabulary and the interrelations of its constituent elements. A semantic field is constituted 
by a set of words defined by semantic proximity and joint occurrence. Of the two pioneers 
in the development of this approach, Trier’s conception of the organisation of vocabulary is 
largely focused on the referential element of vocabulary organisation and hence is too 
conceptual to be of much help in developing an understanding of lexical contiguity.113 
Porzig,114 on the other hand, takes the observation that ‘lexemes vary enormously with 
respect to the freedom with which they can be combined in syntagms with other 
lexemes’115 as his starting point.116 With this more intralingual approach he develops 
theories of ‘encapsulation’ and ‘collocation’. Porzig observes that words have what he calls 
‘essential meaning-relations’ with other words. Lyons offers some straightforward 
examples:  
one could hardly hope to explain the meaning of the verb ‘bark’ without 
mentioning dogs or of ‘blond’ without mentioning hair. … The sense of ‘with the 
foot’ is encapsulated in the sense of ‘kick’, as the sense of ‘with teeth’ is 
encapsulated in the sense of ‘bite’.117 
While encapsulation represents the most intimate of essential meaning-relations between 
words (one cannot be explained without mentioning the other), collocation more openly 
defines the restrictions governing the legitimacy of the combination of two words (one can 
be explained without the other but they regularly occur together and implicitly contain 
aspects of one another). Firth specifies the phenomenon as follows: 
Meaning by collocation is an abstraction at the syntagmatic level and is not 
directly concerned with the conceptual or idea approach to the meaning of 
words. One of the meanings of night is its collocatability with dark, and of dark, 
of course, collocation with night.118 
Firth’s example makes the relevance of collocation in semantic-field theory to contiguity in 
the theory of metonymy obvious: the link of contiguity that holds together a potential 
metonym (say, ‘darkness’) and its virtual, inferred, non-tropical counterpart (say, ‘night’) is 
                                                        
113
 Despite his Humboldtian belief in the powers of language as structuring an a priori unstructured extra-
lingual ‘reality’; see Trier 1934, 429. 
114
 Porzig 1934. 
115
 Lyons 1977, 261. 
116
 This theory was initially known as ‘Wortfeldtheorie’ (‘lexical field theory’), suggesting a focus on words, 
which progressively became sidelined by a focus on ‘meaning’, as implied by the now conventional name 
‘semantic-field theory’. In our redefinition of ‘semantic fields’ below (see pp. 42-43 as well as 80-81), we return 
to the original conception. 
117
 Lyons 1977, 262. 
118
 Firth 1951, 196. 
42 
 
established not actually by any extralingual reality or logical principle but by their pragmatic 
lexical collocatability. What follows is that whatever is said, when something is expressed 
through a metonym, must always be contained and implicitly said in a hypothetical non-
tropical version because of the ‘essential meaning-relation’ between the two words or 
sequences of words in question: each one is encapsulated or at least contained in the 
semantics of the other one by virtue of their collocatability in ordinary language. If the term 
‘semantic field’ is not understood from an concept-centred point of view (‘all things to do 
with night’) but from a lexical point of view (‘all the words that could ordinarily be used in a 
meaningful way in some sort of collocation with the word “night”’), then a semantic field 
can be defined as the sum of all words that are collocatable with any one chosen term in 
ordinary usage. If, furthermore, the ‘contiguity’ that characterises metonymy has to be 
understood as lexical contiguity then one can reasonably expect that it must be a 
precondition for a term x to be a potential metonym of y that both belong to the same 
semantic field: that is, that they are collocatable in ordinary usage. Such collocatability of 
the terms involved is ultimately the condition on which Silk’s litmus test of expanding 
metonyms into literal expressions cited above is based:119 all the terms involved, both the 
actually present ones (‘what is said’) and the virtual, inferred ones (‘what is meant’) can 
potentially stand next to or near to each other in a coherent sentence without the need to 
introduce any explanatory conjunctions or logical markers to bind heterogeneous elements 
together. 
 
This clarification of contiguity as the principle that governs metonymy has two 
consequences. The first follows from a dilemma of semantic-field theory itself, which has 
been subjected to criticism over the criteria that define the borders of semantic fields. Lyons 
remarks:  
What is lacking so far, as most field-theorists would probably admit, is a more 
explicit formulation of the criteria which define a lexical field than has yet been 
provided.120  
Unnerving as this state of affairs may be, it seems as though this blurriness quite accurately 
describes the fluidity of actual language usage. The notion of metonymic contiguity as 
                                                        
119
 See above, p. 39. 
120
 Lyons 1977, 267. 
43 
 
developed above with reference to contiguity in philosophy and psychology makes this 
fluidity almost a corollary: if lexical contiguity is based on the frequent experience of 
togetherness, that is, on the regular joint occurrence of words, without the involvement of 
any causality or other logical principle, then ultimately the legitimacy of any word 
combination that constitutes collocatability is determined not by semantics but by 
pragmatics. In this sense we can reply to Genette’s question that the ‘contiguity’ between 
heart and courage, brain and intelligence, bowels and mercy, is ultimately maintained by 
the establishment of their frequent joint usage in general discourse which makes them form 
part of the same semantic field.121 Metonymy, as it emerges, is thus based, not on abstract 
logic, but on pragmatically determined association. No wonder it did not take Aristotle’s 
fancy. 
 
The second consequence concerns the question whether the theoretical framework of 
interaction theory as developed for the description and analysis of metaphor can also be 
used to describe and analyse metonymy. If metaphor involves a ‘terminological barrier ... 
between tenor and vehicle’,122 then one might press this line of thought further and suggest 
that metaphor is characterised by an interaction of heterogeneous terminologies, that is, of 
verbal sequences from disparate spheres that are related by analogy or similarity at certain 
points. The precondition of metaphor is thus a logical contact on the level of the signified 
while its various poetic effects stem partly from the lexical contact of the interacting 
signifiers and the evocative powers of the connotations and associations that come with 
them; in other words, from the interaction of their terminologies.123 If metonymy were to 
work in a way structurally similar to metaphor, then there should be a similar pattern 
observable there. However, if metonymy is based on contiguity as its defining characteristic, 
then the lexical proximity thereby implied means that contact on the level of the signifier is 
already a given. Metonymic contiguity itself, it would seem, thus precludes the very 
possibility of terminological interaction since both terms are by definition in a static 
relationship, defined by their terminological proximity. This obviously has consequences for 
status of poetic metonyms. If tropical speech is understood strictly as a deviation from 
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standard usage, and if metonymy is defined by contiguity within a semantic field, and if such 
contiguity is determined by the combinatory rules of standard usage, then paradoxically it 
might seem to follow that metonymy is a non-trope, or at least that its tropicality is 
seriously limited. Once again, as with the ancient substitution theories,124 metonymy 
appears to be hovering elusively between ordinary and deviant usage, between being and 
not quite being a trope. If to be or not to be is the question, then it is doubtless time to let 
the tropes speak for themselves in the light of the theoretical perspectives suggested so far, 
and to defer fuller theorising until some examples are before us. 
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2. Index Metonymy 
In order to develop a clearer understanding of the mechanisms at play in metonymy (and of 
the paradoxes associated with the conflicting notions of substitution and contiguity), let us 
examine a selection of metonyms, from the poetry of Pindar and Hölderlin, which resemble, 
more or less, the stock examples in the handbooks of the rhetorical tradition,125 before 
moving on from these to more complex instances. To begin with, consider εὐναί (‘beds’) in 
the following verses from Pindar’s Second and Ninth Pythian Ode:  
a) ἔμαθε δὲ σαφές. εὐμενέσσι γὰρ παρὰ Κρονίδαις 
γλυκὺν ἑλὼν βίοτον, μακρὸν οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ὄλβον, μαινομέναις φράσιν 
Ἥρας ὅτ’ ἐράσσατο, τὰν Διὸς εὐναὶ λάχον 
πολυγαθέες·  
 He [Ixion] learned this clearly, for having won a pleasant existence  
among Kronos’ beneficent children, he could not sustain his happiness for long, when 
in his maddened mind  
 he fell in love with Hera, who belonged to Zeus for joyous acts of love  
 [lit.: whom the joyous beds of Zeus had won]126 
b) εὐναὶ δὲ παράτροποι ἐς κακότατ’ ἀθρόαν 
 ἔβαλον. 
 Aberrant acts of love [lit.: beds mis-turned] cast one into the thick of trouble.127  
c) ὑπέδεκτο δ᾽ ἀργυρόπεζ᾽ Ἀφροδίτα 
 Δάλιον ξεῖνον θεοδμάτων 
 ὀχέων ἐφαπτομένα χερὶ κούφᾳ· 
 καί σφιν ἐπὶ γλυκεραῖς εὐναῖς ἐρατὰν βάλεν αἰδῶ, 
 ξυνὸν ἁρμόζοισα θεῷ τε γάμον μιχθέντα κούρᾳ θ᾽  Ὑψέος εὐρυβία· 
 Silver-footed Aphrodite welcomed  
 her Delian-born guest  
 as she laid a gentle hand on his divinely wrought chariot,  
 and shed loving reverence over their sweet acts of love  
 [lit.: and shed loving reverence over their sweet beds],  
joining together in a marriage of mutual consent the god and the daughter of mighty 
Hypseus.128 
d) … ‘κρυπταὶ κλαΐδες ἐντὶ σοφᾶς 
 Πειθοῦς ἱερᾶν φιλοτάτων, 
 Φοῖβε, καὶ ἔν τε θεοῖς τοῦτο κἀνθρώποις ὁμῶς 
 αἰδέοντ᾽, ἀμφανδὸν ἁδείας τυχεῖν τὸ πρῶτον εὐνᾶς.’ 
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... ‘Hidden are the keys to sacred lovemaking  
that belong to wise Persuasion,  
Phoebus, and both gods and humans alike  
shy from engaging openly for the first time in sweet love [lit.: in sweet bed].’129 
It is immediately clear that εὐναί in these verses does not mean ‘beds’ as the word would in 
ordinary usage. Gildersleeve comments accordingly: ‘eunai: pl. of the joys of love.’130 But 
what makes it so clear? There is obviously something that marks the word out as not being 
used here to convey its primary meaning, and indicates that its usage is non-ordinary. The 
reception process is somewhat slowed down when εὐναί makes its appearance; it obstructs 
smooth, linear progress and creates a hitch in the hermeneutic process of making sense of 
what is being heard or read – the trademark of a trope. 131 This felt obstruction occurs here 
when εὐναί is collocated with adjectives with which it is incongruous in any coherent, non-
tropical sequence. Literal ‘beds’ are neither ‘joyous’ (πολυγαθέες)132 nor ‘sweet’ (γλυκεραῖς, 
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and ἐριγηθής (Orph. L. Prooem 24; ‘very joyful’) are fairly straightforward in denoting the absence and degree 
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ἁδείας);133 one can hardly imagine any non-tropical sequence in which these words could 
jointly occur. Literal ‘beds’ might just be literally ‘mis-turned’ (παράτροποι) but the 
preceding context of Ixion’s attempt to rape Hera strongly suggests that it was not 
disarranged furniture (παράτροποι in a spatial sense) but illicit intercourse (παράτροποι in a 
moral sense) that brought him trouble. Similarly, in addition to the peculiar ‘sweetness’ of 
the beds on which Aphrodite sheds lovely reverence, the development of the scene into a 
marriage ritual in the next verse retrospectively situates the preceding verse in the wedding 
night – and Aphrodite’s blessing is clearly aimed at the act which creates the matrimonial 
bond, and not at the furniture on which it takes place. The same is true for the 
understanding of Cheiron’s advice on how ‘sweet beds’ are to be touched openly for the 
first time: the ‘sweetness’ signals a non-ordinary usage of the following ‘beds’ since they 
constitute an unexpected and non-ordinary collocation; the move towards a tropical 
meaning, which the listener (or reader) is likely to establish, is prompted not only by failing 
to find a meaning for ‘beds’ that makes sense together with ‘sweet’ but also by the context, 
in the shape of Apollo’s preceding question to Cheiron: 
 ‘ὁσία κλυτὰν χέρα οἱ προσενεγκεῖν 
 ἦρα καὶ ἐκ λεχέων κεῖραι μελιαδέα ποίαν;’ 
 ‘Is it right to lay my famous hand upon her  
 and indeed to reap the honey-sweet flower from the bed of love?’134 
Both explicitly and then metaphorically, Apollo’s question makes it unambiguously clear that 
he is not concerned with beautiful bedroom furnishings.  
 
What is gained by all this analysis? Quintilian, as we have seen, identified decorum as one of 
the functions of metonymy and it is easy to see from our examples how he came to this 
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opinion. But are we to think of metonymy just as a form of variatio that embellishes the text 
and keeps the poet out of trouble for being too explicit? Variatio and the effect of 
embellishment that follows from it is no doubt one of metonymy’s poetic functions. 
Sometimes, it can be, or can on the surface appear to be, the only one. Take the following 
lines from Hölderlin’s poem ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage’: 
 Jetzt aber tagt’s! Ich harrt und sah es kommen, 
 Und was ich sah, das Heilige sei mein Wort. 
Denn sie, sie selbst, die älter denn die Zeiten 
 Und über die Götter des Abends und Orients ist, 
 Die Natur ist jetzt mit Waffenklang erwacht... 
 But now it dawns! I waited longingly and saw it coming,  
 And what I saw, the numinous be my word.  
 For she, she herself, who is older than all times  
 And who is above the gods of the evening and orient,  
 Nature has now wakened with weaponry sound...135 
A superficial rhetorical analysis would focus on the inconsistency here. The ‘gods of the 
evening’ (Götter des Abends) and ‘gods of the orient’ (Götter des ... Orients) are obviously 
parallel – but not described in parallel. The analyst might then formulate the thought that 
there are different pantheons in Eastern and Western cultures, but that neither of them has 
a prominent set of deities responsible for various aspects of the evening that might be 
literally referred to as ‘gods of the evening’, and conclude that ‘evening’ stands here as a 
‘substitute’ for the actual opposite of orient, ‘occident’, which is not used. And why is it not 
used? In order to add some variatio to the line by avoiding the formulaic cliché of ‘orient 
and occident’ as equivalent for the whole of the globe. The outcome, then, would be a 
‘metonymic substitution’ with no change in meaning and little impact on the rest of the 
poem, just enough to be noticed.  
 
Yet what happens in the actual process of reception goes far beyond this. In the 
(micro)context of the line itself, in which the metonym ‘Abends’ (‘evening’) occurs, the 
metonymic and the literal elements, ‘evening’ and ‘orient,’ interact. A first obvious 
symptom is the occurrence of the slight hermeneutic hitch observed in the earlier discussion 
of εὐναί in Pindar: the listener will be familiar with the expression ‘gods of the orient’ but 
unfamiliar with the collocation ‘gods of the evening’ and in the reception process will seek 
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to make something of this counter-ordinary lexical collocation by semantically readjusting 
the meaning of ‘evening’; that is, the listener will understand it not literally but 
metonymically. The establishment of a metonymic meaning thus follows the criteria of 
collocatability with the microcontext (‘gods of’ + x) and semantic suitability with the wider 
context (something compatible with ‘gods of the orient’). Here, the process is fairly 
straightforward, which is why, at first, one might toy with the idea of a substitution taking 
place, but the discussion of more complex examples later on will show that this is not 
always the case. In the present instance, however, the listener, guided by the criteria of 
contextual suitability and collocation rules, will quickly move from the present term 
‘evening’ to the inferred term ‘occident’ as the hermeneutic process of reception continues.  
 
This resolution of the hermeneutic hitch, however, is not the end of the matter. The 
opening up of meaning, rather, leads to a further interaction on a different level: if the 
literal ‘evening’ is now evoking a parallel, inferred term, ‘occident’, then the literal ‘orient’ 
that follows also seems to imply a parallel inferred term, ‘morning,’ which bears significantly 
on the stanza as a whole. The stanza is dominated by two interlocking themes: sunrise and 
the supreme rule of nature. As the sun rises majestically to the zenith where it transcends 
everything that is, so does nature and its rule transcend any other ordering force in the 
world.  This theme of the supremacy of nature, first obscurely hinted at (‘das Heilige’, ‘the 
numinous’; l. 22) and then overtly established through the emphasis on nature’s sovereignty 
over time, gods and space in ll. 23-24, is connected with the event of dawn (‘Jetzt aber 
tagt’s!’) and interwoven with the theme of sunrise from the stanza’s dramatic opening 
onwards. Through the interaction of ‘evening’ (subsuming ‘occident’) with ‘orient’, ‘orient’, 
in turn, is implicitly made to subsume ‘morning’ – and thereby reveals its etymology as 
‘Morgenland’ (‘land of the morning’) and land of the rising sun (sol oriens): the juxtaposition 
with the deviantly used ‘evening’ creates a heightened awareness for a chain of connected 
(and metonymically interchangeable) elements in the semantic field (West-sunset-evening, 
East-sunrise-morning) and thus re-activates semantic properties (virtual properties) of the 
literally used ‘orient’ as the land of the rising sun. The metonymically reactivated etymology 
binds the line back to the theme of sunrise in the first line of the stanza and to nature’s 
awakening in the following line and thereby increases the stanza’s cohesion. Moreover, the 
deviant use of ‘evening’ also allows for another linkage, namely between the twofold 
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assertion of nature’s supremacy over time and space. The two orders do not just stand 
separately or self-contained next to each other in linear sequence, but are linked through 
‘Abend’ (‘evening’) in its initial perception as literally denoting a time of day and its 
subsequently established metonymic usage as implying the space of the western 
hemisphere. The metonym ‘Abend[-land]’ (‘evening’/’occident’) thus functions as a 
polyvalent semantic pivot, as a locus of multiple intratextual correlations and consonances 
between different parts of the stanza. The trope yields both cohesion and force, and is key 
in textually representing the conceit of the stanza: the sun-like rise of nature to its due 
supremacy.  
 
With this cohesive potential of metonymy in mind, let us revisit Pindar’s metonymic use of 
εὐναί. In the light of our analysis of Hölderlin’s stanza, the verse  
καί σφιν ἐπὶ γλυκεραῖς εὐναῖς ἐρατὰν βάλεν αἰδῶ 
and shed loving reverence over their sweet acts of love [lit.: their sweet beds]136 
emerges as another example of this pivotal function that metonyms can now be seen to 
exercise. The whole verse hovers between the concrete and the abstract, the physical bed 
as the place of sexual intercourse and the sexual morals and attitudes of the lovers. 
Aphrodite’s interaction with the lovers belongs to the abstract sphere: she adds αἰδώς (a 
moral feeling of respect and honour) to their love-making. This non-physical supplement, 
which qualifies their physical intercourse, is expressed by the very physical verb βαλλεῖν (‘to 
throw, to cast, to shed’). Since the goddess’s act of bestowing an abstract quality is 
expressed by analogy to the physical act of putting something on top of something else, the 
usage of βαλλεῖν here is metaphorical. This invests the sequence with two levels of meaning 
which are both active at the same time: a concrete level (something is thrown on a bed) and 
an abstract level (a moral feeling is added to the attitude of the lovers in their love-making). 
The metonymic implication of ‘beds’ (εὐναῖς) – love-making – is compatible with the 
abstract concept denoted by αἰδώς, whereas ‘beds’ in its primary sense accommodates and 
facilitates the metaphorical usage of βαλλεῖν (expressing here the bestowal of an abstract 
quality) by providing a material object on which something can be literally ‘thrown’. 
‘Throwing something onto beds’ (ἐπὶ … εὐναῖς … βάλεν) constitutes a coherent, non-tropical 
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collocation of words conforming to ordinary usage, onto which an abstract level of meaning 
is superimposed: the non-physical moral quality that is ascribed to the lovers’ attitude. 
Here, then, the polyvalence of metonymy, enabled by the co-presence of the present term’s 
properties and its virtual semantics, reconciles heterogeneous elements and enhances the 
semantic and aesthetic cohesion of the passage. 
 
This potential of polyvalence can also be exploited within the semantics of the metonym 
itself as the last verses of Pindar’s Sixth Pythian Ode show: 
 γλυκεῖα δὲ φρὴν 
 καὶ συμπότασιν ὁμιλεῖν 
 μελισσᾶν ἀμείβεται τρητὸν πόνον. 
And his sweet spirit,  
in company with his drinking companions,  
surpasses the perforated labor of bees.137 
A straight-forward substitutionalist reading, triggered not least by the abrasive tonal clash 
between μελισσᾶν (‘bees’) and τρητὸν (‘perforated’), would simply state that ‘perforated 
labour’ stands for ‘honeycomb.’ That in itself would be interesting enough, seeing that 
‘perforated labour’ appears to be a ‘Russian Doll’ type of metonym, a metonym of a 
metonym: first, action (πόνον, ‘labour’) for result (‘honeycomb’, as established through the 
contextual qualifications of sweetness (γλυκεῖα) and bees (μελισσᾶν) as well as the 
collocation with ‘perforated’ τρητὸν); then, container (‘honeycomb’) for contained 
(‘honey’), for it is, after all, not the honeycomb but the honey itself that is sweet. In 
addition, though, we have interaction between the metonym and its context that shapes 
the mini-scene sketched here. On the one hand, ‘sweet’ is used once again in its stock-
‘metaphorical’ sense of ‘delightful’, and the virtual term implied by the metonym, ‘honey’, 
forms part of an implicit comparison (flagged by ἀμείβεται) that brings together a literally 
sweet and a metaphorically sweet element. While the metonymically inferred term, ‘honey’, 
engages with the stock ‘metaphor’ ‘sweet’, thus reinforcing its literal dimension, the 
present, literal term of the metonym, ‘labour’, juxtaposes the socialising of the symposiasts 
and the activity of the bees: it contrasts the leisure of the symposiasts and the labour of the 
bees – their joyful gathering is obviously ‘sweeter’ than any work. We might be inclined to 
see the famous harmony of the beehive introduced into the comparison through the bees’ 
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labour, a harmony which via this juxtaposition would then reflect on the gathering of the 
symposiasts. In this reading, the shared spirit of harmony in the beehive and among the 
symposiasts would implicitly emerge as a secondary tertium comparationis between the two 
components alongside the primary notion of sweetness. The sweetness itself would thereby 
become, in turn, invested with overtones of an ideal of delightful harmony. However, the 
beehive as a social-political metaphor representing an orderly and harmonious society is 
fully developed only in Roman literature.138 Although bee terminology is also used in 
political contexts in Greek literature,139 similes and metaphors there tend to stress the 
opposition between hard-working bees and parasitic drones, who consume the labour of 
others, within the beehive.140 With this in mind, Pindar’s assertion of the superiority of the 
aristocratic victor’s social graces at the leisurely symposium over the labour of bees acquires 
entirely different overtones within the framework of the aristocratic value system of 
Pindar’s epinician poetry.141 None of these layers of further associations and connotations 
would have been created if the sequence had ended non-metonymically on ‘honey’ in its 
ordinary form. 
 
Occasionally, such polyvalence can even have narrative significance, as in another stanza of 
Hölderlin’s poem ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage’: 
 So fiel, wie Dichter sagen, da sichtbar sie 
 Den Gott zu sehen begehrte, sein Blitz auf Semeles Haus 
 Und die göttlichgetroffne gebar, 
 Die Frucht des Gewitters, den heiligen Bacchus. 
 Thus, as the poets say, his lightening fell  
 Onto Semele’s house, for she desired to see the god undisguised,  
 And the divinely-struck gave birth  
 To the fruit of the thunderstorm, the sacred Bacchus.142 
These lines renarrate the myth of Semele, a mortal lover of Zeus, who asked him to reveal 
himself to her in his true divine nature, with the fatal consequence of her immediate death 
when he granted her wish and revealed himself in the form of the lightning, though the god 
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was able to rescue his child, Dionysus (Bacchus), which she was carrying. The last line refers 
to Dionysus as the son of Zeus by calling him ‘fruit of the thunderstorm’ (‘die Frucht des 
Gewitters’).143 In the particular context of this myth, this is more than just a metonym of the 
remit-for-godhead type (‘thunderstorm’ for ‘Zeus’). The contiguity between Zeus and 
thunderstorm that lies behind this metonym encapsulates the whole myth in a nutshell: 
Dionysus is ‘literally’ the fruit of the thunderstorm, which is the very reason for his mortal 
mother’s death. Note that it is only thanks to this metonym that there is no need to explain 
that the unnamed god is Zeus and that the reason why he struck Semele’s house with his 
lightning is that he essentially is the lightning (this is not made clear in the preceding lines; it 
might as well have been a divine punishment for the hubris of making such a request). The 
trope, with its abrasive tonal clash between ‘Frucht’ (‘fruit’) and ‘Gewitter’ (‘thunderstorm’), 
functions as a mise en abîme of the mythological narrative. 
 
What follows from these first observations? In particular, can Richards’s concept of tenor 
and vehicle be used to describe and analyse metonyms? Throughout our analyses so far, we 
have observed that, as in metaphor, there are two elements at work in every metonym: the 
present term and a virtual, inferred term which the listener or reader is forced to establish 
as soon as a literal reading of the term in question is felt to be impossible in the given 
context. To an extent, this does indeed resemble Richards’s tenor (what is at issue) and 
vehicle (what is being said). There are, however, also considerable differences, most notably 
the absence of any interaction between tenor and vehicle. As predicted theoretically at the 
end of Chapter 1, textual evidence thus far confirms the assumption that the relationship 
between metonymic vehicle (the present term) and metonymic tenor (the virtual term 
inferred in the act of reception) is stable and pre-established. This relationship is neither 
introduced through the metonym nor negotiated in the metonym – both characteristics of 
metaphor. When Hölderlin in his poem ‘Buonaparte’ writes 
 Heilige Gefäße sind die Dichter, 
 Worin des Lebens Wein, der Geist 
 Der Helden sich aufbewahrt 
 Sacred vessels are the poets  
 In whom the wine of life, the spirit  
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 Of heroes, finds a container 144 
a whole set of new connections is introduced, each one determined by analogy or similarity 
and established by various grammatical and syntactic means: between ‘vessels’ and ‘poets’ 
(through equation by means of the copula), between ‘the wine of life’ and ‘the spirit of 
heroes’ (through equation by means of apposition), and between ‘wine,’ ‘life,’ and ‘the spirit 
of heroes’ (by means of genitive link and apposition: what wine is to an individual, the spirit 
of heroes is to life in general – a gift of nature, an intoxicating luxury). Nothing of this kind is 
observable in any of the metonymic occurrences examined above. What can be observed 
instead is that the relationship between metonymic tenor and metonymic vehicle is in fact 
pre-existing: no link needs to be created; on the contrary, the link is the given which the 
metonym is, precisely, exploiting. It is instructive to note that although no interaction is 
taking place between metonymic tenor and metonymic vehicle, there is often a significant 
interaction taking place between both of them jointly and the context in which the 
metonym is embedded. And, crucially, it is because of this polyvalence of metonymy, that 
metonymic replacement is far from being a mere substitution. However, the enhanced 
contextual cohesion that arises from associative interconnections in our examples does not 
categorically distinguish metonymy from metaphor. Metaphor can and often does function 
in a similar way, and this function should rather be characterised as a feature of tropical 
language in general: wherever language deviates from ordinary usage in a way that affects 
the semantics of a given word, it opens up a space between the present term in its literal 
meaning and a virtual term whose inference is enforced by the context and indispensable 
for the sequence to mean anything. The duplication of semantic agents (present and virtual) 
and, consequently, the multiplication of the trope’s potential for interactive contact with 
the context is observable in both metaphor and metonymy; the difference between the two 
tropes lies in the relationship between the present and the virtual terms, that is, within the 
relationship of tenor and vehicle. 
 
The metonyms discussed so far have all been of the same structure, with one noun 
seemingly ‘replacing’ another noun, analogous to Brooke-Rose’s category of metaphor by 
                                                        
144
 Hölderlin, ‘Buonaparte’, 1-3. 
55 
 
‘simple replacement.’145 This is arguably the most widespread type of metonymy and is 
presumably what led Quintilian to his definition of metonymy as a noun replacing another 
noun. We would insist that the term ‘replacement’ has to be used very carefully in this 
context to avoid any confusion with misleading notions of ‘substitution’. As has been 
demonstrated above, there is nothing like a poetic or semantic equivalence between the 
lexically present metonymic vehicle and the virtual metonymic tenor as inferred from the 
context, nor should one imagine the productive poetic process from which a metonym 
originates as one in which poets straightforwardly ‘replace’, ‘substitute’, what they ‘mean’ 
by another word for the sake of superficial embellishment. Creative writing is indeed, as 
Harding once noted, more plausibly seen as a process in which the poet, in his case the 
Great War poet Isaac Rosenberg, is ‘reworking phrases and images again and again, 
developing out of them meanings which were not “the” meaning he had originally wanted 
to “express” with them.’146 In poetic usage, it is fallacious to conceive of words as servants 
of ideas. ‘Replacement’, therefore, can only be a provisional term and it will be desirable to 
develop a more adequate understanding and find a more appropriate term to describe and 
categorise this type of metonym. Meanwhile, the observations and preliminary results of 
our analysis of the ‘replacement type metonym’ so far can be summarised as follows: 
 
‘Replacement metonyms’ consist of two elements: a present term (metonymic vehicle – 
MV) and a virtual, inferred term (metonymic tenor – MT), together with which the present 
term is rendered compatible with the context but which deviates from the MV’s semantic 
range in ordinary usage. ‘Replacement type metonyms’ are identifiable as such because the 
MV in its context constitutes an illegitimate collocation of words. Since the MV cannot be 
understood literally in the given context as a consequence of this breach of collocation 
rules, its semantics have to be readjusted ad hoc in a hermeneutic loop that leads from the 
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MV to the MT and allows the process of reception to continue. The reader’s (or listener’s) 
comprehension of the MV in the light of its MT is guided by the MV as the starting point, by 
the context as the framework, and by the microcontext as the immediate determinative. 
The relationship between the MV and the MT is one of lexical contiguity, that is, both terms 
can be and are collocated in ordinary usage; they belong to a shared semantic field. Because 
of this pre-established link of lexical contiguity between MV and MT, no interaction takes 
place between them nor is there any need to employ grammatical or syntactical links to 
bind them together. MV and MT can, however, interact individually with the context and 
thereby contribute to the cohesion of the surrounding text and to the multilayeredness of 
potential intratextual cross-reference. MV and MT, therefore, are not mere substitutes of 
one another but have different properties, connotations and associations, that can gain 
significance in the interplay between the context and the MV-MT compound. 
 
In this first set of examples, the hermeneutic distance between MV and MT has been 
relatively short and in every case the inferred, virtual MT can be formulated relatively easily. 
In Pindar’s εὐναὶ δὲ παράτροποι147 the MV εὐναὶ (beds) is immediately understood to 
‘mean’ acts of love-making in the given context. The relationship between the MV (beds) 
and the MT (acts of love-making) is fairly straightforward, involves no ambiguity and leads 
to no interaction with the context. This example surely represents the type of metonym 
Quintilian must have had in mind: it is a variatio for the sake of decorum, and the absence of 
any further poetic effect or function makes it understandable how metonymic occurrences 
such as this could lead to the erroneous generalisation that all metonyms are based on 
‘replacements’ with such straightforward equivalence that they could be seen in effect as 
substitutions. Examples like this, however, only prove that some of the most basic 
metonyms of the ‘replacement type’ come under the heading of variatio since their poetic 
function is a matter of elevating language without heightening it.  
 
A second set of examples of ‘replacement metonyms’ shows greater complexity. Consider 
first these verses from Pindar’s First Pythian Ode: 
 ... ἔσχον δ᾽ Ἀμύκλας ὄλβιοι 
 Πινδόθεν ὀρνύμενοι, λευκοπώλων  
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   γείτονες, ὧν κλέος ἄνθησεν αἰχμᾶς. 
 ... Blessed with prosperity, they came down  
 from Pindos and took Amyklai, to become much acclaimed  
neighbors of the Tyndaridai with white horses,  
and the fame of their spears flourished.  
[lit.: and the fame of the spear flourished]148 
The collocation κλέος αἰχμᾶς (‘fame of the spear’) is in itself aberrant and deviates from 
ordinary usage in so far as κλέος customarily refers to humans or their deeds and 
achievements, but not to things; it is always κλέος ἀνδρῶν with regards to something to be 
specified.149 Thus it is both the breach of ordinary collocation rules and the context, notably 
the capture of Amyklai reported in the preceding verse, that prevent the hearer from 
understanding ‘spear’ as a literal weapon and invite a metonymic understanding instead.150 
This may at first seem to be a straightforward case of metonymic ‘replacement’ again, the 
‘fame of the spear’ ‘replacing’ ‘fame earned by showing excellence in fighting with the 
spear’, but though αἰχμᾶς (‘of the spear’) is contextually marked as a metonymic vehicle, 
the initial specification of ‘spear’ is not definitive enough to determine one virtual, 
metonymic tenor: neither context nor microcontext give the reader (or hearer) sufficient 
grounds for assuming that it is the Dorians’ skills in fighting with the spear in particular that 
‘flourish’. Rather, the metonym can be understood to refer to their flourishing reputation 
for excellence in warfare in general, the MV ‘spear’ corresponding to an MT ‘military 
prowess’. There is no clear indicator in context or microcontext that would privilege either 
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of these understandings; they are both contained in the semantic field opened up by 
metonymy. 
 
A similar indeterminacy in the MT can be observed in the famous opening of Pindar’s First 
Olympian Ode: 
 … ἀλλὰ Δωρίαν ἀπὸ φόρμιγγα πασσάλου 
 λάμβαν᾽, εἴ τί τοι Πίσας τε καὶ Φερενίκου χάρις 
 νόον ὑπὸ γλυκυτάταις ἔθηκε φροντίσιν 
 Come, take the Dorian lyre from its peg,  
 if the splendor of Pisa and of Pherenikos has indeed  
 enthralled your mind with sweetest considerations151 
A literal reading of Δωρίαν φόρμιγγα (‘Dorian lyre’) as a musical instrument made by 
Dorians in a traditional Dorian manner is theoretically possible but, as Race points out,  
since we have no evidence for a specifically Dorian lyre and since the meter of 
the ode is Aeolic, the reference may apply to the Dorian character of Syracusae 
(cf. Pyth. 1.61-65) and, perhaps, to the presence of the Doric dialect in Pindar’s 
choral lyric.152 
The potential for virtual metonymic tenors is thus rather broad: the ‘lyre’ could ‘stand for’ a 
‘lyrical performance in Dorian style’ – the Dorian style referring to either the musical mode 
accompanying it or the dialect of the lyrics – but it could also refer to ‘a lyric performance 
with Dorian contents’, namely the Dorian Hieron, king of the Dorian settlement in 
Syracusae, whose victory in the horse race is the topic of the ode. Again, neither the context 
as a whole nor the microcontext rule out any of these possible metonymic tenors, and the 
metonymic vehicle appears to encompass all of them, thereby significantly increasing the 
verse’s semantic potential.153 In passing, though, it should be noted that this passage also 
exemplifies a phenomenon we might call ‘conditional tropicality’, in the shape of the 
necessary correspondence of the tropical or non-tropical status of terms, here λάμβαν᾽ 
(‘pick up’) and φόρμιγγα (‘lyre’). Only a literal lyre can literally be picked up, which means 
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that any metonymic understanding of lyre as ‘lyrical performance’ requires a metaphorical 
understanding of ‘pick up’ as ‘begin’.154 
 
This indeterminacy of the MT in ‘replacement metonyms’ co-exists with further complexities 
within the MV-MT relationship in Hölderlin’s poem ‘Gesang des Deutschen’. Here, Hölderlin 
evokes the decay of the civilisation of classical Greece: 
 Wenn Platons frommer Garten auch schon nicht mehr 
 Am alten Strome grünt und der dürft’ge Mann 
 Die Heldenasche pflügt, und scheu der 
 Vogel der Nacht auf der Säule trauert. 
 Even if Plato’s pious garden no longer blossoms  
 By the old stream and the indigent man  
 Ploughs the heroes’ ashes, and the  
 Bird of the night mourns shyly on the top of the column.155 
‘Platons frommer Garten’ (‘Plato’s pious garden’) follows the pattern of Pindar’s metonymic 
use of εὐναί. ‘Gardens’ cannot literally be ‘pious’, so a different understanding of the term is 
elicited, distinct from any that would follow the normal usage of this word but coherent 
with ‘pious’. In itself, the collocation ‘Plato’s garden’ suggests a reference to the 
philosopher’s school rather than to a horticultural site, since his school, the academy, was in 
fact situated in a sort of garden, the grove of Academus, a park used for gymnastics from 
the sixth century BC. Yet in terms of collocation rules ‘Plato’s garden’, understood as ‘the 
grove of Academus’, still clashes with ‘pious’. A grove can be thought of as ‘heilig’ (‘sacred’) 
but in ordinary usage ‘fromm’ (‘pious’) is reserved for persons or their actions. This would 
lead the reader’s thoughts to the Platonic philosophers philosophising in the grove of 
Academus; or, just as plausibly, to Platonic philosophy as such since ‘fromm’ (‘pious’) as an 
abstract concept could perfectly well be attached to Platonism as a world-view and a 
spiritual-intellectual exercise. Indeed, in the context of the poem’s vision of the rebirth of 
the ancient Greek spirit in Hölderlin’s Germany, ‘Plato’s pious garden’ might even be 
understood as epitomising the entirety of ancient Greek culture,  no longer alive or 
‘blossoming by the old stream’ but perhaps destined for a rebirth in Germany, as the poet 
indicates a few lines later: 
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 Doch, wie der Frühling, wandelt der Genius 
 Von Land zu Land. 
 But the spirit of genius, like spring,  
 Wanders from land to land.156 
Again the reader is left not with one ‘equivalent’ MT that can be set alongside the MV, but 
with a range of associations that all inform the semantic potential, and the colouring, of the 
passage.  
 
In this Hölderlin passage, polyvalence and conditional tropicality are observable once again. 
The vision of a garden with all its associations of flowers and cultivation pervades the 
stanza, notably through the alliterative centrepiece of the first two lines ‘Garten … grünt’ 
(‘garden ... blossoms [lit.: greens]’). The terms are co-dependent in their tropical status: if 
‘Garten’ (‘garden’) is understood metonymically with an MT that conforms with ‘fromm’ 
(‘pious’), then ‘grünt’ (‘blossoms’) must be understood metaphorically in the sense of 
‘thrives’. On the lexical level the first two lines thus create an impression of the rich, green, 
cultivated place of the past which is then markedly contrasted with the ploughing of the dry 
remainders of this past (‘Heldenasche’, ‘heroes’ ashes’) in the present,157 while on the level 
of tropical semantics it is the metonym on which the potential metaphorical understanding 
of ‘grünt’ (‘blossoms’) entirely depends. Again, the correlation of metonym and metaphor 
enhances the cohesion of the individual words and the different layers of meaning that they 
entail. 
 
Here, then, we have a tropical effect that depends on a particularly stark breach of ordinary 
collocation rules in the combination of adjective (‘fromm’, ‘pious’) and MV noun (‘Garten’, 
‘garden’) which, in turn, produces the sense of a wide gap between MV and MT and a 
significant hermeneutic detour. Quite differently, the second metonym in the stanza, 
‘Heldenasche (‘heroes’ ashes’), exploits the specifying properties of a compound word to 
increase the effect of defamiliarisation. What happens in ‘Heldenasche’ is that in a further 
move, from ‘Asche’ (‘ashes’) to ‘Heldenasche’ (‘heroes’ ashes’), the ‘replacing’ term (‘ashes’ 
for ‘soil’) is additionally specified, and this specification reduces the directness of the 
                                                        
156
 Hölderlin, ‘Gesang des Deutschen’, 37-38. 
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 Cf. the aural link in ‘grünt ... pflügt’, further supported by their parallel word-positioning. 
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connection between MV and MT. The link of lexical contiguity between ‘Asche’ (‘ashes’) and 
earth is established through collocation in ordinary usage, notably in funerary contexts, but 
the specification of ashes as heroes’ ashes undermines the ordinariness of the collocation 
and introduces an additional element of defamiliarisation: the soil ploughed by the 
ploughman is not simply mixed with the mortal remains of its former inhabitants, but is 
completely saturated with the sacred relics of a glorious past. This additional specification 
strongly affects both the semantics of the metonym and the intensity of its defamiliarising 
effect. This is an example in which a metonymic ‘replacement’ involves multiple shifts within 
a single semantic field. The inadequacy of a substitutionalist understanding of metonymy 
becomes once again apparent. 
 
The issue of the metonymic tenor (MT) and its contextual determination is also prominent 
in the following two examples, the first from Hölderlin’s poem ‘Rousseau’, the second from 
Pindar’s Tenth Pythian Ode. Hölderlin’s poem evokes the European Rousseau cult in which 
the French author often serves as a poetological cypher for the concept of the seer-poet 
who is misunderstood by his contemporaries. While Rousseau is not once mentioned in the 
poem, there is an implicit presence created through pervasive apostrophe (beginning with 
the first ‘Du’ (‘you’) in line 2) which is never intratextually defined. In the third stanza, 
another form of apostrophe occurs: 
 Und jene, die du nennst, die Verheißenen, 
 Wo sind die Neuen, daß du an Freundeshand 
 Erwarmst, wo nahn sie, daß du einmal 
 Einsame Rede vernehmlich seiest? 
 And those whom you call the Promised Ones,  
Where are these new ones, that you might find warmth at the hand of friends,  
Where do they draw near, that for once,  
 Lonely Speech, you might be perceptible?158 
The apposition with ‘you’ makes it clear that ‘Einsame Rede’ (‘Lonely Speech’) also refers to 
the apostrophised lyric other of the poem, yet there is no sufficient contextual or 
microcontextual information to establish who is referred to with this metonymic 
apostrophe. Only with the paratextual information from the title can the reader establish 
who the ‘you’ is and consequently who the ‘Lonely Speech’ is. It is thus both the paratextual 
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framework (the poem’s title) and the broader, extratextual, cultural background (the 
contemporary Rousseau cult) that are essential in constituting the semantic field within 
which MV and MT are then relatable by their contiguity. While the potential relevance of 
paratext may seem a new kind of consideration, it has to be borne in mind that the 
metonym itself is still operative on the basis of a pre-established link, albeit one established 
by extraordinary (paratextual) information, without which the metonym would remain 
obscure. 
 
An instance of a metonym that – to us – remains obscure as a result of insufficient 
contextual knowledge can be found in Pindar’s Tenth Pythian Ode. The topic is Perseus’ 
sacrificial offering of donkeys to Apollo at the halls of the Hyperboreans, where the god was 
traditionally thought to spend the three winter months: 
 κλειτὰς ὄνων ἑκατόμβας ἐπιτόσσαις θεῷ 
 ῥέζοντας· ὧν θαλίαις ἔμπεδον 
 εὐφαμίαις τε μάλιστ᾽ Ἀπόλλων 
 χαίρει, γελᾷ θ᾽ ὁρῶν ὕβριν ὀρθίαν κνωδάλων. 
 when he came upon them sacrificing glorious hecatombs  
 of asses to the god. In their banquets  
 and praises Apollo ever finds greatest delight  
 and laughs to see the beasts’ braying insolence  
 [lit.: and laughs to see the beasts’ upright/high-pitched insolence/violation].159 
The collocation of ὕβρις (‘insolence, violent transgression’) and ὄρθιος (‘standing straight 
up, upright, steep, high-pitched’) breaches ordinary collocation rules. Yet what is it about 
the donkeys that constitutes a violent transgression, that can be characterised as standing 
straight up or being high-pitched, and causes Apollo’s amusement? Ancient scholiasts and 
modern scholars have interpreted this passage as referring to either the donkeys’ 
outrageous leaping, to their high-pitched braying or to the immodest size of the donkeys’ 
erect phalli that make the god laugh.160 In any case, it is clear that ὕβρις, denoting a 
transgression of some sort that violates the divinely ordained boundaries of what is proper 
in the moral and natural sphere, is a qualification of a phenomenon but not the 
phenomenon itself (‘attribute-for-object’ in rhetorical handbook-speak). As such, ὕβρις both 
contains and ‘replaces’ the actual source of Apollo’s laughter: something is funny because it 
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constitutes an outrageous case of ὕβρις, but what? Given this lack of contextual information 
it is not possible for a modern reader of these verses to establish one single MT for the MV. 
The donkeys are doing something amusingly hubristic, but what this something is, is 
deferred out of reach by the metonym. 
 
With these (admittedly preliminary and selective) readings in mind, a more comprehensive 
theoretical assessment of ‘replacement metonyms’ can now be attempted. The 
transferability of Richards’s tenor-vehicle model from metaphor to metonymy has proven to 
be practicable and instructive in concrete critical analysis, albeit with certain qualifications. 
The qualifications themselves – the observed absence of any interaction between tenor and 
vehicle and the importance of context and microcontext for the establishment of the 
tropical understanding of the metonym – can now be conceptualised with greater precision. 
The attentive reader may already have noted that after our initial introduction of the terms 
metonymic vehicle (MV) and metonymic tenor (MT), the former has always been used 
unambiguously to refer to the metonymically used term or terms in a given passage, 
whereas the usage of the latter has hovered between reference to a virtual but distinct term 
and more loosely to a vague meaning that emerges from the context but cannot be pinned 
down to any one concrete term or even a set of terms. Understanding the reasons for this 
oscillation of the metonymic tenor between ‘term’ and ‘meaning’ will lead to a further 
clarification of the tenor-vehicle relationship in metonymy and thereby of the applicability 
of interaction theory as a tool to understand and theorise metonymy.  
 
The examination of ‘replacement metonyms’ has made it evident that the relationship 
between tenor and vehicle in metonymy is neither one of substitution of equivalent terms 
nor one of interaction of logically related terms. It is helpful to adopt a reception aesthetic 
point of view to describe their real relationship: in the actual process of reception of a 
metonym, the metonymic tenor is called forth through an abrasive (illegitimate) collocation 
of the present terms, which instigates a hermeneutic process that leads to the resolution of 
this incompatibility on a virtual, semantic level by amending the literal meaning of the MV 
to the MT. The microcontext, however, not only negates the positive meaning of the MV in 
ordinary usage and thus establishes its status as a metonym; it is also determinative in the 
process of reaching the MT. The MV, the present term whose literal meaning has been 
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negated and suspended, is thus designated as a starting position for a hermeneutic search 
process: the semantic field of this term is opened up and now constitutes the framework 
within which an MT is to be located. This hermeneutic search is not arbitrary but restricted 
(and governed) by context and microcontext, since it is a prerequisite for the MT to be 
semantically compatible with the context and collocatable with the specific microcontext.  
 
The essential importance of context-determination for the MT also marks a crucial 
difference between metaphor and metonymy: metaphor is always ultimately based on the 
logical relationship of analogy or similarity that holds tenor and vehicle together. Metaphors 
can therefore usually be isolated from their wider context and still function and maintain 
their meaning; metaphorical meaning is contained within the metaphorical compound, 
within its logic of analogy and similarity. In metonymy, on the other hand, tenor and vehicle 
have no such internally negotiated and stabilised relationship, either in the sense that their 
relationship would ever be established in situ through grammatical or syntactic links or in 
the sense that they could be isolated from their context and still function.161 The 
comprehension of a metonym is always initially framed by the semantic field of its vehicle 
but determined (or not) by its context and microcontext.  
 
However, this notion of the metonymic tenor as a vehicle-based but contextually-
determined virtual entity conflicts with the basic assumptions of interaction theory as 
developed in the theory of metaphor. The initial experience of abrasiveness in the reception 
process of both metaphor and metonymy makes it appear likely that similar dynamics take 
place between tenor, vehicle and context in both tropes, but it follows from our analysis 
that the configurations are distinctively different: in metaphor, a passage in tenor 
terminology (or, with hindsight, in neutral terminology)162 is interrupted by the appearance 
of extraneous vehicle terminology. The two terminologies, linked by the logic of analogy or 
similarity, interact through the immediate, extraordinary collocation of the present terms 
and through the conceptual associations that come with them. It is this interaction between 
tenor and vehicle which creates the surplus of meaning characteristic of metaphor. In 
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metonymy, on the other hand, the poetic effect of the trope does not result from an 
interaction of tenor and vehicle (there is none) but from the movement of tracing the tenor 
which takes the vehicle as the starting position and is guided by the context and thus 
interacts with it. The relationship between tenor and vehicle in metonymy might therefore 
be described as in itself directional but open; it is the context and microcontext that do, or 
do not, determine the point (or points) of closure on the trajectory of tracing the MT. It 
follows that while in both metaphor and metonymy the initial impression of tropicality 
stems from an abrasive juxtaposition of terms which are not collocatable in ordinary usage, 
interaction in metonymy takes place between vehicle and context/microcontext and has a 
constitutive significance for the tenor, whereas interaction in metaphor takes place 
between tenor and vehicle and does not constitute either but leads to the emergence of a 
new meaning from the interaction of their properties. While the semantics of metaphor 
thus result from the explosive consequences of the terminological collision between tenor 
and vehicle, the semantics of metonymy result from the emergence of the tenor from the 
vehicle's semantic field as a second active (though virtual) component of the metonym. 
 
If metonymy is indeed characterised by the hermeneutic process of tracing an MT which 
arises from the MV’s semantic field then it is no wonder that the more complex and 
obstacle-ridden this process is, the more rich and multilayered the poetic effect of the 
metonym is likely to seem. In other words, metonymy involves an illegitimate collocation of 
two words out of whose tension a metonymic understanding of one emerges; and the more 
abrasive the collocation and the more open and under-determinative both context and 
microcontext are, the greater the semantic potential. As our examples have shown, the 
extremes seem to range from a virtual one-to-one equivalence in the case of Pindar’s εὐναί 
to effective indeterminabililty in the case of his ὕβριν ὀρθίαν. This is a first indication that 
metonymy subsumes degrees of tropicality that range from the elevated language of poetic 
variatio to the heightened language of striking metonyms. However, we can provisionally 
agree that every MV is in principle capable of a multitude of significations, namely all the 
terms it is associated with by contiguity in its semantic field. Apart from the boundaries of 
the semantic field, the semantic potential of a metonym is capped as and where context 
and microcontext narrow it down, at times to one specifiable tenor term – which is where 
the impression of a mere substitution of terms is created. Conversely, the breadth of 
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metonymy’s semantic potential shines through wherever the restrictive criteria set by 
context and microcontext are loose. And wherever these criteria are so loose that no single 
MT can be established, the reader or listener is left with a string or set of associated 
potential MTs from the MV’s semantic field. Rather than speaking of a ‘replacement 
metonym’, therefore, we might do better to think of it as an index metonym: just as 
individual words listed in the index of a book point the reader to one or several different 
contexts in which the word in question occurs, so a metonymically used word (the MV) 
points the reader to this word’s semantic field, which is essentially the sum of all contexts in 
which it can and does occur – or in terms of lexical contiguity: the sum of all words it can be 
collocated with in ordinary usage. The mechanism at work in this type of metonymy is thus 
comparable to the index of a book insofar as both devices exploit and rely on pre-
established links, and specifically links pre-established through actual collocation in ordinary 
usage; tracing these links ultimately leads to the points of interest: the relevant page 
numbers and text passages on the one hand, and the metonymic tenor on the other. The 
comparison holds true also for cases with multiple MTs: as with words in an index that refer 
to several different pages/contexts, all instances to which the word in question points are 
linked together in a chain of unbroken contiguity through their shared connection with the 
original, lexical starting point.163 
 
As we have seen, one of the major poetic functions of index metonymy is the duplication of 
the potential for intratextual cross-references which makes index metonyms potential focal 
points of a web of associations and intratextual relations on both the level of the present 
MV and the inferred, virtual MT. This externally directed poetic function, however, is 
complemented by an internal poetic effect, arising from the characteristic shift within the 
semantic field which occurs during the hermeneutic movement from the MV to the MT. In 
particular those index metonyms whose MT cannot be established with such immediate 
accuracy that they border on one-to-one equivalence with the MV but which instead only 
point directionally to several possible MTs, reveal with great clarity the intrinsically 
directional character of the semantics of index metonyms. Theoreticians and literary critics, 
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who have often been tempted to dismiss the poetic potential of the allegedly ‘simple’ 
metonymic shift, might do well to remember the way the Great War poet Rosenberg 
characterised ‘simple poetry’ in one of his letters from the trenches as ‘an interesting 
complexity of thought [that] is kept in tone and right value to the dominating idea so that it 
is understandable and still ungraspable.’164  His critic Harding interprets this characterisation 
in a way which, mutatis mutandis, magnificently describes our point here, since index 
metonyms, just like Rosenberg’s ‘simple’ poetry, leave ‘every idea partly embedded in the 
undifferentiated mass of ideas from which it has emerged.’165  
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3. Amplification Metonymy 
Both our introductory theoretical reflections and our first case studies on index metonymy 
might seem to have provided reasons for assuming that grammatical categories, whose 
relevance as facilitators of linkage in metaphor has been stressed by Brooke-Rose, are not in 
the same way relevant for metonymy as a whole. Metonymy is not based on the 
intratextual connection of heterogeneous terminology. The contiguity that ‘links’ the 
components of a metonym and is the precondition of ‘replacement’ in index metonyms is a 
given and does not require additional grammatical and syntactical linkages. There is, 
however, a recurrent type of metonym that is defined precisely by its grammatical 
structure. Consider the following examples from Pindar’s Pythian Odes: 
 κατέκλασε γὰρ ἐντέων σθένος οὐδέν. 
 For he broke none of his strong equipment  
 [lit.: For in no way did he break the strength of the equipment]166 
 ταύτας δὲ μή ποτε τιμᾶς 
 ἀμείρειν γονέων βίον πεπρωμένον. 
 and never to deprive of like honor  
 one’s parents during their allotted lifetime  
 [lit.: the allotted lifetime of one’s parents].167  
Both examples involve divergence from the economy of ordinary language usage. Both are 
recognisable as examples of stylised language that exceed in length a more direct mode of 
expression: ‘he broke none of his equipment’ or ‘one must never deprive one’s parents of 
such honour’ respectively. In both cases, the term that could have been used on its own in a 
more direct and simple expression occurs in the genitive and is joined by another term 
together with which it forms an extended complex. In substitutionalist terms one might say 
that in the first example ‘strength of the equipment’ replaces ‘equipment’ and in the second 
example ‘the allotted lifetime of one’s parents’ replaces ‘one’s parents’. The inadequacy of 
the substitutionalist view, however, is once again revealed when we consider the 
implications of the terms actually chosen. In the first case, this genitive extension from 
ἔντεα (‘equipment’) to ἐντέων σθένος suggests an implicit metaphorisation of the verb: 
‘equipment’ can literally be broken; ‘strength of equipment’ can only be broken 
metaphorically. In the second case, the shift to a compound based on genitival extension 
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results in a breach of the rules of collocation in ordinary usage: the verb ἀμέρδω, ‘deprive’, 
is ordinarily constructed with the accusative of the person and the genitive (or accusative) 
of the object (here ταύτας τιμᾶς, ‘of such honour’) The persons left ‘deprived’ or ‘bereft’ 
here, however, stand in the genitive and it is instead the persons’ ‘allotted lifetime’ that 
takes the ordinary grammatical position of the person in the accusative. These formulations 
no doubt recall our earlier observations on illegitimate collocation and conditional 
tropicality which have emerged as characteristic traits of index metonymy in the previous 
set of examples. The crucial difference between these two types, however, is that in index 
metonymy the tenor (MT) must always be traced in the semantic field of the vehicle (MV), 
guided by context and microcontext, whereas in this type of metonymy the MT is already 
co-present in the tropical compound which in its entirety forms the MV. In κατέκλασε γὰρ 
ἐντέων σθένος οὐδέν, for instance, the MT, the equipment (ἔντεα) which the chariot-driver 
literally did not break, is co-present in the MV, the ‘strength of the equipment’ (ἐντέων 
σθένος). Likewise, the MT, the persons who are literally not to be deprived of honours are 
the parents (γονεῖς) who are co-present in the MV (γονέων βίον πεπρωμένον). 
 
The character and structure of this type of metonymy determine its poetic effect. In the first 
example, the shift from physical ‘equipment’ to its abstract ‘strength’ presents the 
charioteer as a victor who can manage great physical forces and the strain they cause. He 
does not simply own exceptionally sturdy equipment and was not so incompetent as to 
break it; quite the opposite: he controlled all the forces at work in the chariot race and 
steered himself and the chariot through them without any harm to either. The impression 
this metonym creates is therefore not of something static (something is broken or not 
broken) but of something dynamic (something has emerged from a battle of conflicting 
forces).168 In the second example, the broader context needs to be taken into account to 
appreciate the poetic effect more fully: 
   … ὀρθὰν  
 ἄγεις ἐφημοσύναν,  
 …  
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 A predictable objection to this analysis is the formulaic nature of such expressions in the epic tradition 
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 ... μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδαν, 
 βαρύοπα στεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε πρύτανιν, 
 θεῶν σέβεσθαι· 
 ταύτας δὲ μή ποτε τιμᾶς 
 ἀμείρειν γονέων βίον πεπρωμένον.  
   … you uphold the precept  
 …  
 ... above all gods  
 to revere Kronos’ son, loud-voiced lord  
 of lightning and thunder,  
 and never to deprive of like honor  
 one’s parents during their allotted lifetime  
 [lit.: the allotted lifetime of one’s parents].169  
In the context of this precept, with its dual imperative of piety towards the gods and one’s 
parents, the metonym acts as a bridge to connect the two commandments: one must 
honour Zeus who is the supreme ruler and one must honour one’s parents in the lifetime 
(which Zeus has) allotted for them. Because in this way Zeus remains implicitly present in 
the second precept, the metonym carries the overtone that not to fulfil one’s duty of 
achieving glory through honourable deeds ultimately means both to fail one’s parents and 
to set oneself against the will of Zeus. As with index metonymy, both enhanced cohesion 
and intratextual cross-referencing are apparent. 
 
Another example can be found in Hölderlin’s poem ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage‘: 
Drum wenn zu schlafen sie [die Natur] scheint zu Zeiten des Jahrs  
Am Himmel oder unter den Pflanzen oder den Völkern  
So trauert der Dichter Angesicht auch,  
Sie scheinen allein zu sein, doch ahnen sie immer.  
Denn ahnend ruhet sie selbst auch. 
Thus when she [nature] seems to sleep at [certain] times of the year  
In the sky or among/underneath the plants or peoples,  
So does the poets’ countenance mourn, 
They seem to be alone, yet they are always full of premonition.  
For full of premonition she rests herself.170 
The central line in this passage, l. 16, contains a restrained but noticeable breach of ordinary 
collocation rules: in ordinary usage only persons can mourn, not their countenances, which 
can merely bear outward signs of it. The effect of this violation is softened through the co-
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presence of the MT (‘poets’) in the genitive. Although not directly governing ‘trauern’ 
(‘mourning’) as required by ordinary usage, its presence limits the repercussions of this 
deviant language usage by interrupting and thereby softening the otherwise more abrasive 
collocation of the verb, ‘mourning’, and its subject, ‘countenance’. While the tropical impact 
of this metonym is thus restrained in terms of defamiliarised usage, the conceit of the entire 
passage, the likening of poets to nature, depends on it. The simile is one of outer 
appearance and inner spirit: the ‘face of nature’, its visible appearance in the sky and the 
lives of plants and peoples which may be resting and subdued in winter, is but a reflection of 
the spirit of nature which, although hidden underneath, is alive and full of foreboding. 
Likewise, the ‘face of the poets’ may appear to be showing outward signs of melancholy and 
mourning, but the poets’ spirit, like the spirit of nature, is, rather, premonitory. It is surely 
apparent that the parallelism between the faces of nature and of poets, and the spirits of 
nature and of poets, would not have the clarity and pungency that it has were it not for the 
metonym: if we had, simply, ‘so trauern auch die Dichter’ (‘and so mourn the poets too’), 
the reduced parallelism between nature and poets would, for instance, foster an 
understanding of ‘so’ in a largely causative sense, introducing the poets’ mourning as a 
mere consequence of nature’s sleep. Thereby much of this passage’s semantic activation 
would be lost.  
 
While in index metonymy, then, the MT is only virtual and arises as a separate entity from 
the MV, in this second type of metonymy the MT is itself present in the text and forms part 
of the MV. This means, in other words, that the pre-existing link between MT and MV is 
invisible in index metonymy, but visible in the genitival co-presence of the MT in the MV 
compound in this type. However, the visible presence of this link has an effect that needs 
careful formulation. Rather than juxtaposing two heterogeneous terminologies and linking 
them together by means of the genitive, thus facilitating their interaction (a mechanism 
analysed by Brooke-Rose for some forms of metaphor),171 the MT present in the genitive of 
this type of metonymy always constitutes the backdrop against which the specifying 
extension of the MV is set: it is the strength of the equipment and the allotted lifetime of 
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the parents which are in focus; they are the highlighted aspects of the broader MT. 
Metonyms of this type operate on the basis of a partitive genitive: the MT in the genitive 
opens up a field and the MV extension specifies which aspect of it is in the spotlight. Again, 
there is no interaction between MV and MT; they are not being linked, they are linked. 
What both index metonymy and this second type of metonymy have in common, therefore, 
is the fact that the relationship between tenor and vehicle is a relationship of selection from 
a field established by the trope. The peculiarity of the second type is that it renders the link 
that exists between MV and MT manifest, by incorporating it in the form of the genitive that 
holds the two components of the new compound together. Index metonymy explores a 
semantic field that lies (implicitly) behind the MV and remains virtual to it. In these second 
cases, on the other hand, the MV focuses on a specific segment of a semantic field which is 
itself present in the text; the semantic field thus appears within the text as a two-
dimensional segment of which the specifying genitive extension highlights a particular 
aspect. As a result, metonymy’s characteristic contiguity is here operative between the 
semantics of one present term (MT) and the collective semantics of a series of present 
terms (MV) to which the MT term itself contributes but within which, for grammatical 
reasons, another term is more prominent. The contiguous relationship between the two 
terms is one in which the latter is focused on one single aspect of the former. 
 
It has to be said that metonyms of this type are often more smoothly embedded into their 
context, even to the extent that there is little or no abrasiveness felt but merely some 
impression of stylisation stemming from a (seemingly superfluous) over-specification. In 
such cases, metonyms of this type can seem to hover between a tropical and a literal 
signification as in the following three examples: 
… Εὐρυσθῆος ἐπεὶ κεφαλάν 
 ἔπραθε φασγάνου ἀκμᾷ … 
... after he cut off Eurystheus’ head with the edge 
 of his sword... 172 
ἦλθες ἤδη Λιβύας πεδίον … 
and now you have come to the plain of Libya 173 
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Διὀς τοι νόος μέγας κυβερνᾷ 
δαίμον᾽ ἀνδρῶν φίλων. 
Truly the great mind of Zeus steers  
the fortune of men who are dear to him.174  
In all of these cases, the term in the genitive is itself sufficient for a literal statement: one 
would expect from a formulation in normal usage that it was the whole sword, and not just 
its edge, that completed the beheading; that the charioteer has returned to Libya, rather 
than particularly to Libya’s plain; and that it is Zeus who is the metaphorical navigator of 
human affairs and not just his mind. All these specifications serve to highlight aspects that 
flesh out and colour the scene, yet nowhere is there an actual breach of collocation rules or 
an unmistakable deviation from ordinary usage. 
 
I propose to refer to this category of metonymy as amplification metonymy because this 
term captures the two key characteristics of metonyms of this type: first, metonyms of this 
type are in their structure characterised by an amplification of the number of words used; 
the noun-with-noun-in-genitive compound, which constitutes the MV, is considerably larger 
than the co-present MT, which in itself constitutes only a part of the MV. Secondly, the 
poetic effect of this type of metonym is likewise one of amplification. The main aesthetic 
consequence of its deployment, as our discussion of selected examples has shown, is 
additional emphasis and focus. Amplification metonyms give an intensified impression of 
what is at issue but while at the same time adding to ‘the bigger picture’ in the MT which is 
co-present in the partitive genitive.  
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 Pi. P. 5.122; trans. Race. 
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4. Grammatical Metonymy 
The previous chapters have shed light on the mechanisms and effects of metonymic tropes 
by focusing initially on two types of metonymy: index metonymy and amplification 
metonymy. Before moving on to a third type, let us restate the definitive features of the first 
two on the basis of some new examples. 
 
Index metonymy features in this verse from the prophecy on the Greek victory over Troy in 
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon 
χρόνῳ μὲν ἀγρεῖ Πριάμου πόλιν ἅδε κέλευθος  
In time this expedition will capture the city of Priam 
[lit.: In time this path/journey will capture the city of Priam]175 
Here, one word (κέλευθος, ‘path, journey’) appears in a direct collocation with other words 
(in particular the verb ἀγρεῖ, ‘to capture, seize’) which is illegitimate and nonsensical in 
ordinary usage and which marks it out as a trope. In any attempt to make sense of the 
passage, this word will be read as a metonymic vehicle and serves as a starting point for a 
hermeneutic process that reconciles the abrasive collocation of the present words by 
supplementing the present metonymic vehicle (MV) with an inferred metonymic tenor (MT) 
which is compatible with the microcontext. The establishment of this metonymic tenor is 
directional and in itself open-ended: the present MV serves as a starting position which 
indicates the semantic field within which one or more MTs are traced that comply with the 
restrictions of collocatability within the given context (here, for instance, ‘expedition’ or 
‘army’ or ‘those soldiers beginning their journey here’). Index metonymy thus leads to the 
unfolding of a second, co-present dimension: on the one hand, the present term in the text 
(metonymic vehicle), and on the other the term/s inferred from it (metonymic tenor). 
                                                        
175
 A. Agam. 126; trans. Sommerstein. We have no evidence in extant Greek for κέλευθος in prose texts which 
would allow us to reliably establish the term’s ordinary usage. However, the available evidence in the elevated 
vocabulary of epic and tragic poetry makes it clear that the word’s usage in the above example deviates 
significantly from its general elevated use to denote ‘way, path’ or ‘journey’. LSJ, for instance, gives 
‘expedition’ as a further ‘meaning’ of the term but lists, in addition to the passage under discussion, only one 
more instance, namely  A. Pers. 757-758: τοιάδ᾽ ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ὀνείδη πολλάκις κλύων κακῶν | τήνδ᾽ ἐβούλευσεν 
κέλευθον καὶ στράτευμ᾽ ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλάδα (‘Having heard again and again such taunts from evil men, he prepared 
this journey and an army against Greece’; trans. Sommerstein). It is clear that in this latter case the term still 
conforms to its general elevated usage, literally denoting the journey of an army (note the unproblematic 
collocatability with the verb). This is markedly different from ἀγρεῖ ... πόλιν ἅδε κέλευθος (‘this κέλευθος will 
capture the city’), since here the collocation with the verb, which requires human agents, is abrasive and 
makes its ‘ordinary’ sense impossible. 
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In amplification metonymy, on the other hand, the MT itself is present in the sequence. In a 
pleonastic compound the MT here stands in the genitive case while the governing noun 
specifies the compound to a degree which, if read literally, makes it incompatible with the 
context. Take, for instance, the way that the means of silencing Iphigenia before her 
sacrifice are described in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon as  
βίᾳ χαλινῶν τ’ ἀναύδῳ μένει 
by force, by the silencing power of a bridle176 
In the economy of ordinary language, a simple dative χαλινῷ/χαλινοῖς (‘with a bridle’) 
would have been used here. Instead, this direct, more economic term appears in the 
genitive (χαλινῶν, ‘of a bridle’) while a specific aspect of it, namely the abstract μένει 
(‘strength’), is isolated and given, in its stead, as the genitive’s governing noun. The resulting 
compound constitutes an amplification in two ways: first, in that it pleonastically enlarges 
the expression used to express what is at issue, and secondly, in that, when read as a 
compound, it conversely reduces the semantic scope and narrows it down to emphasise and 
focus on only one specific aspect. The potential abrasiveness of the resulting non-ordinary 
collocation caused by this ‘spotlight’ or ‘zoom’ effect (to use theatrical/cinematic 
metaphors) is mitigated by the co-presence of MV (the compound as a whole) and MT (the 
noun in the genitive): the MT is present in the partitive genitive, the whole from which one 
specific aspect is brought into focus. The shift in the semantic field, implicit and inferential in 
index metonymy, is now explicit and occurs within a sequence of present words that form a 
semantic and syntactic unit.  
 
Both index metonymy and amplification metonymy, as studied and defined thus far, appear 
to be noun-based phenomena and as such form a suitable starting point for the analysis of 
metonymy as a whole, which in virtually all discussions is exclusively illustrated by and 
associated with nouns. This presupposition is already, for better or worse, implicit in the 
name μετωνυμία itself which, after all, embodies the technical term used by ancient 
grammarians to denote the noun: ὄνομα. Yet, as Brooke-Rose has shown for metaphor, 
tropes formerly thought of as ‘substitutions of one word for another’ are by no means 
restricted to nouns; in fact, as every reader of poetry will know, some of the most striking 
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metaphors are verb-based. The question arises, then: are there any forms of metonymy that 
display the characteristic metonymic shift, within a virtual semantic field as observed in 
index metonymy or within a present syntactic field as in amplification metonymy, but 
involve verbs, adjectives or adverbs? 
 
Although Brooke-Rose’s discussion of the ‘grammar’ of metaphor follows a division into 
noun metaphor, verb metaphor and adjective metaphor, she suggests that behind this 
grammatical division the general tenor-vehicle relationship in metaphor is inherently verb-
centred: ‘the relationship between the metaphor and the third term is verbal.’177 Reflecting 
on the logical element of similarity or analogy that is constitutive of metaphor, she describes 
the verb-centred nature of this logical element as follows: 
Very broadly speaking, metaphors can be divided, from the point of view of 
idea-content, into functional metaphors (A is called B by virtue of what it does), 
and sensuous metaphors (A is called B by virtue of what it looks like, or, more 
rarely, sounds like, smells like, feels like, tastes like).178  
In this spirit, she concludes her discussion of noun-based metaphors by arguing that ‘[t]he 
various grammatical links, in fact, stood for a verb, and sometimes contained or consisted of 
a verb.’179 In other words, the element of similarity and analogy that enables terminological 
interaction in metaphor does not merely consist of a suppressed, implicit ‘like’ but of an 
implicit ‘(verb) + like’. Consequently, Brooke-Rose argues that the ‘chief difference between 
the noun and the verb metaphor is one of explicitness.’180 
 
From our demonstration that metonymy is not based on any logical relationship, but instead 
on lexical contiguity within a semantic field, it should follow that metonymy does not share 
this intrinsic verb-centred characteristic of metaphor. The empirical evidence vindicates this 
assumption. An assessment of metonymic occurrences in poetry soon shows that there are 
hardly any instances which can be understood as verb-based metonyms at all. Consider the 
following line from Hölderlin’s translation of Sophocles’ Antigone: 
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 Brooke-Rose 1958, 153. 
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 Brooke-Rose 1958, 155. 
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 Brooke-Rose 1958, 210; to illustrate this point: in her analysis of noun-metaphors based on a ‘genitive link’ 
Brooke-Rose ‘found that of can most successfully express complete identity of the two linked nouns [‘the fire 
of love’] when the metaphor can very easily be turned into a verb: if love burns, it is a fire’ (Brooke-Rose 1958, 
155; italics in the original). 
180
 Brooke-Rose 1958, 206. 
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Und auch ein Kind von einem andern Manne, wenn diesen ich umarmt 
And even children [lit.: a child] by another man 
If I embraced that man... 181 
Here, ‘umarmt’ (‘embraced’) will be read in this context of procreation as ‘had sexual 
intercourse with’. This would appear to be a rare case of verb-based index metonymy, albeit 
a rather clichéd one and one with little poetic effect: the immediate context makes the MT 
very clear and neither leaves room for ambiguity nor provides contact points for any 
interactions with surrounding words. In fact, it is hardly felt as tropical at all since the 
reference to a child conceived from another man is already made in the preceding words; 
although the verb attracts a re-adjusted reading in this particular context, which constitutes 
to an extent a deviation from ordinary usage, it occurs in a conditional clause which merely 
illustrates what has already been said – the verb is not the sole conveyor of the action at 
issue. 
 
In other cases, the situation is even less straightforward, as in the following verse from 
Sophocles’ Antigone itself: 
πλεκταῖσιν ἀρτάναισι λωβᾶται βίον 
did [lit.: does] violence to her life with twisted noose182 
The collocation λωβᾶται βίον (‘to mutilate one’s life’) violates ordinary collocation rules: 
λωβᾶσθαι in ordinary usage denotes the mutilation or damaging of a person, a body or any 
other material object while βίος denotes the abstract concepts of ‘manner of life’, ‘means of 
living’ or ‘lifetime’. In the given context of the passage, where Ismene recalls her mother’s 
suicide, it is clear that Jocasta’s (biological) life was not damaged or mutilated, but 
altogether destroyed and ended. Yet the word that stands out most in this verse is arguably 
βίον, since πλεκταῖσιν ἀρτάναισι (‘with twisted ropes’) belongs, together with λωβᾶσθαι, to 
a much more concrete terminology. The opening words πλεκταῖσιν ἀρτάναισι λωβᾶται, 
then, focus on the neck of Jocasta, thus setting up an expectation of a physical object in the 
accusative. In βίον, this expectation is unfulfilled; instead, the narrow focus is now opened 
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 Hölderlin, Trauerspiele des Sophokles: Antigonä, l. 945; trans. Constantine. Hölderlin diverges here from the 
Sophoclean text which has καὶ παῖς ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου φωτός, εἰ τοῦδ᾽ ἤμπλακον (‘a child from another man, if I 
became bereft of this one here’, S. Ant. 910; trans. Lloyd-Jones). This does not affect my argument: for now, I 
am concerned with the tropical effect in the German passage in its own right. 
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 S. Ant. 54. 
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up: the act of suicide by hanging becomes a perversion of the normal way of life, as indeed 
all the acts of familial bloodshed listed in the immediate context are. While λωβᾶται thus 
forms an elegant mediator between the concreteness of the rope and the abstractness 
‘living’, the abrasiveness of the verse is most strongly felt in βίον which, given the 
collocation with λωβᾶται, and the expectations raised by it, is read as an index metonym. 
There are, then, two items in the verse that can appear as tropical, one fixed, the other 
conditional: λωβᾶται can be read metonymically as ‘terminated, ended’ if βίον is read, 
metonymically again, as ‘(biological) life’ in the sense of ζωή. Alternatively, λωβᾶται can be 
read literally with βίον understood, still metonymically, as ‘body’ or ‘herself (sc. Jocasta)’; 
this reading would, in turn, lead those with independent knowledge of the mythical plot to a 
metonymic reading of the entire verse as a whole: she mutilated her body/herself with a 
rope, that is, she killed herself. In such a case of what we shall call ‘conditional metonymy’, 
it is virtually impossible, and arguably counterproductive, to seek a definitive decision on 
which part of the verse is tropical.183 What can and should be noted, however, is that in the 
microcontext of the verse the noun is unequivocally metonymic, the verb only conditionally 
so. 
 
Complications also arise in the following lines from Hölderlin’s poem ‘Hyperions 
Schicksalslied’: 
Schicksallos, wie der schlafende  
Säugling, atmen die Himmlischen 
Fateless[ly], like the sleeping  
baby, the immortals breathe184 
Again, at first glance, this appears to be a straightforward case of a verb-based metonymy: 
‘atmen’ (‘breathe’) is to be read metonymically for ‘to be, to live’. However, the 
precondition of this reading is the adverb ‘schicksallos’ (literally ‘fatelessly’) which itself 
appears to be tropical: fatelessness, being without or beyond the remit of fate, is surely 
always an attribute of a given state, but never of a single action; above the rule of fate, ‘the 
heavenly ones’ thus may be ‘fateless’ but one cannot think of any single action, or hence 
any verb, that could, in ordinary language, be modified by the adverb ‘fatelessly’. Reading 
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 See below, chapter 5.2. ‘Conditional Metonymy’, pp. 124-129. 
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 Hölderlin, ‘Hyperions Schicksalslied’, 7-8. 
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this passage, one immediately connects the adverb with the subject of the sentence – and 
thereby reads it, in effect, as an adjective. Given that this adverb also stands in a doubly 
emphasised position (it heads the sentence, and thus sets its tone, and renders explicit the 
tertium comparationis of the simile), the verb as a potential metonym is itself rather 
overshadowed. ‘Schicksallos’, being the odd adverb that it is, effectively converts itself by 
default implicitly into an adjective, supplies the copula ‘to be’ and  makes a statement about 
the subject of the sentence (‘the gods are fateless’) rather than modifying the action 
described in the present verb. Consequently, the predicate ‘atmen’ has hardly any semantic 
value as a governing verb in its own right but rather serves to colour the atmosphere of the 
preceding simile: the comparison of (a) a baby’s obliviousness to the worries and fears of 
the world of mortals and (b) the gods’ state of perpetual calm is sharpened by focusing on 
the peaceful, undisturbed, quiet breathing of the sleeping baby which encapsulates the 
state of tranquil serenity at issue here. Yet, while this observed effect of ‘focusing’ may 
appear to be reminiscent of noun-based amplification metonymy, it should be noted that 
the usage of the verb ‘atmen’ (‘breathe’) here is not tropical: presumably, anthropomorphic 
gods can literally breathe. If we remove the adverb from the sequence, we have a perfectly 
non-tropical, ordinary sentence. Moreover, the adverb in question is unusually restricted in 
terms of rules of collocation in ordinary language: it would lead to structurally similar 
tropical readings with any verb other than the copula ‘to be’. 
 
While we can observe certain readjustments taking place when reading the sequences in 
which these verbs occur, closer observation shows that in all three cases the potential 
candidates for verb metonymy are weak and undermined or eclipsed by their literal and 
tropical context: the sequence is either altogether resemanticised as a result of conditional 
metonymy, or else the context is so definitive that the potential verb metonym is effectively 
reduced to a mere apposition which, if read as an independent clause, would not appear 
tropical at all. In fact, the tropical status of all the verbs in question can be disputed. 
Certainly, in their respective contexts they seem to be saying more than they denote in 
ordinary usage, yet they can still be read as they would be in ordinary usage; something 
beyond their ordinary denotation seems to be at issue but this does not render the literally 
made statement nonsensical: the anthropomorphic gods do literally breathe (though what 
is at issue is their existence); Jocasta did literally mutilate her body (though what is at issue 
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is her death); Antigone would literally embrace another man in love making (though what is 
at issue is procreative sexual intercourse). While they display a semantic surplus in their 
respective contexts, which one would intuitively read as metonymic, these instances are 
problematic when it comes to identifying them as tropes because they do not involve 
unequivocal deviation from ordinary usage. Given that (for reference) these cases constitute 
the only examples of potential verb metonymy that have emerged in our corpus studies, 
there is all the more reason to wonder whether there is some structural impediment to the 
possibility of striking verb metonyms; our reflections on Brooke-Rose and metaphor have 
already pointed in this direction.185 
 
The answer to the question lies once again, we suggest, in the way that metonymy relies on 
links pre-established through lexical contiguity within a shared semantic field. As already 
noted, the theory of semantic fields has long been criticised for being intuitive rather than 
being based on objective parameters,186 in particular when it comes to defining the actual 
boundaries of a semantic field.187 This is indeed a problem for anyone who takes a 
Neohumboldtian approach that focuses on the organisation of conceptual content in the 
vocabulary of a given language.188 In order to understand the poetic effects of tropical 
language, however, what matters is non-ordinary usages and abrasive collocations. Rather 
than conceptualising semantic fields as static entities based on conceptual content,189 which 
indeed leads to arbitrary boundaries drawn within the vocabulary of a given language, we 
have been using the term ‘semantic field’ to denote an entirely usage-based phenomenon: 
we understand as a word’s semantic field the sum of all other words with which it can be, 
and is, collocated in ordinary usage.190 It is this collocatability, the actual lexical contiguity of 
words in ordinary language which, as we have argued, lies at the heart of metonymy and its 
lexical-semantic shifts.  
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 See above, p. 76. 
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 See Homberger 2000, 632. 
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 See Pelz 1996, 195. 
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 See, for instance, Weisgerber 1962. 
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 Such as ‘the mind’, as in Trier 1931, the seminal study for the development of this theory. 
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 This broad definition is essential to avoid arbitrariness in drawing boundaries for semantic fields: after all, it 
is true that in any given language any given word can be used to head an area which is then labelled a 
semantic field, just as it is true that there are necessary overlaps caused by words belonging to various 
semantic fields at the same time. While this constitutes a taxonomical problem for approaches based on 
conceptual content, it is wholly unproblematic within the usage-based approach taken here. 
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Let us now reconsider the issue of verb metonymy by assessing the implications of the 
different parts of speech for their participation in semantic fields. If lexical contiguity is 
based on semantic fields – that is, on words associated with each other by collocations 
within ordinary language – it naturally follows that nouns are in a privileged position: nouns 
frequently group together in sentences and enter various relations with each other, linked 
(according to the language) by their cases or prepositional connections; verbs, on the other 
hand, tend to appear in distinct and discrete constructions. Even where they occur together 
in the same sentence in ordinary usage, they are either subordinated to one another in 
hypotaxis or comparable constructions, or else separated by conjunctions in parataxis – 
either way, their normal usage in ordinary language keeps them apart from each other, to a 
certain degree, and leaves them to form discrete sequences in a way which is markedly 
different from the more co-equal and less segregated way in which nouns appear jointly in 
ordinary language clauses. It would appear that it is this kind of lexical contiguity of nouns in 
ordinary language, characterised by collective semantic engagement without mutual 
subordination or paratactic separation, that is fundamental to the suitability of nouns for 
index metonymy. Conversely, verbs appear to be structurally incapable of forming striking 
index metonyms, precisely because they lack this kind of pre-established link (based on 
cooperative and co-equal collocation) in ordinary language usage.191  
 
If there are such structural impediments in the way of verbs being used in a metonymically 
defamiliarising way, what about adjectival forms of metonymy? Consider the following two 
examples, the first from the graphic description of a besieged city in enemy hands given by 
the chorus in Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes, the second from the praise of Apollo as 
bringer of the athlete’s victory in Pindar’s Eighth Pythian Ode: 
βλαχαὶ δ’ αἱματόεσσαι  
τῶν ἐπιμαστιδίων  
ἀρτιτρεφεῖς βρέμονται  
loud, bloody screams 
rise up from infants [lit.: rise up from those at the breast] 
fresh from the nourishing breast192 
                                                        
191
 Needless to say, amplification metonymy with its reliance on a compound established through a genitive 
link is a category of metonymy that is by definition not open to verbs. 
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 A. Sept. 348-50; trans. Sommerstein. Note that the translation given here does not fully represent the 
fluidity of syntactic-semantic relationships between the individual words in the original Greek; it does, 
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τὺ δ᾽, Ἑκαταβόλε, πάνδοκον 
ναὸν εὐκλέα διανέμων 
Πυθῶνος ἐν γυάλοις,  
τὸ μὲν  μέγιστον  τόθι  χαρμάτων 
ὤπασας: ... 
And you, Far-shooter [lit.: far-shooting], who govern 
the all-welcoming famous temple 
in the vales of Pytho, 
it was there that you granted the greatest 
of joys ... 193 
In both instances, it is adjectives which command our attention, albeit for different reasons 
and in very different degrees of intensity. In the first case, the agreement of βλαχαὶ and 
αἱματόεσσαι is startling because it drastically breaches ordinary collocation rules: in 
ordinary usage, these two words cannot be found in a close semantic unit as expressed 
here. The abrasiveness of this collocation is mitigated only once the next verse comes into 
view: the genitive τῶν ἐπιμαστιδίων (‘of infants’, ‘of those at the breast’) supplies a term 
which is collocatable with αἱματόεσσαι (‘bloody’, ‘covered in blood’).194 Taken together, and 
disregarding grammatical allegiances, the two verses now do create a sequence that 
conforms with the rules of collocatability in ordinary speech (infants – covered in blood – 
screams). The deviation lies precisely in the grammatical allegiance of the adjective within 
the given elements of this sequence. 
 
In the second example, far less abrasive and not at all startling, a deviation is hardly 
perceptible and can perhaps only be construed as such by the grammarian. The verse, 
though an apostrophe, lacks any explicit specification of an addressee. It follows a sequence 
on the poet’s encounters and the motivations behind the present ode, which is followed by 
praise of the presiding deity of the Pythian games. Given this turn, the personal pronoun τὺ 
                                                                                                                                                                            
however, adequately capture the terminological clash under discussion here. On this point see also below, pp. 
107-108. 
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 Pi. P. 8.61-65; trans. Race. 
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 Whether or not ἐπιμαστιδίων is itself used metonymically is hard to decide. The word is not only an 
elevated verse word but also very rare. In addition to the passage under discussion, it only occurs in E. IT 231-
232: σύγγονον, ὃν ἔλιπον ἐπιμαστίδιον, | ἔτι βρέφος, ἔτι νέον, ἔτι θάλος (‘my brother, whom I left at his 
mother’s breast, still a tender shoot, a young babe’; trans. Kovacs) and in S. Fr. 793: ψακαλοῦχοι | μητέρες 
αἶγες τ’ ἐπιμαστίδιον | γόνον ὀρθαλίχων ἀναφαίνοιεν (‘... mothers with young, and may the goats display a 
brood of young ones at the breast!’ Trans. Lloyd-Jones). In both of these cases we note the grammatically 
‘proper’ adjectival usage of the term as qualifying a noun, whereas in its usage in the passage above the term 
itself effectively serves as a noun. While this points to another grammatical metonym, the lack of ‘reliable’ 
ordinary usage compels us to withhold final judgment. 
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(‘you’), which opens the new sequence, is initially underdetermined, and indeed is not fully 
determined by any noun in the remaining part of the sentence. Needless to say, it is 
impossible to miss the fact that Apollo is the addressee of this eulogy. The larger context of 
the ode, the preceding verses about a meeting γᾶς ὀμφαλὸν παρ’ ἀοίδιμον (‘near the 
earth’s famed navel’) and the subsequent mention of ναὸν εὐκλέα ... Πυθῶνος (‘the famous 
temple of ... Pytho’) make it abundantly clear that it is Apollo who is evoked (and invoked) 
here. And yet ‘evoked’ remains the right word since the name ‘Apollo’ itself is absent. It is 
(together with the context) an adjective (ἑκαταβόλε, ‘far-shooting’) and a periphrastic 
participle construction (ναὸν εὐκλέα διανέμων | Πυθῶνος ἐν γυάλοις, ‘governing the 
famous temple in the vales of Pytho’) that make the reader infer the subject and implicitly 
supply the present sentence with it. That there is some weak form of deviation at work here 
is implicit in the presentation of the text offered by some editors: ἑκαταβόλος is, 
grammatically speaking, an adjective – yet Snell-Maehler and Race, for instance, capitalise 
the word in their editions, thereby indicating that they read it as a noun.195 This shift 
between the present part of speech and the one assumed in reading the passage is made 
explicit by Slater who refers to the usage as ‘pro subst. as epithet of Apollo’.196 This usage 
contrasts with the grammatically consistent usage of the word as an adjective qualifying a 
noun elsewhere, for instance in Pindar’s Ninth Olympian Ode or in the Homeric Hymn to 
Artemis:  
ἀλλὰ νῦν ἑκαταβόλων Μοισᾶν ἀπὸ τόξων 
but now, from the far-shooting bows of the Muses197 
... ὅθ’ ἀργυρότοξος Ἀπόλλων 
ἧσται μιμνάζων ἑκατηβόλον Ἰοχέαιραν 
... where silver-bowed Apollo  
Sits waiting for the far-shooting pourer of arrows [i.e. Artemis]198 
The usage of the adjective ἑκαταβόλος as an epithet for Apollo is indeed so widespread in 
the epic tradition that the impression of straightforward denotation almost eclipses any 
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sense of defamiliarisation.199 However, this instance, along with the Aeschylean example, 
may serve as a starting point for a structural analysis of adjective-based defamiliarisations. 
 
In the Aeschylus, then, we have a non-literal reading prompted by an adjective which, in 
breach of ordinary collocation rules, has shifted its grammatical allegiance from one noun to 
another within a sentence; in the Pindar, a non-literal reading of an adjective as a noun, 
prompted by the lack of a fully determined noun as subject of the sentence.  
 
The first thing to note is that the tropical status and effect of the adjectives in question 
depends on nouns. These adjectives (one might say) are only part-tropical in their own right, 
insofar as they have not changed their semantics compared to their ordinary usage. The 
assessment of metonymic occurrences in our corpus has, in fact, not yielded any example of 
a purely adjective-based index metonymy; that is to say, we know of no instance where a 
literal reading of an adjective is rendered impossible by its given context (thus marking it as 
an adjective in tropical usage) and where this abrasive collocation can be reconciled by 
supplying another adjective, inferred from the present one, that would meet the 
requirements of collocatability and compatibility with the context and lead to a plausible 
reading. Instead, it is grammatical deviations of the kind discussed above which constitute 
non-ordinary (and non-metaphorical) usages of adjectives. In other words, while verbs seem 
to be structurally precluded from metonymic defamiliarisation, adjectives are only to a 
certain extent open to metonymic shifts – by virtue of their association with nouns.  Again, 
we would argue, this ultimately stems from differences in the way that different parts of 
speech collocate in ordinary language: adjectives always qualify nouns or, in predicative 
construction, nouns and verbs, and are therefore, in terms of lexical contiguity, primarily 
associated with nouns rather than with other adjectives. If several adjectives occur in the 
same sentence one of two things happens. Either they qualify different nouns and then do 
not semantically engage with each other. Thus, in ‘the white sail of the swift ship’, ‘sail’ and 
‘ship’ are in semantic engagement by virtue of the genitive link; ‘white’ and ‘swift’, on the 
other hand, remain entirely unrelated. Or they qualify the same noun, but even then are 
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only linked with the noun individually and do not engage with each other, even if linked 
paratactically. Thus, in ‘the swift, old, wooden ship’, the ship is qualified as swift and old and 
wooden, without any semantic engagement between the adjectives within the sentence. 
Like verbs, adjectives do not associate with other adjectives, in ordinary language, in the 
way necessary to create the link of lexical contiguity which is a pre-requisite for index 
metonymy. The connection thereby established between instances of a given part of 
speech, which is exploited in index metonymy, simply does not exist in verbs and adjectives. 
It would seem, however, that this specific form of collocation in ordinary language 
constitutes a necessary though not sufficient requirement for index metonymy: after all, not 
all nouns that can legitimately occur together in a sentence in ordinary speech form any 
durable link that can be drawn upon in metonymy. Instead, both the actual regularity of 
collocation in ordinary language (which facilitates a strengthened pre-existing link) and a 
capacity for contextual framing (which facilitates a strengthening of the metonymic link by a 
given context) would seem to be further prerequisites here. 
 
With these principles in mind, how are we to understand the sort of adjective-based 
deviation seen in the examples above? Are they indeed to be classified as metonymic, and if 
so, how are we to understand the relationship of noun-based and adjective-based forms of 
metonymy? To begin with the second example, Pindar’s use of ἑκαταβόλος (‘far-shooting’): 
if we assumed a straightforward analogy to noun-based index metonymy, one would expect 
that in the process of reading this sequence another adjective would emerge as an MT, 
inferred from the present one, whose co-presence would lead to a plausible reading of the 
sequence. But this is not the case. Instead, either an additional noun is inferentially supplied 
(‘But you, far-shooting [Apollo], ...’) or the adjective itself is read as a noun (as Race suggests 
by translating ‘But you, Far-shooter, ...’). This implicit adjustment of the present term points 
to tropical usage, and (sure enough) it is based on collocation: the epithet ἑκαταβόλος is so 
closely associated with Apollo (even if also, to a lesser degree, associated with Artemis), that 
a pre-existing link exists which can be exploited in metonymical usage. Because of its 
frequent and specific use as an epithet, the adjective has itself gained, through lexical 
contiguity, almost the denotative value of a name, and hence virtually assumed the status of 
a noun. As mentioned earlier, precisely this degree of conventional collocation becomes an 
issue in assessing the actual tropical status of such usage. For the record: in addition to the 
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passage under discussion there are only two more attested instances where the adjective 
ἑκαταβόλος is used without an accompanying noun and is consequently read as a noun-
substitute.200  
 
It is worth noting that there are other epithets which likewise suppress and only evoke a 
proper name. Modern translations tend to give pleonastic paraphrases for these terms by 
supplying a lordly title (‘god of’, ‘lord of’ and the like) and turn the present term into a 
subordinated genitive attribute, but in Greek poetry the actual usage is often far more 
compressed, for instance in these two examples from Pindar’s First Olympian Ode 
τότ᾽  Ἀγλαοτρίαιναν  ἁρπάσαι 
δαμέντα φρένας ἱμέρῳ χρυσέαισί τ᾽ ἀν᾽ ἵπποις 
It was then that the Lord of the Splendid Trident seized you, 
his mind overcome by desire, and with golden steeds201 
… ἐγγὺς  ἐλθὼν  πολιᾶς  ἁλὸς  οἶος  ἐν ὄρφνᾳ 
ἄπυεν βαρύκτυπον  
Εὐτρίαιναν … 
He approached the grey sea alone at night 
And called upon the deep-thundering 
Lord of the Fine Trident202 
Again we are dealing with words that are, grammatically speaking, adjectives but which are 
uncontroversially used as nouns (since there is no evidence for usage of these terms as 
adjectives actually qualifying a noun, and in particular no evidence for them qualifying a 
noun other than the name of the god with whom they are usually associated). In a sense, 
such epithets that suppress the proper name, both the quasi-nouns here and the adjective 
above, are metonymic and resemble index metonymy; yet one would be reluctant to call 
them tropical because they impinge as conventional literary clichés and lack the sense of 
abrasiveness which is characteristic of tropical, defamiliarising usage.203  
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 Cf. σοὶ δ’ αὐτῷ μελέτῳ, ἑκατηβόλε, φαίδιμος Ἕκτωρ (Il. 15.231; ‘And for you yourself, god who strikes from 
afar [lit.: <the> far-shooting <one/Apollo>], let glorious Hector be your care’; trans. Murray/Wyatt) and ὁ δ’ 
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<one/Apollo>]  given to Agamedes and Trephonios’; trans. Race).  
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 Pi. O. 1.71-73; trans. Race. 
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 Although both terms are hapax legomena, the principle behind the formation of these two compounds 
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O. 8.48, P. 2.12, N. 4.86, Pae. 9.47) and χρυσοτρίαινος (‘with golden trident’, cf. Arion 939.2 PMG and Ar. Eq. 
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There are, however, cases of adjective-based defamiliarisation which follow the same 
mechanisms as discussed here for ἑκαταβόλος but are less clichéd. Consider the following 
passage from Pindar’s Second Olympian Ode: 
λείφθη δὲ Θέρσανδρος ἐριπέντι Πολυνείκει, νέοις ἐν ἀέθλοις 
ἐν μάχαις τε πολέμου 
τιμώμενος ... 
but Thersandros, who survived the fallen Polyneikes, gained honor in youthful 
contests 
And in the battles of war ...204 
Contests cannot literally be called νέοι (‘young, youthful’) in ordinary language (unless they 
were ‘newly’ established, which is ruled out by the context), but those participating in them 
can be called ‘young’. As with ἑκαταβόλος, an implicit change in grammatical form and 
status of the present term is involved, namely a shift from actual dative to implied genitive 
and an implied shift from adjective to noun: νέων ἐν ἀέθλοις (‘in contests of young [ones; 
i.e. of youths, young men]’). Such a reading is then reinforced by the next phrase, which in 
parallel structure (note the connection with τε) offers a sequence of the same type that 
conforms with ordinary usage (note that πολέμου is a noun in the genitive case).   
 
Similar in structure but productive of a considerably stronger effect is the deviant usage of 
an adjective in the following verses from the description of the sacrifice of Iphigenia in 
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon: 
λιτὰς δὲ καὶ κληδόνας πατρώιους 
παρ’ οὐδὲν αἰῶνα παρθένειον τ’ 
ἔθεντο φιλόμαχοι βραβῆς 
Her pleas, her cries of “father!” [lit: her fatherly cries] 
and her maiden years, were set at naught 
by the war-loving chieftains 205 
                                                                                                                                                                            
559). In the majority of these instances, the grammatical adjective is used as if a noun, that is to say, it stands 
in its own right without qualifying a governing noun; the exceptions are Pi. P. 2.12, where the adjective 
qualifies θεόν, and Arion loc. cit., which is the only instance where a τριαινα-compound adjective appears in 
direct collocation with the name ‘Poseidon’ – in all other cases, the name of the god is only implied. The 
available evidence thus suggests that these terms virtually denote Poseidon. Ancient rhetoricians classify 
usage of this type as ‘antonomasia’; see, for instance, Tryph. Trop. 757, 24-30 or Quint. Inst. 8.6.29-30. The 
value of this category is doubtful: on the one hand, we are dealing with metonymic shifts and this separate 
category does not add to our understanding of the mechanism or the poetic effects of the phenomena it 
includes; on the other hand, such antonomasia is by definition confined to literary clichés and as such does not 
describe tropical but ordinary, albeit elevated, usage.  
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 Pi. O. 2.43-45; trans. Race. 
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Comparable prose constructions that express such exclamations have the exclaimed word 
as a noun in the genitive case.206 Instead, this passage has the exclamation as an adjective in 
the accusative case, πατρώιους (‘fatherly’), where in ordinary usage one could expect τοῦ 
πατρός (‘of [the] father’). While the adjustment of the case of an exclamation to fit a 
sentence’s grammar appears to be permissible in ordinary usage,207 the use of an adjective 
here in lieu of a noun is striking and abrasive. Once again, a reading that seeks to make 
sense of the abrasive, tropical use of the adjective does not lead to the emergence of 
another adjective as a suitable MT but to a shift in the case and grammatical status of the 
present adjective-based MV. 
 
Deviations of this type, that is, deviations based on changes in grammatical status and 
syntactic dependency, have been discussed by ancient rhetoricians (and modern scholars) 
under various headings, but where adjectives are concerned the discussion has centred on 
‘enallage’, ‘hypallage’ and ‘transferred epithet’. As so often in tropology, variations in 
terminology have led to more confusion than differentiation: terminological usage is often 
unclear or inconsistent or changes from writer to writer. Thus, for the Greek rhetoricians, 
hypallage seems to denote a completely unrelated figure of postpositive correction and 
clarification,208 while Cicero, remarkably enough, uses the term ὑπαλλαγή in his Orator as a 
technical term for noun-based metonymy, thereby providing a first, albeit perfectly 
arbitrary, indication that these adjective-based phenomena should indeed be understood as 
metonymic types.209 Apollonius Dyscolus appears to be the first to highlight the grammatical 
nature of such shifts by speaking of ἐναλλαγὴ πτώσεως (‘enallage of the case’).210 Modern 
scholars tend to refer to the syntactic reorientation of adjectives as enallage adiectivi or 
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 A. Agam. 228; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 See Bers 1974, 38. 
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 Groeneboom on A. Agam. 47-54. 
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 Zonaeus’ definition is representative: Ὑπαλλαγή ἐστιν, ὅταν ἐπιτιμήσαντες τῷ ὀνόματι ἕτερον 
προσλάβωμεν, οἷον ‘οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο φιλανθρωπία, ἀλλ’ ἔρως’, καὶ ‘οὐκ ὠργίζετο, ἀλλ’ ἐμαίνετο.’ (Zonae. Fig., 
689, 7-10; ‘Hypallage occurs whenever, by way of objecting to a word, we add another one to it as in “it is not 
philanthropy, it is desire,” and “he was not angry, he was furious.”’); in Alex. Fig. 486, 21-31 and Anon. Fig. 
712, 22-27, both seemingly based on Zonaeus’ examples and definition, the term seems to indicate metonymy. 
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 A connection of this adjective-based phenomenon with metonymy is also suggested by Genette who 
describes the expression ‘le papier coupable de Boileau’ (‘the guilty paper of Boileau’) as ‘hypallage 
métonymique’ (Genette 1970, 156; italics in the original). The nature and modalities of the connection 
between metonymy and hypallage/enallage, however, remain unexplained. 
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hypallage adiectivi.211 Landfester summarises the current communis opinio in the following 
definition: 
Enallage/hypallage of the adjective. Enallage consists in the relocation of an 
adjective away from a genitive attribute to the governing noun. As an important 
aesthetic means of defamiliarisation it is particularly prominent in Greek lyric 
(Pindar) and tragedy; it abounds in the tragedies of Euripides. It became 
naturalised in Latin poetic language under the influence of the Greek model: 
νεῖκος ἀνδρῶν ξύναιμον (‘kindred strife of men’), instead of: νεῖκος ἀνδρῶν 
ξυναίμων (‘strife of kindred men’), Soph. Ant. 793f.; iratos <...> regum apices 
(‘irate helmets of kings’), instead of: iratorum regum apices (‘helmets of irate 
kings’), Hor. Carm. 3, 21, 19f.212  
 
In order to assess whether such ‘adjective-based defamiliarisings’ are indeed a form of 
metonymy, we can now take into account the potential of different parts of speech to form 
metonymy, and the way adjectives relate to nouns, or, more precisely, focus on the nouns 
upon which one has to draw in order to arrive at a reading that semantically rectifies the 
abrasive breach of ordinary collocation rules which these adjectives effect. 
 
This way of approaching the issue presents us with two different types of adjective-based 
defamiliarisation. In the first type, the noun qualified by the tropical adjective is entirely 
absent, as in Pindar’s ἑκαταβόλε, ‘far-shooting’ ([ἑκαταβόλε <Ἀπόλλωνα>], ‘far-shooting 
<one/Apollo>’), and νέοις ἐν ἀέθλοις, ‘in young contests’ ([ἐν ἀέθλοις νέων <ἄνδρων>], ‘in 
contests of young <ones/men>’), or in Aeschylus’ κληδόνας πατρῷους, ‘fatherly cries’ 
([κληδόνας < πατρός >], ‘cries <of “Father!”>’). In the second type, the noun qualified by the 
tropical adjective is present in the microcontext but is dissociated from the adjective by a 
lack of grammatical agreement, as in Aeschylus’ βλαχαὶ δ’ αἱματόεσσαι τῶν ἐπιμαστιδίων, 
‘blood-covered screams of infants’ ([βλαχαὶ δ’ <αἱματοέσσων> τῶν ἐπιμαστιδίων], ‘screams 
of blood-covered infants’), and Sophocles’ τόδε νεῖκος ἀνδρῶν ξύναιμον, ‘this kindred strife 
of men’ ([τόδε νεῖκος ἀνδρῶν <ξυναίμων>], ‘this strife of kindred men). In the first type, the 
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governing noun which the tropical adjective would qualify in ordinary usage is inferred from 
the adjective and implicitly supplied; in the second type, the tropical adjective’s 
abrasiveness follows from the shift of grammatical allegiance within the present sequence 
which is reversed in the hermeneutic process of reading such occurrences.  
 
If we compare these findings with our now established categories of noun-based 
metonymy, index metonymy and amplification metonymy, we must surely acknowledge 
that the resemblance between the two categories of noun-based metonymy and the two 
types of adjective-based metonymy is striking. In noun-based index metonymy, just as in the 
first type of adjective-based metonymy, a noun emerges as MT and virtually supplements 
the present tropical term (for adjectives this includes the possibility of the adjective itself 
becoming this MT by changing its part of speech and becoming a noun). In noun-based 
amplification metonymy, just as in the second type of adjective-based metonymy, all the 
elements for a literal reading are available in the sequence as it stands, but an 
intrasequential shift occurs: in noun-based amplification metonymy, a shift into over-
specification within the semantic field of the noun in the genitive case which, if it stood on 
its own in a different syntactic position, would pass as literal usage in ordinary language; in 
adjective-based metonymy, a shift of grammatical allegiance on the part of the adjective, 
away from a present noun which one would expect to be its governing noun in ordinary 
usage. It seems clear that the very same phenomenon is occurring here, modified only by 
the inherent differences between these two parts of speech. The dependency of adjectives 
on nouns in order to exercise metonymic defamiliarisation contrasts with their incapacity to 
do so in and of themselves. 
 
These theoretical reflections find their vindication in the most extensive study of ‘enallage’ 
in Greek literature to date, offered by Bers, and also allow us to take his theorisation of the 
phenomenon further.213 Bers’s approach to enallage is largely that of a historical linguist and 
textual scholar; the discussion of poetic effects is given significantly less attention. A 
methodological difficulty arises when historical linguistics and literary criticism are 
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conflated. This is the case when Bers speculates about the ‘origin’, ‘history’ and 
‘development’ of enallage:  
If my theory on the origin of enallage is correct, the non-possessive type arose 
directly by analogical imitation of the syntactical form, through an intermediate 
type employing an adjective whose meaning was both possessive and 
descriptive, or by a combination of these developments.214 
Such claims imply a problematic understanding of tropes as historically contingent 
phenomena that develop organically and are constructed and willed into being by poets in 
the course of the development of a language. While it is certainly true that individual tropes 
may gain greater prominence at different times in the literary culture of any given language, 
tropes are properly seen as possibilities of defamiliarisation inherent in language. They are 
ahistorical in the sense that they embody structural patterns of defamiliarisation which may 
or may not pertain to a specific language at a specific stage of its development, but (unlike, 
say phonetic or morphological features of a language) tropes do not ‘develop’ by 
themselves.215 
 
With these qualifications and caveats in mind we can profitably assess the value of Bers’s 
study for our aim. The main thrust of his argument is that (a) enallage is indeed a tropical 
phenomenon and not just a function of ordinary usage in ancient Greek, and that (b) 
enallage is an archaising device which is connected with syntactically conservative contexts 
and ‘originated’ in the coexistence of possessive adjective and genitive in the early stages of 
the Greek language. Moving on from these arguments, Bers surveys a broad range of 
enallages in Pindar and the tragedians, but confines himself to defending these passages 
against attempts by commentators and textual critics to emend or deny the tropicality of 
these passages. In these attempts to see enallage as a phenomenon of ordinary language, 
Bers extrapolates a succession of theoretical positions and disproves them on grounds of 
demonstrable deviance from ordinary usage. While rightly rejected by Bers, however, these 
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attempts are revealing for our purposes, since they shed light on different reading strategies 
designed to make sense of the non-ordinary usage that occurs in these instances. Bers’s first 
observation is that enallage is particularly prone to normalising emendation by scribes and 
textual critics, which confirms the general tendency to re-align grammatical allegiance of 
deviant adjectives as outlined above. More interestingly, Bers discusses critically what he 
calls ‘the “compound” theory’, according to which ‘many apparent instances of enallage are 
explained as noun + adjective combinations in which the two substantives have merged into 
an ad hoc “compound”.’216 Bers successfully shows that the use of adjectives in ordinary 
language disproves this theory as well as the hypothesis of enallage as a mere attraction of 
case (as ordinarily occurs in relative pronouns). Yet although he demonstrates that such 
reaffiliation of the adjective is indeed tropical, we should not entirely dismiss other critics’ 
impression of a felt ‘compound’ effect in such passages.217 It is right to insist with Bers that 
the adjective’s reaffiliation constitutes an abrasive shift, and is therefore tropical; however, 
it is worth noting that this is a shift within a semantic unit – and therefore not unlike the 
shift within a semantic field that characterises noun-based metonymy, either within a virtual 
semantic field (as in index metonymy) or, even more clearly, within the present semantic 
unit (as in amplification metonymy). 
 
Interestingly, the analogy between the two types of noun-based and adjective-based 
metonymy suggested here also finds support in Bers’s study. Bers proposes a clear 
distinction between ‘enallage’, ‘quasi-enallage’ and ‘transferred epithet’. He confines 
enallage to  
the transfer of a term to the governing substantive of an adjective which by 
logic, or at least convention, belongs with an expressed dependent genitive … 
Phrases in which the inflections do not satisfy this definition, though the 
semantical outcome is similar, will be called ‘quasi-enallages’.218 
Bers justifies this differentiation with reference to the frequency of occurrence in (Greek) 
poetry:  
Examples in which the writer includes the word from which the adjective is 
transferred but puts the noun in a case other than the genitive … are … very 
rare. The switch in concord of adjective away from the genitive is so much more 
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frequent that we are entitled to select precisely this inflectional category as the 
distinguishing feature of a discrete phenomenon in Greek.219 
While this quantitative difference is undoubtedly noteworthy, it does not seem to warrant 
the presumption of a qualitative difference, a difference in kind, in respect of the 
defamiliarising usage of adjectives under discussion here. Consider for instance some 
further examples from Aeschylus’ Agamemnon in the light of those discussed above: 
 ... μηδὲ βαρβάρου φωτὸς δίκην 
χαμαιπετὲς βόαμα προσχάνηις ἐμοί 
do not fall on the ground before me and utter open-mouthed cries  
in the manner of a barbarian 
[lit.: do not, in the manner of a barbarian, open your mouth to me with 
a cry that falls to the ground] 220 
For this usage, let us follow Denniston and Page’s interpretation: ‘“fallen on the ground” 
suggests that the poet thought of his Clytemnestra as actually prostrating herself, with 
oriental προσκύνησις, in Agamemnon’s path.’221 On this interpretation, the adjective 
χαμαιπετές (‘falling on the ground’) is transferred away from Clytemnestra, that is, from the 
subject in the nominative as implicit in the predicate. Compare a sequence uttered by 
Clytemnestra herself earlier in the same play: 
ἐν ὀψικοίτοις  δ᾽ ὄμμασιν  βλάβας  ἔχω 
I have damaged those eyes by lying awake 
[lit.: I have damage in my eyes that go to sleep late] 222 
Again it is Clytemnestra, the subject, who goes to sleep late and the transfer of the adjective 
to the dative of ὄμμασιν (‘eyes’) is a transfer away from an implicit nominative.  
 
That another mode of analysis is required becomes all the more obvious as soon as one 
widens one’s perspective and examines instances of transferred adjectives in languages 
other than Greek, where the spread of the cases of the nouns involved is not as heavily 
centred on the genitive case as appears to be the case in Greek. Consider the following two 
examples from Hölderlin’s poetry, the first from his poem ‘Im Walde’, the second taken 
from ‘Griechenland’: 
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Aber in Hütten wohnet der Mensch, und hüllet  
Sich ein ins verschämte Gewand ... 
But man lives in huts, and wraps himself 
Into bashful garments…223 
Und die schönste der Begeisterungen 
Lächelte vom trunknen Auge dir 
And the most beautiful enthusiasm 
Smiled from your drunken eye224 
In the first case, the transfer of ‘verschämte’ (‘bashful’) is from the subject of the sentence, 
‘Mensch’ (‘man’), to his garments, ‘Gewand’; in the second, the transfer of ‘trunken’ 
(‘drunk’) is from the person in the dative (‘dir’) to that person’s eye.225 It is evident, 
however, that, despite the difference in language and cases involved, the mechanism and 
effect of these transferred adjectives is essentially the same as in the Greek examples 
involving nouns in genitive. It follows that there are no grounds for any categorical 
differentiation of transferred adjectives based on grammatical case.226  
 
Accordingly, we must abandon Bers’s inflection-based distinction between ‘enallage’ 
(transferred adjective involving a noun in the genitive) and ‘quasi-enallage’ (transferred 
adjective involving a noun in a case other than the genitive). However, his differentiation 
between enallage and quasi-enallage on the one hand, and ‘transferred epithets’ on the 
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case, a view rejected by Miller who nevertheless holds that the ‘genitive and the relational adjective are 
identical in semantic content’ (Miller 1969, 150, as cited in Bers 1974, 21). This ‘identity in semantic content’ 
refers to the similarity between adjective-based qualifications and some functions of the genitive in denoting 
the sphere, milieu, or environment in which a noun is placed (see Palmer 1962, 132-134, and, more generally, 
Meillet/Vendryes 1927, 510). Yet even if such a similarity between the semantic scope of the Greek genitive 
and the Greek adjective exists, this would prove only that, as elements involved in a transfer within a given 




other, is more illuminating. By ‘transferred epithet’, Bers refers to usages like Euripides, 
Alcestis, v. 261, ὀφρύσι κυαναυγέσι (‘dark-gleaming eyebrows’), where the epithet is ‘more 
naturally used of the eyes [which are not specified as such] than of the brows’.227 Bers adds: 
in the first [sc. enallage/quasi-enallage], a poet transfers an adjective away from 
a word which appears in the utterance, he places far greater emphasis on the 
manipulation than if he omits the word to which the adjective belongs in 
ordinary language, as in the second [sc. transferred epithet]. One way he 
compels the audience to notice the switch; the other he permits them to 
understand the phrase as being a metaphor of the usual type, viz. that in which 
the literal meaning is implicit.228 
Once more, ‘enallage’ (including ‘quasi-enallage’) emerges as the adjective-based 
counterpart of amplification metonymy: the tropical effect of both depends on a 
modification that involves a noun which is present in the sequence and drawn upon to 
resolve the abrasiveness caused by this deviance from ordinary usage; no inference of a 
noun as metonymic tenor (MT) is required. ‘Transferred epithets’, on the other hand, just 
like index metonymy, prompt the supplementation of the sequence in question with an 
inferred noun as MT. 
 
We propose to refer to all these adjective-based phenomena collectively as grammatical 
metonymy. This seems appropriate given that the characteristic shift of metonymy 
manifests itself in this category as a grammar-based shift.229 At the same time, let us 
maintain a significant subdivision into grammatical index metonymy (metonymic adjectives 
which point to nouns that need to be inferred, or become the inferred noun themselves by 
changing their grammatical status), and grammatical amplification metonymy (metonymic 
adjectives which amplify the intensity of a sequence by shifting their grammatical allegiance 
within a semantic unit). 
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 Dale, cited by Bers 1974, 1. 
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 Bers 1974, 2; our italics. On the surprising reference to metaphor in this context, cf. below, pp. 96-99. 
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 In suggesting this term, I also draw on Jakobson’s differentiation between ‘lexical tropes’ and ‘grammatical 
tropes and figures’ (Jakobson 1960, 375). While Jakobson does not elaborate this distinction further, he rightly 
observes that ‘[t]he poetic resources concealed in the morphological and syntactic structure of language, 
briefly the poetry of grammar, and its literary product, the grammar of poetry, have been seldom known to 
critics and mostly disregarded by linguists but skilfully mastered by creative writers’ (Jakobson 1960, 375). 
Metonymy, as discussed here, subsumes both grammatical and lexical variants, depending on whether the 
characteristic metonymic shift is based on grammar or lexis. On this basis, we note that (a) the potential and 
relevance of grammar for metonymy further undermines any substitutionalist understanding which is 
inevitably restricted to lexis, and that (b) the resources for defamiliarisation provided by syntax are not limited 
to facilitating figurative usage (a notion implicit in Jakobson 1968, 602) but tropical usage too. 
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On the basis of these structural observations on grammatical metonymy, we can analyse its 
aesthetics in greater detail. The two critics cited on ‘enallage’ comment only briefly on its 
poetic effects. In the passage just quoted, Bers initially observes that in grammatical 
amplification metonymy, the transfer of the adjective between elements present in the 
sequence ‘compels the audience to notice the switch’. However, he then associates 
grammatical index metonymy with metaphor, arguing that it will prompt readers ‘to 
understand the phrase as being a metaphor of the usual type, viz. that in which the literal 
meaning is implicit’. These remarks are both problematic and unsatisfying. In the first place, 
for a reader to notice the occurrence of a ‘switch’ in grammatical amplification metonymy 
means no more than awareness of (the mechanism behind) this device, but it does not fully 
describe its poetic effect(s). The insufficiency of such analysis is similar to the shortcomings 
of the now outdated notion of metaphor as mere ‘embellishment’ and ‘replacement’: while 
the reader of a metaphor surely notices that the present word is not the/a word which one 
would expect in ordinary usage, the poetic effects of metaphor are hardly explained by this. 
Likewise, the ‘switch’ that occurs in grammatical amplification metonymy surely 
characterises this trope, but this says little about the aesthetic consequences. Secondly, 
when Bers describes the reading strategy prompted by grammatical index metonymy as 
understanding it ‘as being a metaphor’, he is evidently using ‘metaphor’ (like Aristotle) in 
the broad, undifferentiating sense of ‘tropical, non-literal’. After all, in grammatical index 
metonymy, there is clearly no element of similarity or analogy which would be a 
prerequisite for metaphor. Instead, the way ‘in which the literal meaning is implicit’ is not 
characterised by logic – but by lexical contiguity. 
 
Compare and contrast Bers’s initial assessment with Headlam’s suggestions on how to 
understand the aesthetic effects of ‘enallage’. Headlam quotes the ‘bloody screams’ (βλαχαὶ 
... αἱματοέσσαι) at Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, v. 348, and remarks that 
[t]he inaccurate attachment of the epithets has that further value that I spoke 
of, producing an effect intentionally confused, impressionistic. Infants at their 
mothers’ breast, besmeared with blood, and passionately crying in their bleating 
voice; if you wish to convey the impression vaguely flashed upon the eye and 
ear, you dab the various colours in among the substantives.230  
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 Headlam 1902, 435; italics in the original. 
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In a similar vein, he cites a choral passage from Aeschylus’ Persians to support this 
characterisation: 
ὀτοτοτοῖ, φίλων 
ἁλίδονα μέλεα πολυβαφῆ 
κατθανόντα λέγεις φέρεσθαι 
πλαγκτοῖς ἐν διπλάκεσσι.231 
Otototoi, you are saying 
that the dead limbs of our loved ones, 
are floating, dipped in the sea and dyed in many colours, 
In their wandering cloaks. 
And he comments: 
The sober sense is ἁλίδονα μέλεα καταθανόντα λέγεις φέρεσθαι πλαγκτὰ ἐν 
πολυβαφέσι διπλάκεσσι; but this is one of those pictorial descriptions; their 
imagination shows them dead and mangled limbs tossed on the waves adrift in 
many-coloured garments; and the scattered way in which they jot the details in 
conveys the impression more effectively than if it were more accurately 
phrased.232 
Although sharing Headlam’s appreciation of the passage from Seven Against Thebes, Bers 
rejects his generalisation about the effect of enallage on that basis. Bers maintains that ‘this 
enallage is among the most startling and impressive in Greek: the impressionistic effect is 
not characteristic.’233 Whereas Headlam’s description of these poetic effects point us to the 
passage as a whole, Bers’ own analysis of the effect of ‘enallage’ in general is centred on the 
reading of the tropical adjective itself: 
Enallage bridges the gap between figurative and prosaic. The effect is 
paradoxical. On the one hand, if a reader or listener takes an enallage literally, 
i.e. if he follows the grammatical concord and fails to notice the transfer, he is 
forced to make metaphorical sense of the expression, find an ad hoc logical 
relation between the adjective and noun in agreement, or remain baffled. On 
the other, if he detects enallage he can perceive the prosaic sense at once, and 
so is in danger of leaving his poetic faculty unexercised. ... The majority of 
modern readers … either follow the grammar without observing that the noun in 
the genitive presents a problem, or they transfer the adjective back to the 
genitive and regard the standard expression and the deviation as equivalents.234 
                                                        
231
 A. Pers. 274-277. Headlam’s reconstruction of the passage largely follows the manuscripts, whereas e.g. 
Sommerstein accepts Prien’s emendation of 277 (my changes to Sommerstein’s translation as provided in the 
text reflect this); this textual complication, however, does not affect the point: the passage, as Headlam takes 
it, contains the phenomenon under discussion. Sommerstein’s editorial decision nevertheless reminds us of 
Bers’s remark about the vulnerability of enallage to emendation. 
232
 Headlam 1902, 435;  italics in the original. 
233
 Bers 1974, 52. 
234
 Bers 1974, 3; italics in the original. Note, again, the imprecise, broad usage of ‘metaphorical’. 
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The two critics’ positions, however, are not as far away from each other as they may seem 
to be at first. After all, the two reading acts that Bers constructs in his analysis as ‘either-or’ 
are, in fact, simultaneous: it is precisely the simultaneity of (a) a possible literal reading 
based solely on terms present in the sequence and requiring only the smallest grammatical 
rectification and (b) the startling, abrasive, illegitimate collocation that produces the 
‘paradoxical’ effect and leads to the impression of a hovering between literal and tropical 
usage. While Bers arguably goes too far in drawing such a black and white distinction (either 
a baffling, tropical reading or an unnoticed, rectified literal one), his observation points in 
the right direction: the intensity of the tropical effect of grammatical metonymy does not lie 
in the adjective itself but in the nature of its interaction with the context. That is to say, 
once the adjective has been shifted away from its corresponding noun in ordinary language, 
different effects can occur (depending on the nouns involved) which determine how the 
adjective and the nouns in question themselves are read. In other words, in grammatical 
metonymy we find the tropical effect depending on context in the same way as with the 
two forms of noun-based metonymy: the poetic effect does not occur, as is the case in 
metaphor, within the tropical word or compound, but in the new potential for interaction 
between the tropically used word and its context. 
 
This issue of context-dependency is important for the broader question of the multi-, bi- or 
monopolar structure of the tropical space. In the passages just discussed, Bers associates 
the effect of ‘enallage’ with metaphor, and he is not the only one to do so: by its very title 
(‘Metaphor, with a Note on Transference of Epithets’), as also by its juxtaposition of 
analyses of metaphors and ‘enallages’, Headlam’s article suggests a certain relatedness of 
the two – although he never explicitly makes a connection between them. Among more 
recent critics, Richards, despite some initial reluctance, draws on enallages to develop his 
theory of metaphorical interaction.235 Brooke-Rose, too, while acknowledging that in many 
cases a transfer of the adjective is taking place, nevertheless discusses various examples of 
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 See Richards 1936, 106-108. Richards discusses the examples ‘giddy brink’, ‘jovial wine’ and ‘daring wound’ 
taken from the eighteenth-century rhetorician Kames. He notes the ‘impressionistic’ squashing that takes 
place as well as the lack of metaphorical analogy behind these terminological juxtapositions but eventually 
drops such caveats and proceeds, without real explanation, to subsume the phenomenon under metaphor: ‘... 
we may doubt for a moment whether there is metaphor here at all – until we notice how this whirling that 
infects the world as we grow giddy comes to it by a process which is itself radically metaphorical.’ Richards 
1936, 108.  
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enallage as metaphors in her chapter on adjective-based metaphor.236 Williger, however, is 
more cautious, arguing that  
the ... exchange of terms, the ... artificial interlacing with an expression is more 
related to metaphor. At best, enallage has in common with it that both 
phenomena presuppose the possibility of constructing words purely 
grammatically while leaving their logical relation open to guesswork.237 
Are there any good reasons for these critics’ association of transferred adjectives with 
metaphor? Or does their unquestioned and unexplained association of this form of deviant 
expression with metaphor merely reflect the modern bias of literary critics towards 
metaphor as the ultimate trope beyond and behind all other tropes? Williger’s and Bers’s 
assessments implicitly point to the crucial interface from which poetic effects of ‘enallage’ 
emerge: it is the constructive potential stemming from the unexpected collocation of the 
transferred adjective and its new corresponding noun. To understand the poetic effects of 
grammatical metonymy, we must understand the different kinds of interaction that can 
occur at this interface. Our argument suggests that in addition to the primary metonymic 
shift, which is felt as a poetic effect in its own right, the increased potential for engagement 
with the context caused by the transfer of the adjective can trigger several different types of 
secondary effects: it can engender metonymic readings of neighbouring terms, it can lead to 
metaphorical interaction, it can cause ambivalence within the sequence, and it can produce 
effects of verbal collage. 
 
According to Bers’s assessment above, ‘enallage’ leads either to a purely literal reading 
following the rectification of the adjective-based grammatical deviation or to a metaphorical 
reading (‘forced to make metaphorical sense of the impression’) or to a collapse of the 
hermeneutic process (‘remain baffled’). It remains unclear whether he takes the reading 
strategy of finding ‘an ad hoc logical relation between the adjective and noun in agreement’ 
as a further explanation of the process of making metaphorical sense (implying perception 
of analogy or similarity), or as an additional, separate reading strategy (perhaps erroneously 
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 ‘Besides being often very verbal, many of these are in fact simple transfers from one mentioned or 
unmentioned part of the sentence to an object’: Brooke-Rose 1958, 240; for her full discussion of adjective 
metaphor see ibid., 240-249. 
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 ‘die … Vertauschung der Begriffe, die ... künstliche Verschränkung des Ausdrucks, die eher der Metapher 
verwandt ist. Mit ihr hat die Enallage allenfalls das gemeinsam, daß bei beiden Erscheinungen die Möglichkeit 
vorausgesetzt wird, die Worte rein grammatisch zu konstruieren und ihren logischen Zusammenhang erraten 
zu lassen.’ Williger 1928, 11. 
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assuming other kinds of logical relation as constitutive for metonymy). Although he 
concedes that ‘in the vast majority of examples one can make some sense of the adjective 
taken with the governing substantive’,238 he does assume that there are cases in which a 
literal reading of the transferred adjective in collocation with its new governing noun is 
entirely impossible, as it would lead to a meaningless, nonsensical expression: ‘Occasionally 
the literal reading of an enallage makes the expression meaningless, as in Aesch. Ag[am]. 
504: δεκάτῳ ... φέγγει ... ἔτους’.239  
 
This last example belongs to a verse from Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, which is often emended 
by editors: 
δεκάτῳ σε φέγγει τῷδε ἀφικόμην ἔτους 
on this tenth daylight of the year I have come back240 
The broader context of the Achaeans’ return from Troy makes it clear that the speaker (the 
herald) is talking about the long-awaited day of return in the tenth year of the Trojan 
expedition, and the reader will quickly mitigate the grammatical affiliation of δεκάτῳ 
accordingly. Yet is Bers right to assume that the collocation δεκάτῳ ... φέγγει is 
‘meaningless’ and merely leaves the reader ‘baffled’? In the course of a linear reading of the 
verse, there appears to be interaction between the adjective and its new corresponding 
noun: one will be inclined to read φέγγει, ‘daylight’, as an index metonym, and hence as 
‘day’, and this reading is prompted not least by the numeral δεκάτῳ, ‘tenth’, which is 
essential in creating an abrasive collocation with φέγγει, thus giving it MV status and co-
defining the MT. The metonymic reading that emerges, of course, still leaves the genitive 
ἔτους, ‘of [the] year’, unintegrated, so that the continuing reading process will entail a 
realignment of the deviantly used adjective. Nevertheless, in its tropical position, δεκάτῳ 
exercises a semantic function in emphasising and delineating the metonymic usage of one 
of the two nouns of the semantic unit to which the transfer of the adjective belongs. A 
similar interaction occurs in the lines from Hölderlin’s poem ‘Gesang des Deutschen’, 
discussed in a previous chapter:  
 
                                                        
238
 Bers 1974, 3. 
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 Bers 1974, 3. 
240
 A. Agam. 504, with the manuscript reading, rather than Jacob’s emendation of δεκάτου for δεκάτῳ, 
accepted by e.g. Sommerstein and Bowra, which does away with the enallage.  
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Wenn Platons frommer Garten auch schon nicht mehr  
Am alten Strome grünt ... 
Even if Plato’s pious garden no longer  
blossoms by the old stream … 
Within the semantic unit ‘Platons frommer Garten’ (‘Plato’s pious garden’), ‘fromm’ (‘pious’) 
is undoubtedly closer to ‘Plato’ than to ‘garden’ in terms of the collocation rules of ordinary 
language; accordingly, we see this as an instance of enallage. And though ‘pious garden’ 
may be literally nonsensical, the collocation (rather than leaving the reader ‘baffled’) 
triggers an index metonymic reading of ‘garden’ as already discussed.241 While the 
Aeschylean example represents a case of grammatical amplification metonymy (the 
numeral has suffered a shift, but the noun which it would qualify in ordinary usage is 
present in the sequence), in the Hölderlin it is less obvious that ‘frommer’ (‘pious’) has been 
shifted away from ‘Platon’s’ (‘Plato’s’); the two words are closer in ordinary usage, but the 
context of the passage, in particular the subsequent index metonym, makes it difficult to 
ascertain whether the adjective literally qualifies the MT of its corresponding, tropically 
used noun or has been transferred away from ‘Plato’. In another Agamemnon passage, on 
the other hand, a grammatical index metonym, arguably, involves a degree of metonymic 
cross-fertilisation:  
εὖτ’ ἂν δὲ νυκτίπλαγκτον ἔνδροσόν τ’ ἔχω   
εὐνὴν ὀνείροις οὐκ ἐπισκοπουμέμην 
But while I keep this night-walker’s bed, wet with dew,  
[lit.: But while I keep this bed that causes wandering at night wet with dew],  
This bed of mine not watched over by dreams242 
νυκτίπλαγκτον, ‘causing to wander by night, rousing from the bed’, appears to be an 
Aeschylean coinage as it does not occur anywhere outside of his plays. In the three other 
instance of its occurrence, however, it is used to qualify a task, experience or action which 
brings this state about.243 If we take this as the word’s ‘ordinary’ usage, then the collocation 
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 See above, pp. 59-61. 
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 A. Agam. 12-13; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 Even the underlying simplex, πλαγκτός (‘wandering, roaming’), is attested only in epic and tragic poetry (viz. 
Od. 21.363, A. Agam. 593, Pers. 277, E. Supp. 961) so we cannot establish any ordinary usage for the term in 
the strict sense. It is noteworthy that Aeschylus (including the ‘Aeschylean’ Prometheus Vinctus) displays a 
particular fondness for new compound variations based on πλαγκτός (viz. A. Pr. 838: παλίμπλαγκτος, ‘back-
wandering’, ‘back-driven’; A. Pr. 467: θαλασσόπλαγκτος, ‘made to wander over the sea’, also in E. Hec. 782; A. 
Agam. 303: [ὄρος] αἰγίπλαγκτον (‘[mountain] wandered over by goats’; probably a proper name), while other 
compounds also appear in Homer (πολύπλαγκτος, ‘much-wandering’, at Od. 17.425, 511 and Il. 11.308, also in 
A. Supp. 572, S. Ant. 615, Aj. 1186, E. HF 1197), Sophocles (ἁλίπλαγκτος, ‘wandering the sea’, viz. S. Aj. 695) 
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with εὐνήν (‘bed’) constitutes a breach of ordinary collocation rules. The sentence, 
however, does not contain a noun denoting a task, experience or action from which 
νυκτίπλαγκτον might have been dissociated. It is, therefore, a grammatical index metonym 
which is either to be read as a noun itself (‘I have that which causes wandering by night’, sc. 
the duty of night guard) or from which a missing noun has to be inferred and implicitly 
supplied (‘I have <the duty of night guard> that causes me to wander at night’). The 
neighbouring adjective, ἔνδροσόν (‘dewy, wet with dew’), on the other hand, can literally 
qualify εὐνήν (‘bed’); however, given the metonymically active adjective that precedes it, 
the reading of the rest of the sequence is changed: the reader will not assume that it is 
literally the dew-induced wetness of the guard’s bed that keeps him from sleeping.244 
Instead, it is again the duty of being on guard until the small hours when the morning dew 
appears that informs the adjective (though seemingly used literally) and modifies the way it 
is understood. The bed, unvisited by dreams but covered in morning dew, is the bed not 
slept in by someone whose duty is νυκτίπλαγκτον (‘causing him to wander by night’) and 
thus keeps him from getting any sleep, by keeping him out of his bed. We have, then, an 
artful compression of an entire scene into no more than two verses, thanks to the 
metonymically used adjective νυκτίπλαγκτον, which, to use a musical analogy, states the 
key in which the rest of the passage is heard. 
 
In all of the above examples, a primary metonymic shift, namely the transfer of an adjective 
into a position of illegitimate collocation, has prompted further metonymic readings of the 
immediate context. This is markedly different from the following cases where the same 
phenomenon of an initial metonymic shift leads to secondary metaphorical interactions. 
Consider to begin with the following verses from Euripides’ Bacchae: 
                                                                                                                                                                            
and Aristophanes (ὀρείπλαγκτος, ‘wandering on mountains’, at Ar. Th. 326). However, it is difficult to draw any 
conclusion about νυκτίπλαγκτος from these compounds since they all differ in the way the simplex and the 
additional element of the compound relate to each other in the compound’s semantics: in some cases the 
prefix designates the place or manner of the wandering and in others the agent; in some cases the simplex 
conveys an intransitive notion of ‘wandering’, in others a transitive notion of ‘making wander’. Consequently, 
the only remaining frame of reference for any kind of ‘ordinary’ usage of this term in elevated poetic diction 
are the other instances in Aeschylus’ plays: νυκτίπλαγκτος ... πόνος (A. Agam. 330; ‘toil that causes to wander 
by night’, sc. nocturnal patrolling), νυκτιπλάγκτων δειμάτων πεπαλμένη (A. Ch. 524; ‘shaken by terrors that 
cause to wander by night’), and νυκτιπλάγκτων ὀρθίων κελευμάτων (A. Ch. 751; ‘shrill commands that cause 
to wander by night’) – all three trans. Sommerstein.  
244
 This lack of sleep is itself expressed metonymically in the personification of dreams watching over the bed 
(εὐνὴν ὀνείροις οὐκ ἐπισκοπουμέμην): the bed not visited by dreams is the bed not visited by sleep.  
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ἆρ’ ἐν παννυχίοις χοροῖς 
θήσω ποτὲ λευκὸν 
πόδ’ ἀναβακχεύουσα, δέραν 
αἰθέρ ἐς δροσερὸν ῥίπτουσ’, 
ὡς νεβρὸς χλοεραῖς ἐμπαί- 
ζουσα λείμακος ἡδοναῖς... 
Shall I ever in the nightlong dances 
move my white feet 
in ecstasy? Shall I toss 
my head to the dewy heaven 
like a fawn that plays 
amid green meadow delights... 245 
[lit: in the green joy of a meadow] 
Dodds remarks that ‘a colour word applied to an abstract noun is bold for a Greek poet’ and 
then seeks to mitigate the abrasiveness of this collocation by suggesting that the passage 
‘has perhaps the effect of a compound, “green-meadow-joy”’.246 Following the rules of 
ordinary collocation, χλοεραῖς (‘green’) is, of course, felt to have a closer connection with 
λείμακος (‘meadow’) than with ἡδοναῖς (‘delight, joy’), but Dodds’s reading of the sequence 
as a compound does not do justice to the actual effect of the abrasive collocation. In this 
context of a simile concerned with the energy and exuberance of life, the adjective 
χλοερός/χλωρός (‘green’) carries metaphorical overtones: the energy behind nightlong 
ecstatic dances is like the energy behind a young deer’s movements which itself is like the 
energy behind the sprouting plants that fill the meadow with green vegetation. ‘Green joy’ 
metaphorically captures this very energy with which the passage is concerned.  
 
An even more intense example of secondary metaphorical interaction triggered by 
grammatical amplification metonymy occurs in a passage from Aeschylus’ Seven Against 
Thebes: 
σὺ δ’ ὥστε ναὸς κεδνὸς οἰακοστρόφος 
φάρξαι πόλισμα, πρὶν καταιγίσαι πνοὰς 
Ἄρεως· βοᾶι γὰρ κῦμα χερσαῖον στρατοῦ  
Be like a good ship’s captain  
and make the city tight, before the squalls of war assail her  
– for this army is like a roaring land-wave – 
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 E. Ba. 862-867; trans. Kovacs. 
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 Dodds ad loc.; Dodds’s suggestion exemplifies the reading strategy that Bers refers to as the ‘compound 
theory’ of enallage; see above, p. 92. 
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[lit.: for this land-wave of an army is roaring]247 
κῦμα ... στρατοῦ (‘wave of an army’) as a description of the approaching enemy forces 
constitutes a metaphor, consistent (in typical Aeschylean mode) with the preceding imagery 
of a captain’s leadership, the city as a ship, and the squalls of war. The qualification of this 
metaphor’s vehicle, κῦμα (‘wave’), as χερσαῖον (‘from/of/on dry land) not only constitutes a 
stark clash of terminologies,248 it also leads to further metaphorical interactions: referring to 
the approaching army as a land-wave (κῦμα χερσαῖον) evokes the image of the cloud of dust 
whirled up by and preceding the approaching forces as seen from afar. Once the noun 
στρατοῦ (‘of the army’) comes into the picture, which χερσαῖον would qualify in more 
ordinary (albeit poetically elevated) usage, the reaffiliated adjective serves to underscore 
the terminological difference between the two elements linked by analogy in the primary 
metaphor, κῦμα ... στρατοῦ (‘wave of an army’): this army, in its speedy movement and 
destructive power is the terrestrial equivalent of a wave on the sea.  Another example of 
such an enhancement of an existing metaphor as a secondary effect of grammatical 
amplification metonymy occurs in the concluding verses of the same play: 
ὅδε Καδμείων ἤρυξε πόλιν 
μὴ ’νατραπῆναι μηδ’ ἀλλοδαπῷ 
κύματι φωτῶν 
κατακλυσθῆναι τὰ μάλιστα 
he did most to prevent the city of the Cadmeans 
being destroyed and overwhelmed 
by the human wave of foreigners 
[lit: by the foreign wave of men] 249 
Once again, κύματι φωτῶν (‘wave of men’) constitutes a metaphor in its own right but, once 
again, the reaffiliated adjective enhances the poetic effect: for the wave to be literally 
ἀλλοδαπῷ (‘foreign’ or, closer to the Greek, ‘from another land’) it has to have travelled 
quite a distance; hence, even in itself ἀλλοδαπῷ κύματι (‘wave from another land’) 
metaphorically points to the enemies marching against the city. 
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‘purely Pindaric’ (ibid. 144). 
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Contrast the situation in grammatical amplification metonymy when the adjective in 
question suits both nouns of the semantic unit. In such cases, an effect of ambivalent 
semantic openness, rather than a secondary effect of metaphor (or metonymy) is the 
outcome. Bers discusses a prime example in Pindar’s Tenth Olympian Ode: 
... ὦ Μοῖσ’, ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ θυγάτηρ 
Ἀλάθεια Διός, ὀρθᾷ χερί 
ἐρύκετον ψευδέων 
ἐνιπὰν ἀλιτόξενον. 
... O Muse, but you and Zeus’ daughter, 
Truth, with a correcting hand 
ward off from me the charge of harming a guest friend 
with broken promises  
[lit.: ward off from me the charge of lies  
which is a sin against a guest friend] 250 
Here, Gildersleeve interprets ἀλιτόξενον (‘sinning against one’s friend’) as transferred to 
ἐνιπὰν (‘rebuke, charge’) from ψευδέων (‘lies’), with which one would expect collocation in 
ordinary usage. He classifies this usage as ‘hypallage’ but merely remarks that this is ‘much 
more poetic than ἀλιτοξένων with ψευδέων’.251 Bers notes the ambivalence caused by this 
grammatical shift of the adjective and offers a more perceptive reading: 
Perhaps the enallage is deliberately equivocal. Taken as a transferred epithet it 
means that Pindar has been rebuked for deceits that sin against his friends; but 
following the grammatical concord, the meaning is that the rebuke itself sins 
against Pindar, who a few lines later observes that payment with interest 
satisfies a debt (9-12).252 
Another instance of such ambivalence occurs in a simile from Sophocles’ Ajax in which 
Athena compares Odysseus to a Spartan dog: 
            ... εὖ δέ σ’ ἐκφέρει 
κυνὸς Λακαίνης ὥς τις εὔρινος βάσις 
moving like a Spartan hound with keen scent 
[lit.: like a Spartan hound’s well-nosed movement] 
you travel quickly to your goal253 
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 Pi. O. 10.3-6; trans. Race. 
251
 Gildersleeve ad loc. 
252
 Bers 1974, 47. 
253
 S. Aj. 8, trans. Lloyd-Jones; this interpretation takes εὔρινος (following Jebb and Pearson ad loc.) as 
nominative singular and not as genitive singular of εὔρις as suggested by Stanford ad loc., on which basis there 
would be no reaffiliation of the adjective here. 
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On an interpretation that reaffiliates the adjective according to ordinary usage, the verse 
only compares Odysseus to a Spartan dog, proverbial for its especially keen scent. Such a 
reaffiliation, however, leaves the amplification metonym κυνὸς Λακαίνης ... βάσις 
(‘movement of a ... Spartan dog’) as a clumsy pleonasm. Yet as Bers observes, the 
juxtaposition of εὔρινος βάσις, ‘elegantly suggests the way a hunting dog’s nose determines 
his posture and gait ... and it neatly combines the dog’s movement and sniffing to balance 
Odysseus’ movement and scanning’.254 
 
A particularly striking example of ambivalence as a secondary effect of grammatical 
amplification metonymy can be found in a simile in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon where the 
chorus compares the Greek expedition against Troy under Menelaus and Agamemnon to 
birds circling over their nest: 
τρόπον αἰγυπιῶν οἵτ’ ἐκπατίοις 
ἄλγεσι παίδων ὕπατοι λεχέων 
στροφοδινοῦνται 
like birds of prey who, crazed 
by grief [lit.: in out-of-their-path grief] for their children, wheel around 
high above their eyries255 
In the context of this human-animal simile the semantic range of ἐκπατίοις is significantly 
exploited: the word has a concrete spatial dimension applicable to the animal sphere (ἐκ-
πατίοις, ‘out of the way’, hence ‘missing [from the nest]’) but also suggests an abstract 
dimension applicable to human emotions (ἐκ-πατίοις, by analogy with ἔκ-τοπος, ‘out of the 
common path’, hence, ‘extreme’).256 In the first case, ἐκπατίοις is taken as having been 
transferred from παίδων (‘children’): the nestlings are missing from their nest; in the second 
case, ἐκπατίοις is taken with the noun that it overtly qualifies, ἄλγεσι (‘grief, pain’): the birds 
are in extreme grief over their nestlings. Seeking to determine one ‘correct’ reading of the 
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 Bers 1974, 59. 
255
 Α. Αgam. 49-51; trans. Sommerstein. 
256
 Satisfactory literary-lexicographical analysis of this word is complicated by its extreme rarity: it only occurs 
here. The adverbial form, ἐκπατίως, occurs only in Erotian’s (1
st
 cent. AD) comment on Hp. Mul. 2. 171 where 
he discusses a variant of the Hippocratic text that has ἐκπατίως which he explains as: ἐκτρόπως. καὶ ... ὁδοῦ 
ἀγνοοῦντες. ἔνιοι δὲ γραφοῦσιν ἐκπάγλως (‘“turning out of the way”. And ... not knowing the way. But some 
write “exceedingly”’) The Hippocratic text itself as transmitted in the MSS., however, has ἐκπάγλως (the 
variant that Erotianus mentions: Anastassiou-Irmer 2006, 355) and therefore cannot be drawn upon as 
significant corroborative evidence for the suggested non-spatial notion. Given the scarcity of evidence, 
Fraenkel is right to state that ‘[a]s regards the meaning of ἐκπατίοις ... we cannot get beyond conjecture’ 
(Fraenkel ad loc.); we should, however, at least entertain the possibility that this is precisely the point of 
Aeschylus’ usage of this (newly coined?) term here. 
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verses obstructs an appreciation of their full poetic quality which lies precisely in the 
expression of an entire scenario, cause and effect, compressed into three words, which is 
enabled by the ambivalence that grammatical amplification metonymy can engender.257  
 
Finally, there are instances of grammatical metonymy where neither metonymic effects, nor 
metaphorical interaction nor ambiguity arises from the rearrangement of the elements 
within a semantic unit. In these cases, however, the consequence is not a hermeneutic 
collapse nor is the poetic effect one of mere bafflement. In such cases, the grammatical 
modification still takes place within an otherwise coherent semantic unit, and it is such 
cases whose effect is indeed, as Headlam noted, ‘impressionistic’: the elements of the 
sequence are still felt as belonging together, since they do belong to the same semantic 
field, even though their concrete grammatical affiliation violates the collocation rules of 
ordinary language and does not allow for a meaningful reading of the terms in their 
grammatical order (even if adjusted by metonymic or metaphorical readings of 
neighbouring terms). While the words do not constitute a coherent, plausible, linear 
sentence (either literally or if read tropically), they do constitute a verbal collage which is all 
the more expressive for its stark juxtapositions of semantically related but grammatically 
incompatible elements. Headlam’s term ‘impressionistic’ now has undesirable connotations, 
for instance of the art of Monet, which would be misleading here; however, his own 
‘impression’ of the collage-like aesthetics of this type of grammatical metonymy is insightful. 
In this light, let us consider the passage from Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes once again: 
βλαχαὶ δ’ αἱματόεσσαι  
τῶν ἐπιμαστιδίων  
ἀρτιτρεφεῖς βρέμονται  
loud, bloody screams 
rise up from infants 
fresh from the nourishing breast258 
The primary metonymic shift, which is felt in the abrasive juxtaposition of βλαχαί and 
αἱματόεσσαι, does not give rise to any secondary effect: no ambivalence arises, no 
metonymic reading of any term of the sequence is prompted, no metaphorical interaction 
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 Denniston/Page ad loc. succumb to the perennial temptation to simplify poetic ambiguity. Fraenkel 
discusses the possibility of ambiguity with greater openness but eventually prefers suspending his judgment 
rather than positively endorsing ambiguity: ‘And so the summing up must be non liquet.’ Fraenkel ad loc. 
258
 A. Sept. 348-50; trans. Sommerstein.  
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occurs. Only the entire sequence taken together allows for an acceptable reading, and the 
acceptable reading is one which includes a rectification of the grammatical shift but is still 
coloured by the collage-like effect that results from squashing a linear narration into an 
expressive assortment of otherwise grammatically uncollocatable nouns and adjectives.259 
What is true for this case of grammatical amplification metonymy also holds for 
grammatical index metonymy, as in this example from Euripides’ Trojan Women: 
σφαγαὶ δ’ ἀμφιβώμιοι 
Φρυγῶν ἔν τε δεμνίοις 
καράτομος  ἐρημία 
νεανίδων στέφανον ἔφερεν 
Ἑλλαδι κουροτρόφον, 
Φρυγῶν δὲ πατρίδι πένθος 
The slaughtering of Phrygians about the altars 
and, in our beds, desolation wrought by the headman’s blade 
[lit.: and, in our beds, beheaded absence/loneliness] 
brought a victory garland of young women  
to Greece to bear them children, 
but grief to the land of the Phrygians260 
The adjective καράτομος (‘beheaded’) is, in non-tropical (albeit poetically elevated) usage, 
collocatable only with human beings, but there is no noun in the sequence from which the 
adjective appears to be grammatically dissociated. Consequently, taken as grammatical 
index metonymy, the adjective would be read in a nominalising way: ‘and in our beds the 
absence of those who have been beheaded’ or ‘and in our beds the loneliness following the 
beheading’. On both readings, the effect is one of a verbal collage, of an expressive 
juxtaposition of different scenes – the killing around the altars, the beheadings, the empty 
beds as a consequence and domestic symbol of the loss of life – which are not 
straightforwardly explicated but dramatically (as well as grammatically) conflated and left to 
be separated by the reader. 
 
Our discussion has shown that various types of poetic effect can result from the 
grammatical reaffiliation of an adjective – instigation of metonymic readings, metaphorical 
                                                        
259
 A comparison of different available translations shows the range of possible re-associations (and 
supplementations); compare the above with ‘For the babes at their breast resound the wailing cries of young 
mothers, all streaming with blood’ (trans. Smyth) and ‘new-born infants suckling at the breast are wailing and 
screaming in their own blood.’ (trans. Collard). 
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 E. Tro. 562-567; trans. Kovacs. 
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interaction, introduction of ambivalence and collage-like compression of narrative. But it is 
important to remember that these effects are themselves the result of a grammatical shift 
within a semantic unit. This grammar-based shift, as we have argued, is in itself similar in 
kind to the sorts of shift identified in Chapters 2-3 as index and amplification metonymy, 
and the affinity entitles us to classify this phenomenon as grammatical metonymy. As the 
discussion has shown, it is arguably only a conflation of cause and (selected) effect, allied to 
the widespread tendency to describe all tropical usage as ‘metaphorical’, that has led many 
critics to associate ‘enallage’ with metaphor. 
 
Three main features of metonymy in poetic action thus emerge from our analysis of these 
three categories: 
1) The central characteristic of metonymy is the occurrence of a metonymic shift, that is, 
a lateral shift within a given, pre-existing, stable semantic field and/or semantic unit, 
facilitated either by a grammatical or a lexical deviation from ordinary usage. 
2) By contrast with metaphor (where startling poetic effects occur within the 
metaphorical compound of tenor and vehicle), the poetic effects of metonymy do not 
occur so much within (components of) the metonymic trope itself; rather, 
metonymically used words serve to create an increased potential for engagement with 
the context on the part of the metonymic vehicle. Such engagement can take various 
forms, but whatever the effects, they are epiphenomena of the primary metonymic 
shift; since that shift is ultimately based on linkages established by ordinary usage, it 
remains too close to ordinary usage to lead to stark effects in and of itself. 
3) Insofar as metaphor can be understood (with Brooke-Rose) as an ultimately verb-
centred phenomenon (the full implicit tertium comparationis always being an action 
or state of being), metonymy can be said to be a noun-based phenomenon, with the 
defamiliarisation which it constitutes always ultimately relatable to nouns. Here, it 
would seem, we have literary-linguistic evidence to substantiate Jakobson’s assertion 
of a bipolar order of the tropical space: the metaphorical and the metonymic poles as 
the basic principles of tropical language are in complementary distribution in their 
respective association with verbs and nouns, and correlate respectively with 
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predicates and subjects as the basic principles around which ordinary language use is 
structured.261 
 
Building on these principles, we shall now go on to investigate cases where tropical status is 
in various ways complicated. The questions to be considered will be: how should we best 
theorise clusters of metaphorical and metonymic tropes in direct interaction and 
interdependence? how should we theorise instances of conditional metonymy? what are 
we to say of instances that are felt to carry a surplus of meaning along the lines of index 
metonymy but which are perfectly compatible with ordinary usage? how does 
personification relate to metaphor and metonymy? and finally, is synecdoche to be 
understood as a subcategory of metaphor or of metonymy?  
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 However, this binary opposition is not as neat as it may appear. If metaphor is verb-centred, then its verb-
quality is of a semantic nature: metaphor is verb-centred insofar as verbs are the principle conveyors of action, 
and the similarity or analogy of actions lies at the heart of metaphor. Metonymy, on the other hand, is noun-
based in the grammatical sense that nouns, as a part of speech, are always at the centre of its poetic 
mechanisms and effects. 
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5. Complications and Complexities 
Our starting point was the paradoxical co-existence of two incompatible conceptualisations 
of the tropical space: Jakobson’s suggestion of a bipolar order centred on an assumed 
opposition of metaphor and metonymy on the one hand, and the prevalent tendency of 
(modern) rhetoric towards metaphor monism as diagnosed by Genette on the other. The 
establishment of several distinct categories of metonymy over the course of Chapters 2-4 
and the comparison of our findings with theories of metaphor have confirmed thus far that 
there is a fundamental difference in kind between the two tropes. Again and again we have 
seen confusion arise in the critical literature when ‘metaphor’/’metaphorical’ is used in a 
loose, indiscriminate way to denote deviant, tropical usage rather than metaphor proper; or 
else when secondary metaphorical effects overshadow less prominent, yet structurally more 
fundamental metonymic shifts which make such secondary metaphorical interactions 
possible in the first place. In this chapter, which concludes our proposal for a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of metonymy, we shall take account of a series of complicating 
factors and consider their creative potential. 
 
5.1. Tropical Clusters  
The attentive reader will already have noticed that in a fair number of examples discussed 
above metonyms occur jointly with metaphors.262 In this section, we shall examine a 
selection of instances of this kind in order to assess how such joint occurrence impacts on 
the perception of both tropes and how they affect one another. Our analysis of their 
engagement with each other will also help us distinguish such co-occurrences from cases of 
‘conditional metonymy’, discussed further below (5.2), where a metonymic understanding 
of a term or sequence of terms depends on the interpretation of other terms or sequences.  
 
Let us begin with a straightforward example from Sophocles’ Antigone: 
καὶ τοῦτον ἂν τὸν ἄνδρα θαρσοίην ἐγὼ 
καλῶς μὲν ἄρχειν, εὖ δ᾽ ἂν ἄρχεσθαι θέλειν, 
δορός τ᾽ ἂν ἐν χειμῶνι προστεταγμένον 
μένειν δίκαιον κἀγαθὸν παραστάτην. 
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This is the man whom I would trust  
to be a good ruler and a good subject,  
and when assigned his post in the storm of the battle  
[lit.: and when assigned his post in the storm of the spear] 
to prove a true and noble comrade in the fight.263 
Having outlined his conviction that the same strict principles need to govern both the 
private and the public sphere, Creon here describes the ideal citizen’s behaviour in both 
peace and war as the result of adherence to these principles. His particular attention is 
given to bravery, loyalty and steadfastness in the heat of the battle which is captured in v. 
670 with the words δορός τ᾽ ἂν ἐν χειμῶνι (‘in the storm of the spear’). This sequence of 
words comprises both metaphorical and metonymic elements. The metaphorical vehicle, 
χειμῶνι, likens the chaos and assaults on the battlefield to a storm, with the effect that the 
principled citizen-soldier’s steadfastness amidst such brutal, elemental forces shines out 
even more. However, the metaphor is not confined to this term alone. The full metaphorical 
sequence, which belongs to the type that Brooke-Rose classifies as metaphors based on a 
genitive link, also includes δορός. By means of this genitive link, the metaphor brings the 
tenor terminology of war, which is at issue here, into interaction with the extraneous 
terminology of a meteorological phenomenon. The effect is the characteristic surplus in 
meaning and associations introduced by metaphor, here especially the pointed contrast 
between the untamed, volatile forces of nature and the principled steadfastness of the good 
citizen. This δορός, however, involves a metonymic shift. While the tenor terminology in this 
sequence is the terminology of war, and δορός undoubtedly belongs to it, we note that the 
single spear effectively evokes various weapons (arrows, swords, etc),264 various combat 
actions, and hence the battlefield and battle in general. In other words, δορός is used as an 
index metonym and introduces via its semantic field a broad range of terms from the 
terminology of war. While the metaphor thus introduces extraneous terminology to convey 
what is at issue in a new light, the metonymic usage of a term from the metaphor’s tenor 
terminology extends this term’s semantic scope and thereby saturates the sequence with an 
array of further, implied terms from that terminology. The two tropes overlap as far as the 
terms involved are concerned but they remain autonomous in their mechanisms; that is to 
say, they co-occur but they do not depend on one another: the metaphor would still be a 
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 S. Ant. 668-671; trans. Lloyd-Jones. 
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 In this sense, δορός is, in fact, a double metonym: the singular ‘spear’ implying a plural, and ‘spears’ 
implying various other weapons.  
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metaphor if we removed the metonym (for instance, ‘stand his ground in the storm of war’) 
and the metonym would still be a metonym if we removed the metaphor (for instance, 
‘stand his ground under the onslaught ... of the spear’). Yet, while both tropes remain 
structurally independent, their poetic effects mutually influence each other and this 
interaction shapes the aesthetics of the tropical cluster as a whole. One notes, on 
distributional evidence, that χειμών of encounters with adverse forces gives every 
impression of being literary cliché.265 Juxtaposition with the metonymically used δορός, 
however, although in itself also clichéd,266 reinvigorates (let us suggest) the defamiliarising 
quality of both terms in their deviance from ordinary usage: by metonymically focusing the 
general actions and forces of the battlefield on a specific missile, some aspects of the 
metaphor’s underlying analogy are strengthened and foregrounded. Even though χειμών 
(‘winter, wintry and stormy weather, storm’) does not denote rain in a direct way as, for 
instance, ὄμβρος (‘rain, rain-storm’) does, it is frequently collocated with words denoting 
rain or snow so that, as a weather condition, it appears at least to imply the likelihood or 
possibility of some sort of precipitation.267 The metonym supplies a term that enhances an 
aspect of the analogy on which the metaphor is based. With a more abstract term, say, ‘the 
storm of battle’ (as in Lloyd-Jones’s translation of this sequence), the metaphor is centred 
on the comparability of the enormous, adverse forces which threaten to overpower the 
individual in both a hostile climate and on the battlefield. Thanks to the metonym, however, 
the focus shifts from abstract forces and a general threat to the more concrete exposure to 
damage, descent and speed. Although the two tropes are independent in their mechanisms, 
their participation in a tropical cluster and the resulting dynamics of their interaction create 
a new (more heightened) effect overall. 
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 Cf. A. Ch. 202, 1066, A. Pr. 643 and S. Aj. 207; also of battle vel sim. at Pi. I. 7.39 and B. 13.140. Its 
occurrence and usage at Hp. Dent. 12 ἐν τῷ ὀδοντοφυεῖν χειμῶνας ἔχει (‘to have storms [sc. trouble] in cutting 
teeth’) and Hp. Flat. 14 παύονται τῆς νούσου καὶ τοῦ παρεόντος χειμώνος (‘their disease and present affliction 
come to an end’) suggests that we might even be dealing here with ‘dead metaphor’ which has already passed 
into ordinary usage – except that (a) the word is largely restricted to verse (see LSJ s.v.) and (b) Hp. Dent. may 
well be post-classical (see Silk 1974, 84). 
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 Cf. e.g. Il. 16.57, 708, Th. 1.128, A. Eum. 773, S. OC 1525; Dindorf 1831-1865 s.v. gives a list of the term’s 
occurrences in this usage and summarises: frequentissimus apud Tragicos hic usus vocabuli, ut Pugnam aut 
Pugnantes s. Exercitium significet (‘this usage of the term is most frequent among the tragedians, to signify 
‘battle’ or ‘fighters’ and ‘army’). 
267
 Cf. Il. 3.4, Od. 4.566, 14.522, Hes. Op.675, Th. 3.21. 
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The same phenomenon occurs later on in the play when the chorus praises Antigone’s 
punishment as a glorious death: 
οὐκοῦν κλεινὴ καὶ ἔπαινον ἔχουσ᾽ 
ἐς τόδ᾽ ἀπέρχῃ κεῦθος νεκύων; 
οὔτε φθινάσιν πληγεῖσα νόσοις 
οὔτε ξιφέων ἐπίχειρα λαχοῦσ᾽ 
Is it not with glory and with praise that you 
depart to this cavern of the dead? 
Not smitten by wasting maladies 
nor paid the wages of the sword 
[lit.: nor having obtained wages of swords]268 
The οὔτε ... οὔτε (‘neither ... nor’) construction in vv. 819-820 presents, in marked 
parallelism, two causes of death which are deemed less noteworthy than the death 
Antigone is facing: death by natural causes, i.e. disease, and death in combat or by a violent 
attack. Neither of the two verses is straightforwardly literal: πληγεῖσα νόσοις is, like the 
English ‘struck down by disease’, notionally a metaphor but one that has become clichéd 
and has passed into ordinary usage, and is therefore no longer tropical.269 ξιφέων ἐπίχειρα 
λαχοῦσ᾽, on the other hand, has a stronger tropical feel to it – despite the fact that one 
element of the tropical cluster is, again, clichéd. In terms of etymology, ἐπίχειρα points to 
the wage earned through manual labour; however, even in prose usage it tends to be used 
to convey a ‘reward’ in a more abstract sense, namely the consequence of certain actions or 
behaviour.270 In a negative sense, it is also used to refer to a punishment received.271 What 
is at issue in this verse might be expressed in more ordinary language as ‘having suffered the 
(fatal) consequences of physical violence (that is: death)’. Whether ἐπίχειρα is understood 
as ‘wages’, ‘rewards’, or ‘punishment’ – ξιφέων (‘of swords’) is used here as an index 
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 S. Ant. 817-820; trans. Lloyd-Jones. 
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 Passive forms of the verb are frequently used to convey being affected negatively by external forces or 
events (in the sense of ‘receiving a blow’), cf. Hdt. 5.120, 8.130, Th. 4.108, 8.38. The combination of the verb’s 
participle in passive voice with a noun in the dative to indicate the source or kind of the harm incurred can be 
found in both prose and poetic usage, e.g. Hdt. 1.41: συμφορῇ πεπληγμένον, A. Ch. 31: ξυμφοραῖς 
πεπληγμένων (‘struck by misfortune’) and Simon. 103a7-8: μέγα δ’ ἔστενεν Ἀσὶς ὑπ’ αὐτῶι πληγεῖσ’ 
ἀμφοτέραις χερσὶ κράτει πολέμου (‘Asia groaned loudly when struck with both hands by them with the 
strength of war’; trans. Campbell). 
270
 Cf. Pl. Resp. 608c: τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς (‘the greatest rewards of virtue’) and D.[?] Ep. 3.38: γῆρας 
καὶ φυγὴν ἐπίχειρα τῶν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πεπονημένων ἔχων (‘with old age and exile as a reward for my labouring 
on your behalf’); we find the same usage in comedy (Ar. V. 581), lyric poetry (Pi. Pae. 14.31) as well as later 
prose (Plb. 8.12.5). 
271
 Cf. Antiph. 1.20: ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἡ μὲν διακονήσασα καὶ χειρουργήσασα ἔχει τὰ ἐπίχειρα ὧν ἀξία ἦν, οὐδὲν αἰτία 
οὖσα (‘In atonement, the subordinate who carried out the deed has been punished as she deserved, although 
the crime in no sense originated from her’; trans. Maidment). See also A. Pr. 321. 
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metonym since in neither of the three cases can we draw on the word’s literal meaning in 
ordinary usage. Instead, we note the characteristic metonymic shift which compresses an 
armed attack of any kind (assassination, battle, etc.) involving any kind of weapon into one 
single word.  
 
Again, we would argue, the resulting whole is more than the sum of its parts. The tropical 
cluster of a metonym and ‘dead’ metaphor adds up to a wholly unexpected collocation, 
which, furthermore, introduces a suggestion of those people who literally live off ξιφέων 
ἐπίχειρα: mercenaries, assassins and henchmen.272 The juxtaposition of the metonymic 
ξιφέων with the ‘dead’ metaphor ἐπίχειρα gives rise to a joint impression of both terms in 
which the semantic potential of ἐπίχειρα is in effect reactivated and made fully present. 
Thereby, the chorus offers its qualified praise: Antigone’s is not an ignoble, violent death, at 
the hands of unworthy hirelings.  
 
For a more complex tropical cluster, involving multiple metaphors and metonyms, consider 
the allusion to the famous riddle of the sphinx in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon: 
τό θ᾽ ὑπέργηρων  φυλλάδος ἤδη  
κατακαρφομένης τρίποδας μὲν ὁδοὺς 
στείχει 
 While extreme old age, its leaves already  
 Withering, walks its way 
 On three feet  
 [lit.: walks its three-legged path]273 
In these verses we find several separate but mutually illuminating tropes: τὸ ὑπέργηρων is 
an abstract term (‘extreme old age’) and is followed by a genitive absolute, φυλλάδος ἤδη 
κατακαρφομένης (‘leaves already withering’) which metaphorically illustrates it: old age, in 
particular the physical decline that comes with it, is implicitly compared to a withered 
plant.274 Next comes the unexpected collocation of τρίποδας and ὁδούς. τρίπους in ordinary 
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 There is no acknowledgement of this implication in the commentaries, which treat the ‘violent death’ as if it 
specifically pointed to the free citizen’s death on the battlefield in defence of his polis – which would make 
their praise of Antigone less equivocal than it is. 
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 A. Agam. 79-81; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 Note that, given the absolute construction, there is no grammatical or syntactical link between the abstract 
concept and the metaphorical vehicle – metaphor is established in the reading process (a) because a non-
metaphorical reading would make it impossible to integrate the vehicle terms into the reading of the 
sequence, and (b) because of the perceptible underlying logic of analogy. With its prominent position at the 
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usage mainly denotes objects with three legs but there is also evidence for its usage 
qualifying distances measuring three feet.275 Only in one instance, in Hesiod’s Works and 
Days, is it used in direct collocation with ‘human’ terminology: 
... τότε δὴ τρίποδι βροτῷ ἶσοι,  
οὗ τ᾽ ἐπὶ νῶτα ἔαγε, κάρη δ᾽ εἰς οὖδας ὁρᾶται  
Then they are like the three-legged man  
whose curved back bends around –  
his head habitually is turned; he gazes on the  ground276  
The same metaphorical play on man leaning on a crutch as a ‘third leg’ in his old age stands 
behind both of these instances, but the Aeschylean passages integrates this metaphor into a 
larger, more complex image. While the first part of the sequence conjoins the abstract 
‘extreme old age’ to a metaphorical illustration of that abstraction, the second part of the 
sequence features an adjective (τρίποδας, ‘three-legged’) that is terminologically 
incompatible with its governing noun (ὁδοὺς, ‘paths’) and introduces a verb (στείχει, 
‘walks’) that is incompatible with the governing subject which opened the sentence (τὸ 
ὑπέργηρων, ‘extreme old age’). In ordinary usage, στείχει assumes a human as its governing 
subject while τρίπους requires a material object (unless conceivably allusion to Hesiod 
permits extension to a person). The outcome of these abrasive collocations is that τὸ 
ὑπέργηρων is understood, retrospectively, as an index metonym (‘abstract for concrete’ in 
rhetorical handbook-speak): what is at issue turns out not to be old age but an old person. 
Once the verb στείχει prompts an index-metonymical understanding of τὸ ὑπέργηρων and a 
compatible term such as ‘old person/s’ is implicitly supplied, the metaphorical adjective 
τρίποδας is reaffiliated to the implied governing subject: ‘a three-legged old person’, sc. ‘an 
old person using a crutch’. As we have established in Chapter 4, such a reaffiliation of an 
adjective is to be understood as grammatical metonymy: a shift in the grammatical status 
and/or affiliation of an adjective. Our earlier discussion of this phenomenon prompted us to 
differentiate between grammatical-amplification metonymy (the term from which the 
adjective has been transferred is present in the sequence) and grammatical-index 
metonymy (the term from which the adjective has been transferred needs to be inferred 
                                                                                                                                                                            
beginning of the sentence, τὸ ὑπέργηρων sets the tone, and all subsequent information is aligned to the now 
designated tenor. 
275
 Cf. for the former e.g. X. An. 7.3.21, Th. 1.132, Lys. 21.2 and Hdt. 9.81, and for the latter Hdt. 3.60, Pl. Men. 
83e, Tht. 147d. 
276
Hes. Op. 533-534; trans. Schlegel/Weinfield. I give the Greek text according to the MSS. and follow West ad 
loc. in seeing no need for emendation here. 
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and supplemented). In the case under review, the term from which the adjective τρίποδας 
has been dissociated is both present and absent: in the form of the index metonym τὸ 
ὑπέργηρων, with the adjective transferred only from the implied metonymic tenor.  
 
The outcomes of this complex cluster are complex in their turn. One is a greater cohesion of 
the passage in the sense that it integrates the more concrete notion of a person in old age 
(which is supported and indeed demanded by the tropes in the second part of the 
sequence) with the more abstract focus on old age as such. A further, and more important 
consequence is the way the switch from abstract to concrete is ‘timed’ by the metonyms 
that follow. This is of particular importance for the metaphor that represents old age as a 
withered plant. By casting old age as a plant, the metaphor inevitably evokes the static 
aspect of ageing – which would seem incongruous and even comic, given the way the 
sequence (with the walking on three legs) continues. It is the retrospective reading of τὸ 
ὑπέργηρων as an index metonym which avoids this by allowing the genitive absolute to 
make a metaphorical statement about ‘old age’, in plant terminology, before moving on to 
the next metaphor, ‘walking on three legs’; this metaphor now invites reference to the 
metonymic tenor ‘old person/s’ and thus averts any tonal clash between the two 
metaphors. The (retrospective) index metonym serves a function that in Chapter 2 we 
characterised as ‘pivotal’:277 the term in question can be understood both literally and 
metonymically, and thereby allows a smooth transition between two terminological spheres 
in a given sequence. We will return to a related phenomenon, that of ‘conditional 
metonymy’ (that is, instances where a term may or may not be read as a metonym), 
below.278 For now, let it suffice to note the way a tropical cluster creates a more Protean 
and yet at the same time much more dense impression of what is at issue. 
 
The parodos of Sophocles’ Antigone also contains a grand example of the effects of 
oscillation and condensation that arise from tropical clusters. The chorus of Theban elders 
celebrate their victory and the retreat of the enemy, and a whole array of tropes (as well as 
other literary devices) is used in their description of the recent events: 
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 See above, pp. 50. 
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 See below, pp. 124-129. 
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ἀκτὶς ἀελίου, τὸ κάλ- 
λιστον ἑπταπύλῳ φανὲν 
Θήβᾳ τῶν προτέρων φάος, 
ἐφάνθης ποτ’, ὦ χρυσέας 
ἁμέρας βλέφαρον, Διρκαί- 
ων ὑπὲρ ῥεέθρων μολοῦσα, 
τὸν λεύκασπιν Ἀργόθεν 
φῶτα βάντα πανσαγίᾳ 
φυγάδα πρόδρομον ὀξυτόρῳ 
κινήσασα χαλινῷ· 
ὃς ἐφ’ ἡμετέρα γῇ Πολυνείκους 
ἀρθεὶς νεικέων ἐξ ἀμφιλόγων 
ὀξέα κλάζων 
αἰετὸς ἐς γῆν ὣς ὑπερέπτα, 
λευκῆς χιόνος πτέρυγι στεγανὸς 
πολλῶν μεθ’ ὅπλων 
ξύν θ’ ἱπποκόμοις κορύθεσσιν. 
στὰς δ’ ὑπὲρ μελάθρων φονώ- 
σαισιν ἀμφιχανὼν κύκλῳ 
λόγχαις ἑπτάπυλον στόμα 
ἔβα, πρίν ποθ’ ἁμετέρων 
αἱμάτων γένυσιν πλησθῆ- 
ναί τε καὶ στεφάνωμα πύργων 
πευκάενθ’ Ἥφαιστον ἑλεῖν. 
τοῖος ἀμφὶ νῶτ’ ἐτάθη 
πάταγος  Ἄρεος, ἀντιπάλῳ 
δυσχείρωμα δράκοντος. 
Beam of the sun,  
fairer than all that have shone before  
for seven-gated Thebes,  
finally you shone forth, 
eye of golden day,  
coming over the streams of Dirce,  
you who have moved off  
in headlong flight  
the man with white shield  
that came from Argos in his panoply,  
with a bridle of constraint that pierced him sharply,  
him that was raised up against our land  
by the contentious quarrels of Polynices,  
and flew to our country,  
loudly screaming like an eagle  
sheathed in snow-white pinion,  
with many weapons and with helmets,  
ringing round the seven gates  
with spears that longed for blood;  
but he went before  
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his jaws had been glutted with our gore  
and the fire-god’s pine-fed flame had taken  
the walls that crown our city.  
Such was the din of battle  
stretched about his back,  
hard for the dragon’s adversary to vanquish.279 
The chorus opens emphatically with an apostrophe to the light of the day which sees the 
flight of the enemy. Already this opening sequence is rich in tropes: the day is addressed 
through what initially appears to be an amplification metonym (ἀκτὶς ἀελίου, ‘beam of the 
sun’280 – seemingly simply for ‘sun’) but emerges later, as the sequence continues, as an 
index metonym: at issue is the long-awaited (day of) victory, not the sunlight. This 
metonymic tenor, to which the opening apostrophe eventually points, re-appears in the 
second apostrophe where ‘day’ appears as part of a familiar metaphor (ὦ χρυσέας | ἁμέρας 
βλέφαρον, ‘eye of golden day’281). The multiple metonymic shifts effect a focus on the 
splendour of this day: all is radiance and light on this day of victory. In addition to the tropes, 
this emphasis is also supported by the assonance in φανὲν... φάος... ἐφάνθης... βλέφαρον 
(vv. 101-104). The whole field of ‘light’ terminology (pointing to the radiant day of triumph) 
is then connected to the actual military triumph through the participle κινήσασα (‘move’, 
‘set in motion’): the day of victory is now personified and attributed agency, as if the day (or 
was it the sun?) itself had driven away the enemy, rather than the combating forces fighting 
on that day. Yet more important for what interests us here is the depiction of the enemy. 
The enemy is first introduced as  
τὸν λεύκασπιν Ἀργόθεν  
ἐκβάντα φῶτα πανσαγίᾳ  
the man with white shield that came from Argos  
in his white panoply282 
and is, as such, markedly under-determined. Commentators ponder: ‘Has τὸν λεύκασπιν ... 
φῶτα to be understood in a collective sense or is Polyneices himself (or Adrastus) 
                                                        
279
 S. Ant. 100-126; trans. Lloyd-Jones. 
280
 S. Ant. 100; trans. Lloyd-Jones. These opening words (literally) echo those of Pindar’s Ninth Paean; see 
Griffith ad loc.  
281
 S. Ant. 103-104; trans. Lloyd-Jones. Variations on sun and moon as the ‘eye’ of heaven are frequently used 
in poetry, cf. e.g. Il. 3.277: Ἠέλιός θ᾽, ὃς πάντ᾽ ἐφορᾷς (‘Helios, who looks down on everthing’), S. Ant. 879-880: 
λάμπαδος ... ὄμμα (‘the eye of light’), E. Phoen. 543: νυκτός τ᾽ ἀφεγγὲς βλέφαρον (‘the sightless eye of the 
night’), Ar. Nub. 285: ὄμμα ... αἰθέρος (‘the eye of the aether’). See also Davidson 1983, 41-43. For βλέφαρον 
(as metonymic cliché) for ‘eye’, see e.g. S. Aj. 85 and Tr. 107. 
282
 S. Ant. 106-107; trans. Lloyd-Jones. 
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meant?’283 The sequence is clearly metonymic and implies a whole range of possible 
metonymic tenors. A few verses on, a relative clause qualifies ‘the man’ as ὃς ἐφ᾽ ἡμετέρᾳ 
γᾷ Πολυνείκους | ἀρθεὶς νεικέων ἐξ ἀμφιλόγων (‘[who] was raised up against our land by 
the contentious quarrels of Polyneices’284), which makes it retrospectively impossible that 
φῶτα refers to Polyneices (at least for now), but still leaves φῶτα hovering between 
Adrastus, king of Argos (persuaded by Polyneices to lead an army against Thebes) or 
(singular for plural) the whole army itself. Ambiguity is further increased when immediately 
after the relative clause a simile is introduced: vv. 113-114 compare ‘the man’ to an eagle, 
highlighting the loud cry (of the warrior and the bird) and the white colour (of the shield and 
the feathers) as particular points of comparison.285 The subsequent verses are then marked 
by a constant movement back and forth between terminology compatible with only the 
tenor of the simile or the vehicle. Immediately after the eagle simile a further qualification is 
added through a prepositional construction: πολλῶν μεθ᾽ ὅπλων | ξύν θ᾽ ἱπποκόμοις 
κορύθεσσιν (‘with many weapons and with helmets with horsehair plumes.’286). The direct 
juxtaposition with the eagle creates a particularly abrasive effect since, owing to the plural, 
this additional description is not literally compatible with either constituent of the simile. 
The abrasiveness is reconciled semantically by our retrospectively understanding the 
ambiguous φῶτα (‘man’) as metonymically referring to the entire enemy army (which 
literally comes with many weapons and helmets); on the imagistic level, however, this 
juxtaposition sets the tone for a conflation of animal and military terminology that evokes 
single monstrous, belligerent entity. By the time the simile-clause comes to an end, the 
animal terminology has become metaphorical. Yet because it is so closely interwoven with 
the tenor terminology of the enemy army and because this interrelation is sustained for so 
long, the impression created is of an extended merging rather than a punctual similarity.287 
 
This impression of a merging into a polymorphous monster allows for various terminological 
sleights, both in terms of further metaphorical deviations from the more specific vehicle 
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 Kamerbeek ad loc. 
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 S. Ant. 110-111; trans. Lloyd-Jones. 
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 For the poetic tradition of comparing an army or individual warriors to birds or animals of prey, see 
Davidson 1983, 43-44. 
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 S. Ant. 115-116; trans. Lloyd-Jones. 
287
 Cf. Burton 1980, 93. The overall effect is akin to (though not entirely analysable in strict terms of) what Silk 
calls ‘intrusion’; see Silk 1974, 138-149. 
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terminology of the bird of prey (from the initial eagle-simile), and in terms of metonymic 
specifications. Thus, v. 117 (στὰς δ’ ὑπὲρ μελάθρων...) remains consistent with eagle-
terminology and can be read as describing a bird of prey hovering over the city and about to 
swoop down in attack; but the following verses introduce terminology that adds new 
complications:  
[φονώ]σαισιν ἀμφιχανὼν κύκλῳ 
λόγχαις ἑπτάπυλον στόμα 
he gaped around our sevenfold portals  
with spears thirsting for blood288 
The complication arises from the abrasive juxtaposition of ἀμφιχανών (‘gaping wide’) and 
κύκλῳ (in effect ‘surrounding’) which are incompatible in any ordinary usage. Without 
ἀμφιχανών, the sequence more or less literally describes the army surrounding Thebes, the 
metonymic cliché ‘spears’ implying weaponry in general.  With ἀμφιχανὼν, however, a 
continuing impression of animal terminology suggests the open mouth of an attacking 
beast. This impression is supported by the addition of στόμα (‘mouth’, ‘entrance’, 
‘opening’). Although the preceding epithet ἑπτάπυλον (‘seven-gated’) makes clear that the 
famous entrance gates of Thebes are at issue here,289 the mere presence of the term στόμα 
reinforces a parallel impression of gaping jaws.290 This, however, stretches the implicit 
analogy with the eagle: how far can a gaping mouth ‘with blood-thirsty spears’ still be 
comparable to an eagle’s? In other words: within the context of a beast-army metaphor, the 
combination of ‘spears’ and ‘mouth’ more immediately suggests ‘teeth’, and thus a beast of 
a different kind. The rapid – clashing – progression from the image of an eagle pausing in 
mid-air above the city to the notion of an army surrounding the city seems indeed to give us 
a sudden impression of an approaching monster, growing and changing its form as it draws 
nearer.  
 
A new complication arises a few verses later: 
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 S. Ant. 117-118; trans. Jebb. 
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 For this poetic code, see e.g. Il. 1.505, Od. 11.263, Hes. Op. 162, Sc. 49, A. Sept. 165. 
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 The usage of στόμα in the singular is of key importance for this association, alongside the word’s literal-
denotative function. Müller ad loc. also notes the relevance of the singular but goes too far when he argues 
that ‘[t]he metaphor requires that the bloodthirsty spears correspond to the bloodthirsty throat of the eagle. 
The metaphor also explains the singular of στόμα: it is the mouth of the bird.’ (‘Die Metaphorik will, daß dem 
blutrünstigen Rachen des Adlers die blutgierigen Speere entsprechen. Aus der Metaphorik erklärt sich auch 
der Singular στόμα: es ist das Maul des Vogels.’). It is not that στόμα ‘is’ the mouth of the eagle; rather, it 
facilitates its evocation. 
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ἔβα, πρίν ποθ᾽ ἁμετέρων 
αἱμάτων γένυσιν πλησθῆναί 
but he went, before his 
jaws had been glutted with our gore291 
Kamerbeek comments that ‘“jaw” remains within the imagery (but note that γένυς is also 
used of the “edge” of an axe).’292 The interpretation is tempting, but problematic. If we 
follow Kamerbeek, we have here another instance of a movement between the 
metaphorical beast terminology and literal army terminology, this time within the ambiguity 
played out in a single word: depending on the interpretation, γένυσιν could be associated 
with either. We should note, however, that the usage of γένυς as ‘(the edge of) an axe’ not 
only appears to be specifically Sophoclean but also is only attested in plays (probably) 
written after the Antigone, so that (if our lexicographical data are at least representative) 
this poet-specific usage cannot have informed the understanding of a contemporary 
audience.293 Yet what can be safely assumed is that both in ordinary usage and elevated 
poetic usage, γένυς is always used of humans and other mammals; in no other attested 
instance in classical Greek is it used to refer to the beak of a bird.294 Consequently, we have 
here too an extension of the initial eagle simile (and the eagle metaphor) to a broader 
monstrous enemy that acquires alarmingly unpredictable animal and human traits. 
 
The key point for our assessment of metonymy in tropical clusters is that the seemingly 
innocent oscillation of φῶτα (‘man’) between an individual warrior and the army as a 
collective entity is essential to the various conformations of the passage’s main conceit. All 
the ambiguities that follow from the Protean representations of the enemy would – one 
surmises – fall apart and become mere awkward contradictions, were they not held 
together by this opening metonym which, from the outset, introduces the co-presence of a 
single warrior and the entire army as simultaneously available points of reference. At the 
opening of the parodos the first metaphor is centred on the vehicle ὀξυτέρῳ κινήσασα 
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 This usage is only attested in S. El. 196 and Ph. 1205. 
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χαλινῷ (‘urging him with a swifter/sharper bit’295). Both the subject and the object of this 
participle are themselves metonyms: the ‘beam of the sun’ (and later the ‘eye(lid) of day’) 
on the one hand, and the ‘man’ on the other. The particularising metonymic focus on a 
‘man’, manoeuvred away by the sun, using a ‘bit’, creates a concentrated representation of 
what is at issue: the enemy army driven to retreat on the day of victory. The eagle simile, 
again, initially draws on the individualised ‘man’, and particular points of similarity (cries and 
white attributes) are highlighted to sharpen the comparison. Yet the simile is soon opened 
up to encompass the entire army, and the sustained animal terminology that follows also 
points to the army as collective entity: it is the army’s many spears and its ability, as a 
collective, to surround the city (κύκλῳ) that creates the resemblance to a gigantic monster 
set to devour the city which the various metaphorical terms exploit. While the ‘man’, as it 
were, expands into an army, the eagle expands into a polymorphous monster (although, as 
we have seen, both also move back to focus on particular points of contact that draw on the 
singular). After this remarkably vivid and detailed elaboration of the attack on the city, the 
passage moves in the opposite direction, towards emblematic abstraction, and it is again 
metonyms that facilitate both the shift into abstraction and the linking of those abstractions 
with the preceding imagery. The move towards abstraction occurs in the last sentence of 
the first part of the parodos and marks the end of the heightened sequence; after this point, 
the language becomes more direct again: 
τοῖος ἀμφὶ νῶτ᾽ ἐτάθη 
πάταγος Ἄρεος, ἀντιπάλῳ  
δυσχείρωμα δράκοντος. 
Such was the din of battle 
Stretched about his back,  
Hard for the dragon’s adversary to vanquish.296 
In this concluding sequence, we observe a move back to the focusing singular, with 
δράκοντος (‘dragon’ or ‘snake’) representing one single opponent that has not been 
overcome by the attacker. The snake does not appear until the end of the antistrophe and 
receives none of the great elaboration which the eagle has been afforded in the preceding 
verses.297 However, its occurrence here serves an important function in that it translates the 
animal terminology, first introduced by the simile and then maintained by various 
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 S. Ant. 124-126; trans. Lloyd-Jones. 
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metaphors, onto a much more abstract level and thereby brings it to a conclusion. How is 
this achieved? Kamerbeek comments: ‘δράκοντος as a metonymy for the Theban army is 
not strange and for a moment the battle is seen as a fight between eagle and δράκων 
[‘snake’].’298 Eagle and snake are traditional enemies in epic similes;299 the association of 
Argos with the eagle has been impressively manufactured in the earlier verses; and the 
association of Thebes with the snake (or ‘dragon’) is traditional.300 After unfolding the 
military confrontation in great detail and with sustained usage of animal terminology, the 
passage here ‘zooms out’ again, as it were, and presents the bigger picture, a confrontation 
between (the armies of) two cities, through their metonymic representatives. The Argive 
eagle’s inability to overcome the Theban snake thus frames and concludes the first part of 
the parodos, and again we note that φῶτα (‘man’) is of central importance for this effect, as 
the element that first introduced a particularising focus. Taken together, then, our several 
observations on this long passage demonstrate the way a seemingly trivial metonym within 
a tropical cluster can create and facilitate poetic effects out of all proportion to the seeming 
triviality of the metonym itself. 
 
5.2. Conditional Metonymy 
The ‘complications’ discussed in this chapter thus far involve the joint occurrence of 
structurally independent metaphors and metonyms in tropical clusters; each trope’s poetic 
effects and reverberations influence the perception of neighbouring tropes and of the 
cluster as a whole. In this section, we turn to cases in which a term may or may not be read 
as a metonym, that is to say, where the tropical status of a term is conditional on one 
possible interpretation of the sequence in which it occurs. Silk has observed a corresponding 
phenomenon in metaphor: 
By ‘conditional metaphor’ I mean metaphor whose existence is implied by one, 
and only one, of two possible interpretations, when by the other interpretation 
no metaphor is in question, but either some other trope (usually metonymy) or 
no trope at all. The metaphor is, therefore, not inescapably ‘there’ but 
conditional on a given interpretation. It is not characteristic of such instances 
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 It recurs later in the play in vv. 1124-1124; Jebb ad loc. refers to S. OC 1534 and the mythical origin of the 
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that the alternatives are exclusive (either/or); rather that the fact of an 
alternative is the basic datum (both/and).301  
In what follows, we shall seek to establish whether the same is the case with metonymy and 
consider what insights regarding the relationship of metaphor and metonymy can be gained 
from an examination of instances in which internal ambiguities or the presence of another 
trope determine the status of a given term as metonymic, metaphorical or literal.  
 
An example of such ambiguity can be found in Hölderlin’s poem ‘Griechenland’. The poem 
opens with a meditation on what it would have been like to live with the beloved, whom the 
poem addresses, in ancient Greece. The stanza quoted below marks the turning point where 
the poem’s vision of a glorified past begins to be contrasted with perspectives on the 
present: 
Ist der Stern der Liebe dir verschwunden? 
Und der Jugend holdes Rosenlicht? 
Ach! Umtanzt von Hellas‘ goldnen Stunden, 
Fühltest du die Flucht der Jahre nicht, 
Ewig, wie der Vesta Flamme, glühte 
Mut und Liebe dort in jeder Brust, 
Wie die Frucht der Hesperiden, blühte 
Ewig dort der Jugend stolze Lust 
Has the star of love vanished for you? 
And the sweet rosy light of youth? 
Alas! Surrounded in dance by Hellas’ golden hours, 
You did not [or: you would not] feel the flight of years, 
Eternally, like the flame of Vesta, was the glow 
Of valour and love there in every breast, 
Like the fruit of the Hesperides, blossomed 
Eternally there youth’s proud joy.302 
How are we to understand ‘the star of love’ (‘der Stern der Liebe’)? Two readings seem 
possible: we can take the genitive as a ‘genitive link’ in Brooke-Rose’s sense and understand 
the sequence as a metaphor of the equation type; the star of love as a metaphorical 
representation of love itself. Alternatively, we can read the sequence as a metonymic 
paraphrase for ‘Venus’ – the ‘star’ of love. ‘Venus’ itself contains further metonymic 
potential: it evokes both Venus as the morning star and Venus as the goddess of love. The 
following lines support both the metaphorical and the metonymic reading. The phrase ‘the 
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sweet rosy light of youth’ (‘der Jugend holdes Rosenlicht’) supplies a parallel ‘[light] of + 
abstract concept’ construction, and one would be more inclined to understand this 
sequence as a metaphor based on a genitive link; read metaphorically, the two lines 
together can be understood as saying ‘have love and youth vanished for you?’. However, 
the mention of Vesta and the Hesperides later in the stanza, each in the genitive and 
together with their characteristic attributes (the fire of Vesta, the fruit of the Hesperides), 
adds further divine figures, whose occurrence retrospectively confirms a metonymic reading 
of the first line of the stanza as referring to the gentle guidance of Venus. As noted by Silk, 
with reference to conditional metaphor, what we are dealing with here in terms of poetic 
effect is not an either/or but a both/and scenario. Even if we do understand ‘the star of 
love’ as metonymically referring to Venus the morning star, this is soon felt to be located in 
the metaphorical domain as well when ‘youth’ is introduced in the subsequent line: thanks 
to the two lines’ parallelism, the light of the morning star appears analogous to the sweet 
rosy light of youth and consequently both lines evoke the light of dawn and the new day as 
a metaphor for youth.  
 
A similar case of conditional metonymy, but one involving a different kind of metonym, can 
be found in Pindar’s Eleventh Pythian Ode: 
τὰ μὲν ἐν ἅρμασι καλλίνικοι πάλαι, 
Ὀλυμπίᾳ τ’ ἀγώνων πολυφάτων 
ἔσχον θοὰν ἀκτῖνα σὺν ἵπποις: 
With their chariots they were victorious long ago;  
at Olympia they captured the famous games’ 
swift radiance with their horses.303 
The term whose tropical status is ambiguous here is the adjective θοάν. Grammatically 
speaking, it is governed by ἀκτῖνα and thus forms part of a typical Pindaric radiance 
metaphor:304 the ray (radiance/splendour) of the famous games at Olympia metaphorically 
represents the winner’s glory obtained there. The qualification θοάν (‘swift’), however, 
seems to hover between the metaphorical ray of light and the horses themselves insofar as 
both might be described as ‘swift’ in non-tropical usage. Farnell notes ad loc.: ‘a vivid and 
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effective phrase; “the light of victory flashes from the swift moving chariot”.’305  θοός is, in 
fact, regularly collocated with means of transportation in Pindar’s poetry so that, while most 
commentators follow the metaphorical reading, Slater cites this instance s.v. θοός and 
explains it as ‘speeding brilliance: θοὰν transf. from ἵπποις’.306  We have here, then, a case 
where it cannot be determined whether the word in question is a grammatical-amplification 
metonym or part of a metaphor. Farnell’s suggested translation adequately conveys the 
poetic effect: θοάν effect-ively operates as both. Note, however, that the noun which 
governs this conditional grammatical amplification metonym is itself unquestionably 
metaphorical.  
 
This is not the case in the following example from Aeschylus’ Agamemnon: 
... οὐκέτ᾽ ἐξ ἐλευθέρου 
  δέρης ἀποιμώζουσι φιλτάτων μόρον 
... and from throats [or: necks] that are no longer free 
 They cry out their laments for the death of their dearest.307 
Verrall comments ad loc.:  
δέρης, both neck and throat (E. Or. 41 οὔτε σῖτα διὰ δέρης ἐδέξατο Wecklein), 
here combines the two meanings. With οὐκέτ᾽ ἐλευθέρου it is the neck, the 
metaphor being that of the yoke, with ἀποιμώζουσι throat. No English word will 
exactly fit.  
If we follow Verrall, we have a case where a conditional metaphor (δέρης) determines 
whether an adjective is read literally (‘a [yoke-burdened, hence] unfree neck’) or as a 
grammatical-amplification metonym (ἐλευθέρου transferred from the implicit subject – ‘no 
longer free they cry out from their throat’). While the range of δέρη indeed covers both 
                                                        
305
 Similarly Gentili ad loc.: ‘the ray of light metaphorically indicates the splendour which emanates from the 
contests, as in Isth. 4,42, and is defined as “swift” through the presence of the ἵπποις that follows (cf. ἱπποσόα 
θοάς as apposition to ἀκτὶς ἀελίου in Pae. 9,7)’ (‘il raggio di luce indica metaforicamente lo splendore che 
emana dagli agoni, come in Isth. 4,42, ed è definito “veloce” per la presenza del seguente ἵπποις (cfr. ἱπποσόα 
θοάς come apposizione di ἀκτὶς ἀελίου in Pae. 9,7)’. Although θοός is, as the evidence in TLG confirms, most 
frequently used to describe ‘feet’, ‘ships’ or ‘horses’, there is some (albeit limited) further evidence for its 
collocatability with ‘light’, cf. B. 3.55-56: θοὰν ... ἀστραπάν (‘swift ... lightning’) and, per contrarium, Il. 10.394, 
Od. 12.284 and Hes. Th. 482: θοὴν ... νύκτα (‘swift ... night’). Cf. θοός of other natural phenomena as at E. Tro. 
454: θοαῖς αὔραις (‘swift winds’). 
306
 For straightforward collocations of θοός with horses (vel sim.) in Pindar’s poetry, see P. 4.17, Pae. 9.7 and 
Fr. 80. 
307
 A. Agam. 328-329; trans. Sommerstein. 
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‘throat’ and ‘neck’,308 Verrall is too quick to move from metaphorical overtones of an English 
translation to claims about the tropical status of the Greek term – not least, because there is 
no evidence in extant Greek usage for δέρη of the neck of oxen or indeed any other animal, 
which would be a prerequisite for the alleged metaphor. Instead, the Greek term used to 
denote ‘neck’ in such a context is αὐχήν.309 However, we should not discard Verrall’s 
observation entirely but rather qualify it, for it is clear that the loss of freedom and, 
therefore, the ‘yoke of slavery’ are at issue in this passage. In fact, in the context of slaves 
captured during warfare we may well imagine the ‘necks’ of human captives being literally 
‘no longer free’, but bound together for transportation to the slave market. At the same 
time, however, the force of δέρη/‘throat’ is also present, namely through the verb 
ἀποιμώζουσι (‘cry out laments’) in which connection the adjective ἐλευθέρου (‘free’) is 
transferred insofar as it describes the subject rather than one specific body part of the 
subject. We can say, then, that at different stages in hearing or reading the sequence, 
different semantic properties of δέρη (‘neck’, ‘throat’) are foregrounded and that depending 
on that, its adjective can, at first, be understood literally but will then, retrospectively, 
appear to be transferred and in need of reaffiliation. Tropical status, therefore, is 
conditional on the different ways in which the semantic range of the governing noun is 
exploited at different stages of the sequence. 
 
How do these examples of conditional metonymy relate to our earlier discussion of tropical 
clusters? The accumulation of structurally independent tropes in clusters leads, as we have 
seen, to more complex tropical explorations. In terms of the intensity of poetic effect, it is 
metaphors in the various examples that are clearly dominant, though on closer examination 
it becomes clear that metonyms play a crucial role in facilitating transitions from one 
metaphor to the next and in lending cohesion to the cluster as a whole. Where clichéd 
tropes are reactivated through collocation in clusters, the effect of the metaphors is also 
stronger. Examination of tropical clusters in which metaphors and metonyms are co-present 
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 See for the former, for instance E. Or. 41, for the latter E. Phoen. 166. Note that, with the sole exception of 
X. Cyr. 5.1.7, this word only occurs in Greek verse so that Homeric/epic usage is to be taken as determinative: 
for the former see, for instance, h. Merc. 133 and for the latter Od. 23.208, 240. 
309
 See, for instance, Hes. Op. 815-816: ἐπὶ ζυγὸν αὐχένι θεῖναι | βουσὶ καὶ ἡμιόνοισι καὶ ἵπποις ὠκυπόδεσσι, 
(‘to put yokes on the neck of oxen and mules and swift-footed horses’) and Pi. P. 4.234-235: σπασσάμενος δ᾽ 
ἄροτρον, βοέους δήσαις ἀνάγκας | ἔντεσιν αὐχένας ἐμβάλλων (‘He grasped the plow, bound the necks of 
oxen by force in their harness’; trans. Race). The term’s usage in prose at Arist. HA 493a5 and PA 691b29 refers 
to the entire part of the body between torso and head and thus subsumes both ‘neck’ and ‘throat’. 
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thus substantiates our earlier claim that the terminological extraneousness introduced by a 
metaphor’s vehicle and the defamiliarising effect resulting from this is likely to eclipse the 
more subtle metonymic shift within a semantic field which is in itself based on the 
combinatory rules of ordinary usage. On the other hand, in conditional metonymy, where 
both a metaphorical and a metonymic reading are possible, the effect that results from a 
metaphorical reading does not seem significantly more intense than that of the alternative 
metonymic reading.310 Once again, this is explicable in terms of metonymy’s dependence on 
semantic fields established by ordinary usage: if a sequence of terms can be read both as 
metaphor and as metonymy, the defamiliarising potential of the metaphor within the 
context of the sequence is inevitably capped, because metonymy is based on the inference 
or reaffiliation of otherwise coherent and compatible terminology; the possible degree of 
felt abrasiveness caused by conflicting terminologies is inherently limited.  
 
We can thus conclude that where metaphor and metonymy are co-present in clusters, 
metaphor ‘trumps’ metonymy in terms of poetic effect because of its stronger deviance 
from terminologically coherent usage. Where the same term or sequence of terms can be 
read both metaphorically and metonymically, however, metonymy’s capped potential for 
abrasive collocations extends to the metaphor and limits the conditional metaphor’s effect. 
We can now take these observations one step further by considering examples in which a 
term or sequence of terms may be read either metonymically or literally. 
 
5.3. Metonymic Association 
Consider, to begin with, two examples, the first from Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus and the 
second from Aeschylus’ Eumenides: 
εἰπὼν ἄπειμ’ ὧν οὕνεκ’ ἦλθον, οὐ τὸ σόν 
δείσας πρόσωπον ... 
I shall go, now that I have spoken of things that brought me here, 
With no fear of your angry countenance ... 
[lit.: with no fear of your countenance ...]311 
ἐς τὸ πᾶν δέ σοι λέγω,  
βωμὸν αἴδεσαι Δίκας,  
                                                        
310
 Cf. the instances discussed as ‘conditional metaphor’ which may also be read as (conditional) metonyms in 
Silk 1974, 242-243.  
311
 S. OT 447-448; trans. Lloyd-Jones. 
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μηδέ νιν κέρδος ἰδὼν ἀθέωι ποδὶ λὰξ ἀτίσῃς· ποινὰ γὰρ ἕπεσται  
I say to you, as a universal rule: 
respect the altar of Justice, 
and do not, with a view to gain, spurn and trample it with godless foot,  
for punishment will follow312 
In the first example, the reader will quickly assume that Teiresias’ point here is not that he is 
undaunted by Creon’s face but by the anger expressed by it.313 Likewise, Aeschylus’ choral 
ode, with its list of maxims on how to act righteously in various areas of life, invites an 
understanding of this passage as an admonition to have respect for justice in general rather 
than as a specific warning against desecrating altars of the goddess. In any case, the 
expectation of a summarising, general statement raised by ἐς τὸ πᾶν makes any such 
specificity implausible. Does it make sense to understand these shifts – context-determined 
– as metonymic? Both readings seem to display the kind of shift that has emerged as the 
prime characteristic of metonymy. On the basis of the categories of noun-based metonymy 
established in previous chapters, we could classify the first example as an instance of index 
metonymy and the second as an instance of amplification metonymy. However, do such 
cases really constitute the kind of deviation from ordinary usage that makes it appropriate 
to identify them as tropical?  
 
A case could be made that in the first example there is some deviation to guide us: Medusa 
aside, it would be hard to think of an instance where a countenance in and of itself can 
literally be said to be a cause of fear. However, as Lloyd-Jones’s translation shows, the 
deviation is not so abrasive that another noun needs to be inferred to make sense of the 
sequence (as would be the case in index metonymy proper). But even given that one does 
have to make an inference – to infer that Teiresias’ potential reason for fear would be 
Creon’s anger and the harm that means for him – the actual source of this fear would 
literally be the expression of that anger on Creon’s face. Thus, with these inferences arising 
as immediate associations, we seem to be within the territory of (albeit on the edge of) 
linguistic correctness – which makes the tropical status of this passage questionable. The 
passage, one might say, is elliptical (‘angry’ being suppressed) rather than metonymic; the 
effect, however, is still one of association along the lines of metonymy. 
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 A. Eum. 538-43; trans. Sommerstein. 
313
 Note that Lloyd-Jones’s translation reveals a felt need to render this more explicit. 
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The same is true for the second example: while there is a focusing and specifying shift which 
takes the same syntactical form as is characteristic of amplification metonymy (from ‘justice’ 
to ‘altar of justice’), the sequence itself does not violate any rules of collocation within 
ordinary language. In its given context, the overspecification goes against a reader’s 
expectations; however, there is little concrete deviation from ordinary usage. Only the 
grammatical metonym ἀθέωι attached to ποδὶ λάξ (‘with godless foot’) constitutes a real 
breach of ordinary collocation rules.314 The passage as a whole does certainly create an 
image of the desecration of an altar, focused on the foot which tramples on it, and thereby 
expresses the more abstract idea of a violation of justice in concrete terms. Yet this is not 
achieved through any negation of ordinary usage but by a surplus in meaning: the words in 
context carry a greater significance than the present terms literally denote. 
 
Another example of this phenomenon can be found in the following lines from Aeschylus’ 
Agamemnon:  
οὔ μοι φόβου μέλαθρον ἔλπις ἐμπατεῖ, 
ἕως  ἂν αἴθηι  πῦρ  ἐφ᾽  ἑστίας  ἐμῆς  
Αἴγισθος, ὡς τὸ πρόσθεν εὖ φρονῶν ἐμοι 
no fearful apprehension stalks my house, 
so long as the fire upon my hearth is kindled by  
Aegisthus and he remains loyal to me as hitherto315 
Clytemnestra’s statement does not deviate from ordinary usage or, more precisely, from the 
habitual usage of tragic diction. However, it would be absurd to read her words as meaning 
that she takes comfort, specifically, from the fact that Aegisthus lights the fire in her house. 
Not only is this a task one expects to be performed by the palace servants; even if Aegisthus 
did indeed light the fire in Clytemnestra’s hearth, in the given context it is implausible that 
this action itself is literally at issue here. Instead, it is of course Aegisthus’ presence in her 
house, and notably his presence as (stand-in) head of the household, that is evoked. The 
preceding personification (οὔ μοι φόβου μέλαθρον ἔλπις ἐμπατεῖ, ‘no fearful apprehension 
stalks my house’) creates an expectation that remains literally unfulfilled by the following 
verse. In order that this expectation be met, the words that follow must be given greater 
significance (retrospectively) than their mere denotative value merits. The clause that 
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 With ‘godless’ being transferred from the subject and instead affiliated with ‘foot’. 
315
 A. Agam. 1434-1436; trans. Sommerstein. 
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follows, ὡς τὸ πρόσθεν εὖ φρονῶν ἐμοι (‘and he remains loyal to me as hitherto’) duly 
reinforces this reading. Again, we observe that a line of associations is prompted which 
resembles metonymy but is not based on deviation from ordinary usage, and hence is not 
strictly tropical. 
 
A simile rather than a personification creates a potential for extended significance in the 
following lines from Hölderlin’s ‘Hymne an die Freiheit’: 
 Glühend stehn, und stolz, die neuen Brüder, 
 Stehn und dulden für das Vaterland; 
 Wie der Efeu, treu und sanft umwunden 
 Zu der Eiche stolzen Höhn hinauf, 
 Schwingen, ewig brüderlich verbunden, 
 Nun am Helden Tausende sich auf. 
 Glowing, and proud, the new brothers stand, 
 Stand and endure for the fatherland; 
 Just as the ivy, faithful and soft/gentle, is twined around  
 The oak right up to its fine/proud heights,  
 So do thousands now, in brotherly bond,  
 Rise up alongside the hero.316 
The simile itself contains no relevant deviation from ordinary usage:317 the freedom-
enthused masses, envisaged as rising up with ‘the hero’ as their support, are compared – 
literally – to the many-leafed ivy which rambles upward around the trunk of the solid oak. 
Yet the specific terms used here appear to be endowed with further significance, in terms of 
the ivy’s association with ancient Greece (and Dionysus) and the oak’s association with 
Germany (and Donar). On this secondary level, the rise of the masses who find firm hold in a 
hero is implicitly linked with a resurgence of the spirit of ancient Greece, made possible 
through the vitality and strength of the German spirit. As before, a seemingly metonymic 
line of contiguity is perceptible (ivy-Dionysus-Greece, oak-Donar-Germany) yet no breach of 
ordinary collocation rules occurs and no ordinary usage is negated, so that no tropical usage 
is felt. 
 
Such increased semantic investment of a term which is not metonymic, but looks 
metonymic, also occurs in this passage from Aeschylus’ Eumenides: 
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 Hölderlin, ‘Hymne an die Freiheit‘, 77-80. 
317
 Though only by metaphor (personification) can a plant be described as ‘faithful’ (‘treu’), in particular. 
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... μέγα γὰρ δύναται πότνι᾽  Ἐρινὺς  
παρά τ᾽ ἀθανάτοις τοῖς θ᾽ ὑπὸ γαῖαν,  
περί τ᾽ ἀνθρώπων φανερ’ ὡς τελέως  
διαπράσσουσιν, τοῖς μὲν ἀοιδάς,  
τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ δακρύων 
βίον ἀμβλωπὸν παρέχουσαι. 
... for the august Fury has great power 
among the immortals and among those beneath the earth; 
and as regards humans it is manifest how decisively 
they effect their will, furnishing 
to some joyful song 
[lit.: songs to some] 
to others a life dim-eyed with tears.318 
The parallelism created by the τοῖς μὲν ... τοῖς δὲ construction (‘to some... to others...’) leads 
to an expectation of equivalence between the two clauses. Once βίον (‘life’) comes into 
view as the accusative object of the second clause, ἀοιδάς (‘songs’) as the accusative of the 
first clause is re-interpreted: the Erinyes distribute different kinds of life, either a life filled 
with joy or one filled with sadness. In both clauses, the present terms make sense in their 
literal usage but the syntactic structure and the broader context lead to associations on a 
more general level (constituting an instance of ‘result-for-cause’, in rhetorical handbook-
speak). The associative leap is greater in the first clause than in the second since the latter 
contains βίον (‘life’) and the association is limited to the qualification of βίον: a life ‘of tears’ 
being a ‘sad’ life. The first clause, on the other hand, has only ‘songs’ which, owing to the 
syntactic parallelism, is retrospectively extended to ‘a life of songs’, that is, a ‘happy’ life. 
Note, however, that not only syntax and context but also a surprising collocation support 
this associative reading. In τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ δακρύων βίον ἀμβλωπὸν (‘and to others a life dim-
eyed with tears’) we have a grammatical amplification metonymy, for what is literally ‘dim-
eyed’ is the ‘others’ (τοῖς δὲ) who have a life filled with tears, rather than their life itself. 
 
While the examples discussed so far feature at least some form of defamiliarisation, either 
through ambiguous tropical status or else collocation with an actual trope (vel sim.), we do 
also find cases in which an entire sequence is indisputably literal – and yet shows a similar 
surplus of meaning. In Goethe’s Iphigenia among the Taurians, for instance, Iphigenia asks 
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 A. Eum. 950-955; trans. Sommerstein. 
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... Sinnt er vom Altar   
Mich in sein Bette mit Gewalt zu ziehn? 
... Does he intend to drag 
Me from the altar to his bed by force?319 
A literal reading is possible, yet the reader is bound to infer that Iphigenia’s anxiety consists 
not only, and not even primarily, in the fear that she will be violently dragged away from the 
altar in particular and placed in Thoas’ bed in particular, but rather that she will be forced to 
surrender her role as priestess and coerced into assuming the role of Thoas’ wife. ‘Altar’ and 
‘bed’ encapsulate these two different roles and spheres and the broader context of the 
scene makes clear that this is what is at issue. Within the same sentence, however, no 
deviation from ordinary usage occurs, nor are there any tropical elements or ambiguities 
behind this semantic extension. Compare the following from Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus: 
ὡς εἴπερ ἄρξεις τῆσδε τῆς γῆς, ὥσπερ κρατεῖς,  
ξὺν ἀνδράσιν κάλλιον ἢ κενῆς κρατεῖν· 
ὡς οὐδέν ἐστιν οὔτε πύργος οὔτε ναῦς  
ἐρῆμος ἀνδρῶν μὴ ξυνοικούντων ἔσω. 
For if you are to continue ruling, as you govern now,  
better rule a land that has men than one that is empty,  
since a  wall or a ship is nothing  
without men who live inside it.320 
Again, within the sentence the sequence contains no violation of collocation rules, and yet 
the focus on πύργος (‘wall’, ’tower’) and ναῦς (‘ship’), as exemplary of the ruler’s 
dependency on the civic body of the polis, are evocative beyond their denotative value. 
Highlighted by the οὔτε ... οὔτε construction, they appear to point to two spheres, one 
internal (the defence of the polis) and one external (trade and war); without the support of 
his citizens, a ruler can neither defend his rule nor activate it in relation to the outside 
world. One might – just – wonder whether it makes sense to invoke a ‘paratactic analogy’,321 
but there is no formal or other pressure to do so. 
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 Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris. Ein Schauspiel, 195-196. It is worth noting that the same phrasing occurs in 
Goethe’s prose version of the play (Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris, p. 155, l. 14). 
320
 S. OT 54-57; trans. Lloyd-Jones. 
321
 See e.g. Johansen 1959, 16-49 (where this passage is, however, not cited). 
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A further point of kinship between this phenomenon and metonymy proper is its potential 
to involve cliché in the shape of elevated poetic language. Euripides’ Iphigenia among the 
Taurians provides a good example. In the verse 
δοκοῦσ᾽  Ὀρέστην μηκέθ᾽ ἥλιον βλέπειν 
Thinking that Orestes no longer looks upon the sun 322 
the reader will assume that ‘looking upon the sun’ is not what is at issue here, but whether 
or not Orestes is still alive. However, no breach of collocation rules occurs which would 
make this literal reading impossible. The literal reading’s narrow scope is merely made 
implausible, though not impossible, by the context. Compare the following instances from 
the same play: 
οὐδείς γε, πλὴν θανοῦσαν οὐχ ὁρᾶν φάος. 
No, save that she is dead and does not look on the light. 323 
ὃν οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἢ 'μὲ φῶς ὁρᾶν θέλω. 
and I desire that he should look on the light no less than I. 324 
αἰσχρὸν θανόντος σοῦ βλέπειν ἡμᾶς φάος: 
It is disgraceful for me to look on the light with you dead. 325 
Comparable formulations can be found elsewhere, for instance in Sophocles’ Oedipus 
Tyrannus: 
ὦ φῶς, τελευταῖόν σε προσβλέψαιμι νῦν 
O light, may I now look on you for the last time326 
This same cliché also serves as the basis for subsequent literary appropriations, for instance 
in Goethe’s Iphigenia among the Taurians: 
... Und laß dir raten habe  
Die Sonne nicht zu lieb und nicht die Sterne;  
Komm, folge mir in’s dunkle Reich hinab! 
... and let me recommend you not to 
Love the sun too much or the stars; 
Come, follow me down into the dark realm!327 
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 E. IT 349; trans. Kovacs. 
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 E. IT 564; trans. Kovacs. 
324
 E. IT 608; trans. Kovacs. 
325
 E. IT 674; trans. Kovacs. 
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 S. OT 1183; trans. Lloyd Jones. 
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 Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris. Ein Schauspiel, 1232-1234. 
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Where such a formulation is so frequent, it effectively acquires denotative value in its 
‘extended’ sense and in this regard resembles ‘dead metonyms’ which have entered 
ordinary usage. 
 
How should we understand the examples discussed in this section? If we take the reading 
experience seriously, it cannot be denied that here too a shift occurs which resembles the 
metonymic shifts discussed in earlier chapters. At the same time, our opening argument 
about tropicality and the tropical space makes it inappropriate to consider these instances 
as metonymic tropes. If tropes are essentially characterised by the negation, in context, of a 
term’s meaning in ordinary usage, none of the above cases can be deemed tropical. Instead, 
we are dealing with associations characterised by a specific conformation that might, still, 
be best described as ‘metonymic’. What we see here, then, is a first extension of the term 
‘metonymy’ and ’metonymic’ beyond its original confines of tropology proper – but one that 
is warranted and, indeed, called for by literary analysis. We propose to refer to such 
instances as metonymic association. The distinction between metonymic association and 
metonymy proper (in all its various forms) is an important one, since it highlights, by 
comparison and contrast, the specific lexical-linguistic nature of metonymy proper. In 
metonymic association, a shift of understanding is contextually compelling; in metonymy 
proper, it is lexico-linguistically inevitable. The distinction also makes it apparent that any 
attempt to elucidate the structural organisation of the tropical space can only be valid when 
based on metonymy proper. Failure to make the distinction must inevitably lead to 
confusion, once such associations are conflated with deviation from ordinary usage.328 As 
we shall see, the distinction is also important when assessing complex literary devices which 
appear to have both a metonymic and a metaphorical dimension, such as certain types of 
personification to which we now turn. 
 
5.4. Personification 
Personifications involve applications of extraneous terminology (the terminology of humans 
and human agency) to non-humans, objects and abstractions. And they are essentially 
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 Confusion of precisely this kind tends to compromise structuralist re-appropriations of tropology, for 
instance, several of De Man’s close readings in his Allegories of Reading which will be discussed in more detail 
below; see pp. 246-251. 
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metaphorical:329 if an object or concept is said to (consciously) ‘act’ it is inevitably likened to 
humans and thereby displays metaphor’s definitive characteristic of an underlying or 
implied similarity and/or analogy.330 The object or concept is cast in another light by 
portraying it in the terminology of human agency which is alien to it and reconfigures the 
way it is perceived. An example from Goethe’s poem ‘Maifest‘ illustrates the point:  
Wie herrlich leuchtet  
Mir die Natur! 
Wie glänzt die Sonne! 
Wie lacht die Flur! 
How magnificently nature 
Shines for me! 
How the sun glistens! 
How the meadow laughs!331 
The metaphorically used verb ‘lacht’ (‘laughs’) expresses the exuberance and liveliness of 
the natural world in spring by analogy with the human activity of laughter.  
 
If we accept this definition in terms of an implied analogy, it immediately becomes clear 
that personification is not a phenomenon of poetic language on the same level as metaphor 
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 Ancient critics differentiate between personification of inanimate objects/concepts through attribution of 
speech or through other forms of personified behaviour, but they do not show any awareness of its structural 
similarity with metaphor (for a compilation of the relevant discussions by ancient critics see Lausberg 1960, 
369-372 and Stafford 2000, 5-9). This is surprising given that Aristotle’s subclassifications of metaphor are 
based on the possible combinations of animate and inanimate terminology (see Arist. Rhet. 1411b-1412a), one 
of which, treating inanimate objects or concepts as if alive, without doubt subsumes personification. The 
fourfold classification of metaphor (animate as animate, inanimate as animate, animate as inanimate, 
inanimate as inanimate) is maintained by the rhetorical handbook tradition (see e.g. Quint. Inst. 8.6.9. and 
Tryph. Trop. 730), but personification is generally discussed separately. Modern critics tend to continue this 
classification of personification as a distinct category in its own right rather than as a subcategory of metaphor, 
although they often associate the two. Landfester, for instance, notes that ‘personification ... is frequently part 
of a metaphorical expression’ (‘[d]ie Personifikation ... ist häufig Teil einer metaphorischen Aussage’; 
Landfester 1997, 194). Similarly, Lausberg concludes his discussion of fictio personae by stating that ‘[i]n 
general the personifying metaphor ... and allegory ... may, in the final analysis, be included under this heading’ 
(Lausberg 1960, 372) and Knapp defines ‘[a]llegorical personification’ as ‘the endowing of metaphors with 
agency of literal persons ....’ (Knapp 1985, 2). 
330
 This makes personifications an illustration par excellence of Black’s point, cited earlier (above, p. 33), that 
the similarity which underlies metaphor is not necessarily a given which the metaphor exploits but may also be 
constructed by the metaphor itself. Coleridge, too, seems to be aware of this when he argues in his third 
lecture of 1818 (albeit in a discussion of allegory rather than individual personifications): ‘[w]e may ... safely 
define allegoric writing as the employment of one set of agents and images with actions and accompaniments 
correspondent, so as to convey, while in disguise, either moral qualities or conceptions of the mind that are 
not in themselves objects of the senses, or other images, agents, actions, fortunes, and circumstances, so that 
the difference is everywhere presented to the eye or imagination while the likeness is suggested to the mind; 
and this connectedly so that the parts combine to form a consistent whole.' Coleridge 1818, 30. 
331
 Goethe, ‘Maifest’, 1-4.  
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and metonymy. Instead, among the countless terminologies which can be drawn on in 
metaphorical expressions, one specific terminology in metaphorical usage has been isolated 
here: personification is not another trope on a par with metaphor and metonymy, but 
rather a terminology-specific subcategory of metaphor. As such, it is equivalent, in 
taxonomic terms, to ‘zoomorphisation’ (extraneous application of animal terminology) or 
‘nautification’ (extraneous application of nautical terminology) and so on.332 While it is 
certainly useful in the critical analysis of individual pieces of literature to examine which 
particular terminologies are drawn upon in metaphorical usage, it is misleading to think of 
personification as different in kind from metaphor when theorising poetic language. 
 
There are, however, instances of personification which complicate this picture and make the 
differentiation between personification, metaphor and metonymy less clear-cut. Landfester, 
for instance, defines personification as the ‘introduction of a non-person (object, collective 
entity, animal, abstract concept) as a (speaking/acting) person’,333 and cites the following 
verse from Euripides’ Phoenissae as an example: 
 βοᾶι δὲ δῶμα πᾶν... 
 My whole house is wailing...334 
Is ‘house’ here indeed personified, or should we rather understand it as an index metonym? 
That is: does ‘house’ metonymically imply ‘the persons in the house’? The sequence 
undoubtedly meets Landfester’s own definition of personification: an object, ‘house’, is 
introduced as a speaking/action person; but, then again, one notes that his definition of 
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personification significantly overlaps with traditional definitions of metonymy in the 
rhetorical handbook tradition. Content-based categories like ‘container for contained’ or 
‘city for inhabitant’ must inevitably fall under Landfester’s definition of personification if the 
metonymic term is attached to a verb denoting speech or (conscious) action. The key issue 
here is surely to determine what prompts a tropical reading of such a sequence and 
precisely which elements are understood in a way that deviates from ordinary usage. In his 
example, Landfester prints δῶμα (‘house’) in bold, thereby implying that this is the tropically 
used term. This seems right: given that the context of this verse is Creon’s weeping and 
groaning over the loss of his son (cf. vv. 1310), βοᾶι (‘wails’, ‘cries’) literally denotes what is 
at issue here. The terminology of humans and human agency – here crying or wailing – is 
not extraneous to the sequence, nor is any similarity or analogy implied between the sounds 
produced by human crying and the actual sounds at issue. On reflection it is apparent that 
personification too is a verb-centred phenomenon: what turns a term into a personification 
(or what ‘introduces’ it as a person, to use Landfester’s phrasing) is collocation with verbs 
which in ordinary usage denote actions confined to the terminology of humans. We can 
therefore formulate the general rule, as follows: the tropical element in any personification 
is not the term which (as we tend to say) ‘is personified’ but the verb which personifies that 
term. Nouns can be personified, but personification is essentially concerned with a specific 
type of action, and thus depends on a specific usage of specific (implied or explicit) verbs.335 
In the instance under discussion, however, the verb is understood literally, and it is 
therefore misleading to base a tropological analysis of the sequence on it. Instead, the 
illegitimate collocation of βοᾶι (‘wails’) and δῶμα (‘house’) involves a metonymic shift in the 
understanding of the noun and the inference of some related but different expressions 
compatible with the literal verb: ‘my entire household’, ‘all the people in the house’.  
 
Yet if this argument serves to corroborate our view that personification constitutes a special 
case of metaphor, there are uses of personification that appear to point a different way. 
Consider an example from Hölderlin’s poem ‘Die Heimat‘: 
Ihr teuern Ufer, die mich erzogen einst, 
Stillt ihr der Liebe Leiden, versprecht ihr mir, 
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Ihr Wälder meiner Jugend, wenn ich 
Komme, die Ruhe noch einmal wieder? 
You dear riverbanks, who once raised me, 
Will you soothe love’s sorrow, will you promise me, 
You forests of my youth, if/when I 
Come, peace once more?336 
The ‘riverbanks’ (‘Ufer’) are apostrophised and attributed with human agency when they are 
said to have ‘raised (‘erzogen’) the poetic ‘I’, thus encouraging us to understand ‘Ufer’ 
(‘riverbanks’) here as personified and the sequence, a fortiori, as metaphorical. Yet there 
appears to be a difference between the personification of ‘Ufer’ (‘riverbanks’) in the first 
two lines and the personification of ‘Wälder’ (‘forests’) in the second two. With the ‘forests’, 
a natural phenomenon is apostrophised and personified by attribution of human agency 
(‘versprecht ihr mir’, ‘will you promise me’), and the poetic effect goes no further. With the 
‘riverbanks’, on the other hand, the metaphorically used verb seems simultaneously to 
evoke a metonymic understanding of the personified ‘Ufer’. In addition to the landscape 
itself, the formulation also seems to evoke the people living at or around those riverbanks, 
who once literally ‘raised’ the poetic ‘I’. Are we to understand ‘mich erzogen einst‘ (‘raised 
me once’) literally, which means that we understand ‘Ufer’ (‘riverbanks’) as an index 
metonym (for the inhabitants of the area)? Or, conversely, are we to understand the verb as 
a metaphor, which implicitly compares the formative influence of the landscape on the 
childhood (and childhood memories) of the poetic ‘I’ with the formative influence of his 
parents, and personifies ‘riverbanks’ in the process of creating this analogy? Both readings 
seem perfectly plausible. The next verb, ‘stillen’ (‘soothe’), does not eliminate the ambiguity 
either, since both the sight of the familiar riverbanks and of one’s family may literally be said 
to be ‘soothing’. This instance, then, constitutes a case of ‘conditional metonymy’ as 
discussed above. In the light of the unambiguous personification that follows, and given the 
general focus on landscape rather than persons, a reader may be more inclined to read this 
instance too as a case of personification; but that reading still co-exists with a possible 
metonymic reading. 
 
Compare these lines from Hölderlin’s ‘Hymne an die Freiheit‘: 
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 Keck erhub sich des Gesetzes Rute, 
Nachzubilden, was die Liebe schuf; 
Ach! Gegeißelt von dem Übermute 
Fühlte keiner göttlichen Beruf 
Brashly the rod of law rose up 
To recreate what love had created; 
Alas! Castigated by such hubris 
Nobody felt a divine calling337 
The passage contains a tropical cluster, and personification lies at its centre: the ‘rod of law’ 
(‘des Gesetzes Rute’) is personified (animated) by two verbs, ‘rose up’ (‘erhub sich’) and 
‘recreate’ (‘nachzubilden’), as well as by an accompanying adverb, ‘keck’ (‘brashly’), all of 
which imply human agency. The verbs, and the accompanying adverb, can neither be 
collocated with ‘rod of law’ as their subject in ordinary usage, nor are they understood here 
in the sense which they would have in ordinary usage. What is at issue is the ‘progression’ 
from a lost Golden Age when love guided all human behaviour to the current age 
characterised by laws men have created and imposed on each other, which are enforced by 
threat of punishment. The emergence of this new law-and-order regime is defined by 
analogy with a person getting up and ready for action; the attempt to create a just society 
artificially by analogy with moulding or sculpting. While the ‘rod of law’ is thus personified, 
there is clearly more to it than just its personification. The parallel between the original 
‘creation’ of a social order by love followed by a ‘re-creation’ of a social order by law and 
punishment suggests that the equivalent to ‘love’ should be also an abstract concept: ‘law’, 
‘legal prosecution’, ‘fear of punishment’ or whatever. Thus, even if the personifying verbs 
are understood metaphorically, ‘the rod of the law’ is understood as evoking, 
metonymically, more abstract concepts. Yet is ‘the rod of law’ in this particular context a 
straightforward metonym? The genitive structure of the compound alerts us to an 
amplification metonym: from law in general the focus is shifted to its punishing aspect, 
which is represented by an instrument used for such punishment. Then the third line picks 
up the image of the rod again and develops it further, though now in metaphorical usage, 
with ‘gegeißelt von dem Übermute’ (‘castigated by such hubris’). Should we, all in all, invoke 
a personified amplification metonym here? Our earlier discussions have shown that 
metonymy is more context-dependent than the relatively self-contained metaphorical 
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tenor-vehicle compound. In a case like Hölderlin’s here, the immediate syntactic context 
does not provide a sufficiently stable frame of reference of literally used terms from which a 
metonym could stand out in its deviant usage. While the context strongly suggests a 
metonymic understanding of a term, its meaning in ordinary usage is not negated or made 
impossible by the microcontext. Our analysis of tropical clusters has shown the tendency of 
metaphors to outdo metonyms in terms of poetic effect. Here, a fully metaphorical 
microcontext seems to undermine the conditions for metonymy proper so that the shift is 
better understood as a case of metonymic association. 
 
Personifications appear to carry an increased potential for creating a context in which the 
tropical status of individual terms is hard to ascertain, either because they introduce 
possibilities for optional tropical readings or because they compel the reader to construct 
further associations. The fact that such ambiguities go beyond the primary effect of 
personification itself (the metaphorical attribution of human terms to non-human entities) 
is surely part of the attractiveness of this device and may be one of the reasons why 
theorists feel the need to classify it as an independent trope in its own right. Nevertheless, a 
structural analysis of the mechanisms at work in personification proper tends to confirm 
that it is based on a mode of defamiliarisation along the lines of metaphor and constitutes a 
terminology-specific variant of metaphor. 
 
5.5. Synecdoche  
A final complication that needs to be addressed is the position of synecdoche within the 
order of the tropical space. While personification is usually (if unhelpfully) understood as a 
trope in its own right, synecdoche’s relation to both metaphor and metonymy has been 
subject to debate and remains unresolved.338 In critical practice, both classical scholars and 
literary scholars more broadly have tended to operate within the framework of the 
rhetorical handbook tradition, taking metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche as three 
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distinct phenomena of poetic language.339 Within theories of rhetoric and poetics, however, 
synecdoche is subsumed under either metaphor or metonymy. The root of this confusion 
lies, once more, in Aristotle’s broad and ambiguous usage of μεταφορά (‘metaphor’) in his 
Poetics.340 After defining ‘metaphor’ (or rather tropicality) in substitutionalist terms as ‘the 
transference of a term from one thing to another’,341 Aristotle suggests four ways in which 
such ‘transference’ can occur: from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to 
species and by analogy. Both the theoretical exposition as well as the examples he gives 
make clear that only the fourth category constitutes metaphor proper, whereas the 
examples given for the other three range from dead metaphor (νηῦς δέ μοι ἥ δ᾽ ἕστηκεν, 
‘here stands my ship’) to metonymic hyperbole (ἦ δὴ μυρί᾽ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν, 
‘indeed, ten thousand noble things did Odysseus’)342 and multiple metonymy (τεμὼν 
ταναήκεϊ χαλκῷ, ‘cutting off with the tireless bronze’). His fourfold classification, however, 
is influential for the later development of a more diversified view of the tropical space. As 
with μετωνυμία, the term συνεκδοχή itself does not appear in Aristotle’s theorising but 
features as an established technical term in the later Greek rhetoricians,343 the Stoic 
grammarians,344 and in the late-Hellenistic Rhetorica ad Herennium.345 All of these treat 
synecdoche as a trope in its own right, but the definitions they give overlap with Aristotle’s 
types of ‘metaphora’: synecdoche is primarily understood as a ‘substitution’ of a part for the 
whole or of the whole for a part, thus corresponding, more or less, to Aristotle’s categories 
of species for genus and genus for species.346  At the same time, the examples cited by these 
writers to illustrate synecdoche are barely distinguishable from those used to illustrate 
metonymy. Eco notes that this imprecision continues on the level of theoretical analysis:  
As a matter of fact, traditional rhetoric has never satisfactorily explained why a 
substitution genus/species ... and a substitution pars/totum ... are both 
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synecdoches, whereas all other kinds of substitution (object/purpose, 
container/content, cause/effect, material/object, and so on) are called 
metonymies.347 
Quintilian is the first to address the relationship between metaphor, metonymy and 
synecdoche explicitly. Initially he distinguishes synecdoche from metaphor and then, as he 
moves on to discuss metonymy, states that ‘there is no great gap between synecdoche and 
metonymy.’348 Accordingly, from Quintilian onwards, one strand of criticism has insisted 
that synecdoche should be understood as a variant and subcategory of metonymy. 
According to Barwick, Stoic grammarians considered metonymy, synecdoche and 
antonomasia as a group of related tropes, collectively characterised by the operative 
principle of vicinitas (‘proximity’) in which we can see another precursor of the more recent 
term ‘contiguity’.349 This view re-emerges in the rhetorical tradition, for instance in 
Durmarsais’ view (1729) that ‘[s]ynecdoche, then, is a species of metonymy by which ... I 
take the more for the less, or the less for the more.’350 Likewise, in Jakobson’s bipolar 
conceptualisation of the tropical space, synecdoche is subsumed under metonymy,351 a view 
endorsed by critics who accept Jakobson’s basic assumption.352 Others, however, have 
questioned this affiliation. Genette, for instance, views it as a consequence of an inadequate 
understanding of metonymic contiguity as spatial proximity or contact.353 Yet, in his critique, 
in which he calls for a sharper differentiation of the various relationships that exist between 
constituent elements and a greater whole, he remains entirely concerned with conceptual 
content:  
This reduction [sc. subsuming synecdoche under metonymy] no doubt has its 
origin in an almost inevitable confusion between the relation of the part to the 
whole and the relation of the same part to the other parts that make up the 
whole: a relation, it might be said, of the part to the remainder. ... one might 
read ad libitum, in the figure by attribute (‘crown’ for ‘monarch’, for example), a 
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metonymy or a synecdoche, depending on whether one regards the crown as 
simply linked to the monarch, or as forming part of him, by virtue of the implicit 
axiom: no monarch without a crown. One then sees that every metonymy can 
be converted into a synecdoche by appeal to the higher totality, and every 
synecdoche into a metonymy by recourse to the relations between constituent 
parts. The fact that each figure-event can be analysed in two ways at will 
certainly does not imply that these two ways are in fact one ... but one can see 
very well how in fact this kind of double membership might cause confusion.354 
Genette is sceptical of any attempt to reduce the various modalities of metaphorical and 
metonymic relations to just two principles, analogy and contiguity,355 and he sees in 
synecdoche a prime example of the supposed shortcomings of this bipolar view: 
The schema of intersection has never really, in any tropology, classical or 
modern, defined synecdoche: it concerns in fact an inclusion, or belonging ... 
and [is] of a logical rather than of a spatial type: the inclusion of ‘sail’ in ‘ship’ 
might be regarded as spatial, but in no sense is that of ‘iron’ in ‘sword,’ or ‘man’ 
in ‘mortal.’ Were it so, rhetoricians would not define the figure ‘to drink a glass’, 
as they constantly do, as a metonymy of content, but as a synecdoche, 
considering that the wine is ‘included’ in the glass – a blunder they have never 
committed.356 
Genette’s argumentation here is not original but belongs to a long-standing tradition that 
seeks to establish an underlying (and differential) logic of synecdoche and metonymy.357 
While metonymy persistently eludes such attempts,358 synecdoche, understood as a 
‘substitution’ based on a part-whole relationship, appears to promise some such logical 
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basis. Pecz, for example, presents an equation that reflects Genette’s concerns: ‘Synecdoche 
= a pro a + b, or a + b pro a. ... Metonymy = a pro b or b pro a.’359  
 
The first thing to note here is that both Pecz’s and Genette’s discussions privilege 
conceptual content, and the problems they attempt to confront arise primarily from having 
chosen an approach which offers few dividends for a systematic, structural understanding of 
poetic language. As Eco has rightly pointed out,  
when it is specified that the synecdoche carries out a substitution within the 
conceptual content of a term, while metonymy acts outside of that content, it is 
hard to see why the part for the whole is a synecdoche and the material for the 
object a metonymy – as though it were ‘conceptually’ essential for an object to 
have constituent parts and not to be made of some material.360 
Moreover, given the impossibility of establishing one single ‘logic’ of contiguity, it is also 
apparent that any attempt to distinguish metonymy from synecdoche by constructing an 
opposition between ‘logical’ synecdoche and extra-logical metonymy is deeply problematic, 
since metonymy in its traditional sense already encompasses various logical relationships 
(container ‘for’ contained, product ‘for’ producer, etc.).361 The argument that synecdoche is 
characterised by a particular logical relationship between its elements may therefore (at 
most) distinguish synecdoche as a particular type of metonymy, but it does not warrant the 
conclusion that synecdoche is different in kind from metonymy on a structural level. As we 
have shown, what distinguishes metaphor from metonymy is that the metaphorical 
compound is characterised by both an underlying logic of analogy/similarity and a resulting 
collocation of otherwise incompatible terminologies, whereas metonymy is characterised by 
a shift within a given terminology, that is, within a semantic field. Pecz’s and Genette’s focus 
on the ‘conceptual content’ ignores the terminological dimension, and thus sidelines what 
should be at the centre of any discussion that seeks to illuminate poetic language.  
 
Before we propose a better way of theorising synecdoche and its relationship with 
metaphor and metonymy, it is worth taking account of the argument that synecdoche 
should be seen as connected with metaphor. The most important proponents of this view 
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are the Groupe μ.362 These critics use the principle of ‘decomposition’ in their analyses to 
conclude that metaphor is a combination of two synecdoches. Culler illustrates this notion 
with the following example: 
Metaphor is a combination of two synecdoches: it moves from a whole to one of 
its parts to another whole which contains that part, or from a member to a 
general class and then back again to another member of that class. Starting ... 
from ‘oak’ we have: 
member  class  member 
oak  tall things  any tall person or object 
  strong things  any strong person or object 
whole  part  whole  
oak branches  anything with branches (banks?) 
   anything with roots 
The move from member to class to member is the most common procedure for 
interpreting metaphors.363 
The problem with this approach is the opposite of the one that compromises Genette and 
Pecz. While their focus on ‘logical’ relationships leads them to ignore the central fact of 
tropical terminology, the Groupe μ critics take terminological considerations into an 
dimension where it is misleading to do so. What their theory does is effectively translate the 
logical principle of analogy/similarity at the heart of metaphor into – itself – a terminological 
format: the tertium comparationis, which links tenor and vehicle in metaphor, is analysed as 
if it were – itself – actual terminology. Yet, as Ricoeur points out, 
[i]t goes without saying that the reader of a metaphor is not conscious of the 
two operations. He is conscious only of the transfer of meaning from the first 
term to the second ... This is why the reader does not sense the impoverishment 
involved in passing through ‘the narrow path of the semic intersection,’ but on 
the contrary feels a sense of enlargement, an opening up, an amplification.364 
The problem is evident. If tropical language consists structurally and aesthetically in 
perceptible deviation from ordinary usage and is therefore – itself – essentially a 
terminological phenomenon, how can any theorising based on something the reader can 
not perceive lead to a better understanding of the poetic mechanisms and effects of such 
phenomena? Moreover, the concept of two synecdoches intersecting in one point is itself 
misleading. One need only call to mind one of Brooke-Rose’s examples to see this. By way of 
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illustrating the verbal nature of metaphor, she argues that ‘the fire of love’ is based on the 
notion that ‘if love burns, it is a fire.’365 Are ‘love’ and ‘fire’ members of the class ‘things that 
burn’? Does ‘love’ ever literally ‘burn’? And what about other classes of things which both 
terms could be said to be members of, such as ‘things that warm’, ‘things that consume’, 
‘things that destroy’, ‘things that easily get out of control’, ‘forces of nature’? It is misleading 
to assume merely one common denominator for a metaphor’s tenor and vehicle; the logical 
relation of analogy and similarity provides an inclusive principle that more adequately 
acknowledges the possibility of both single and multiple points of contact.366  
 
What is remarkable about the double-synecdoche model for metaphor is that it relies on 
the traditional ‘conceptual content’ theory of semantic fields, albeit in the terminology of 
more recent linguistics. In order for this model to work, one must identify a field to which 
both tenor and vehicle belong (‘things that ...’), which is then said to constitute the point of 
contact at which the two synecdoches intersect. But any such attempt to use the traditional 
semantic-field theory to explain metaphor is flawed. As we have seen, not only does the 
‘decomposition’ fail to reduce the metaphorical statement to a literal statement, but the 
restriction to just one semantic field also makes it impossible to accommodate any 
metaphors that are based on more than one point of similarity or analogy. This is important 
for our overall argument because the Groupe μ’s position also entails the modern monistic 
view of the tropical space. The notion of synedochical decomposition and reduction leads 
the Groupe μ to postulate an ‘intermediary term’ at the heart of both metaphor and 
metonymy. According to this view, both tenor and vehicle share a seme in metaphor (the 
element that indicates that both are ‘things that ...’), whereas, in metonymy, tenor and 
vehicle are included in an ensemble of semes that belong together: 
And this is the place to remember the notions of denotation and connotation ... 
Metaphor involves denotative semes, nuclear semes, included in the definition 
of terms. Metonymy, on the other hand, involves connotative semes, that is to 
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his criticism that ‘it is certainly possible to decompose a given metaphor into two synecdoches; but one cannot 
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takes the view ‘that metonymy and synecdoche belong on the same side, in that they can be defined and 
explained as accidents of denomination.’ Ricoeur 1975, 346. 
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say, semes contiguous within a larger grouping and combining to define this 
grouping.367 
Synecdoche is represented here as a technical linguistic operation: the isolation of a 
seme.368 In synecdoche, this isolation itself would be the poetic mechanism and effect; in 
metaphor, this isolation is seen as an intermediary stage between the tenor and vehicle 
which share the seme that the implicit synecdoches isolate; in metonymy, the tenor and the 
vehicle are implicit synecdoches of the intermediary term. Metonymy here is not subsumed 
under metaphor as one of its variants but is seen as one stage in a process: the stage that 
leads to metonymy, where the full process results in metaphor. In Ricoeur’s words: ‘The 
same theory that demonstrates the close relationship of synecdoche and metonymy also 
shows that the difference between metaphor and metonymy reduces to a difference 
between the partial and the total character of the self-same addition-suppression 
operation.’ 369 The fact is that this whole approach to analysing poetic language is defective. 
In the first place, it describes analytical operations which do not pertain to the actual 
reading experience, and therefore have little to offer by way of explaining the aesthetics of 
tropes; and, secondly, it relies on an inherent ambiguity in its key concept, ‘seme’. The 
Groupe μ themselves rightly point out that traditional approaches that share their focus on 
extra-linguistic realities are inadequate,370 but shifting the focus from ‘things’ to ‘meanings’ 
leads to a new set of complications, and the more so given that ‘seme’ (the smallest 
meaning-carrying unit in language) is used here in a way that makes it hover ambiguously 
between reference to actual terms and identification of conceptual contents. 
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 ‘Et c’est ici le lieu de se raccorder aux notions de dénotation et de connotation … La métaphore fait 
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368
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 ‘Among modern semanticians, for example in Ullmann’s theory referred to above, metonymy is “the 
transfer of a term by contiguity of meaning”, this contiguity being “spatial, temporal or causal”. In this regard, 
there would be no great difference between metonymy and synecdoche: in both cases “the thing receives its 
name from something else with which it comes into contact”. We do not dispute that there is in the notion of 
actual contiguity the beginning of a satisfactory theory of metonymy, but one sees that the problem is poorly 
posed by this reference to the “thing”.’ (‘Chez les modernes sémanticiens, par example dans la théorie 
d’Ullmann rappelée plus haut, la métonymie est “transfert  du nom par contiguïté des sens”, cette contiguïté 
étant “spatiale, temporelle ou causale”. A cet égard, il n’y aurait pas grande différence entre la métonymie et 
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satisfaisante de la métonymie, mais on voit que le problème est mal posé par cette référence à la “chose”.’ 
Groupe μ 1982, 117). 
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It is once again clear that a focus on conceptual contents and on logical relationships 
between such contents fails to provide a satisfying structural analysis, while a focus on 
semantic components likewise fails to do justice to the aesthetics of poetic language. In the 
light of the short-comings – though also the insights – of these views, we can now reassess 
this phenomenon of synecdoche.  
 
In its most basic form, synecdoche involves expressing a part through the whole or the 
whole through a part by using the singular where ordinary language would give the plural 
and vice versa.371 In such instances, the reader will understand the present singular as an 
implied plural and will perceive a sharper focus as the effect of this deviance from ordinary 
usage. Consider, for example, these verses from Euripides’ Iphigenia among the Taurians 
and Hölderlin’s ‘Der Neckar’: 
οἰκτρόν τ᾽ ἐκβαλλόντων δάκρυον 
and shedding a piteous tear.372 
… aus dem Tal,  
Wie Leben aus dem Freudebecher,  
Glänzte die bläuliche Silberwelle 
… from the valley, 
like life from the cup of joy, 
shimmered the bluish silver-wave373 
While this ‘zooming’ or ‘focusing’ effect is reminiscent of amplification metonymy, the 
grammar-based readjustment that occurs in the reading process bears a formal 
resemblance to grammatical metonymy. In terms of both aesthetic effect and governing 
structural principle, we therefore have at a most basic level clear similarities with 
metonymy, but no element of analogy or introduction of extraneous terminology that 
would point to metaphor. At this point it is worth recalling our discussion of index 
metonymy and amplification metonymy. Both variants of metonymy are characterised by a 
shift within a semantic field; the shift is present in the form of a genitive compound in 
amplification metonymy; the shift is implicit and points to a virtual semantic field in index 
metonymy. One of Pecz’s formulae for synecdoche (a + b pro a) matches precisely the 
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syntactical structure that constitutes amplification metonymy: a, the whole (as the partitive 
genitive that expresses the metonymic tenor) and b, the part (as the metonymic vehicle that 
specifies the compound beyond what would be expected in ordinary language). This is, of 
course, not in itself an argument that synecdoche is a variant of metonymy; one might as 
well argue, conversely, that what has been classified above as amplification metonymy 
should better be understood as synecdoche. What is of central importance, rather, is 
whether it can be demonstrated that the structural principle at work in both index 
metonymy and amplification metonymy, namely a lateral shift within a semantic field 
(implicit in the former and explicit in the syntax of the latter), likewise characterises 
synecdoche.  
 
The two commonly acknowledged variants of synecdoche, part for the whole (and vice 
versa) and genus for species (and vice versa), find their correspondence in the linguistic 
concepts of meronymy/holonymy and hyponymy/hyperonymy. A meronym denotes a word 
or other element that together with other elements constitutes a whole. Thus, ‘bark’, ‘leaf’ 
and ‘branch’ are meronyms of the holonym ‘tree’. A hyponym, on the other hand, denotes a 
word that belongs to a subset whose elements are collectively summarised by a hypernym. 
Thus, ‘tree’, ‘flower’, ‘bush’ are hyponyms of the hypernym ‘plant’. A first observation to be 
made here is that these two concepts describe relationships on different levels: 
meronymy/holonymy describes a relationship between elements of material objects. It is 
the referential object ‘leaf’ which in extralingual reality forms a part of the whole ‘tree’. 
Hyponymy/hypernymy, by contrast, refers to a relationship between concepts. ‘Flowers’ 
and ‘trees’ are jointly classified as ‘plants’, but in extralingual reality there is no ‘plant’ that 
consists of ‘flowers’ and ‘trees’. In other words, the first relationship is extralingual, the 
second relationship is conceptual.  
 
Genette’s attempted critique of the reduction of synecdoche to metonymy relies precisely 
on the alleged irreducibility of meronymy to hyponymy.374 However, both 
meronymy/holonymy and hyponymy/hyperonymy describe a relationship between a sub-
group and an overarching point of reference. This is arguably the reason why synecdoche 
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was thought of as a distinct phenomenon in poetic language in the first place, and why 
examples traditionally given to illustrate synecdoche indiscriminately exploit associations 
along the lines of both meronymy/holonymy and hyponymy/hyperonymy. If one moves 
away from a logic-based and/or conceptual content-based analysis and adopts a 
terminological perspective, this becomes all the more obvious: the terms on either end of 
this relationship can be connected by supplying either an ‘and more specifically’ or an ‘and 
more generally’. Any deviation from ordinary language in which a hyponym or a meronym is 
used to imply its hypernym or holonym (and vice versa) can easily be transformed into a 
non-deviant statement if the sequence is thus expanded. Here we should bear in mind Silk’s 
‘operational’ suggestion that any deviation from ordinary usage which can be expanded into 
a literal statement without using similarity or analogy markers (such as ‘like’) should be seen 
as metonymy.375 The principle surely provides powerful evidence for a structural connection 
of synecdoche with metonymy. This finds further confirmation if we consider how the shift, 
which we might explicate with an ‘and more specifically/generally’, is realised in deviant, 
tropical language. We have already noted that the meronym/holonym relationship can take 
the form of a partitive genitive compound.376  In addition to this grammatical option for the 
particularising shift from holonym to meronym, the generalising and the particularising shift 
of both variants of synecdoche can be realised lexically – when a reading of an implied term 
or terms is prompted by deviant usage of a term which is too general or too specific to be 
compatible with the given context. And this, on a structural level, is no different from the 
workings of index metonymy. 
 
In the new framework proposed, it thus becomes clear that synecdoche shares both the 
aesthetic effects and the structural mechanisms of metonymy, since it, too, is based on a 
lateral shift within a semantic field. The revised theory of semantic fields as advanced here, 
namely as clusters of terms pragmatically constituted through regular co-occurrence in 
ordinary usage, can also explain synecdoche; the fact that both variants of synecdoche can 
be readily expanded into non-deviant statements supports this point. Once we get beyond a 
preoccupation with logical, content-based ‘relationships’, we can see that synecdoche has 
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to be understood as a specific variant of metonymy, just as personification has to be 
understood as a specific variant of metaphor.   
 
While metaphor as such is characterised by a logical relation of analogy/similarity and the 
introduction of extraneous terminology, further distinctions may indeed be made that take 
account of either the way this logical relation is realised (as Brooke-Rose does) or the 
particular extraneous terminologies that are introduced (as Pecz and Breitenbach do). 
Metonymy, characterised by a lateral shift within a semantic field may, of course, also be 
sub-categorised by taking account of the various ‘relationships’ between the metonymic 
vehicle and the metonymic tenor. These ‘relationships’ are ultimately always abstractions of 
the most likely expansion of the metonym in question: ‘x who/which produces/is produced 
by y’, ‘x which contains/is contained by’, ‘x which is made of y’, and so on. Synecdoche, 
which can be expanded to ‘x which is a part of y’, ‘x which includes y’, ‘x among which there 
are y’ (and so on), is now shown to be just another set of such ‘relationship statements’. 
Synecdoche is therefore to be seen as a content-specific variant of metonymy but not as a 
structurally different trope in its own right. As with personification, it may be significant for 
a particular text that this specific variant occurs or is predominant, and for that reason 
synecdoche (like personification) may have a legitimate place in the critical vocabulary, but 
the level on which this specificity occurs is not one that warrants the assumption of a 
difference in kind. 
 
Our analyses of these various ‘complications’ and ‘complexities’ serve to confirm that the 
theory of metonymy developed in Chapters 1-4 provides a reliable basis for the analysis of 
more complex scenarios. The discussion of more complex examples has also provided 
further vindication for Jakobson’s claim that metonymy and metaphor should be seen as 
two basic principles under which other phenomena of poetic language can be subsumed. 
The second part of our enquiry will continue to refine the new theory of metonymy 
proposed here as we consider some of its further implications in literary practice. By 
comparing metonyms from the ancient Greek corpus with selected German translations, we 
shall look at what happens to metonymy under the impact of changed linguistic, syntactic 
and cultural contexts. We shall also consider whether metonyms are affected by the 
different translation strategies of each writer and, by way of examining these translations as 
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literary texts in their own right, test our theory against a wider range of examples to 
demonstrate its value as a tool of practical criticism.   
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Part II. Metonymy and Translation 
6. Metonymy in Translation 
A fine metaphor is one of the hardest things in the world to rationalize. The 
translator of a play of Aeschylus or an ode of Pindar soon finds that of all stylistic 
devices metaphors are by far the most fugacious of interpretation in a foreign 
idiom.377  
As noted earlier, Stanford’s study of Greek metaphor, from which this quotation is taken, is 
marked by a pervasive neo-Romantic bias that privileges metaphor over and above all other 
forms of poetic language.378 While his assertions should, therefore, be read with a certain 
caution, he is undoubtedly right in emphasising that the act of translation is a further 
activity, alongside abstract theorising, in which a sustained engagement with tropical 
language becomes unavoidable. Literary translations are inescapably forced to respond to 
issues of style and defamiliarised language and thereby become, in a way, the practical (and 
implicit) counterpart of abstract (and explicit) theorising in this arena. Ortega y Gasset 
lucidly summarises what is at issue here: 
To write well is to make continual incursions into grammar, into established 
usage, and into accepted linguistic norms. It is an act of permanent rebellion 
against the social environs, a subversion. To write well is to employ a certain 
radical courage. Fine, but the translator is usually a shy character. .... He finds 
himself facing an enormous controlling apparatus, composed of grammar and 
common usage. What will he do with the rebellious text? Isn’t it too much to ask 
that he also be rebellious, particularly since the text is someone else’s? He will 
be ruled by cowardice, so instead of resisting grammatical restraints he will do 
just the opposite: he will place the translated author into the prison of normal 
expression; that is, he will betray him. Traduttore, traditore.379 
Curiously, in contrast to the voluminous literature on metaphor in various fields and 
disciplines, the translating of metaphors has been largely neglected by translation 
theorists.380 Debate has been confined to brief theoretical sketches, rarely supported by (let 
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alone based on) any substantial evaluation of empirical material, and the outcome limited 
to arguments about various critics’ differing concepts and categorisations of metaphor 
rather than the actual specifics of metaphor in translation.381 The usefulness of these 
contributions for practical literary criticism is reduced further by the fact that they follow, by 
and large, cognitive and conceptual approaches, and consequently pay little or no attention 
to questions of literary aesthetics.382 And with metonymy, it is fair to say, critical-theoretical 
discussion has hardly begun at all. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to assess what happens to metonymy in translation. After some 
initial reflections on the translatability of metonyms, we shall revisit some of our earlier 
examples but in various translations. The texts chosen for examination are translations from 
ancient Greek into German, dating from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century. 
This period is particularly suitable for such comparative investigation because it witnesses 
an intense debate on different ideals and models of translation which one would expect to 
have a direct impact on how tropical passages in a source text are tackled in the translation 
process. Our analysis of metonyms in translation will take the form of two ‘cuts’, allowing us 
to study metonymy in translation from two different angles. We shall compare and contrast 
various translations in order to trace how different translation strategies affect the way 
metonyms in the Greek text are represented in translation practice. Our discussion will be 
structured according to the various categories established in Part I, which will thus be re-
examined from a new perspective. This will enable us to assess how different conformations 
of metonymy (as well as different translation strategies) influence the representation of 
metonymic passages in translation.  
 
First, then, let us reflect on what sort of expectations we can formulate regarding the 
‘translatability’ of metonyms in the light of our theoretical framework. One influential 
notion of translatability suggested by Benjamin has as its focus works of literature as a 
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whole.383 Here, we shall understand translatability in a more narrow and concrete sense as 
the possibility of reproducing a specific linguistic feature, a trope, in another language so 
that it is (a) still felt to be the same trope and (b) carries approximately the same semantic 
value.384 What parameters can we expect for the translatability of metonyms?  
 
6.1. ‘Translatability’ 
In his classic discussion of ‘translatability’ from a linguistic perspective,385 Catford notes that, 
[t]ranslation fails – or untranslatability occurs – when it is impossible to build 
functionally relevant features of the situation into the contextual meaning of the 
TL [target language] text. Broadly speaking, the cases where this happens fall 
into two categories. Those where the difficulty is linguistic, and those where it is 
cultural.386 
In the case of cultural untranslatability, translation is impossible because the target culture 
has no equivalent for what is denoted by a term in the source text; the term’s rendering in 
the target text therefore requires explanatory paraphrase. In the case of linguistic 
untranslatability, on the other hand, 
the functionally relevant features include some which are in fact formal features 
of the language of the SL [source language] text. If the TL [target language] has 
no formally corresponding feature, the text, or the item, is (relatively) 
untranslatable. Linguistic untranslatability occurs typically in cases where an 
ambiguity peculiar to the SL text is a functionally relevant feature – e.g. in SL 
puns.387 
As a further exemplary occasion of linguistic untranslatability, Catford goes on to mention 
polysemy and oligosemy, that is, cases in which one language is either more, or less, specific 
than the other. By way of illustration, he mentions the Russian verb prišla, which specifically 
denotes to arrive by foot, and cannot be expressed by any one ‘equivalent’ English verb.  
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Although Catford’s linguistic theory of translation is, by and large, focused on ordinary 
language usage, his observations offer a helpful starting point, not least because a certain 
degree of ‘ambiguity’ is undoubtedly a ‘functionally relevant feature’ in tropical usage and 
one of the main causes of difficulty in translating poetic texts mentioned by Stanford. Yet 
are we to conclude from this that, where tropes turn out to be untranslatable, we are 
necessarily dealing with cases of linguistic rather than cultural untranslatability? The 
differences between metaphor and metonymy which have surfaced in our theoretical 
discussion suggest otherwise.  
 
We have seen that metonymy is structurally more dependent on ordinary language usage 
than metaphor: while the effects of metaphor stem from the terminological interaction 
between tenor and vehicle terms, their encounter is facilitated by the principle of analogy 
and similarity; in other words, by an extra-linguistic principle. In metonymy, on the other 
hand, the effects not only occur largely outside the tenor-vehicle compound (namely in 
interaction with the context); the relationship of tenor and vehicle here actually assumes 
ordinary usage. The link between the two, in other words, is based on an intra-linguistic 
principle. While this difference does not eliminate the potential for cultural untranslatability 
in the case of certain metonyms, it does situate that potential at a different location. We 
have argued that metonymy is to be understood as a shift within a semantic field and have 
suggested that this explains why it is possible to expand a metonymic expression into a 
literal statement without the need to add any logical markers. It follows that whenever this 
expanded literal version of a metonym can be translated from the source language into the 
target language without any intercultural complications, so can the metonym. If the 
expanded literal sentence is coherent and acceptable as an expression in ordinary usage in 
both languages (that is, that the corresponding terms are collocatable in both languages), it 
must be that the lexical contiguity, which constitutes the link between metonymic tenor and 
metonymic vehicle, is equally available to both languages. In metaphor, on the other hand, 
even if an extended literal statement explicating the relationship of similarity and/or 
analogy can be translated into the target language without any cultural untranslatability of 
the terms involved, the analogy or similarity itself must also be subject to potential cultural 
differences. After all, what is perceived of as comparable or analogous in one culture need 
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not necessarily be seen as such in another.388 Metaphors, therefore, are that much more 
likely to be subject to culturally determined untranslatability. 
 
However, as we have shown, while collocatability in ordinary usage is a sine qua non for 
potential metonymic usage, it is not the sole criterion that determines the viability of 
metonymic expressions. Rather, the frequency of such collocations determines the strength 
of the link between metonymic vehicle and tenor which the metonym exploits. The more 
frequently collocations occur in ordinary usage, the stronger the link, but also, as a 
consequence, the weaker the primary poetic effect of the metonymic shift in tropical usage. 
With regards to translation, this means that while a metonym may be translatable, the 
abrasiveness of the metonymic shift (and the strength of the poetic effect) may be felt more 
or less strongly in the target language depending on whether the terms in question co-occur 
with greater or lesser frequency and regularity in that language.  
 
A further consideration: the most prominent effects of metaphor arise from terminological 
interaction within the tenor-vehicle compound between otherwise unrelated terminologies. 
In this sense, metaphors are more self-contained; if the isolated metaphorical compound 
can be translated into the target language, then the metaphor will be recognisable as such 
in that language, regardless of the context.389 The poetic effects of metonymy, on the other 
hand, depend to a greater extent on secondary terminological interactions with the context. 
The metonymic tenor and vehicle stand in a pre-established relationship stemming from 
ordinary usage and therefore do not form a compound with ‘built-in’ terminological 
interaction: they must be terminologically coherent.390 Given this high degree of context-
dependency for the overall effect of metonyms, it follows that in addition to the primary 
effect of the metonymic shift itself, secondary effects resulting from interaction(s) of the 
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metonymic vehicle with the context may be a further source of increased or decreased 
effect-iveness of the metonym in translation.  
 
Cultural untranslatability, then, is a special risk for index metonyms and mutatis mutandis 
metonyms by association. The remaining categories of metonymy distinguished in Part I, on 
the other hand, come with an additional potential for linguistic untranslatability. Re-
examining Catford’s work on translatability, Wong has pointed out that 
Working within the framework of Indo-European languages ... Catford has 
focused only on the lexical level, leaving the macro, syntactic level untouched, 
perhaps because syntax does not pose too much of a problem in translation 
between Indo-European languages.391 
To illustrate his point, Wong refers to relative pronouns which are available as a syntactical  
feature in all Indo-European languages but have no equivalent in Chinese. Wong suggests 
that Chinese syntax ‘is normally short and linear, with an extremely small capacity to carry 
subordinate clauses, parenthetical constructions, etc. so that it can never aspire after the 
syntactic complexity, malleability, or tortuosity of its counterpart in an Indo-European 
language.’392 This lack of equivalent syntactical structures leads to one-way linguistic 
untranslatability: while sentences in Indo-European languages can be too complex to be 
rendered into Chinese, ‘the sense units in a Chinese text can be readily transported in the 
opposite direction with little disturbance to the original configuration.’393 As we have seen, 
syntax plays a structurally significant role in both amplification metonymy and in forms of 
grammatical metonymy. In both cases, specific linguistic features are prerequisites: the 
genitive case in amplification metonymy and the affiliation of an adjective to its governing 
noun through agreement of case, number and gender in grammatical metonymy. We shall 
accordingly factor into our examination the question whether linguistic untranslatability 
occurs in cases where the target language does not offer these features, or only offers them 
to a limited extent, while also remaining open to the possibility that a target language might 
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6.2. Language in the ‘Age of Translation’ 
These preliminaries bear on the translatability of metonyms but in no way predetermine 
how translators can or will actually respond to metonyms encountered in the source text. A 
particularly broad range of responses to the challenges of literary translation is observable 
in Germany during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.394 Contemporaries 
were acutely aware of developments in both the theory and practice of translation. 
Madame de Staël noted that ‘[t]he art of translation has been pushed further in Germany 
than in any other European dialect’395 and August Wilhelm Schlegel concurred: ‘The 
Germans are indeed universal translators.’396 The idiosyncratic co-existence and 
interpenetration of classicism and romanticism in Germany meant that the development of 
literary translation into German included both classical texts and texts in vernacular 
European languages of various epochs.  However, the rise of German philhellenism, with its 
notion of a special affinity between Germany and ancient Greece in terms of language and 
culture, ensured a special place for translations of Greek texts. After only very limited 
engagement with Greek literature in the original during the Renaissance,397 the radically 
new mode of translation represented by Voss’s Homer, along with Schleiermacher’s and 
Goethe’s contrasting theorisings, are widely seen as a turning point in the history of 
translation.398 Then again, it is a prime characteristic of the period of Weimar classicism in 
general that  
[n]early all the notable writers and critics in this period – Goethe, Herder, 
Humboldt, Hölderlin – translated the ancients, [while] even Schiller in his 
Hellenic period translated Euripides with the aid of Latin and French editions. ... 
The task of the translator was to lead the reader to an authentic appreciation of 
the original, even if this meant exploding the usual syntax and rhythm of 
German. The novelty of this approach can be seen in comparison with Wieland, 
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 Good introductions to these developments in Germany are offered by Fuhrmann 1987, Louth 1998, 5-53, 
Bernofsky 2005a and Kofler 2007. The most comprehensive study to date is Kitzbichler/Lubitz/Mindt 2009, 12-
113. A summary of the wider European dimension of the emerging theoretical approaches to translation in this 
period can be found in Frank 2007. 
395
 ‘L’art de traduire est poussé plus loin en allemande que dans aucun dialecte européen’, Staël 1813, vol. ii, 
103.  
396
 ‘Die Deutschen sind ja Allerweltsübersetzer‘, Schlegel 1798, 58. 
397
 ‘Reuchlin is said to have been one of the five men in Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century 
who had a thorough command of Greek. ... The knowledge of Greek did not become general in Germany until 
the middle of the sixteenth century. The first translations from the Greek were Reuchlin’s versions of 
Demosthenes’ First Olynthian Oration and the twelfth of Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead. For nearly a century 
following Reuchlin, practically all “translations” of Greek authors were from Latin. ... Sophocles, Aeschylus, 
Euripides and the Greek poets were translated into German only long after 1550.’ Thompson 1943, 348. 
398
 See, for instance, Louth 1998, 27f. and Bernofsky 2005b, 4; see also below, pp. 166-167. 
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who strove by all faithfulness to the original to produce a work of elegance and 
clarity; the ‘improvement’ of difficult or unclear passages was a pardonable sin, 
if not an outright virtue. The younger generation, on the other hand, sought to 
retain absolute fidelity to the original, so that the translation, in the words of 
Humboldt, ‘den Geist des Lesers gleichsam zum Geist des Schriftstellers stimmt’ 
[‘would, as it were, tune the spirit of the reader to the author’s’] ... ’399 
A shift of attention away from the reader and his aesthetic expectations to the author and 
the stylistic peculiarities of the original text are at the heart of a fundamental change in the 
practice and theory of translation. Several reasons have been suggested for this change. In 
literary-theoretical terms, a preoccupation with authors is one of the most evident features 
of Romantic thinking (German and other). In terms of cultural-political context, the 
‘specifically German mode was in large part arrived at via opposition to what they saw as 
the domination and assimilation foisted on foreign texts by translators in France.’400 This 
opposition is pointedly illustrated in Herder’s celebrated remark that  
[t]he French, too proud of their national taste, assimilate everything to it rather 
than bringing themselves to appreciate the taste of another era. Homer has to 
come to France a captive, dressed in their fashion so as not to offend their eyes. 
Stripped of his venerable beard and his old, simple dress, he is made to adopt 
French manners, and where his rustic nobility still shines through, he is mocked 
for being a barbarian. – We poor Germans, on the other hand, still virtually 
without an audience, and without a fatherland, still free from the tyranny of a 
national taste, want to see him the way he is.401 
The rise of German national sentiment also stands behind the frequent deployment of the 
topos which presents translation of classical literature as a means of refining and improving 
one’s native language. While in antiquity translation had often been a personal undertaking 
in which individuals sought to extend their own stylistic repertoire and powers of 
expression,402 it now became central to nation-building.403 Humboldt’s preface to his 
translation of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (1816) is a prime witness here: 
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 Grair 2005, 81.  
400
 Louth 1998, 7. See also Kofler 2007. 
401
 ‘Die Franzosen, zu stolz auf ihren Nationalgeschmack, nähern demselben alles, statt sich dem Geschmack 
einer andern Zeit zu bequemen. Homer muß als Besiegter nach Frankreich kommen, sich nach ihrer Mode 
kleiden, um ihr Auge nicht zu ärgern: sich seinen ehrwürdigen Bart, und alte einfältige Tracht abnehmen 
lassen: Französische Sitten soll er an sich nehmen, und wo seine bäurische Hoheit noch hervorblickt, da 
verlacht man ihn, als einen Barbaren. – Wir armen Deutschen hingegen, noch ohne Publikum beinahe, und 
ohne Vaterland, noch ohne Tyrannen eines Nationalgeschmacks, wollen ihn sehen, wie er ist.‘ Herder 1805, 
63f. 
402
 See e.g. (from ancient Rome) Cic. De Or. 1.155, Quint. Inst. 10.5.2-3 or Plin. Ep. 7.9.2. 
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It is impossible to count the merits Klopstock has earned himself in serving the 
German nation through his first successful treatment of ancient metres, and 
even more so Voss, about whom one can say that he has indeed introduced 
classical antiquity into the German language. A more powerful and beneficent 
influence on Nationalbildung [both ‘nation-building’ and ‘national 
formation/erudition’] in an already highly cultivated era is hardly conceivable, 
and this merit is his alone.404 
If the purpose of translation is to add to the language and spirit of a nation that 
which it does not possess or at least only possesses in a different way, then the 
first necessity is fidelity. ... It follows from this view, of course, that the 
translation will carry a certain colouring of foreignness ... As long as not 
foreignness but the foreign is felt, the translation has fulfilled its highest purpose 
... If, out of some queasy timidity, one goes further still and seeks even to avoid 
the foreign, in the sense in which one is used to hear it said that the translator 
ought to write just as the original author would have written in the language of 
the translator ... then one destroys all translation, and all of its benefit for 
language and nation alike.405 
 
On a more fundamental level, the massive surge of interest in translation itself can also be 
understood as a consequence of a radical shift in semiotics that occurs around 1800. The 
Enlightenment notion of linguistic signs had been based on the principle of representation: 
signs, if used properly, were credited with the ability to clearly represent whatever they 
signify.406 On this view, signifiers are virtually transparent; the creation of meaning in 
literature, therefore, is exclusively a matter of content, not of form. Gottsched’s 
Ausführliche Redekunst (‘Comprehensive Art of Rhetoric’) of 1736, for instance, is entirely 
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 As, of course, it had also been in earlier centuries for other vernacular languages: cf. e.g. Du Bellay’s 
Deffence et illustration de la langue françoise (1549). And the literature of ancient Rome itself depends in the 
first instance on translation (and other ‘imitation’) of Greek texts. 
404
 ‘Es ist nicht zu sagen, wieviel Verdienst um die Deutsche Nation durch die erste gelungne Behandlung der 
antiken Silbenmasse Klopstock, wie noch weit mehr Voss gehabt, von dem man behaupten kann, dass er das 
klassische Alterthum in die Deutsche Sprache eingeführt hat. Eine mächtigere und wohlthätigere Einwirkung 
auf die Nationalbildung ist in einer schon hoch cultivirten Zeit kaum denkbar, und sie gehört ihm allein an.’ 
Humboldt 1816, xviii. 
405
 ‘Soll aber das Uebersetzen der Sprache und dem Geist der Nation dasjenige aneignen, was sie nicht, oder 
was sie doch anders besitzt, so ist die erste Forderung einfache Treue. ... Mit dieser Ansicht ist freilich 
nothwendig verbunden, dass die Uebersetzung eine gewisse Farbe der Fremdheit an sich trägt ... Solange nicht 
die Fremdheit, sondern das Fremde gefühlt wird, hat die Uebersetzung ihre höchsten Zwecke erreicht ... Wenn 
man in ekler Scheu vor dem Ungewöhnlichen noch weiter geht, und auch das Fremde selbst vermeiden will, so 
wie man wohl sonst sagen hörte, dass der Uebersetzer schreiben müsse, wie der Originalverfasser in der 
Spracher des Uebersetzers geschrieben haben würde ... so zerstört man alles Uebersetzen, und allen Nutzen 
desselben für Sprache und Nation.’ Humboldt 1816, xix-xx. 
406
 For a general discussion, see Foucault 1966, 58-71 and 81-120. Based on the principles outlined there, 
Wellbery 1984 offers a cogent reading of Lessing’s Laocoon as a paradigmatic text for the Enlightenment 
semiotics of representation.  
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based on this assumption. He holds that ‘[w]ords themselves are arbitrary signs of our 
concepts’407 and shows no signs of any doubt regarding the general reliability of language in 
terms of referentiality and communication. When Gottsched displays any concern about 
issues of obscurity and incomprehensibility in language, he thinks only of problems of 
unconventionality.408 Thus, when discussing ‘the dark, unclear or incomprehensible way of 
writing’ (‘die dunkle, undeutliche, oder unverständliche Schreibart’), he argues that such 
writing originates either from a corresponding dark or unintelligible quality of the thought 
to be expressed or from the choice of unconventional words or from an infelicitous and 
obfuscating combination of words.409 In other words: it results from misuses of language, 
but not from any general problem inherent in language as such.  
 
This view inevitably has consequences for Gottsched’s understanding of tropical language. 
He defines tropes as ‘nothing but words taken in meanings other than those which they 
ordinarily have’410 with the consequence that  
such expressions ... [are] richer in senses and meanings than ordinary words: 
and whoever wishes to understand them needs to be able to intellectualise 
more than someone who only understands literal ways of speaking. Thus tropes 
have been introduced to oratory as a means to make the style more beautiful.411 
In Gottsched’s substitutionalist view, the ‘proper’ signifier is replaced by another, less 
precise sign which requires from the reader or listener a greater intellectual effort (‘mehr 
nachsinnen’) in order to reach the signified. There is a clear distinction between aesthetic 
effect and conceptual content which makes it possible and legitimate to translate foreign 
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 ‘Die Wörter an sich selbst sind willkürliche Zeichen unserer Begriffe.’ Gottsched 1736, 299. 
408
 ‘Insofar as comprehensible words are concerned, it is the particular duty of the orator to use them: because 
he cannot succeed in his intentions at all when he is not understood. Those words are comprehensible which 
are in general usage among the people where one gives a speech, and which the orator takes in their ordinary 
meaning. Incomprehensible items tend to be 1) local (provincial) words ... 2) very old words ... 3) foreign words 
... 4) neologisms ... 5) artificial words ...’ (‘Was die verständlichen Wörter betrifft, so hat ein Redner dieselben 
sonderlich zu befleißigen: weil er seine Absichten gar nicht erreichen kann, wofern er nicht verstanden wird. Es 
sind aber alle Wörter verständlich, die bey dem Volke, wo man redet, durchgehend üblich sind, und die der 
Redner in der gewöhnlichen Bedeutung nimmt. Hergegen unverständlich pflegen oft zu sein 1) 
Provinzialwörter ... 2) Die gar zu alten Wörter ... 3) Fremde Wörter ... 4) Die neugemachten Wörter ... 5) Die 
Kunstwörter ...’) Gottsched 1736, 300-301. The Aristotelian source for this list is apparent (cf. Arist. Poet. 22). 
409
 Gottsched 1736, 361-367. 
410
 ‘nichts anderes, als Wörter, die man in anderen Bedeutungen nimmt, als die sie gemeiniglich haben ...‘ 
Gottsched 1736, 307. 
411
 ‘solche Ausdrückungen ... allerdings reicher an Sinn und Bedeutungen als die gemeinen Worte [sind]: und 
wer sie verstehen will, der muß mehr nachsinnen können, als wer nur eigentliche Redensarten vernehmen 
kann. Dadurch wurden die Tropen, als ein Mittel, die Schreibart schöner zu machen, in die Redekunst 
eingeführt. ’ Gottsched 1736, 309. 
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texts ad sensum and to add a roughly ‘equivalent’ level of stylistic ‘decoration’ according to 
contemporary taste without incurring any real loss.412 The word as such has little 
importance; it merely provides access to the content. Translations by Wieland (whose 
approach to translation is based on Christian Wolff’s rationalistic theory of signs),413 like the 
much earlier translations by Opitz, assume this argument.414 Only when the assumed 
transparency of the sign and its ability to represent reliably become questionable – only 
when signs themselves are seen to be opaque and historically contingent carriers of 
aesthetic and semantic value415 – can translation become problematic enough to provoke 
the degree of theoretical reflection and practical experimentation that we see in Germany 
around 1800. Romantic aesthetics are profoundly influenced by a new notion of the sign as 
a ‘hieroglyph’ which ultimately eludes the full grasp of the writer and, consequently, also 
the translator.  
 
It follows that Humboldt’s notion of the general untranslatability of poetry, as expressed in 
the preface to his Agamemnon translation,416 and Friedrich Schlegel’s doubts about the 
reliability of linguistic communication in general, as expressed in his essay ‘On 
Incomprehensibility’ (‘Über die Unverständlichkeit’) of 1800,417 can be seen as two 
expressions of a single underlying epistemological-semiotic problematic. The form of the 
sign becomes meaningful in its own right; the act of translation thus acquires a Sisyphean 
quality and becomes an ongoing work-in-progress engagement with a foreign text that can 
never hope to reach a final stage of full completion.418 And the ubiquitous understanding of 
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 ‘Gottsched emphasises the rendering of the sense rather than form. In this he is a faithful adherent to 
Leibniz’ theory of language: words are signs, or even counters. They are freely convertible by means of what 
almost amounts to a mathematical operation. Equivalents can be found, imports are unnecessary.’ Lefevre 
1977, 13.  
413
 See Fuhrmann 1987, 3-6. 
414
 See Louth 1998, 10-11. 
415
 Or, as Foucault has put it: ‘From the nineteenth century, language began to fold in upon itself, to acquire a 
particular density, to deploy a history, an objectivity, and laws of its own. It became an object of knowledge 
among others ...’ Foucault 1966, 295. 
416
 ‘Such a poem [as Aeschylus’ Agamemnon] is untranslatable by its own particular nature, as well as in a very 
different sense insofar as this can be said of all works of great originality in general.’ (‘Ein solches Gedicht ist, 
seiner eigenthümlichen Natur nach, und in einem noch viel anderen Sinne, als es sich überhaupt von allen 
Werken von grosser Originalität sagen lässt, unübersetzbar.‘) Humboldt 1816, xv. 
417
 ‘Of all things that have to do with communicating ideas, what could be more fascinating than the question 
of whether such communication is actually possible?’ (‘Was kann wohl von allem, was sich auf die Mitteilung 
der Ideen bezieht, anziehender sein, als die Frage, ob sie überhaupt möglich sei.‘) Schlegel 1800, 363. 
418
 Humboldt is once again exemplary for this new view: ‘For translations are rather works which probe, 
determine and influence the state of a language at a given point in time and which need to be repeated anew 
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the poet as an ‘original genius’, whose creativity takes priority over any contemporary 
conventions, now pushes translators towards an ever increasing closeness to the modes of 
expression used in the original. 
 
In this context, Voss’s translation of Homer’s Odyssey (1781) marks the pioneering step that 
took translation onto new ground:  
Convinced of the inner relatedness of both languages, Voss dared to attempt a 
translation which set out not only to be faithful with regard to individual words 
and verses but also to maintain the word order and rhythm of the Greek 
original. ... despite much criticism, not least from Weimar, concerning the 
unreadability of his translation, his Homer and with it his new mode of 
translation set a new standard.419 
The novelty of Voss’s translation lies in its thoroughly foreignising approach, and the 
distinction between foreignising and domesticating translation does indeed date back to the 
period under discussion here. In 1813, three years before Humboldt’s reflections on 
‘foreignness’ and ‘the foreign’ in translation, both Goethe and Schleiermacher use their 
experience of reading and translating Greek literature, and the stimulus of Voss’s 
revolutionary experiment,420 to formulate the two basic approaches to translation which are 
still fundamental to translation theory today: 
There are two principles of translation: the first requires that an author from a 
foreign nation be brought across to us in such a way that we can consider him 
one of us; the second conversely requires of us that we ourselves move closer to 
the foreign author and reconcile ourselves to his conditions, his idiom and his 
peculiarities.421 
                                                                                                                                                                            
time and again, as lasting works.’ (‘Denn Uebersetzungen sind doch mehr Arbeiten, welche den Zustand der 
Sprache in einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt, wie an einem bleibenden Massstab, prüfen, bestimmen, und auf ihn 
einwirken sollen, und die immer von neuem wiederholt werden müssen, als dauernde Werke.‘) Humboldt 
1816, xxiv. 
419
  ‘Überzeugt von der geistigen Verwandtschaft beider Sprachen, wagt Voss hingegen eine Übersetzung, die 
nicht nur wort- und versgetreu sein, sondern auch Wortstellung und Versrhythmus des griechischen Originals 
bewahren soll.  ... trotz vieler Kritik gerade auch aus Weimar an der mangelhaften Lesbarkeit der Übersetzung 
setzt sich sein Homer und mit ihm seine neue Art des Übersetzens durch.‘ Kofler 2007, 1753. 
420
 ‘Voss did effect a kind of revolution in taste ... .’ Louth 1998, 28. 
421
 ‘Es gibt zwei Übersetzungsmaximen: die eine verlangt, daß der Autor einer fremden Nation zu uns herüber 
gebracht werde, dergestalt, daß wir ihn als den Unsrigen ansehen können; die andere hingegen macht an uns 
die Forderung, daß wir uns zu dem Fremden hinüber begeben und uns in seine Zustände, seine Sprachweise, 
seine Eigenheiten finden sollen.‘ Goethe 1813, 705. 
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The translator either leaves the author in peace as far as possible and moves the 
reader towards him or else leaves the reader in peace as far as possible and 
moves the author towards him.422  
The formulation of these two options,423 seen today as extreme points on a scale rather 
than mutually exclusive positions, presupposes the shift in translation practice from the 
traditional, domesticating translation model advocated by the likes of Gottsched to the new 
foreignising promoted by Voss, Humboldt and others. And soon, as Louth observes, the 
foreignising imperative itself yields alternative positions: 
If metre was perhaps Voss’s overriding concern, he was in practice always 
making carefully judged compromises ... no one consideration was allowed to 
crowd the others. Still, it is easy to see how Voss gave rise to translations where 
one principle did prevail to the detriment of other aspects: word-order in 
Hölderlin’s Pindar, or metre in Humboldt’s Agamemnon.424 
Different translators’ responses to metonyms can be expected to reflect this revolutionary 
turn, along with their own particular preoccupations, in different ways. Bernofsky rightly 
points out as a caveat that  
[i]nevitably, perhaps, the developments in translation practice around 1800, 
considerable as they were, could not entirely keep pace with the ambitious 
theoretical goals being set, even when translator and theorist were one and the 
same person.425 
Nonetheless, programmatic statements by the translators themselves help us to assess how 
far each translator’s response to metonyms in an original text is in line with explicit 
theoretical positions and objectives.  
 
In what follows, we shall compare and contrast a selection of excerpted translations of 
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon that involve metonymy in the Greek original. Here we have chosen 
a text written by one of the authors Stanford mentioned in this chapter’s opening quotation 
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 ‘Entweder der Übersetzer läßt den Schriftsteller möglichst in Ruhe, und bewegt den Leser ihm entgegen 
oder er läßt den Leser möglichst in Ruhe und bewegt ihm den Schriftsteller entgegen.‘ Schleiermacher 1838, 
218. The paper was delivered as a lecture to the Prussian Royal Academy of Sciences on 24
th
 June 1813. 
423
 There are, of course, precursors to these two famous formulations. Lefevre points out that ‘in reality 
Bodmer deserves most of the praise which is usually lavished on Goethe and Schleiermacher as theorists of 
translation.’ Lefevre 1977, 19; see also Louth 1998, 15-17. While Johann Jakob Bodmer (1689-1783) certainly 
implies the two positions in his 1746 work ‘Der Mahler der Sitten’ (‘The Painter of Manners’), the greater 
precision and impact of Goethe’s and Schleiermacher’s theorising surely justifies their prominent position in 
the history of translation theory. 
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 Louth 1998, 29. 
425
 Bernofsky 2005a, 2. 
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as particularly challenging to translators. The richness of Aeschylus’ tropical language has 
informed large parts of our theorising in Part I, and it is especially instructive to observe 
what happens to striking metonyms in translation. The German translations include texts 
from before and around 1800 as well as later texts which revert to a sober and philological 
method which, in semiotic and aesthetic terms, is much more akin to the pre-1800 mode of 
translation. With their different strategies, the translations will enable us to assess whether 
and how particular preoccupations or aesthetic-stylistic preferences on the part of the 
translators affect the way the source text’s metonyms are represented in the target 
language. And special attention will also be paid to whether and how metonyms are 
affected by the linguistic possibilities and limitations of the target language, culture and 
literary tradition, as well as to the role metonyms play in these translations in general. 
 
6.3. Metonymy in Translations of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon 
The translations of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon chosen for examination are by Daniel Jenisch 
(published 1786), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1816), Johann Gustav Droysen (1832), Ulrich von 
Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (1900) and (by way of contrast and comparison) Robert Browning 
(1877). All of these translations are prefaced by a statement from the translator in which he 
outlines his views on the text and the appropriate method of translating it.  
 
An epigraph, from Salmasius’ De Hellenistica Commentarius, on the frontispiece of Jenisch’s 
translation underlines the translator’s awareness of the high level of defamiliarised 
language usage in this play: ‘Only Aeschylus’ Agamemnon contains more obscurity than all 
the books of the Old Testament with their Hebraisms, Chaldeisms, Samaritanisms, etc.’426 
Jenisch claims to be the first to offer a translation of the entire play into German, only to 
stress the impossibility of such an undertaking:  
I dare to present to the public the translation of a piece by the tragic muse of 
antiquity which, as far as I know, has never appeared in German dress before, 
except for some translated choral passages published in the Museum ... But the 
translation of an Aeschylean tragedy will perhaps be a daring undertaking even 
after this [sc. the latest Pindar edition by Schütz], since among others Herder, 
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Unus Aeschyli Agamemnon plus habet obscuritatis quam omnes Veteris Testmenti libri cum suis Hebraismis, 
Chaldaïsmis, Samaritanïsmis etc. etc. (Jenisch 1786, frontispiece). In the preface, Jenisch looks back to this 
same quotation: ‘Salmasius said ... that it is darker than the entire Old Testament with all its dialects.’ 




Germany’s Longinus, in his Fragments places Aeschylus in the ranks of 
untranslatable poets.427 
While the notion of the untranslatability of poetic language would seem to situate Jenisch 
on the side of the new, foreignising approach to translation, the metaphorical notion of 
undressing and reclothing the source text echoes the earlier, domesticating approach.428 
This ambiguity continues as Jenisch proceeds to give an outline of his attitude to translation: 
... translating is, of course, easy, if it means nothing more than exchanging words 
and making a foreign original somehow readable to the public in one’s own 
mother tongue: but if it means carrying every individual idiosyncrasy of an 
author’s words and thoughts, his genius and that of his language, into our 
language and into our souls, so that the author of the original might accept the 
translation as a second copy of his work and the public the translation as a 
home-grown original: in that case, translating becomes somewhat more 
complicated. ... The more original the genius of a writer, the more idiosyncratic 
his manner of expression, the more his language differs from ours and the spirit 
of his age from ours, the more difficulties will be encountered in translation. ... 
For a translator of works of genius it is therefore paramount that, in addition to 
linguistic proficiency, he is able to empathise with the inner situation [‘idealische 
Situation’] of the author and that he translates in the same spirit in which the 
other wrote.429 
In every line, it seems, Jenisch shifts from one approach to the other: he rejects word-for-
word translation, considers it insufficient merely to communicate the meaning and stresses 
the importance of conveying not only the idiosyncrasies of the author’s thoughts but also 
the words he uses (one also notes the connection of all this with the concept of the poet as 
original genius). Although this points to a foreignising approach, there is also a tendency 
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 ‘Ich wage es, dem Publikum die Uebersetzung eines Stückes der tragischen Muse des Alterthums 
vorzulegen, welches, so viel ich wüßte, außer einigen im Museum verteutschten Chören noch niemals in einem 
teutschen Gewande aufgetreten ist ... Aber die Uebersetzung eines Aeschylischen Trauerspiels dürfte vielleicht 
auch nach dem  [sc. der neuesten Pindarausgabe besorgt durch Schütz] noch ein Wagestück seyn, da nebst 
andern Herder, Teutschlands Longin, in seinen Fragmenten, den Aeschylus in die Reihe der unübersetzbaren 
Dichter zählt..‘ Jenisch 1786, vii. 
428
 For the role this metaphor plays in Gottsched’s concept of translation, see Louth 1998, 15. 
429
 ‘... übersezzen ist freilich leicht, wenn es nicht mehr heißt, als Worte umtauschen und ein ausländisches 
Original dem Publikum seiner Muttersprache irgend lesbar zu machen: aber wenn es heißt, jede Individualität 
der Worte und Gedanken eines Autors, seines Genies und des seiner Sprache in unsere Sprache und in unsere 
Seelen hinübertragen, so daß der Autor des Originals die Uebersezzung für die zweyte Abschrift seines Werkes, 
und das Publikum die Uebersetzung für ein einheimisches Original ansehe: dann könnte übersezzen vielleicht 
doch etwas schwerer seyn ... Je origineller das Genie eines Schriftstellers, je eigenthümlicher die Manier seines 
Ausdrucks, je verschiedener seine Sprache von der unsrigen, und der Genius seiner Zeit von dem der unsrigen 
ist, desto mehr Schwierigkeiten wird auch die Uebersezzung haben. ... Bey einem Uebersezzer der Werke des 
Genies ist es also, außer der Sprachkenntniß, eine Haupterforderniß, daß er sich in die ganze idealische 
Situation seines Verfassers hineinzuversezzen wisse, und mit eben dem Geist übersezze, mit dem jener 
schrieb.‘ Jenisch 1786, vii-viii. 
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towards ad sensum translation in the exhortation to write ‘in the same spirit’, and the 
expressed aim that the translation should appear to readers as if originally written in the 
source language clearly points to a domesticating approach. It is worth noting that later in 
the preface the need to do justice to the author’s genius is placed in categorical opposition 
to attention to form: clinging to formulations in a literal-minded way is portrayed as 
intrinsically opposed to the elusive, sublime, spiritual quality that constitutes the genius in 
the first place.430 It is this that leads Jenisch to the ideal of free translation: 
This alone I cannot leave unmentioned, that I have dealt with my Aeschylus 
rather freely here and there ... [s]ince a literal translation ... of Aeschylus would 
be the most unbearable of all unbearable things, and would degrade one of the 
greatest geniuses to a nonsensical, pompous creator of bombast. Aeschylus ... 
says everything only with half a mouth: he thinks more than he says, hints at 
more than he shows ...431  
If the ‘hinting rather than showing’ is achieved in the original through a metonym, however, 
the metonymic shift will be a shift within a semantic field and, hence, a matter of 
terminology and its formal manipulation, for which free translation may or may not be 
adequate. In terms of metrical constraints that might affect his translation, Jenisch renders 
dialogue passages into iambics while turning the play’s choral passages into variants of the 
metres introduced into the German poetic repertoire by Klopstock in his odes.432 
 
As noted already, metre is widely recognised as the major concern of Humboldt’s 
translation.433 Humboldt is one of the key thinkers associated with the new semiotic 
paradigm, which is also reflected in his preface to the Agamemnon translation: 
All forms of language are symbols, not things themselves, not conventional 
signs, but sounds which perpetually remain in a real and, as it were, mystical 
correlation with the things and concepts they represent through the spirit in 
which they were conceived and continue to be conceived, and which contain the 
content of reality, in effect, dissolved into ideas and which can now change, 
                                                        
430
 See Jenisch 1786, x-xi.  
431
 ‘Dies nur kann ich nicht unangemerkt lassen, daß ich mit meinem Aeschylus hier und dort noch 
freymüthiger umgegangen ... Daher auch eine wörtliche Uebersezzung ... vom Aeschylus, das unerträglichste 
aller unerträglichen Dinge seyn, und nothwendig eins der größesten Genies zu einem non-sensikalischen 
Bombastaufdunser herabwürdigen würde. Aeschylus ... redet alles gleichsam nur mit halbem Munde aus: er 
denkt mehr, als er sagt, winkt mehr, als er zeigt ...‘ Jenisch 1786, xi. 
432
 See Jenisch 1786, xxvi-xxvii. 
433
 See above, p. 167. In the preface, Humboldt argues that German is the only language which can imitate the 
rhythmic nature of ancient Greek metre; see Humboldt 1816, xxiii-xxiv. 
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determine, separate and unite them in a way that must be thought of as 
infinite.434 
Accordingly, he advocates a foreignising approach which seeks to convey the idiosyncrasies 
of the original in the target language, avoiding only the most serious violations of the 
mother tongue:435 
An inability to match the particular beauties of the original all too easily leads to 
decorating it with foreign ornaments which produce a different colour and tone 
altogether. I have tried to avoid un-Germanness and obscurity, although, in 
respect to the latter, one must not call for unjustifiable changes that will 
diminish the original’s particular qualities. A translation cannot and need not be 
a commentary. It may not contain obscurities that result from vague usage or 
odd composition; but where the original only hints at something rather than 
explicitly expressing it, where it allows itself the use of metaphors whose 
relations are hard to grasp, where it skips pivotal ideas, there a translator would 
commit an injustice if he introduced on his own account a clarity that would 
distort the character of the text. The obscurity we find at times in the texts of 
the ancients, and which marks the Agamemnon in particular, results from the 
brevity and boldness with which – while discarding mediating and connecting 
phrases – ideas, images, emotions, memories and premonitions are conjoined 
with one another just as they emerge from the mind in a state of deep 
emotion.436 
                                                        
434
 ‘Alle Sprachformen sind Symbole, nicht die Dinge selbst, nicht verabredete Zeichen, sondern Laute, welche 
mit den Dingen und Begriffen, die sie darstellen, durch den Geist, in dem sie entstanden sind, und immerfort 
entstehen, sich in wirklichem, wenn man es so nennen will, mystischen Zusammenhange befinden, welche die 
Gegenstände der Wirklichkeit gleichsam aufgelöst in Ideen enthalten, und nun auf eine Weise, der keine 
Gränze gedacht werden kann, verändern, bestimmmen, trennen und verbinden können.‘ Humboldt 1816, xvii. 
435
 See also Humboldt 1816, xix-xx, as cited above, see above p. 163. 
436
 ‘Das Unvermögen, die eigenthümlichen Schönheiten des Originals zu erreichen, führt gar zu leicht dahin, 
ihm fremden Schmuck zu leihen, woraus im Ganzen eine abweichende Farbe, und ein verschiedener Ton 
entsteht. Vor Undeutschheit und Dunkelheit habe ich mich zu hüten gesucht, allein in dieser letzteren 
Rücksicht muss man keine ungerechte, und höhere Vorzüge verhindernde Forderungen machen. Eine 
Uebersetzung kann und soll kein Commentar seyn. Sie darf keine Dunkelheit enthalten, die aus schwankendem 
Wortgebrauch, schielender Fügung entsteht; aber wo das Original nur andeutet, statt klar auszusprechen, wo 
es sich Metaphern erlaubt, deren Beziehung schwer zu fassen ist, wo es Mittelideen auslässt, da würde der 
Uebersetzer Unrecht thun, aus sich selbst willkührlich eine den Charakter des Textes verstellende Klarheit 
hineinzubringen. Die Dunkelheit, die man in den Schriften der Alten manchmal findet, und die gerade der 
Agamemnon vorzüglich an sich trägt, entsteht aus der Kürze, und der Kühnheit, mit der, mit Verschmähung 
vermittelnder Bindesätze, Gedanken, Bilder, Gefühle, Erinnerungen und Ahndungen, wie sie aus dem tief 
bewegten Gemüthe entstehen, an einander gereiht werden.‘ Humboldt 1816, xx-xix. In the same spirit 
Humboldt declares later on: ‘A part of such attention must also be devoted to the translation, not demanding 
that what in the source language is sublime, gigantic and extraordinary should in translation be easy and 
immediately accessible.’ (‘Einen Theil dieser Aufmerksamkeit muss man auch der Uebersetzung schenken, 
nicht verlangen, dass das, was in der Ursprache erhaben, riesenhaft und ungewöhnlich ist, in der  
Uebertragung leicht und augenblicklich fasslich seyn solle.‘) Humboldt 1816, xix. 
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Once again, an awareness of ‘obscurities’ resulting from tropical language is apparent 
(metaphor is singled out, but ‘hinting rather than explicitly expressing’ certainly covers 
metonymy as well), and the stated aim is to preserve such ‘obscurities’ in the translation. 
 
Droysen and Wilamowitz take a very different stance. Both produce their translations at a 
time when the spirit of excited experimentation with translation has already worn itself 
out.437 The pendulum now swings back to a preference for domesticating, albeit in different 
degrees and with a residual sensitivity to stylistic features. 
 
For Droysen, the primary objective of translations is to ‘domesticate the foreign’,438 but not 
to the extent that all foreignness disappears: 
Insofar as the translation itself is concerned, I have, of course, followed the 
natural rule which follows from its rationale. It would be just as erroneous to 
blur all that is foreign as to force one’s own language under the yoke of a foreign 
idiom; only the greatest fidelity can steer a course between the twin hazards of 
caricature and blandness.439 
Although he emphasises the need to convey not only the source text’s content but also the 
aesthetic impression created by its formal features,440 Droysen rejects foreignising 
                                                        
437
 ‘Translations of ancient poets have an awkward status in our literature; the public has grown tired and 
suspicious because of the many failed attempts; for good reasons one refers to the more congenial and 
incomparably richer poetry of modern peoples; famous names from antiquity slowly lose the aura of 
traditional partiality; and the essence of classicism, rhetorical perfection, which no longer surpasses that of 
modern writing, usually perishes in translations, whose tastelessness has become proverbial.’ 
(‘Uebersetzungen antiker Dichter haben in unserer Literatur einen schwierigen Stand; durch viele mißglückte 
Versuche ist das Publikum ermüdet und mißtrauisch gemacht; mit Recht wird auf die verwandtere und 
ungleich reichere Poesie der modernen Völker verwiesen; berühmte Namen des Alterthums verlieren allmählig 
den Nimbus herkömmlicher Vorurtheile; und das Wesen der Klassicität, die rhetorische Vollendung, die sie 
schon nicht mehr vor dem neueren Schriftthum  voraus haben, geht gewöhnlich in den Uebersetzungen zu 
Grunde, deren Geschmacklosigkeit zum Sprüchwort [sic] geworden ist.‘) Droysen 1832, i. 
438
 ‘If the purpose of translations is to domesticate the foreign, then it is not necessary, I believe, to display at 
the same time the extensive apparatus of transmission and all the untidy traces of this journey and its learned 
wrappings.’ (‘Wenn Uebersetzungen Fremdes heimisch zu machen bestimmt sind, so, glaube ich, braucht nicht 
der weitlaeufige Apparat des Transportes und alle die unreinlichen Spuren des durchgemachten Weges und 
der gelehrten Emballage mit ausgestellt zu werden.‘) Droysen 1832, i. 
439
 ‘Die Uebersetzung selbst anlangend bin ich der natürlichen Regel, die aus ihrem Zwecke folgt, gefolgt. Es 
wäre gleich fehlerhaft, alles Fremdartige zu verwischen, wie der eigenen Sprache das Joch eines fremden 
Idioms aufzubürden; zwischen beiden Klippen der Karikatur und der Farblosigkeit kann die größte Treue allein 
hindurchleiten.‘ Droysen 1832, vii. 
440
 ‘This fidelity initially requires an understanding of the original that is as comprehensive as possible; if it 
were sufficient to convey the contents, a translator with dictionary and grammar book would be sufficient; the 
more essential and idiosyncratic the form of the original is, the more important is it to pick up and raise to 
awareness the immediate impression. The ancient poets present manifold difficulties in this respect ... The 
translator must seek to convey the content of the original faithfully, yet the impression of the form which is 
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approaches that seek to re-model foreign expressions, words and syntax in the target 
language.441 Thus, despite arguing for a via media and despite insisting on replicating the 
original metre,442 ultimately he favours a domesticating approach: 
The translator has no higher guiding principle than to represent the artistic 
beauty of the original in his language to the degree that it can count for a free 
product of that language, that it could be the form which the poet himself would 
have used in this language.443 
Droysen privileges the impression created in and by the source language over the actual 
formal features which create it. It is the aesthetic impression which needs to be represented 
through the given means of the target language, and in this recreation the formal structures 
which create them in the source language are not considered as binding. In other words, 
Droysen’s approach effectively aims at dynamic, functional equivalence as opposed to 
formal equivalence.444 It remains to be seen if and how metonymy is affected by this choice, 
given that its specific aesthetic impression – the metonymic shift – seems to be intrinsically 
linked to its specific formal realisations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
given to the content more faithfully; in all that remains he operates like a scholar, in this one respect like an 
artist.’ (‘Diese Treue fordert zunächst möglichst vollkommenes Verständniß des Originals; genügte es, den 
Inhalt wiederzugeben, so möchte der Uebersetzer mit Lexikon und Grammatik ausreichen; je wesentlicher und 
eigenthümlicher die Form des Originals ist, desto wichtiger ist es, das Unmittelbare ihres Eindrucks 
herauszufühlen und zum Bewußtsein zu bringen. Die alten Dichter bieten in dieser Hinsicht mannigfache 
Schwierigkeit ... Der Uebersetzer muß treu den Inhalt des Originals, treuer den  Eindruck  der Form, die sich der 
Inhalt gegeben, wiederzugeben suchen; in allem Uebrigen ist er auf gelehrte, in diesem Einen auf künstlerische 
Weise thätig.‘) Droysen 1832, viii;  italics in the original. 
441
 ‘And yet in translations of ancient authors one has grown used to taking clumsiness for fidelity, crass crudity 
for the antique ... Can the most repulsive German be a true translation of pure, rhetorically perfect Greek? The 
first demand is to translate from the beautiful into the beautiful; every cacophony, every maimed word, every 
contorted sentence is a worse infidelity than a word more or a word less; it is not far from the pedantry of 
slavishly literal translation to the absurd manner of those Persian translators who, when they could not 
proceed any further, honestly left the Indian word of the Upanishads in the text.’ (‘Und doch hat man sich 
gewöhnt, in Uebersetzungen alter Autoren Unbehülflichkeit für Treue, krasse Rohheit für antik zu nehmen ... 
Kann das abscheulichste Deutsch treue Uebersetzung eines reinen, rhetorisch vollendeten Griechisch sein? Die 
erste Anforderung ist, daß aus dem Schönen in das Schöne übertragen werde; jeder Mißlaut, jede 
Wortverstümmelung, jede Satzverrenkung ist eine ärgere Untreue, als ein Wort zuviel oder zu wenig; von der 
Pedanterei sklavischer Wörtlichkeit ist es nicht weit bis zur absurden Manier jener Persischen Uebersetzer, die, 
wenn es nicht weiter ging, ehrlich das Indische Wort ihres Upanischad selbst in den Text setzen.‘) Droysen 
1832, ix. 
442
 ‘It goes without saying that the metre of the original had to be kept everywhere.‘ (‘Es versteht sich von 
selbst, daß überall die Versformen des Originals beizubehalten waren.‘) Droysen 1832, xi. This declaration is 
followed by an extensive discussion of the difficulties of metrical transposition into German, see Droysen 1832,  
xi-xv. 
443
 ‘Der Uebersetzer hat keine höhere Richtschnur, als die künstlerische Schönheit des Originals in seiner 
Sprache bis zu dem Grade wiederzugeben, daß sie für ein freieres Erzeugniß derselben gelten, daß sie die Form 
sein könnte, deren der Dichter selbst sich in dieser Sprache bedient haben würde.‘ Droysen 1832, ix. 
444
 These terms for the two concepts were coined by Nida; see Nida 1964. 
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Wilamowitz positions himself yet more clearly at the domesticating end of the translation 
spectrum. For the radical foreignising pioneered by Humboldt almost a century earlier, the 
philologist only has poisoned praise: 
I adore Wilhelm von Humboldt to the utmost degree, I admire his desire to 
translate the Agamemnon and the spirit in which he has attempted it; but I no 
longer attempt to do it in exactly the same spirit, for now we also know the 
errors of classicism, and I consider his translation a complete failure.445 
For Wilamowitz, revealingly, the provisional nature of all translation is not so much a matter 
of the intrinsic untranslatability of signs but of ‘scientific’ progress which renders earlier 
translations progressively obsolete.446 Once again, this is related to an underlying change in 
the way language in general is understood. Apel and Kopetzki rightly point out that ‘as if 
Herder, Goethe, Schlegel and Humboldt had never existed, in the context of translation 
Wilamowitz returns to a conception of language which seems to have belonged to a pre-
philological era.’447 While Jenisch’s pioneering German translation of the Agamemnon 
stands between traditional, classicising domestication, on the one hand, and Voss’s and 
Humboldt’s new, radical foreignising, on the other, Wilamowitz’s (and Droysen’s) position is 
more akin to that of Gottsched and Wieland than to their chronologically closer 
predecessors. The difference between Wilamowitz and that first wave of German classicism, 
however, lies in the direction their ‘domestication’ takes. For the earlier classicists, the 
appropriate way to address the ‘obscurities’ of the source text was embellishment according 
to the contemporary taste of neo-classicism; for the philologist, such obscurities call for 
explanation: 
                                                        
445
 ‘Ich verehre Wilhelm von Humboldt auf das höchste, ich bewundere, dass er den Agamemnon hat 
übersetzen wollen und in welchem Sinne er es versucht hat; aber ich versuche es nicht mehr ganz in 
demselben Sinne, denn wir kennen jetzt auch die Irrtümer des Klassicismus, und ich halte seine Übersetzung 
für ganz verfehlt. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1900, 3f. Remarkably enough, in the following lines Wilamowitz 
cites Humboldt’s translation of Agam. 239-247 as an illustration of precisely what he takes issue with – a 
passage of the play that contains one of the most striking index metonyms in Greek tragedy. Humboldt’s 
translation of the passage, Wilamowitz’s critique and his own translation are discussed in more detail further 
below, see pp. 196-199. 
446
 See Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1900, 5. 
447
  ‘Als hätte es Herder, Goethe, Schlegel und Humboldt nie gegeben, kehrt Wilamowitz-Moellendorff im 
Kontext der Übersetzung zu einer Sprachauffassung zurück, die vorphilologischen Zeiten anzugehören schien 
...‘ Apel/Kopetzki 2003, 93-94. 
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My translation aims to be as comprehensible as the original was to the 
Athenians, perhaps even more readily comprehensible; that is, it already wants 
to supply part of the interpretation.448 
This aim of a self-explanatory translation, clearer than the original, opens up intriguing 
possibilities regarding the treatment of metonyms: will they be simply translated into literal 
expressions whenever their ambiguity is considered too ‘obscure’, or are there other modes 
of ‘interpretation’ (‘Erklärung’) that reflect at least something of the original poetic idiom 
even when presenting a more lucid and comprehensible sequence? 
 
Browning’s English translation, finally, though chronologically closer to Wilamowitz’s than to 
the others, can also be counted among the foreignising versions. Browning is prepared to 
use unfamiliar language in order to achieve closeness to the foreign original, but proposes 
to limit it to archaisms, in particular, without doing violence to the target language: 
If, because of the immense fame of the following Tragedy, I wished to acquaint 
myself with it, and could only do so by the help of a translator, I should require 
him to be literal at every cost save that of absolute violence to our language. The 
use of certain allowable constructions which, happening to be out of daily 
favour, are all the more appropriate to archaic workmanship, is no violence: but 
I would be tolerant for once, - in the case of so immensely famous an original, - 
of even a clumsy attempt to furnish me with the very turn of each phrase in as 
Greek a fashion as English will bear...449 
 
In this set of translations, then, Humboldt represents the foreignising approach, while 
Droysen and Wilamowitz set out to offer more domesticating renderings of the Greek text. 
Jenisch’s translation takes an intermediate position between the two. Browning, another 
foreigniser but the only non-German translator discussed here, will provide valuable 
                                                        
448
 ‘Meine Übersetzung will mindestens so verständlich sein wie den Athenern das Original war, womöglich 
noch leichter verständlich; sie will also einen Teil der Erklärung bereits liefern.‘ Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1900, 
3. 
449
 Browning 1877, v-vi. In addition to this (positive) programme, the (negative) rejection of a merely content-
centred domestication is made explicit later on in the preface: ‘Further, - if I obtained a mere strict bald 
version of thing by thing, or at least word pregnant with thing, I should hardly look for an impossible 
transmission of the reputed magniloquence and sonority of the Greek, and this with much the less regret, 
inasmuch as there is abundant musicality elsewhere, but nowhere else in his poem the ideas of the poet. And 
lastly, when presented with these ideas, I should expect the result to prove very hard reading indeed if it were 
meant to resemble Aeschylus, ξυμβαλεῖν οὐ ῤᾴδιος, “not easy to understand”, in the opinion of his stoutest 
advocate among the ancients.’ Browning 1877, vi. A domesticating element that should be noted, however, is 
the use of rhyming to express the elevated tone of the choral passages. 
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evidence for how far specific features of the German language may be playing a role in 
responses to metonymy in the German versions. 
 
Let us to begin our assessment here, as we did in Part I, with passages containing metonyms 
that have become clichéd through frequent usage in Greek poetic idiom and have thus 
effectively gained denotative value. What happens to such metonymic clichés and ‘dead’ 
metonyms in translation? Consider the following passage: 
 ... νῦν δέ μοι, φίλον κάρα, 
 ἔκβαιν’... 
 Now then, please, dear head, 
 step out... 450 
a)  Jenisch 
 ... mein geliebtes Haupt ... 
 ... my beloved head ... 
b)  Humboldt 
 ... geliebtes Haupt... 
 ... my beloved head ... 
c) Droysen 
 ... mein theures Haupt... 
 ... my precious head ... 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 ... Trauter Freund ... 
 ... my dear friend ... 
e) Browning 
 ... dear headship... 
As Fraenkel ad loc. points out ‘[t]his form of affectionate address, the prototype of which is 
as early as Homer, occurs in Aeschylus only here, whereas in Sophocles and Euripides it is to 
be found a number of times.’ Jenisch’s, Humboldt’s and Droysen’s translations show that 
the metonymic expression can be translated verbatim into German where the clichéd 
literary tradition continues in the target language. We refer here, and in what follows, to 
verbatim translations when the highest degree of translatability is demonstrated, whereby 
the term in the target language corresponds to the term in the source language in its range 
                                                        
450
 A. Agam. 905-906; trans. Sommerstein. 
177 
 
of both denotative and tropical significations, so that the semantic range of the two terms in 
ordinary usage and in tropical usage is roughly equivalent.451 Wilamowitz’s translation gives 
a literal version instead of the metonymic cliché, whereas Browning’s translation gives a 
more striking (if bizarre) live metonym: Agamemnon is not addressed as a person, or as a 
body part implying one, but as an abstraction.  
 
We find a similar outcome with the following sequence: 
 προφθάσασα  καρδία   
 γλῶσσαν ἂν τάδ᾽ ἐξέχει. 
 my heart would be too quick for my tongue 
 and would be pouring all this out452 
a)  Jenisch 
 längst schon hat die Zung‘ herausgeströmet,  
 was die Seele erfüllt: 
 the tongue has already poured out 
 that which fills the soul 
b)  Humboldt 
 goss das Herz, voreilend, sich  
 über meine Lippen aus 
 the heart precipitately poured itself out 
 over my lips 
c)  Droysen 
 Eilen würde da mein Herz  
 Auszuströmen diesen Wunsch 
 Then my heart would rush to 
 Pour out this wish 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Der Zunge käm‘ zuvor das Herz 
 The tongue would come second after the heart 
e) Browning 
 My heart, outstripping what tongue utters,  
 Would have all out 
                                                        
451
 This (approximate) semantic equivalence does not, however, imply equivalence in terms of poetic effect. A 
literary cliché in one culture and one poetic idiom may be less clichéd or even striking in another, and vice 
versa. 
452
 A. Agam. 1028-1029; trans. Sommerstein. 
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In four of the translations, the metonymic cliché ‘heart’ (implying the emotional inner life of 
the subject) has been carried over into the target language with the same terminology and 
the same clichéd status in poetic idiom.453 ‘Tongue’ also proves to be translatable in 
principle. Humboldt’s translation converts it to ‘lips’, thus replacing one stock metonym 
with another, but both equally imply ‘speech’. Only Jenisch’s translation gives a literalised 
translation, which renders the content of the otherwise implied speech explicit (‘that which 
fills my soul’). 
 
The Greek term κέαρ (‘heart’) also exemplifies this type of traditional literary cliché; 
compare the following two sets: 
(1) γυναικὸς ἀνδρόβουλον ἐλπίζον κέαρ 
 a woman’s hopeful heart, which plans like a man454 
a) Jenisch 
 Wie sollt‘  
 hier dieses Weibes freches Männerherz hinschmelzen 
 How should 
 here this woman’s daring man-heart melt away 
b) Humboldt 
 Denn so heischet es des Weibes mannhaft kühnes, tückisch hoffend Herz 
 For thus desires the woman’s manly-bold, cunningly-hoping heart 
c) Droysen 
 also, denk‘ ich, hat es mir  
 geboten meiner Herrin männlich ratend Herz 
 This way, I think,  
 has my lady’s manly-counselling heart instructed her 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Die Königin, an Kühnheit und Verstand ein Mann 
 The queen, a man in terms of boldness and intelligence 
                                                        
453
 We take all expressions of this type to be metonymic clichés (and not literal or indeed metaphorical 
expressions) since they are based on a link of contiguity between an organ and an abstract capacity of human 
subjects with no analogy or similarity involved. Regardless of how exactly the extra-linguistic relationship 
between organ and non-corporeal capacity may have been conceptualised, the link between them is 
established through regular collocation of organ terminology with human terminology in the context of 
abstract human faculties – and the exploitation of links established through collocation in ordinary  usage is, as 
we have shown, the core principle of metonymy. This argument is developed more fully in the appendix 
‘“Speaking Organs” – Tropology, Intellectual History and Literary Lexicography’. 
454
 A. Agam. 11; trans. Sommerstein. 
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e)  Browning 
 so prevails audacious  
 the man’s-way-planning hoping heart of woman 
 
(2) ἦ κάρτα  πρὸς  γυναικὸς  αἴρεσθαι κέαρ  
 How very like a woman, to let her heart take flight455 
a) Jenisch 
  Wie schwillt das Herz des Weibes doch so leicht der Freude  
 How easily woman’s heart swells to joy 
b)  Humboldt 
 Recht Weiberart ist’s, eitlen Wahns das Herz zu blähen 
 It is indeed women’s way to inflate the heart in vain delusion 
c)  Droysen 
 Doch Weiberart ist’s, außer sich gar bald zu sein  
 But it is women’s way to be completely out of one’s mind  
d) Wilamowitz 
 Wie leicht ist doch ein Weiberherz entzündet 
 How easily a woman’s heart is set on fire 
e)  Browning 
 Truly, the woman’s way, - high to lift heart up’ 
In both sequences, the majority of translations replicate the Greek metonymic cliché 
verbatim. The only variations are, in the first passage, Jenisch’s addition of a stock metaphor 
(‘melt away’) and Wilamowitz’s literalising translation; and in the second, Wilamowitz’s 
addition of a stock metaphor (‘easily set on fire’) and Droysen’s literalising translation. 
 
With the Greek term γλῶσσα (‘tongue’), the situation is slightly different. As before, a 
verbatim translation is possible (as other instances in the play confirm).456 However, the 
                                                        
455
 A. Agam. 592; trans. Sommerstein. 
456
 Compare, for instance, the translation of θαυμάζομέν  σου  γλῶσσαν, ὡς θρασύστομος (‘We are amazed at 
your language [lit.: your tongue] – the arrogance of it – [lit.: how bold-mouthed]’ A. Agam. 1400; trans. 
Sommerstein) in which all translators but Jenisch preserve the metonymic cliché in one form or another (note 
how Droysen first literalises the original metonym and then re-introduces it in the form of a compound 
adjective): Jenisch – ‘Wie staun ich über deine Frechheit!‘ (‘How I marvel at your boldness!‘), Humboldt – ‘Wir 
staunen deiner Zunge frecher Lästerung‘ (‘We marvel at your tongue’s impertinent blasphemy’), Droysen – 
‘Wir staunen deiner Rede, wie Du zungenfrech noch solche Worte prahlest über dich und ihn!‘ (‘We marvel at 
your speech, how bold-tongued you boast such words about yourself and him!‘), Wilamowitz – ‘Ob deiner 
Zunge Kühnheit staun’ ich.’ (‘I marvel at the boldness of your tongue.’), Browning – ‘We wonder at thy tongue: 
since bold-mouthed truly is she who in such speech boasts o’er her husband.’ Full translatability is also 
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semantic range of the term as a metonym has become so familiar that the translators are 
prepared to eliminate any sense of metonymy and its directional, open-ended suggestions. 
Compare the following two sets: 
(1) εὔφημον  ἦμαρ  οὐ πρέπει  κακαγγέλῳ γλώσσῃ μιαίνειν 
 It is not proper to defile a day of good omen by uttering of bad news  
 [lit.: with a tongue that brings ill tidings]457 
a)  Jenisch 
 Den Tag des Heiles ziemt’s   
 mit Unglücksbotschaften nicht zu entweihn 
 It is not proper to desecrate the day of salvation 
 with news of ill-fortune 
b)  Humboldt 
 Den Tag des Heils mit Trauerkunde schnöd‘ entweihn  
 gebühret nicht  
 To vilely desecrate the day of salvation with news of mourning 
 is not proper 
c)  Droysen 
 Mit böser Botschaft sollte man den frohen Tag  
 Niemals entweihen  
 One should never desecrate the happy day 
 With bad news 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Den Tag der Freude sollte Trauerbotschaft nicht entweihn 
 News of mourning should not desecrate the day of joy 
e) Browning 
 It suits not to defile a day auspicious  
 With ill-announcing speech 
 
(2) μή τις  ὅντιν᾽  οὐχ  ὁρῶμεν  προνοίαισι  
 τοῦ πεπρωμένου  
 γλῶσσαν ἐν τύχᾳ νέμων; 
 perhaps a being we cannot see, 
 using language [lit.: tongue] with accuracy 
 through his foreknowledge of what was fated458 
                                                                                                                                                                            
displayed in the translation of ἀλλὰ  τούσδ᾽  ἐμοὶ  ματαίαν  γλῶσσαν  ὧδ᾽  ἀπανθίσαι (‘But to think that these 
men should shoot off their worthless tongues‘ A. Agam. 1662; trans. Sommerstein): Jenisch – ‘[m]it so loser 
Zunge‘ (‘with such loose tongue‘), Humboldt – ‘der eitlen Zunge‘ (‘of vain tongue’), Droysen and Wilamowitz – 
‘mit frecher Zunge’ (‘with insolent tongue’), Browning – ‘the idle tongue’.  
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 der Unsichtbaren einer   
 lenkte, kundig des Schicksals  
 die profetische Zunge ihm 
 one of the invisibles,  
 knowing the ways of fate, directed 
 the prophetic tongue for him 
b)  Humboldt 
 lenket‘, unerschauet, nicht, ahndungsvoll  
 dess, was vorbestimmt war, einer recht der Zunge Wort? 
 does not someone, unseen, full of foreboding 
 of what was predetermined, rightly guide the tongue’s word? 
c) Droysen 
 Wenn nicht der, den keener schaut, der voraus all Verhängniß überdenkt,  
 Auch das Wort im Zufall lenkt 
 Even if the one whom nobody sees, who ponders all fate in advance,  
 Does not also guide the word by chance. 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Fand ihn eines Dämons Zunge, zukunftahnend, schicksaldeutend? 
 Did a demon’s tongue find him, with premonitions of the future, interpreting fate? 
e) Browning 
 Was he someone whom we see not, by forecastings of the future 
 Guiding tongue in happy mood? 
In the first example, all the translations have eliminated the vestige of a metonymic trope 
and thus any vestigial ambiguity. Most of the German translations conflate the adjective 
κακαγγέλῳ (‘bringing ill tidings’) and the noun γλώσσῃ (‘tongue’, ‘speech’) into one 
compound noun which indicates that it is the microcontextual specification accomplished by 
the adjective which prompts the disambiguation. In the second example, the microcontext 
is less specific and leaves more room for the ambiguity resulting from the extended 
semantic range of the Greek term. In the event, only Droysen’s translation disambiguifies 
the metonym, though without rendering the term entirely literal (note the singular ‘word’ 
implying a plural). Humboldt’s translation gives the same disambiguified version (‘Wort’, 
‘word’), but at the same time includes a literal translation of the metonymic term (‘der 
Zunge’, ‘the tongue’), albeit in a subordinate position where it carries little semantic weight. 
All the other translations give a verbatim representation of the stock metonym. 
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Translatable metonymic clichés in which the terminology of body parts is used to imply 
either the whole person or aspects of personhood are common enough.459 Conversely, 
there are some cases where cultural specificities impede verbatim translation. Consider two 
cases involving the Greek term φρήν (‘midriff’, ‘diaphragm’): 
(1) οὐδ᾽  ἀποπτύσαι  δίκαν  
 δυσκρίτων ὀνειράτων 
 θάρσος εὐπειθὲς 
 ἵζει φρενὸς φίλον θρόνον; 
 Why can I not spurn it, 
 like a dream hard to interpret, 
 and let optimism persuade me and set itself  
 in command of my mind within? 
 [lit.: and let persuasive confidence  
 sit on the dear throne of my diaphragm]460  
a)  Jenisch 
 Warum fliegt mir der schwarze Schreckgedanke  
 durch die Seele profetisch hin, und weissagt  
 ungelohnt, ungeheissen, dunkle Zukunft?  
 Warum tilg‘ ich ihn, gleich dem unausdeutbarn Traume, nicht aus der bangen Brust? 
 Why does the frightful black thought fly 
 prophetically through my soul, and prophesy 
 unpaid, uncalled for, a dark future? 
 Why do I not purge it, like an uninterpretable dream, from the anxious breast? 
b)  Humboldt 
 Warum kehret, räthselhaftem Traum  
 gleich, es fern verbannend, nie  
 wieder sicherer Muth mir  
 zum Sitz der lieben Brust? 
 Why does firm courage 
 nevermore return 
 to the seat of the dear breast,  
 banning it far away  
 like a mysterious dream? 
c)  Droysen 
 Warum nicht, vergessend sein,  
 sein wie eines dunklen Traums,  
 weilt auf meines Gemüths liebem Thron getroster Muth?  
                                                        
459
 Such aspects being, for instance, powers of reasoning, speech, feelings of sympathy and anger, and so on. 
460
 A. Agam. 980-983; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 Why does confident courage  
 not rest on the dear throne of my mind, 
 forgetting it, like a dark dream? 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Und die das Herze  
 nicht wie ein wirres Traumgesicht  
 verscheucht und frei und ruhig schlagen mag. 
 And which the heart  
 does not expel like a confused dream vision 
 and [sc. so that it] may beat free and peaceful. 
e) Browning 
 Fronting my heart, the portent-watcher – flits she?  
 Wherefore should prophet-play  
 The uncalled lay,  
 Nor – having spat forth fear, like bad dreams – sits she  
 On the mind’s throne beloved – well-suasive Boldness? 
 
(2) φονολιβεῖ  τύχᾳ  φρὴν  ἐπιμαίνεται 
 your mind [lit.: your diaphragm] is driven mad by your experience of flowing blood461 
a)  Jenisch 
 als hättest du aus dem Blutbecher gesoffen,  
 so rasest du 
 you are raging 
 as though you had been drinking from the cup of blood 
b)  Humboldt 
 da dir die Brust, an Mord frech sich ergötzend, rast 
 since your breast is raging, impertinently delighting in murder  
c)  Droysen 
 so frech von dem vergoss’nen Blut  
 ras’t dir der Geist noch nach 
 your mind is still raging on, 
 impertinent because of the shed blood 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Wie sich dein rasend Herz  
 letzt an der blut’gen That 
 How your raging heart  
 feasts on the bloody deed 
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 thy mind, with its slaughter-outpouring part,  
 is frantic 
The difficulty in translating the term φρήν lies in the fact that a metonymic connection 
between the diaphragm and an abstract human faculty (encompassing both emotional, 
intellectual and voluntative responses) has no direct parallel in German or English culture or 
in the poetic idiom of the two literary traditions. For cultural reasons, therefore, this 
metonymic cliché is untranslatable so far as verbatim translation is concerned. Accordingly, 
the translations show a variety of responses, ranging from paraphrase that drops the 
metonymic element in Jenisch’s translation of the second passage, to literalisation (‘mind’) 
and replacement with the nearest available metonymic cliché of the target language 
(‘breast’, ‘heart’). In the first passage, Wilamowitz goes further by simply conflating the 
untranslatable φρενός with the translatable καρδίας (‘heart’) (a term that occurs in the 
preceding verses). One other noteworthy feature is the explication of the associative link on 
which such (clichéd) metonyms were originally based, as in Humboldt’s translation of the 
first example: the breast is explicitly and, as it were, ‘literally’ said to be the seat of courage. 
The same is true, although less explicitly, with Jenisch’s translation. In the Greek original, 
things are not so clear, because here the metaphorical φίλον θρόνον (‘dear throne’) ascribes 
a notion of rulership to the mental faculty at issue rather than explicating the metonymic 
link itself. It is interesting to note that this notion is dropped in most of the translations. 
 
Many similar examples could be cited. The term σπλάγχνον, for instance, is another 
metonymic cliché which has come to denote not only (unspecific) internal organs but also 
the seat of the emotions.462 Where it occurs in the play, the translations display a wide 
range of approximately equivalent metonymic clichés from the target language: ‘breast’, 
‘bosom’, ‘heart’.463 Needless to say, organ terminology is not the only field in which such 
metonymic clichés can be found. A quite different example is ‘roof’ for ‘house’. Here, too, 
                                                        
462
 The term denotes a physical organ at e.g. Hdt. 2. 40, Arist. PA 667b3 and Il. 1. 464; instances where it occurs 
as a metonymic cliché for the seat of the feelings or the feelings themselves include A. Ch. 413, S. Aj. 955 and 
E. Med. 220. 
463
 σπλάγχνα  δ᾽ οὔτοι  ματᾴζει (‘And my inwards ... do not speak in vain’, A. Agam. 995;  trans. Sommerstein) 
is translated as ‘Keine Ahndung klopfte je vergebens die Brust‘ (‘No premonition ever knocked at the breast in 
vain’) by Jenisch, ‘Nicht schwatzt eitel der Busen’ (‘The bosom does not speak in vain’) by Humboldt, ‘so 
täuscht sich nicht mein Herz‘ (‘thus my heart is not mistaken’) by Droysen, ‘Nicht trügt das Zeichen ... das treue 
Herz‘ (‘The sign does not mislead the faithful heart’) by Wilamowitz, and as ‘The heart that’s rolled in whirls ... 
justly presageful of a fate’ by Browning. 
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translingual and transcultural equivalents are available – and yet the fact that literalisation 
does occur in some of the translations (notably Droysen’s and Wilamowitz’s) shows that the 
term is, nevertheless, still recognised as metonymic.464 
 
The issues that arise with metonymic clichés recur with mythological metonyms. The names 
of gods are often used as stock examples of metonymy in rhetorical handbooks (‘god-for-
sphere-of-operation’-type metonym) but they have been excluded from the main body of 
our discussion because of the difficulty of assessing whether or not, in any particular case, 
Greek religion treats divinities as subsuming their sphere of operation and, therefore, the 
impossibility of determining the exact semantic range of what is denoted (or else 
metonymically implied) by the name of a god. With our eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
translations, the case is different: here, a literal identity or approximate synonymity of 
sphere and godhead is no longer a donnée in ordinary usage, and so the tropical status of 
gods’ names can be reliably assessed.465 Moreover, these translations illustrate the range of 
terms metonymically evoked by divine names. Consider the following example: 
 ὀμμάτων  δ᾽ ἐν ἀχηνίαις 
 ἔρρει πᾶσ᾽ Ἀφροδίτα. 
 because they [sc. statues] lack eyes 
 all their loveliness goes for nothing 
 [lit.: they lack all/every Aphrodite]466 
a)  Jenisch 
 Denn diese Augen ach!  
 sie schmachten nicht! Ganz ist sie, ganz hin –  
 hin – Afrodite mit jedem Liebreiz. 
 For these eyes, alas! 
 They do not yearn! She is utterly, utterly gone –  
                                                        
464
 κἄπειτ᾽  Ἀτρειδῶν  ἐς τόδε  σκήπτει  στέγος (‘And then it fell upon this house [lit.: roof] of the Atreidae’, A. 
Agam. 310; trans. Sommerstein) is translated as ‘der Atriden Dach‘ (‘the Atreidai’s roof’) by Jenisch and 
Humboldt, as ‘Schloß der Atriden’ (‘the Atreidai’s castle’) and ‘unser königliches Schloss’ (‘our royal castle’) by 
Droysen and Wilamowitz and as ‘roof of the Atreidai’ by Browning. Similarly, ἆ ποῖ  ποτ᾽  ἤγαγές  με; πρὸς  
ποίαν  στέγην; | πρὸς  τὴν  Ἀτρειδῶν ... (‘Where on earth, what kind of house [lit.: roof] have you brought me 
to?’, A. Agam. 1087; trans. Sommerstein) is translated as ‘der Atriden Haus‘ (‘the Atreidai’s house’) by Jenisch, 
‘Zum Dach von Atreus‘ (‘to Atreus’ roof’) by Humboldt, ‘Zum Hause der Atriden‘ (‘to the Atreidai’s house’) by 
Droysen and Wilamowitz and as ‘To the Atreidai’s roof’ by Browning. Note that it is the domesticators Droysen 
and Wilamowitz who opt for a literalised version of the metonymic cliché while the others carry the cliché over 
into the target language. 
465
 Needless to say, where the names of Greek gods are used ‘metonymically’, we usually have cases of 
metonymic cliché, since such usages are a firmly established part of the poetic idiom of classical writing and 
are not striking or abrasive enough to be counted as tropical in the strict sense. 
466
 A. Agam. 418-419; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 gone – Aphrodite with all loveliness. 
b)  Humboldt 
 weil in Blickes Entbehrung kalt  
 jede Liebe dahin welkt.  
 for cold, lacking a gaze, 
 all love dies. 
c)  Droysen 
 Ihres Auges verloren Lust aller Liebe Verlust ihm  
 The lost pleasure of her eye [equalled] loss of all love for him  
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Nicht tröstete der Gatte  
 sein darbendes Auge  
 am Bild der Geliebten; er fühlte sich  
 von Aphrodite verlassen. 
 The spouse did not console  
 his starving eye 
 with the image of the beloved; he felt himself to be 
 deserted by Aphrodite. 
e) Browning 
 in place of eyes  
 those blanks – all Aphrodité dies. 
In the Greek original, the adjective πᾶσ’ (‘all’) prompts a reading that takes Ἀφροδίτα to 
signify ‘loveliness’, ‘erotic appeal’, ‘beauty’ and so on. Of all the translations, Browning’s is 
the only one that would strictly speaking be a ‘god-for-remit’-type metonym: his translation 
only makes sense if we take the goddess’s name as an index metonym and infer any or all of 
these terms.467 The versions offered by Humboldt, Droysen and Wilamowitz, on the other 
hand, disambiguify and literalise the term, the former two by specifying ‘love’, the latter by 
rephrasing the sequence in a way that turns the goddess into a personally acting ‘absent 
presence’. Jenisch’s translation, finally, seeks a middle way by keeping the goddess’s name 
in the text but supplementing it with an explicit term that spells out what is at issue 
(‘loveliness’). The ambiguity inherent in the Greek original (active goddess linked 
                                                        
467
 The name of the goddess taken together with the verb in this passage represents a case of conditional 
metonymy/metaphor as discussed above, see pp. 124-129: as soon as metonymic tenor (abstract quality) is 
inferred from metonymic vehicle (person), the verb must be understood metaphorically; however, the 
combination of the metonymic vehicle (person) and the verb (‘to die’) as such is perfectly literal – albeit not 
undramatic, since it expresses nothing less than the death of a goddess. 
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unspecifically to the presence of an abstract quality) is thus expressed in literal terms468 –  a 
strategy we have already encountered in Humboldt’s translation of another passage:469 the 
term, which serves as metonymic vehicle in the source text, is carried over into the target 
language in literal translation but is supplemented with a term that would be the (implicit) 
metonymic tenor in the source text. As this translation strategy can be observed frequently, 
we suggest to refer to it from here on as ‘literalising supplementation’. 
 
A range of responses similar to the one triggered by the mythological metonym above can 
be found in the following passage: 
 μέγαν ἐκ θυμοῦ κλάζοντες Ἄρη 
 uttering from their hearts a great cry for war470 
 [lit.: crying from their heart (thumos) for great war (Ares) /  
 crying in anger (thumos) loudly for war (Ares) /  
 expressing in cries from their heart (thumos) their great warlike spirit (Ares)] 
a) Jenisch: 
 gewaltgen Krieg  
 und blutge Rache athmend  
 breathing great war 
 and bloody revenge 
b) Humboldt: 
 aus der Brust die Begier laut schnaubend des Kampfes 
 breathing out from the breast the desire for fighting 
c) Droysen: 
 Voll Zornmuth schrie’n sie gewaltigen Kampf 
 Full of angry valour they cried [for] great fighting 
d) Wilamowitz: 
 Grimmig scholl aus ihrer Brust der Schlachtruf 
                                                        
468
 But Jenisch’s ‘inspired’ approach to translation, which calls for the translator to write ‘in the same spirit’ as 
the author, also leads him to deploy heightened poetic language in what follows, adding tropical elements that 
are not present in the source text. He translates μάταν γάρ, εὔτ’ ἄν ἐσθλά τις δοκοῦνθ’ ὁρᾷ,| παραλλάξασα 
διὰ | χερῶν βέβακεν ὄψιν ('for it is empty when one sees what seems a blessing and then the vision slips aside 
through one’s arms and is gone’, A. Agam. 423-425; trans. Sommerstein.) as 'Denn zwiefach jammert, wem vor 
dem Auge die Wohllust tanzte, und lange ihm den trunkenen Blick geweid’t' ('for twice he moans whose eye 
lust has danced in front of and has long nourished his drunken gaze’). Jenisch thus adds a number-metonym 
(‘eye’ for ‘eyes’), an index metonym (‘lust’ implying ‘a person that arouses lust’) and a metaphorical cliché 
combined with grammatical amplification metonymy (‘drunk’ implies ‘pleasure’, ‘saturation’, ‘exhilaration’, 
and is transferred from the subject implicit in ‘his’ to  ‘[his] gaze’). 
469
 See above, pp. 181.  
470
 A. Agam. 48; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 Grimly the battle cry arose from their breast 
e) Browning: 
 clamouring   
 “Ares” from out the indignant breast 
All the German translators literalise the sequence, replacing the god’s name with various 
terms from the field of battle terminology. In addition to the variety of terms chosen 
(ranging from ‘war’ and ‘fighting’ to ‘revenge’), several of the translations also conflate the 
metonymic tenor, as inferred from the metonymic vehicle, with other elements from the 
source text. Wilamowitz’s translation conflates κλάζοντες Ἄρη (‘crying Ares’) into the 
compound noun ‘battle-cry’. Jenisch’s and Humboldt’s versions, on the other hand, seek to 
integrate it with the literally untranslatable ἐκ θυμοῦ. This Greek phrase denotes a human 
faculty that encompasses will and passion and has no direct equivalent in German culture or 
language. Jenisch’s translation, by contrast, duplicates  Ἄρη into both ‘great war’ and 
‘bloody revenge’. That second phrase conflates θυμοῦ and  Ἄρη, conveying both passionate 
response (θυμοῦ) and the war terminology implied by the metonymic vehicle (Ἄρη). 
Humboldt’s translation of the sequence recalls our discussion of the untranslatable ‘dead’ 
metonym φρήν.471 His version splits ἐκ θυμοῦ into two terms, yielding both ‘breast’ (the 
assumed ‘seat’) and ‘desire’ (the emotion). Browning’s translation, finally, preserves the 
god’s name and might therefore seem to be the most ‘faithful’ translation. However, it 
diverges significantly from the source text so far as tropicality is concerned: the god’s name 
is used literally – as the very word the combatants utter. This constitutes a literalisation of 
the Greek original, in which the accusative case of Ἄρη precludes such an interpretation.472 
Despite carrying the same term over into English, therefore, Browning’s translation is as 
much a disambiguifiying literalisation as any of the German versions. 
 
One final example of a mythological metonym produces quite different outcomes: 
 Ἥφαιστος  Ἴδης  λαμπρὸν  ἐκπέμπων  σέλας  
 Hephaestus, sending a bright blaze on its way from Mount Ida473 
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 See above, pp. 182-185; see also appendix, ‘“Speaking Organs”‘. 
472
 This would require the genitive case; on this construction, see above, p. 88. 
473
 A. Agam. 281; trans. Sommerstein. 
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a)  Jenisch 
 Vulkan, der bis von Ida’s Gipfel her  
 Glanzstrahlend Fackel stets an Fackel zündt 
 Vulcan, who lights all the way from Ida’s peak 
 one radiant torch with another torch 
b)  Humboldt 
 Hephästos, fern vom Ida sendend Feuerglanz  
 Hephaestus, sending fire-gleam from far-away Ida 
c)  Droysen 
 Hephaistos, der vom Ida hellen Strahl gesandt  
 Hephaestus, who sent a bright ray from Ida 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Hephaistos, der vom Ida helles Licht gesandt 
 Hephaestus, who sent bright light from Ida 
e) Browning 
 Hephaistos – sending a bright blaze from Idé 
To begin with the Greek original: the sequence is the beginning of Clytemnestra’s reply to 
the question, which messenger could have possibly brought the news of the fall of Troy with 
such speed. The literal answer to the question is the chain of watch posts equipped with 
beacons to report the Greek victory. Clytemnestra’s reply is rhetorically elegant and 
effective: the question, as phrased, asks for a person to be named in the answer. Naming 
Hephaestus not only meets this requirement of personhood but also invokes a divinity as 
guarantor for the validity of her claim. Once again it is impossible for us to be sure about the 
Greek term’s tropical status but it is interesting that all the translations reproduce the god’s 
name; not one translation literalises to ‘fire’ or ‘fire signals’. The context of the passage 
makes it abundantly clear that what is at issue is not a divine intervention but 
Clytemnestra’s very human machination, so the shift from fire signals to god of fire is (at 
least from the perspective of the translators) metonymic. However, the translations display 
a sensitivity for the rhetoric at work in this passage by reproducing the god’s name.  
 
Before moving on to the more striking metonyms discussed in Part I, let us consider a few 
more low-level metonyms. Our discussion of synecdoche pointed to the implication of 
singular for plural, and vice versa, as the most basic form of this type of metonymic 
defamiliarisation. In itself, this might seem to be a negligible, almost imperceptible 
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deviation. Yet, when it comes to the overall poetic texture of a translation, the role of such 
‘minor’ devices should not be underestimated. As with the examples just discussed, there 
are many instances where metonymic shifts in number have become clichéd and where 
translingual and transcultural continuation of such traditions of poetic idiom exists. To give 
just one example: 
ἐπεύχομαι δὲ καιρίας πληγῆς τυχεῖν,  
ὡς ἀσφάδαστος, αἱμάτων εὐθνησίμων  
ἀπορρυέντων, ὄμμα συμβάλω τόδε.  
And I pray that I may receive a single mortal stroke, 
and close these eyes [lit.: eye] without a struggle, 
my blood flowing out in an easy death.474   
is translated verbatim in all the versions: 475 
a) Jenisch 
 und sich schnell dies Auge schließ‘. 
 and that this eye may close quickly 
b)  Humboldt 
 schliessen dieses Aug’ ich kann 
 and may close this eye’ 
c) Droysen 
 sich ruhig ohne Todeskampf mein Auge schließt 
 my eye may close quietly without agony 
d) Wilamowitz 
 rasch das Auge bricht,  das Leben ohne Krampf und Zucken scheiden kann 
 the eye breaks quickly, life departs without agony and convulsion 
e)  Browning 
 without a struggle, - blood the calm death bringing in easy outflow, – 
 I this eye may close up 
Compare, however, what happens with the following two sequences: 
 ἐν ὀψικοίτοις δ᾽ ὄμμασιν  βλάβας  ἔχω 
                                                        
474
 A. Agam. 1292-1294; trans. Sommerstein. 
475
 Note that this entire sequence also illustrates the structural similarity of metonymy proper and metonymic 
association (see above, pp. 129-136): the instance under discussion here involves the collocation of an explicit 
statement on death with the mention of closing one’s eye/s. Regular collocations of this kind establish a link 
that can be exploited in metonymy by association: when closing one’s eye/s is mentioned alone in a similar 
context but without an explicit death statement, the preceding collocations have invested the term with a 
semantic surplus that becomes active and implies, by metonymic association, such a death statement when 
only the closing of one’s eye/s is mentioned. 
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 And I have damaged those eyes by lying late awake 
 [lit.: and I have damage in my eyes which go to bed late]476   
a)  Jenisch 
 Mein Auge, das  
 oft bis um Mitternacht, gewacht, ward trüb 
 vor Gram 
 My eye, which 
 often stayed awake until midnight, became overcast 
 with sadness... 
b)  Humboldt 
 Mein spät entschlummernd Auge kranket schmerzerfüllt  
 My eye, falling asleep late, is sick and full of pain 
c)  Droysen 
 Mein spätentschlummernd Auge krankt und schmerzt mich sehr 
 My eye, falling asleep late, is sick and pains me very much 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 und blöde ward des überwachten Auges Blick. 
 and the vision of my eye, which has been awake for too long, has gone blind. 
e) Browning 
 And in my late-to-bed eyes damage have I  
 Bewailing what concerned thee, ... 
Here, the Greek original has an ordinary-language plural, ὄμμασιν  (‘eyes’), whereas all the 
translations except Browning’s choose a rendering which implies the plural but gives the 
singular. Why? ὀψικοίτοις  (‘going to bed late’) is a grammatical amplification metonym, 
transferred from the implied subject (who literally goes to bed late) to the subject’s eyes.477 
By adding a metonymic cliché to the grammatical amplification metonym, the translations 
achieve a further elaboration of the overall poetic effect. It is worth pointing out that this 
includes the translations by Droysen and Wilamowitz. We noted earlier that their 
translations disambiguify even metonymic clichés,478 as indeed their ‘domesticating’ 
agendas would lead us to expect, but here even they make the sequence (slightly) more 
defamiliarised than it is in the source text. And this is not an isolated case; consider this 
further example: 
                                                        
476
 A. Agam. 889; trans. Sommerstein. 
477
 Cf. above, p. 93. 
478
 See above, pp. 176-185. 
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 ... φόβος γὰρ ἀνθ’ ὕπνου παραστατεῖ 
 τὸ μὴ βεβαίως  βλέφαρα  συμβαλεῖν  ὕπνῳ 
 for it is Fear instead of Sleep that stands beside me, 
 preventing me from closing my eyes firmly in sleep 
 [lit.: preventing me from putting together my eyelids in sleep]479 
a) Jenisch: 
 an seiner Stelle steht  
 zur Seite mir mit dem Erynnenstab  
 die wache Furcht, und wehrt ihm, dieses Aug 
 fest zuzusiegeln) 
 in its [Sleep’s] place stands 
 by my side with the Erinyes‘ staff 
 wide-awake Fear, and keeps him,  
 from firmly sealing this eye 
b) Humboldt: 
 Dass nie ich, schlummernd, schliesse fest das Augenlied [sic] 
 So that never, slumbering, do I close my eyelid tight 
c) Droysen: 
 Zufallen könnte gar im Schlaf mein Augenlied [sic] 
 My eyelid might even close in sleep 
d) Wilamowitz: 
 dass nicht zu fest der Schlummer meine Lider schliesst 
 so that slumber does not firmly close my [eye]lids 
e) Browning: 
 So as that fast I fix in sleep no eyelids [sic] 
The Greek original contains no metonym as such. If anything, one might suggest that the 
(not especially striking) collocation βλέφαρα συμβαλεῖν ὕπνῳ is one of the many Greek 
usages that create a link between (the Greek for) ‘sleep’ and (for) ‘closing one’s eyes’ which 
can then be potentially drawn on in metonymic association: ‘closing one’s eyelids’ implies 
‘sleep’ by mere association without any literal sleep terminology being present. The only 
tropical element in this sequence is the phrase φόβος παραστατεῖ. Here ‘fear’ is personified 
by virtue of the fact that the verb παραστατεῖ (‘stands beside’) associates this abstract 
emotion with the terminology of human agency.480 Compare the translations. Both 
Humboldt’s and Droysen’s give singular instead of plural (‘eyelid’ instead of ‘eyelids’), 
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thereby making the expression more pointed and ‘poetic’ than in the source text. Jenisch’s 
translation increases the number of tropical elements in the sequence even further: 
personified ‘fear’ is supplemented by a grammatical amplification metonym in the form of 
an epithet, ‘die wache Furcht’ (‘wide-awake fear’), with the adjective transferred from the 
implied subject; the plural of βλέφαρα (‘eyelids’) is represented by the singular ‘Aug’ (‘eye’) 
which, however, implies a plural; the verb-based personification of ‘fear’ is continued by the 
insertion of a further live metaphor, ‘fest zuzusiegeln’ (‘to seal firmly’); and the 
‘Erynnenstab’ (‘Erinyes‘ staff’) in the hand of personified ‘Fear’ not only adds to the 
personification but also suggests, by metonymic association, what the watchman is so afraid 
of (revenge of bloodshed among kin). The density of defamiliarising elements here 
significantly exceeds that in the source text. Wilamowitz’s translation, on the other hand, 
does not much increase the quantity of poetic defamiliarisation; for instance, it keeps the 
plural βλέφαρα (‘eyelids’). Yet even this translation intensifies the personification of ‘sleep’, 
in parallel to that of ‘fear’ in the preceding verse, by making ‘sleep’ the acting subject of a 
clause. Only Browning’s translation is verbatim in every respect. 
 
Such intensification of poetic language beyond the level of the source text is not confined to 
exceptional moments. It pervades these translations, regardless of whether they follow a 
‘foreignising’ or ‘domesticating’ manifesto. Two more examples make the point: 
 ὥστ᾽  ἐνδακρύειν  γ᾽ ὄμμασιν  χαρᾶς  ὕπο. 
 So much so that my eyes now fill with tears of joy.481 
a) Jenisch 
 Ach  
 oft standen, oft, der Sehnsucht Thränen mir  
 auf dieser Wange. 
 Alas 
 often, often were there tears of longing 
 on this cheek. 
b)  Humboldt 
 Dass jetzt der Freude Thräne meinem Aug’ entquillt  
 That now joy’s tear pours from my eye 
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c)  Droysen 
 So daß die Freude Thränen meinem Aug‘ entlockt!  
 So that joy elicits tears from my eye. 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Drum macht das Wiedersehen mir das Auge feucht. 
 Thus the reunion makes my eye wet. 
e) Browning 
 So that I weep, at least, with joy, my eyes full. 
In the Greek original, the sequence is perfectly literal, and yet all the translators except 
Browning introduce metonymic singular for plural, as if by way of (lightly) elevating the 
diction. Compare and contrast the range of responses in a second example: 
 ... δάκρυ  μὴ κατασχεῖν. 
 ἄναξ  δ᾽ ὁ πρέσβυς  τότ᾽  εἶπε  φωνῶν 
 ... could not hold back their tears [lit.: the tear] –  
 And the senior king spoke, and said this482 
a)  Jenisch 
 Konnten sich der Thränen nicht erwehren. 
 Laut rief der zween Könige größter aus 
 Could not fend off the tears. 
 The greater of the two kings cried out 
b)  Humboldt 
 ... nicht haltend des Grams  
 Thräne zurück. 
 Da hub das Wort an der ältre König 
 ... not holding back the tear 
 of grief. 
 Then the older king began uttering the word 
c)  Droysen 
 ... und selbst Thränen sie nicht hemmten. 
 Da also sprach dieses Wort der Aeltere 
 ... and even they did not hinder [their] tears. 
 Then the older one said this word. 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 aus unwilligem Auge 
 brachen die Thränen. 
 Da war es, wo der ält‘re der Atreidenfürsten sprach 
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 out of an unwilling eye 
 broke forth the tears. 
 It was then that the older of the Atreidai lords said 
e) Browning 
 So that the Atreidai striking staves on earth  
 Could not withhold the tear. 
 Then did the king, the elder, speak this clear. 
The Greek original here displays a very low level of defamiliarised language with only the 
singular for plural of δάκρυ (‘tear’) deviating from ordinary usage. Once again, Browning’s 
translation is the only one to represent the source text verbatim. The others all adjust the 
tropical status of elements in the sequence. Despite his openness to ‘free’ and ‘foreignising’ 
translation, Jenisch normalises the deviation, with the plural ‘Thränen’ (‘tears’). Droysen 
also literalises the tropical element of the sequence in the source text but introduces, as if in 
its stead, another metonymic cliché: ‘sprach dieses Wort’ (‘said this word’). One might 
assume that this rendering is prompted by the formulaic and tautological εἶπε φωνῶν 
(‘saying he said’), but it is not without significance that it thereby preserves the degree of 
defamiliarisation of the source text, albeit without a verbatim translation. Humboldt’s 
translation likewise introduces the same metonymic cliché, but also preserves the number-
based metonym of the source. The most remarkable innovation, however, is in 
Wilamowitz’s translation, which literalises the modest number-metonym with the plural, 
‘tears’, but simultaneously introduces not only another number-metonym but also 
combines it with a grammatical amplification metonym: ‘aus unwilligem Auge’ (‘out of an 
unwilling eye’). Counter-intuitively, Jenisch’s ‘free’ translation emerges in this instance as 
‘familiarising’, in the sense that it literalises tropical elements, whereas Wilamowitz‘s 
‘domesticating’ translation is the most ‘defamiliarising’ in the sense that it introduces new 
elements of poetic language. This is noteworthy, as is the phenomenon we propose to call 
‘transferred tropical replacement’: a metonymic element in the source text is literalised, but 
another trope (metonymic or metaphorical) is introduced which, in effect, preserves the 
degree of poetic elevation or heightening. 
 
With these preliminary observations in mind, we can now revisit the more striking examples 
discussed in Part I and assess how each category of metonymy fares in translation. We shall 
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also continue to probe the extent to which ‘domesticating’ and ‘foreignising’ strategies 
correspond, in practice, with ‘familiarising’ and ‘defamiliarising’ translation, respectively.  
 
As we have seen, Wilamowitz strongly criticises Humboldt’s translation, and it is a passage 
containing one of the play’s most striking index metonyms that he cites in order to illustrate 
what he considers to be Humboldt’s failure to provide an adequate rendering.483 The 
passage he refers to is 
κρόκου βαφὰς δ’ ἐς πέδον χέουσα  
ἔβαλλ’ ἕκαστον θυτήρων ἀπ’ ὄμματος βέλει  
φιλοίκτῳ, πρέπουσα τὼς  
ἐν γραφαῖς, προσεννέπειν  
θέλουσ’, ἐπεὶ πολλάκις  
πατρὸς κατ’ ἀνδρῶνας εὐτραπέζους  
ἐμέλψεν, ἁγνᾷ δ’ ἀταύρωτος αὐδᾷ πατρὸς 
φίλου τριτόσπονδον εὔποτμον   
παιῶνα φίλως ἐτίμα 
As she poured saffron dye towards the ground 
She cast on each of her sacrificers a glance darted from her eye, 
A glance to stir pity, standing out as if 
In a picture wanting to address them 
By name – because often 
At the rich banquets in her father’s dining-chambers 
She had sung, a pure virgin with pure voice, 
Duly and lovingly performing her father’s 
Paean for good fortune to accompany the third libation.484  
Humboldt’s translation of the passage, cited by Wilamowitz, reads as follows:  
Des Safrans Tünchung zum Boden giessend,  
und sanft des Mitleids Geschosse  
vom Blick der Opfrer jedem sendend, erschien sie bildähnlich dort,  
verlangend noch, wie sonst nach Anrede,  
weil sie oft im Männergemach des Vaters versammelt einst weilten.  
Fromm ehrte dann ihres Vaters hochbeglücktes Los  
aus kindlicher Brust Stimme sie nicht ergrimmet.  
Pouring down to the ground the saffron dye, 
and softly sending from her gaze missiles of pity 
to each of the sacrificers, [thus] she appeared there, like an image, 
still longing to be spoken to as usual, 
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 See Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1900, 4.  
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 A. Agam. 239-247; trans. Sommerstein. For a discussion of the crucial role of this index metonym within a 
system of kindred imagery in the Oresteia, in which images of ‘flowing‘ and ‘dripping‘ proleptically prepare the 
flow of Agamemnon’s blood when he is killed in the bath, see Lebeck 1971, 80-86. 
197 
 
since they were often gathered together in the men’s chamber of her father. 
Piously, from childish breast her voice, not angered, 
then honoured her father’s happy lot. 
Wilamowitz comments: 
When I read this, I know, first, that it is not German, and it is not verse either; 
secondly, I cannot understand it without the Greek, and thirdly, when I put the 
Greek next to it, I see that Humboldt has not understood it.485 
Let us compare Humboldt’s translation with Wilamowitz’s own version of the passage: 
Vom Busen riss rohe Faust das Safrankleid.  
Auf jeden ihrer Schlächter schoss sie Gnade flehend Blick um Blick,  
schön wie ein Bild, wie ein Bild der Sprache bar,  
und hatte doch so oft in ihres Vaters  
gastfreien Hallen singen dürfen.  An frohen Festen pries beim Tischgebet  
der Jungfrau reiner Mund  
des Vaters Glück  
mit kindlich liebevollem Psalm 
The raw fist tore the saffron robe from the bosom. 
She shot at each one of her slaughterers glance after glance, begging for mercy, 
beautiful like an image, like an image without voice, 
and yet she had so often 
been allowed to sing at her father’s hospitable halls. At happy feasts,  
saying grace at the table, the virgin’s pure mouth praised 
her father’s happiness 
with childish, loving psalm. 
The translations do indeed have a very different tone to them and the felt degree of poetic 
defamiliarisation in Wilamowitz’s version is clearly less than Humboldt’s. But is this a matter 
of tropical language usage?  
 
When Wilamowitz remarks that Humboldt’s translation is ‘not German’, he is primarily 
pointing to Humboldt’s syntax which follows the Greek closely. The key features here are 
word order (in particular, nouns in the genitive preceding their governing noun in prominent 
positions) and the extensive use of participles. While literal reproduction of these features is 
grammatically possible in German without making the text incomprehensible, it deviates 
from ordinary usage, thus creating a broadly ‘poetic’ impression. This is where Wilamowitz’s 
translation most obviously differs from Humboldt’s: his syntax runs smoothly; most 
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 ‘Wenn ich das lese, so weiss ich erstens, das ist kein Deutsch, und es sind auch keine Verse; zweitens kann 
ich es ohne das Griechische nicht verstehen, und drittens sehe ich, wenn ich das Griechische hinzunehme, dass 
Humboldt dieses nicht verstanden hat.‘ Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1900, 4. 
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participles have been converted into predicates; there are only two preceding genitives and 
they are in inconspicuous positions. Yet there are also important stylistic issues on the 
tropical level, and here Humboldt’s translation reproduces its source verbatim: all the 
tropical elements in the first two verses of the sequence are present here with the same 
status and effect. Wilamowitz’s translation, on the other hand, literalises the striking index 
metonym and conditional metaphor compound κρόκου βαφὰς ... χέουσα (‘pouring down 
saffron dye’). However, his rendering replaces this tropical cluster with another metonymic 
sequence: the singular ‘fist’ implies a plural (‘Faust’ is a number-metonym), but the 
collocation with ‘raw’ also suggests a possible reading as an index metonym in which it 
would imply (‘raw’) ‘physical violence’. While the tropical status of ‘raw’ is thus conditional 
on the interpretation of ‘fist’, the term is in itself a metaphorical cliché (‘raw’ does not 
suggest ‘uncooked’ but ‘unrefined’, ‘untamed’, ‘unmitigated’). If ‘fist’ is taken as (merely) 
singular-for-plural, the adjective is read as transferred away from the implied subjects – it is 
the slaughterers, not their fists, that are brutally ‘raw’ in the violence they are about to do 
to Iphigenia. Only with ‘fist’ taken as an index metonym is its metonymic tenor (‘physical 
violence’) directly qualified by the adjective. Similarly, ‘bosom’ could be read literally, but 
the context implies not that Iphigenia is partially exposed but that she is forcefully disrobed, 
making ‘bosom’ a metonym by association. This, with a striking ‘live’ metonym, is another 
case of ‘transferred tropical replacement’. In this instance, Wilamowitz’s translation does 
not lead to a simple ‘literalisation’ of tropical elements but to the fashioning of a new 
metonymic sequence. Towards the end of the sequence, conversely, we get ‘domestication’ 
in the ordinary sense. The terms ‘Tischgebet’ (‘grace’) and ‘Psalm’ (‘psalm’), with their 
obvious Christian connotations, make the text culturally familiar.  
 
As far as the metonymic elements in the passage are concerned, one can perhaps 
acknowledge some reduction of poetic intensity in Wilamowitz’s translation and argue that 
the instances of metonymic defamiliarisation here are less striking than those in Humboldt 
or in the Greek original. Metonymy by association is by definition felt as less intense than 
metonymy proper, and the deviation from ordinary usage involved in the ‘fist’ index 
metonym is arguably less marked than the one in the ‘saffron dye’ index metonym. 
Moreover, there is a conditional metonymic element in the Wilamowitz but a conditional 
metaphorical element in the Humboldt, and as we have seen, metaphorical elements tend 
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to exceed the metonymic in poetic effect.486 However, it is difficult to pass an absolute 
judgment here. For one thing, the focus of the image is significantly changed: in Aeschylus 
and Humboldt the focus is on the yellow of the robe which dramatically glides to the 
ground, in Wilamowitz it is on the hand that reaches out to violate Iphigenia (note how the 
singulars intensify this sharp focus). The impression, though, that Wilamowitz ‘tones down’ 
the poetic effects in this passage is reinforced in the second verse. Like Humboldt, he carries 
the metaphor in that verse over into the target language (ἔβαλλ’ ... ἀπ’ ὄμματος βέλει 
φιλοίκτῳ – ‘she cast... a glance darted from her eye, a glance to stir pity’). Yet, here, too, we 
notice a contrast of intensity: Humboldt’s translation, like the Greek original, contains both 
a noun and a verb in vehicle terminology (‘Geschosse ... sendend’, ‘sending... missiles’); 
Wilamowitz, less forcefully, only has a verb in vehicle terminology (‘schoss’, ‘shot’). This 
impression is confirmed by the fact that the number-metonym here (‘eye’ for ‘eyes’) is 
maintained in the Humboldt but literalised in the Wilamowitz (‘Blick um Blick’, ‘glance after 
glance’). The typical effect of tropical clusters, in which elements combine to create an 
intensified impression overall,487 is lost in Wilamowitz’s rendering.  
 
The other translations, too, show an inclination to reduce the poetic intensity of this 
passage. None of them reproduces the striking index metonym, the ‘saffron dye’: 
a) Jenisch 
 der safranfarbne Mantel  
 auf die Erde entflos – und sie dastand 
 gleich dem Meißelgebild – ein Marmorleben!  
 Da da blickte sie Zärtlichkeit  
 in der Opferer Herz 
 the saffron-coloured robe 
 poured down onto the ground – and she stood there 
 like a chisel-work – a marble-life! 
 Then, there she looked tenderness 
 into the heart of the sacrificers 
b)  Droysen 
 Ihr Safrankleid ließ sie niederfließen,  
 Und sah mit wehmüth’gem Blick bang zu jedem bittend ihrer Opfrer  
 And she let her saffron robe flow down, 
 And, begging, looked anxiously with wistful gaze at each of her sacrificers 
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c)  Browning 
 And as to the ground her saffron-vest she shed,  
 She smote the sacrificers all and each  
 With arrow sweet and piteous,  
 From the eye only sped, -  
 Significant of will to use a word 
  Just as in pictures 
Droysen’s translation literalises the sequence most markedly: it retains only one metaphor 
and drops all other tropical elements.488 Browning drops the striking index metonym but 
keeps the tropical compound (‘arrow’ metaphor and number-metonym) and adds a further 
number-metonym (‘Significant of will to use a word’). The effect created by these singulars 
is a more poignant contrast between the visual and the verbal: ‘eye’ and ‘pictures’ enclose 
Iphigenia’s suppressed ‘word’, which is now stuck between the two visual terms. Jenisch 
translates the beginning of the passage like Droysen, but then produces a remarkably 
heightened sequence that has no parallel in the source text (yet another case of ‘transferred 
tropical replacement’). Jenisch elaborates the source text’s notion that the muted and 
restrained Iphigenia resembles a speechless picture (πρέπουσα τὼς ἐν γραφαῖς, ‘as if in a 
picture’) by comparing her to a marble statue. The outer form of the simile is kept (‘gleich’, 
‘like’) but the substitution of ‘statue’ for ‘image’ is unexpected. Iphigenia’s ‘statuesque’ 
appearance is now elaborated by two compound nouns, ‘Meißelgebild‘ (‘chisel-work’) and 
‘Marmorleben’ (‘marble-life’). This ‘chisel-work’ is metonymic and, if analysed into separate 
words (‘work of a chisel’), can be seen to resemble the Pindaric index metonym μελισσᾶν ... 
τρητὸν πόνον (‘perforated labour of bees’, for ‘honeycomb’) discussed earlier.489 The ‘labour 
(of bees)’ and the ‘work (of a chisel)’ both metonymically translate outcome into activity. 
Jenisch’s other compound noun, ‘Marmorleben’ (‘marble-life’), is elliptical; it would seem to 
conflate ‘marble’ and ‘still life’ in such a way as to emphasise the contrast of cold and fixed 
marble and Iphigenia’s (sadly restrained) vivacity.490  
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 This instance also vividly illustrates how the tropical status of a conditional metaphor (χέουσα, ‘pouring’) 
changes to full, live metaphor as soon as the metonym is disambiguified: the metonymic tenor (‘saffron-
coloured robe’), upon which the metaphorical reading is conditional, is here literally present, the tropical 
status of the metaphor therefore unequivocally given. Cf. pp. 124-129 above. 
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 See above, p. 51. 
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 The German language’s capacity to create compound nouns is one of its most prominent distinctive 
features, but the compressions it produces do not affect our argument: cf. below, pp. 207-208. 
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Another striking element in this sequence is the ‘arrow’-metaphor, which in the source text 
expresses Iphigenia’s attempt to move her sacrificers with the look of her eyes. In Jenisch’s 
translation the metaphor is represented by the sequence ‘da blickte sie Zärtlichkeit in der 
Opferer Herz‘ (‘she looked tenderness into the heart of the sacrificers’). As with the 
compound nouns, we have a compression here: Iphigenia looks at her sacrificers, she looks 
for sympathetic tenderness in their hearts, she tries to stir symphathy in their hearts – all 
these notions are implicit. But what exactly is the tropical element that creates this range of 
implications? And are we to classify it as metonymic? Leaving the metonymic cliché ‘heart’ 
aside, we are dealing only with tenor terminology: Iphigenia literally ‘looks’ at her 
‘sacrificers’ in her longing for ‘tenderness’. The defamiliarisation, then, does not lie in the 
terms used but in the way they are syntactically coordinated. The noun ‘Zärtlichkeit’ 
(‘tenderness’), which functions as accusative object, requires the predicate ‘blickte’ 
(‘looked’) to be a transitive verb. One might be tempted to consider this as a case of verb-
based index metonymy, arguing that from the present term (‘look’) a further term is 
inferred (‘create/stir [a feeling]’). On closer examination, though, this thought is 
misleading.491 In index metonymy, the metonymic tenor is inferred from the metonymic 
vehicle, with which it stands in a relationship of lexical contiguity, because the (micro-) 
context makes a literal reading of the vehicle impossible. While the vehicle creates poetic 
effects through interaction with the context, the semantic coherence of the sequence 
depends on the inferred tenor. The metonymic shift between vehicle and tenor and the 
enhanced possibilities for interaction of present and supplemented terms with the context 
jointly create the various poetic effects of index metonymy. The comprehensibility of the 
sequence, however, rests on the inferred tenor: it is the inferred term that makes the 
sequence semantically coherent. This is clearly not the case here. Iphigenia literally ‘looks’ at 
the sacrificers, indeed, her ‘looking’ is the central issue of the passage. While the grammar is 
deviant, the terminology is not. Given that there is no introduction of extraneous 
terminology nor any underlying notion of analogy or similarity, we can rule out metaphor. 
Moreover, we have already come across comparable metonymic phenomena, albeit 
involving nouns and adjectives: the reaffiliation of adjectives (as in grammatical metonymy) 
and the change of a noun’s number (as in basic synecdoche: singular-for-plural and vice 
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versa) also result from the manipulation of grammatical categories. Here indeed, then, we 
are dealing with a metonymic phenomenon centred on a verb. But, just as in grammatical 
metonymy, the tropical status of the verb here does not stem from the verb’s usage but 
ultimately arises from the demands of the noun with which it is syntactically coordinated. 
We propose, therefore, that ‘she looked tenderness into the heart of the sacrificers’ is best 
understood as a variant of grammatical index metonymy. In this sequence, the accusative 
object combined with the preposition ‘into’ demand of the predicate a grammatical function 
that is not compatible with the verb’s ordinary usage (transitive instead of intransitive). 
Consequently, these elements prompt the inference of additional, implicit notions (‘create’, 
‘plant’, ‘arouse’, ‘insert’) which are superimposed on the present, literal predicate. As with 
adjective-based grammatical metonymy, the tropical term maintains its denotative meaning 
according to ordinary usage, but the demands of the context give rise to further terms 
which need to be supplemented. Thus understood, one can appreciate how Jenisch’s 
translation, too, reproduces the source text’s ‘arrow’-metaphor – in the form of a much 
more subtle metonym. 
 
As the last instance shows, even a striking index metonym may not be reproduced in 
translation. In order to assess what happens to this type of metonymy in translation more 
generally, let us examine some other examples: 
 χρόνῳ μὲν ἀγρεῖ Πριάμου πόλιν ἃδε κέλευθος 
 In time this expedition [lit.: path, journey] will capture the city of Priam492 
a) Jenisch 
 Nur noch ein kleines – und Priams Stadt gehört  
 den Streitern dieses Heers 
 Just a little longer – and Priam’s city belongs 
 to the warriors of this army 
b)  Humboldt 
 Im Lauf der Zeit einst  
 stürmt Priamos Veste der Pfad hier  
 In the passage of time  
 This path here will one day storm Priam’s stronghold 
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c)  Droysen 
 Wohl wird dereinst Priamos Feste die Beute der Heerfahrt  
 Surely at some point Priam’s stronghold will be the booty of the expedition 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 ... der Tag wird kommen, wo unsere Heerfahrt  
 Priamos’ Veste bewältigt  
 The day will come, when our expedition 
 overcomes Priam’s stronghold 
e) Browning 
 In time, this outset takes the town of Priamos 
Only the Browning and Humboldt verbatim translations carry the metonym over into the 
target language. The degree of defamiliarisation is arguably highest in Humboldt’s version, 
since the Greek term κέλευθος denotes both ‘path’ and ‘journey’, and therefore has 
dynamic overtones, which are closer to the tenor (the attacking army); the German ‘Pfad’ 
(‘path’) does not have these overtones, but they are present in Browning’s ‘outset’. One 
imagines that this might well be one of the passages Wilamowitz had in mind when writing 
that Humboldt’s translation made no sense without the Greek original. Humboldt’s index 
metonym is certainly abrasive, but, arguably, is neither incomprehensible nor the product of 
‘misunderstanding’ the source text. The other German translations, however, literalise the 
index metonym, displaying a range of metonymic tenors (from the individual soldiers of the 
army to the expedition as such) and thereby illustrating the directional semantics of index 
metonymy. Here, then, a metonymically used Greek term is either literalised or actually 
made more pronounced because the broader semantic range of the Greek term cannot be 
replicated in the target language.  
 
In the following example, the opposite is the case. A bit of Greek idiom, best seen as non-
tropical in its usage, is treated as tropical by the translators: 
 ἔθυσεν  αὑτοῦ  παῖδα, φιλτάτην  ἐμοὶ  
 ὠδῖν᾽, ἐπῳδὸν Θρῃκίων ἀημάτων 
 He sacrificed his own child, the darling  
 offspring of my pangs, as a spell to soothe the Thracian winds493 
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 ... sie, – sein Blut,  
 die Tochter meiner Schmerzen, schlachtete – 
 ihr Blut, wie einen höllschen Zaubertrank  
 den Winden strömen ließ.  
 He sacrificed her, his blood, 
 the daughter of my pains,  
 letting her blood run to the winds, 
  like an infernal magic potion 
b)  Humboldt 
 Hinwürgte seine Tochter, mir die theuerste  
 der Weh’n, zur Sühne wilder Stürme Thrakiens.  
 He strangled his daughter, to me the most precious 
 of labour pangs, to reconcile the wild storms of Thrace. 
c)  Droysen 
 Sein eigen Kind doch, meines Schooßes liebste Frucht, 
 Ließ schlachten, thracische Winde zu beschwigtigen. 
 He let his very own child, the dearest fruit of my womb, 
 Be slaughtered so as to pacify Thracian winds. 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Die eigne Tochter, meines Schosses liebste Frucht,  
 den Nordlandstürmen zur Beschwicht’gung schlachtete. 
 He slaughtered his own daughter, the dearest fruit of my womb, 
 To the pacification of the winds of the northern lands. 
e) Browning 
 Sacrificed his child, - dearest fruit of travail  
 To me, - as song-spell against Threkian blowings 
The Greek ὠδίς is largely a verse word so it is difficult to establish an ‘ordinary’ usage for it, 
but its usage in extant literature includes both the throes of child-birth and the (born) child 
itself.494 In all the translations, however, the term is tropicalised. Jenisch offers us a 
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Animals are the only extant prose usages of the word in classical Greek literature (apart from ‘metaphorical’ 
uses: see LSJ s.v. II.). The word is used of ‘pangs of labour’ in Plato (καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια 
καὶ ἐπᾴδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδῖνας καὶ μαλθακωτέρας ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν – ‘And furthermore, 
the midwives, by means of drugs and incantations, are able to arouse the pangs of labour and, if they wish, to 
make them milder’; trans. Fowler) and ‘birth-giving’ in Aristotle (δύνανται δ’ αἱ περιστεραὶ καὶ ἤδη τοῦ ᾠοῦ ἐν 
ὠδῖνι ὄντος κατέχειν – ‘Pigeons are able to hold the egg back even when they are just on the point of laying it’; 




‘literalising supplementation’: we get both the potential metonymic vehicle (‘meine 
Schmerzen’, ‘my pains’) and the metonymic tenor (‘Tochter’, ‘daughter’).495 Moreover, 
Jenisch introduces a metonymic cliché by referring to Agamemnon’s daughter as ‘sein Blut’ 
(‘his blood’). Mentioning ‘blood’ twice within three lines, once in (clichéd) tropical usage and 
once in ordinary usage, invests the passage with an ominous quality: by sacrificing his 
daughter, Agamemnon not only (literally) sheds ‘her blood’ but also (metonymically) ‘his 
blood’. This well-placed metonym illustrates in nuce how Agamemnon’s own fatal 
bloodshed takes effect, through his own doing. In shedding his daughter’s blood, he sheds 
his own: what the metonym suggests here will all too soon become literal reality as the play 
moves towards its climax, the stabbing of Agamemnon.  
 
Humboldt’s translation, by contrast, singles out one component from the semantic range 
encompassed by the Greek term ὠδίς and thereby creates a striking index metonym in its 
own right, moderated only by the fact that the metonymic tenor (‘Tochter’, ‘daughter’) is 
co-present already. The metonym serves as a subordinated epithet that sheds new light on 
what is at issue rather than introducing, by implication, what is at issue. Nevertheless, this 
example proves an important point: index metonymy can arise in the target language when 
polysemy in the source language makes for linguistic untranslatability.496 Since there is no 
one word in the target language which encompasses the semantic range of the term in the 
source language, any attempt at literal translation is bound to be selective. From the 
perspective of the target language, the semantic range covered by the term in the source 
language becomes a semantic field, and the translator is forced to choose one term from 
this field. In Humboldt’s case, the term chosen is incompatible with the microcontext which 
prompts a reading of the term as an index metonym.497 Intriguingly, Droysen and 
Wilamowitz take an entirely different approach. Both give a clichéd metaphorical version of 
this sequence (‘dearest fruit of my womb’), as does Browning (albeit in a slightly less clichéd 
variation). In the case of Droysen and Wilamowitz, this suits an understanding of translation 
as concerned less with formal equivalence than with dynamic, functional equivalence. Given 
the clichéd nature of the Greek term, its representation in the target language in the form of 
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 Note that the same translation strategy is observable in Sommerstein’s ‘offspring of my pangs’. 
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 On this type of untranslatability according to Catford, see above, p. 157. 
497
 This analysis supports (in reverse, as it were) our understanding of metonymy as a shift in a semantic field. 
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a metaphorical cliché is, in effect, closer to the source text than Humboldt’s much more 
startling and heightened version. 
 
The impact of polysemy/oligosemy on translatability also arises in the following example, 
discussed earlier as a case of conditional metonymy: 
 ... οὐκέτ᾽  ἐξ ἐλευθέρου  
 δέρης ἀποιμώζουσι φιλτάτων μόρον 
 ... and from throats [or: necks] that are no longer free 
 They cry out their laments for the death of their dearest.498 
a) Jenisch 
 ... Sie weinen, ach nicht mehr mit freier Brust!  
 der Lieben Tod. 
 ... they cry, alas, no longer with a free breast! 
 over the death of their loved ones. 
b)  Humboldt 
 ... weinen, schluchzend laut,   
 aus nicht, wie sonst, mehr freier Brust, der Liebsten Tod  
 ... they cry, sobbing loudly, 
 not as before from a free breast, over their loved ones’ death 
c)  Droysen 
 ... sie beklagen nimmer mehr  
 Mit freier Kehle dieß Geschick der Theuersten  
 ... they no longer mourn 
 with a free throat this fate of their dearest 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 ... und alle jammern um des Teuersten Verlust, und jeder Mund, der jammert, ist ein 
 Sklavenmund. 
 ...and all are mourning the loss of their dearest, and every mouth that mourns is a 
 slave-mouth. 
e) Browning 
 from a throat that’s free no longer,  
 shriekingly wail the death-doom of their dearest 
 
As already noted, the Greek term δέρης is both ‘neck’ and ‘throat’, and the sequence 
consequently allows both for a literal reading that imagines the Trojan captives literally 
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 A. Agam. 328-329; trans. Sommerstein. 
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yoked together by their necks when enslaved and for a grammatical-metonymic reading in 
which the Trojans, and not just the ‘throats’ that emit their laments, are no longer free.499 
Again we observe how, for lack of a term with a comparable semantic range in the target 
language, the translators are forced to reduce the ambiguity of a sequence. The 
disambiguation observable here, however, is not straightforward literalisation but rather an 
adjustment from conditional tropicality to tropicality proper or to tropical cliché. Thus, 
Droysen and Browning opt for a translation that gives a grammatical amplification 
metonym: the adjective ‘no longer free’ is transferred from the implied subjects to their 
throats, thereby adding emphasis to their cries which now appear to lament the death of 
their loved ones and their own loss of freedom simultaneously. Jenisch and Humboldt, on 
the other hand, opt for ‘transferred tropical replacement’: the conditional metonym of the 
source text is replaced with a metonymic cliché which emphasises not a concrete, physical 
loss of freedom to move (as the neck terminology does) but the broken spirit of the 
captives. Wilamowitz, finally, gives us an example of ‘literalising supplementation’: his 
translation includes both the (potentially) metonymic vehicle term followed by an 
explication in the shape of tenor terminology: ‘Mund’ (‘mouth’), as the subject governing 
‘der jammert (‘that mourns’), is an index metonym which implies the person through a part 
of the mourner’s body, but the compound ‘Sklavenmund’ (‘slave-mouth’) then makes 
explicit what is at issue.  
 
It is interesting to reflect further on Wilamowitz’s compound noun. As a compound, it is a 
compressed version of a noun with genitive attribute: ‘the mouth of a slave’. If we replaced 
the compound noun with this extended version, we would have a case of amplification 
metonymy, because the tenor would be present in the genitive case (‘[of a] slave’); after all, 
what is at issue in this latter part of the sequence is that all mourners are now slaves. Yet 
the density of a compound seems to impinge with a greater poetic effect, because the 
‘Mund’ (‘mouth’) of ‘Sklavenmund’ (‘slave-mouth’) belongs to ‘body part’ terminology, and 
as such prolongs the incompatibility of the terminology with the verb. The presence of 
‘slave’ as a separate noun in the genitive would (however minutely) have weakened the 
abrasiveness. This instance, then, allows us to make two observations: first, that compound 
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nouns can be compressed versions of amplification metonyms, since they, too, can include a 
metonymic tenor embedded in a context in which the emphasis is shifted from one term to 
another within one semantic field; and second, that the compression into a compound noun 
itself adds to the impression of defamiliarisation, partly because of the novelty of the 
compound (if it is a neologism), partly because of the immediacy of the specifying shift and 
the additional possibility of remaining more closely within the confines of context-
incompatible vehicle terminology.  
Contrast what happens with translations of elevated poetic idiom in the following sequence: 
 οὐδ᾽ ἐπόντισε σκάφος 
 nor does he wreck the ship [literally also: hull]500 
a) Jenisch  
 das Schiff selbst kämpft oft aus den Fluthen empor. 
 the ship itself fights its way out of the floods. 
b)  Humboldt 
 noch [sinkt] das Schiff zum Meeresgrund  
 nor does the ship sink to the ground of the sea 
c)  Droysen 
 Noch verschlingt die See den Kiel  
 Nor does the sea swallow the keel 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 so mag die Ladung überfrachtet nicht versinken 
 so that the cargo, overloaded, might not sink 
e) Browning 
 Nor has fear overwhelmed the hull. 
The term σκάφος denotes the hull but is frequently used in poetry (and beyond) to mean 
the entire ship.501 Hence, we are dealing with a metonymic cliché in the source text which, 
in this sequence, is best classified as a (clichéd) metonym by association: a literal reading is 
technically possible but a metonymic inference is prompted by the context. Contrary to 
what one might expect, Jenisch and Humboldt literalise the term whereas Droysen’s 
‘domesticating’ translation as well as Browning’s ‘foreignising’ version give a verbatim 
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 A. Agam. 1013; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 For the more specific denotation of ‘hull’, see e.g. Th. 1.50, A. Pers. 419 and Hdt. 7.182 (the latter already 
bordering on metonymy by association, implying the entire ship); examples of the word referring to a ship as a 
whole include A. Supp. 440, Ar. Ach. 541 and D. 9.69.  
209 
 
rendering from which the reader infers that it is the entire ship and not just the hull that 
does not sink.502 Wilamowitz conflates the metonymic term of the source text with a literal 
term from the preceding verse and thus evades any tropical ambiguity.  
 
Interestingly, the same term, σκάφος, appears in another passage of the same play, but in 
non-tropical collocation: 
 ἡμᾶς  γε μὲν  δὴ ναῦν  τ᾽ ἀκήρατον  σκάφος  
 ἤτοι τις ἐξέκλεψεν ἢ 'ξῃτήσατο 
 θεός τις 
 We ourselves, on the other hand, and our ship, its hull unscathed, 
 were either smuggled out or begged off  
 by some god503 
As one would expect, all the translations give a literal rendering of the passage – except 
Humboldt’s which, without anything in the source text to prompt it, introduces an 
amplification metonym: 
 Uns aber sammt des Schiffes unversehrtem Bau  
 entführte damals, oder rettet’ unvermerkt  
 ein Gott 
 But then a god 
 abducted us, or saved us imperceptibly 
 together with the ship’s undamaged construction 
 
Compare the responses to the index metonym in the following example: 
 τραπέζας  
 ἀτίμωσιν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ 
 exacting delayed requital for the dishonouring  
 of the host’s table504 
a) Jenisch 
 Straften bald die Entweihung ihres Mahles,  
 deines heiligen Gastrechts 
 Soon punished the desecration of their meal, 
 of your holy laws of hospitality 
                                                        
502
 This is, in fact, a borderline case between index metonymy and metonymy by association: in both cases 
‘hull’ can be taken literally without violating rules of collocation, yet the sequence effectively requires that 
‘ship’ is inferred as the metonymic tenor – not as an additional association but as what is at issue here. 
503
 A. Agam. 661-662; trans. Sommerstein. 
504
 A. Agam. 702-703; trans. Sommerstein. 
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b)  Humboldt 
 ... rächte schwer   
 noch nachher das Gastgebot  
 ... still later took harsh revenge 
 for [the breach of] the laws of hospitality 
c)  Droysen 
 ... für des Gasttisches arge Schändung einst, ... 
 ... for the former desecration of the guest-table ... 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Sühne für des Herdes Schändung, Sühne für den Bruch des Gastrechts 
 atonement for the desecration of the hearth, atonement for the breach of the laws 
 of hospitality 
e) Browning 
 In after-time, for the tables’ abuse 
At issue in this passage is Paris’ breach of the laws of hospitality by abducting Menelaus’ 
wife Helen while a guest in his house. The Greek term τράπεζα denotes ‘table’, especially 
‘dining-table’, and while there are further instances in which the term is used to connote 
hospitable generosity,505 it cannot literally denote the laws of hospitality as such. 
Humboldt’s ‘foreignising’ translation literalises the index metonym whereas Browning’s 
‘foreignising’, as well as Droysen’s ‘domesticating’, preserves the metonym verbatim. 
Jenisch once again opts for ‘literalising supplementation’, offering both the metonymic 
vehicle and the metonymic tenor, albeit with a slight modification: his version has ‘meal’ 
instead of ‘table’ as an index metonym to imply ‘laws of hospitality’. The same can be 
observed in the Wilamowitz: his version doubles the sequence and gives a literalised version 
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 Such instances are to be found e.g. at Od. 14.158, Xen. Anab. 7.2.33 and Hdt. 5. 20. An example of the kind 
of collocation that terminologically links ‘table’ and ‘hospitality’ in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon itself is ᾔσχυνε  
ξενίαν | τράπεζαν κλοπαῖσι γυναικός (‘and shamed the table of hospitality by stealing away a wife’ A. Agam. 
401-402; trans. Sommerstein). Here the adjective expresses explicitly what the noun implies: ξενία – 
hospitality and the code of conduct attached to it. The translations of this sequence show a similar spread to 
the one above: Wilamowitz literalises the sequence (‘entweihte den Frieden des Gastrechts, entführte die 
Herrin des Hauses’, ‘desecrated the peace of the laws of hospitality, abducted the lady of the house’); 
Droysen’s and Browning’s versions are verbatim (‘frech den gastlichen Tisch entweiht, der die Gattin entführt 
hat’, ‘impertinently he desecrated the hospitable table, he who abducted the wife’ and (Browning) ‘shamed 
the guestboard by robbery of the spouse’); Humboldt combines literalising explication with retention of the 
metonymically used term, i.e. ‘literalising supplementation’ (‘kühn einst schmähte des Gastgebots Tisch durch 
Weibes Entführung’, ‘daringly once spurned the table of the law of hospitality by kidnapping the wife’); and 
Jenisch’s translation opts for ‘transferred tropical replacement’, as it literalises the metonymic term of the 
source text but introduces metonymic association later in the text (‘Er kam – ein Fremdling – in der Atriden  
Haus, und scheute nicht der Gastfreundschaft heilges Recht; er schändete des Freundes Bette: raubte sein 
Weib ihm vom warmen Busen’,  ‘He came – a stranger – into the Atreidai’s house, and he was not respectful of 
the sacred laws of hospitality; he desecrated the friend’s bed: stole his wife from his warm bosom’). 
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preceded by a metonymic version in which, however, the index metonym has been replaced 
by a metonymic cliché (‘hearth’ implying ‘household’). The insertion of a metonymic cliché 
reflects but ‘tones down’ the intensified idiom of the source text by gesturing towards 
poetic elevation. We observe, once again, that there is no inevitable correspondence 
between ‘domesticating’ and literalising translations, or ‘foreignising’ and verbatim 
translations. This becomes yet more obvious in the following case (another index 
metonym): 
 ἥρως τε τοὺς πέμψαντας, εὐμενεῖς πάλιν 
 στρατὸν δέχεσθαι τὸν λελειμμένον δορός 
 and the heroes who sent us forth, praying that they may 
 receive back with favour the army, or what the war [lit.: the spear] has spared of it506 
a) Jenisch 
 Ihr, die ihr Helden sandtet, führet auch  
 den Rest der Schlacht, das Heer, ins Land zurück 
 You, who sent out heroes, also lead  
 the rest of the battle, the army, back into the land 
b)  Humboldt 
 jetzt aufzunehmen dieses speerverschonte Heer 
 now to receive this army, spared by the spear 
c)  Droysen 
 das Heer empfangen, das der Lanzen Wuth verschont 
 to receive the army, which the wrath of spears has spared 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 nehmt uns gnädig auf,  
 so viel dem Schwert entronnen heut ihr wiederseht. 
 graciously receive us, 
 as many of us as you see again today, having escaped the sword  
e) Browning 
 friendly, once more  
 the army to receive, the war-spear’s leavings! 
For once, all our translations contain a metonymic element to represent the index metonym 
of the source text, albeit in a variety of conformations and with different effects. Jenisch 
alone comes close to literalising the sequence. There is only a slight metonymic feel to ‘der 
Rest der Schlacht’ (‘the rest of the battle’) with ‘battle’ implying ‘the army fighting in the 
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battle’. However, the fact that ‘army’ is mentioned in a clarifying parenthesis immediately 
afterwards greatly reduces any feeling of defamiliarisation. Furthermore, ‘the rest of the 
battle’ comes with an inherent ambiguity: it feels tropical if ‘rest’ is understood in a partitive 
sense (‘a part of the battle is left’ implying ‘a part of the [army fighting in the] battle is left’), 
but it seems literal if understood in a more temporal sense (‘that what remains after the 
battle’). The elliptical expression, at all events, falls short of constituting an index metonym 
proper. Humboldt, by contrast, coins a compound adjective, ‘speerverschont’ (‘spared-by-
the-spear’), to represent the source text’s index metonym. There is a slight change in the 
semantics of this sequence, since the Greek original emphasises that only a part of the army 
returns whereas Humboldt’s version merely indicates that the present army has survived 
the battle. On the level of poetic defamiliarisation, however, Humboldt’s neologism is a 
compressed version of ‘spared by the spear’ (implying the onslaught of the enemy army, 
regardless of any specific weapon), which closely resembles the metonymic sequence in the 
source text, with the newly created compound intensifying the effect. Wilamowitz moves in 
the opposite direction by replacing ‘spear’ with ‘sword’, which is a widely-used metonymic 
cliché in the German literary tradition and therefore comes with a reduced poetic impact. 
Contrary to what one might expect from his ‘domesticating’ agenda, Droysen heightens the 
poetic impact of the sequence. In describing the army as one ‘which the wrath of spears has 
spared’, his translation introduces a stark clash of incompatible terms, directly juxtaposing 
weapon terminology with emotion terminology in a way that evokes the aggressive 
onslaught of the enemy more forcefully than the other translations and, indeed, than the 
original. Finally, Browning’s translation also features a newly created compound noun but 
the effect is different. Browning comes closest to a verbatim translation, but in his 
apposition (‘the army ... the war-spear’s leavings) he adds the specifying prefix ‘war-’ to 
‘spear’ and thereby introduces a potential metonymic tenor into the sequence; the effect is 
reduced correspondingly. 
 
In the examples discussed so far, we have seen metonymic elements produce responses 
ranging from verbatim translation to literalising disambiguation and transposition into other 
forms of defamiliarised language; and this range has been prompted not only by striking, 
abrasive metonyms, but also by ‘dead’ metonyms, literary clichés and at times even literal 
terms whose semantic range has no parallel in the target language. With metonymic 
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association, where the surplus in meaning does not stem from any deviant usage, the range 
of outcomes is – surprisingly? – similar. Consider, to begin with, an example discussed 
earlier: 
 οὔ μοι φόβου μέλαθρον ἔλπις ἐμπατεῖ, 
 ἕως  ἂν αἴθηι  πῦρ  ἐφ᾽  ἑστίας  ἐμῆς  
 Αἴγισθος, ὡς τὸ πρόσθεν εὖ φρονῶν ἐμοι 
 no fearful apprehension stalks my house, 
 so long as the fire upon my hearth is kindled by  
 Aegisthus and he remains loyal to me as hitherto507 
a) Jenisch 
 so lang  
 Aegisthus Feu’r auf meinem Heerde brennt,  
 wohlwollend, wie er’s war  
 For as long as 
 Aegisthus‘  fire burns on my hearth, 
 Benevolent, as he used to be 
b)  Humboldt 
 So lange meines Heerdes Flamme zündet an  
 Aigisthos  
 As long as Aegisthus kindles the flame at my hearth 
c)  Droysen 
 so lang auf meinem Heerd das Feuer noch  
 Aigisthos anschürt, wie bisher mir treugesinnt 
 as long as Aegisthus kindles the flame at my heath, 
 As loyally minded as ever 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 so lange wohlgesinnet, wie er bisher war,  
 Aigisthos über meines Herdes Flamme wacht. 
 as long as, loyally minded as he has been so far, 
 Aegisthus stands guard over my hearth’s flames 
e) Browning 
 So long as on my hearth there burns a fire,   
 Aigisthos as before well-caring for me 
As we have argued, what is at issue here is not whether Aegisthus literally lights a fire (at 
the ‘hearth’), but rather that he is and remains present in Clytemnestra’s house and, 
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moreover, that he does so as (stand-in) head of the household.508 The metonymic cliché 
‘hearth’ (implying ‘household’) is part of the traditional poetic idiom of Greek, German and 
English, and has the same evocative power in each of these languages: hence the similarity 
of metonymic association in each translation. The evocation of such associations is then 
reinforced by the explicit comment on Aegisthus’ continued loyalty. The metonymic 
association in the source is thus a feature common to all the translations of this passage.509  
 
However, such equivalence is not invariable, as the following example shows: 
 ἐν μέρει  δ᾽ ἀπέπτυσαν  
 εὐνὰς ἀδελφοῦ τῷ πατοῦντι δυσμενεῖς 
 and one after another they [the Erinyes] show their abhorrence of [also: spit out at] 
 the brother’s bed that worked harm to him who defiled it.510 
a) Jenisch 
 Auch ihnen ist das Bruderbett verhaßt,  
 in das ein Bruder stieg 
 And they hate the brother’s bed [lit.: the brother-bed]  
 to which a brother went 
b)  Humboldt 
 fluchen abscheuvoll zugleich  
 des Bruders Ehbett...  
 at the same time they curse full of abhorrence 
 the brother’s marriage-bed 
c)  Droysen 
 verfluchen dann  
 Des Bruders Ehbett  
 then they curse  
 the brother’s marriage-bed 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 sein Fluch vergisst  
 auch dessen nicht, der seines Bruders Ehe brach  
 neither does his curse forget  
 the one who broke his brother’s marriage 
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 in turn spit forth at  
 the brother’s bed, to him who spurned it hostile. 
Clytemnestra is elaborating on the long-running curse of familial violence and revenge that 
plagues her house, and here she refers to Thyestes' corruption of Aerope, the wife of his 
brother Atreus. As discussed earlier, the term εὐνή is used widely throughout Greek texts to 
refer to acts of love-making and constitutes a literary cliché.511 These overtones are 
undoubtedly present here: what the Erinyes spurn is not the item of furniture but the 
forbidden acts that occurred in it. The Greek sequence gains a certain elegance from the 
way that the ambiguity of εὐνή as ‘bed’ on the one hand, and ‘love-making’ on the other, is 
matched by the semantic range of ἀπέπτυσαν as ‘spit (on)’ and ‘spurn’. The personified 
goddesses of revenge and fury spit on the beds and spurn the illicit love-making – both 
concrete and abstract are harmoniously co-present.512 This elegance disappears in 
translation, both because the polysemy of ἀπέπτυσαν cannot be reproduced in either of the 
target languages and because ‘Bett’ and ‘bed’ do not have the same status as metonymic 
clichés for ‘acts of love-making’ in the poetic idiom of the target languages. In Jenisch’s 
translation, the reader is nevertheless likely to assume that the reason for the Erinyes’ 
hatred of the bed cannot simply be that a brother lay in it. However, the immediacy of the 
metonymic association is not as straightforward here as in the Humboldt or the Droysen. 
Where Jenisch offers a disconcerting neologism, in the shape of the compound noun 
‘Bruderbett’ (‘brother-bed’), these give ‘Ehebett’ (‘marriage-bed’). This unremarkable 
ordinary-language compound noun points more directly to what is at issue in this sequence: 
matrimony, and its violation. Once again, tenor terminology that explicates what is at issue 
is introduced through a compound noun, albeit somewhat more concealed in this instance. 
Wilamowitz, finally, makes this entirely explicit. He literalises the sequence and completely 
removes the source text’s ‘bed’ terminology, and with it any possibility or need for 
metonymic associations. The fact that literalisation occurs here is remarkable, given that 
there is no actual deviance from ordinary language in the source text. The effect of 
metonymic association elicited by the source text is clearly strong enough to prompt a mode 
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of translation appropriate for the treatment of tropes in the strict sense and, by extension, 
of literary clichés.  
 
The following example illustrates this yet more forcibly: 
 καὶ παῖδα γάρ τοί φασιν Ἀλκμήνης ποτὲ 
 πραθέντα τλῆναι δουλίας μάζης τυχεῖν 
 they say, you know, that even the son of Alcmene was once  
 sold and brought himself to touch the coarse food of the slave.513 
a) Jenisch 
 Zwar bist Alkmenens Tochter du: (so sagen sie)  
 doch jetzt – hieher verkauft: und mit Gewalt dem Joche unterworfen 
 Although you are Alcmene’s daughter (or so they say) 
 you are now sold to this place: and with force subjected to the yoke 
b)  Humboldt 
 Alkmenens Sprössling, sagt man, auch erduldete  
 verkauft, und schmeckte wider Willen einst das Joch  
 Alkmene’s son too, they say, suffered, 
 when sold, and once against his will tasted the yoke 
c)  Droysen 
 Denn auch Alkmene’s Sohn, so sagt man, trug es einst  
 verkauft zu leben und gezwungen Knecht zu sein 
 For Alcmene’s son too, so they say, once endured 
 living as a sold man and being forced to be a servant 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Selbst Herakles, erzählt man, hat von Sklavenbrot,  
 als er verkauft war, sich zu nähren nicht verschmäht 
 Even Heracles, so they say, did not refuse to nourish himself 
 with slaves’ bread when he was sold 
e) Browning 
 And truly they do say Alkmene’s child once  
 bore being sold, slaves’ barley bread his living. 
In the Greek original, the sequence τλῆναι δουλίας μάζης τυχεῖν (‘brought himself to touch 
the coarse food of the slave’) prompts metonymic association. It is clear from the context 
that what is at issue here is not that Heracles was prepared to master an unwelcome diet 
but that he accepted the lot of slavery when it fell upon him. The association is prompted 
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and framed by the terms πραθέντα (‘sold’) and δουλίας (‘belonging to a slave’), describing 
in explicit terms Heracles’ being a slave, which is consequently taken to be the implicit, 
general point of the sequence all together. Stanford comments on this idiom: 
Another such [cliché] is ‘to eat the bread of slavery’ for simply ‘to be a slave.’ It 
occurs in Archilochus 79,6, Hipponax 39,6, and Aeschylus A. 1041 (as well as in 
Sophocles Ajax 499, Euripides Alcestis 2).  Another is ‘to trample oaths under 
foot’ in place of ‘to break an oath’ (Iliad, IV, 157, Archilochus, 79, 13, Theognis 
847, Aeschylus E. 110). These, and others like them, may sound fresh and vivid 
to our ears. But so it is with clichés in general – some hundred years from now 
such phrases as ‘the long arm of the law’ or ‘in the nick of time’ may charm 
posterity, though they are nerveless to us.514 
All the more interesting is what actually happens to the ‘fresh and vivid’-sounding cliché in 
our translations. Only Wilamowitz’s ‘domesticating’ translation and Browning’s ‘foreignising’ 
translation give verbatim renderings of the passage. Both preserve the contextual elements 
that inspire metonymic association in the source text. Jenisch and Humboldt, on the other 
hand, alter the sequence along the lines of ‘transferred tropical replacement’: metonymic 
association is replaced with metaphorical cliché.515 The ‘yoke’ as a metaphor for ‘slavery’ is a 
well-established literary cliché in German poetic idiom and both translators offer it here as a 
functional equivalent to the metonymic cliché of the source. Humboldt’s translation has a 
slightly stronger tropical feel to it because it combines two metaphorical clichés whose 
terminologies are unaligned: ‘taste’ implying ‘experience’ and the ‘yoke’ implying ‘slavery’. 
Coming from the Greek original, it is easy to see how the first metaphorical cliché (‘taste’) 
might be inspired by the food terminology of δουλίας μάζης (‘slave’s bread’); the resulting 
juxtaposition of the two clichés, however, creates a certain abrasiveness that is not present 
in the source. Droysen, finally, gives a literalised translation of the sequence, making explicit 
what a reader will read in (by association) to the other translations and to the original: 
Heracles ‘endured living as a sold man and being forced to be a servant’.  
 
As the different translations of this sequence show, metonymic association in the source 
text elicits the same range of responses as index metonymy: verbatim translation, 
transferred tropical replacement and literalisation. Here is confirmation that this seemingly 
insignificant form of metonymy does impact on readers (represented here by our 
                                                        
514
 Stanford 1942, 47; italics in the original. 
515
 Jenisch, by way of an incidental variant, appears also to have misunderstood the Greek παῖδα, ‘son’, to 
mean ‘daughter’ (along with the syntax of the sentence as a whole). 
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translators). And the correspondence of responses to those elicited by index metonymy also 
tends to validate our categorisation of this phenomenon as a variant of metonymy, albeit 
one that is not tropical in the strict sense. 
 
A picture of metonymy in translation is emerging. Metonymic passages are widely 
translatable, but there are limited instances of cultural untranslatability (with culturally 
specific ‘dead’ metonyms and metonymic clichés) and linguistic untranslatability (with 
polysemy/oligosemy). One type of metonymy, however, would seem to be particularly at 
risk in translation: grammatical metonymy. After all, as Apollonius Dyscolus (in effect) 
recognised, the transfer of an adjective from its governing noun to another noun depends to 
a degree on the possibilities of interchange between inflectional endings.516 The question 
therefore arises: what happens to grammatical metonyms when they are translated from a 
highly inflected language like ancient Greek into a moderately inflected language like 
German or a weakly inflected language like English? 
 
We begin with three straightforward cases of grammatical metonymy. Consider this 
example first: 
 τούτων  θεοῖσι  χρὴ  πολύμνηστον  χάριν  
 τίνειν 
 For this we must be deeply mindful of the gods’ favour and pay them  
 Thanks [lit.: pay them much-remembering thanks]517 
a) Jenisch 
 Deswegen ziemt’s den Göttern Preisgesäng‘ 
  hinaufzutönen  
 Therefore it is proper to let the gods‘ praises 
 resound up high 
b)  Humboldt 
 Dafür gebührt’s, den Göttern Dank, lautschallenden,  
 zu weihen 
 Therefore it is becoming to dedicate to the gods  
                                                        
516
 On grammatical metonymy and ἐναλλαγὴ πτώσεως (‘enallage of the case’), see above, p. 88. Pertinently 
enough, Puttenham argued that speakers of English, ‘having no such variety of accidents [i.e. inflections], have 
little or no use of this figure’ (Puttenham 1589, 171). This view is still held by some contemporary rhetoricians, 
such as Fowler, who likewise posits that ‘[s]ome figures of classical rhetoric, indeed, could not be used at all in 
non-inflected languages – like enallage, variation of endings’ (Fowler 1990, 105; italics in the original). 
517
 A. Agam. 821; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 loud-resounding praise 
c)  Droysen 
 Dafür gebührt den Göttern vielgedenker Dank 
 Therefore the gods deserve much-remembering thanks 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Des Dankes für der Götter Beistand dürfen wir  
 niemals vergessen 
 We must never forget to thank the gods for their 
 aid 
e) Browning 
 Of these things, to the gods grace many-mindful  
 ’tis right I render ... 
In the source text’s grammatical amplification metonym, the adjective is transferred from 
implicit subject to accusative object, for it is not the expression of gratitude itself that is 
‘mindful’ and ‘much-remembering’ but the subject that expresses this gratitude. Jenisch’s 
and Humboldt’s ‘foreignising’ translations entirely drop the adjective and literalise the 
sequence.518 Wilamowitz’s ‘domesticating’ translation, too, literalises the term but does so 
by turning the adjectival trope into a literal verb – a move that effectively reunites the 
transferred adjective with the implied subject, albeit with a slight adjustment of the 
message: the source text’s emphasis is on the gods’ aid in the past which is not to be 
forgotten, whereas in the Wilamowitz it is the duty to give thanks that is not to be 
forgotten. Both the ‘domesticating’ by Droysen and the ‘foreignising’ by Browning produce 
verbatim translations, though Browning changes the word order and thereby increases the 
feeling of defamiliarisation further.  
 
Compare the following: 
 βιάζεται  δ᾽ ὁμοσπόροις  
 ἐπιρροαῖσιν αἱμάτων  
 μέλας Ἄρης 
 black Ares forces his way, 
 with ... streams of kindred blood 
 [lit.: with kindred streams of blood]519 
                                                        
518
 In both cases, one suspects a misunderstanding of the Greek term πολύμνηστον as an adjectival compound 
based on πολύ (‘many’) and ὕμνος (‘song’). 
519




 Ströme des Blutes, euch fürcht ich, von eurem Rauschen versinket  
 einst dieses Haus: denn es träuft nicht mehr in Tropfen das Blut 
 Streams of blood, I fear you, in your gushing this house will sink 
 one day: for the blood no longer drizzles in drops 
b)  Humboldt 
 Gewaltsam fortgetrieben stets  
 von Strömen gleich entstammten Bluts  
 Always driven away violently 
 By streams of kindred blood 
c)  Droysen 
 In Strömen gleich entsprungnen Bluts  
 Drängt fort und fort der öde Kampf  
 In streams of kindred blood 
 the bleak fighting pushes further and further 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 In Strömen des Verwandtenblutes stürmt einher  
 der schwarze Mord 
 In streams of kindred blood storms in 
 black murder 
e) Browning 
 He is forced on and on  
 By the kin-born flowing of blood,  
 Black Ares 
In the Greek, the adjective ὁμοσπόροις (‘kindred’) has been transferred from αἱμάτων 
(‘blood’) to ἐπιρροαῖσιν (‘streams’), by grammatical amplification metonymy. All the 
German translators literalise this instance, Humboldt, Droysen and Wilamowitz by 
reaffiliating the adjective, Jenisch by turning it into a noun (‘dieses Haus’, ‘this house’, 
implying ‘the kin of this family’) and by paraphrasing the sequence freely. ‘Foreignising’ and 
‘domesticating’ translators alike are happy to eliminate the metonym. Browning’s English, 
by contrast, comes close to a verbatim translation: the semantic affinity of ‘kin-born’ and 
‘blood’ is felt, but the adjective goes with ‘flowing’ unmistakably. Browning’s rendering of 
ὁμοσπόροις as ‘kin-born’ rather than as ‘kindred’, however, makes the term all but 
compatible with its governing noun, expressing the causal background of the bloodshed: the 
‘flowing of blood’ is ‘born’ of [strife and violence among] ‘kin’. The example is complicated 
further, but trivially, by the fact that ‘born’ here is a metaphorical cliché. While there is an 
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element of discourse compression here, the juxtaposition of adjective and noun perhaps 
falls short of the abrasiveness and incompatibility needed to constitute grammatical 
amplification metonymy as in the source text. 
 
In the following example, already discussed,520 several of the translators do carry the 
grammatical metonym into the target language: 
 ... μηδὲ βαρβάρου φωτὸς δίκην 
  χαμαιπετὲς  βόαμα  προσχάνηις  ἐμοί 
 do not fall to the ground before me and utter open-mouthed cries  
 in the manner of a barbarian 
 [lit.: do not, in the manner of a barbarian, open your mouth to me with 
 A cry that falls to the ground] 521 
a) Jenisch 
 ... grüß mich auch nicht,  
 auf Barbaren Art, zu Erde hingestreckt  
 ... nor greet me, 
 in barbarian manner, stretched out on the ground 
b)  Humboldt 
 ... noch mir senden, gleich ausländischem  
 Weichlinge, staubgesunknen Ehrfurchtsruf empor  
 ... nor send up to me, like a foreign 
 weakling, cries of reverence that have sunk into the dust 
 [lit.: sunk-into-dust reverence-cries] 
c)  Droysen 
 Auch wolle sonst nicht mit mir zärteln, nach der Art  
 der Weiber, noch am Boden liegend tief herauf  
 so wie’s Barbaren thun, mir knechten deinen Gruß 
 And do not attempt to indulge me otherwise, in the manner 
 of women, nor subjugate your greetings to me, like barbarians do, 
 lying low on the ground  
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Ich bin kein Barbar,  
 vor dem ein plumpes Schmeicheln in den Staub sich wirft. 
 I am not a barbarian 
 in front of whom a clumsy flattering throws itself into the dust 
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 See above, p. 93. 
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 ... nor – as in mode of barbarous man is –  
  To me gape forth a groundward-falling clamour! 
Jenisch literalises the sequence through paraphrase. Humboldt and Browning give verbatim 
translations, incidentally indicating that striking grammatical amplification metonymy is 
possible in both languages, regardless of the degree to which they are inflected. More 
remarkable is what happens in the two programmatically ‘domesticating’ translations. 
Wilamowitz replaces the grammatical amplification metonym of the source text with a 
striking index metonym: ‘clumsy flattering’ implies the person who does the flattering. The 
direct juxtaposition of abstract elements and the physical description of the act itself is 
‘poetic’ in spirit. Droysen likewise transforms the grammatical metonym into a tropical 
cluster consisting of conditional metaphor and conditional metonym. The sequence is 
perfectly literal until the clause finishes with the words ‘mir knechten deinen Gruß’ 
(‘subjugate your greetings to me’). The expression  is startling and violates collocation rules 
in ordinary usage. Two different readings are possible. The ‘greeting’ could be taken as 
tenor terminology, expressing what is at issue here; in that case the verb ‘knechten’ 
(‘subjugate’, ‘treat like a slave’) must be understand tropically. It would then imply by 
analogy that the proper form of greeting among free-born persons is violated in the same 
way that their dignity would be violated if they were treated as slaves. On this reading, the 
verb is a metaphor. Alternatively, the verb can be taken as tenor terminology, with ‘you’ 
literally treated as a slave. In this case, the accusative object will be understood as an index 
metonym. What is subjugated and treated like a slave is not ‘deinen Gruß’ (‘your greetings’) 
but the metonymic tenor implied by the possessive pronoun: do not subjugate yourself to 
me. Both readings are possible and are co-present in a remarkable instance of ‘transferred 
tropical replacement’. 
 
To conclude our survey of grammatical metonymy, let us examine two more examples, both 
powerful and both discussed earlier. First these verses from the watchman’s opening 
monologue: 
 εὖτ’ ἂν δὲ νυκτίπλαγκτον ἔνδροσόν τ’ ἔχω  
 εὐνὴν ὀνείροις οὐκ ἐπισκοπουμέμην 
 But while I keep this night-walker’s bed, wet with dew,  
 [lit.: But while I keep this bed that causes wandering at night wet with dew,]  
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 this bed of mine not watched over by dreams522 
a) Jenisch 
 Seit ich dieses Lager mir  
 hier bette, das der Thau so oft durchnezzet, das  
 der Schlummer flieht  
 Since I am preparing for myself this bed here, 
 which the dew drenches, 
 which sleep flees away from 
b)  Humboldt 
 Wann hier mich nachtdurchirrend Lager, thaubenetzt,  
 von Traumgesichten freundlich nie besuchet, hält  
 When a bed, wandering through the night, drenched with dew, 
 never visited by friendly dream visions, keeps me 
c)  Droysen 
 Und halt’ ich so nachtgestörte Ruh  
 vom Thau durchnäßt, nie mehr von Träumen aufgesucht  
 And thus I have a night-disturbed rest, 
 drenched with dew, nevermore visited by dreams. 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Da muss ich liegen, nachtumwittert, thaubenetzt,  
 und meinem Lager nahet nimmer sich ein Traum 
 There I have to lie,  night-weathered, dew-drenched, 
 and never does a dream approach my bed 
e) Browning 
 But when I, driven from night-rest, dew-drenched, hold to  
 this couch of mine – not looked upon by visions 
Jenisch’s translation is the only one that literalises the sequence by dropping the metonymic 
adjective altogether. Browning keeps the term as ‘driven from night-rest’, but reaffiliates it 
with the subject of the sentence, thereby undoing the grammatical metonymy (and tacitly 
affirming our earlier analysis).523 The other translators offer different compound adjectives 
that variously re-model the Greek νυκτίπλαγκτον (‘causing to wander by night, rousing from 
the bed’), in itself an adjectival neologism coined by Aeschylus.524 Like Browning, 
Wilamowitz affiliates the adjective, along with the accompanying adjective ἔνδροσον (‘wet 
with dew’), with the subject rather than the accusative object as in the source text. His 
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 A. Agam. 12-13; trans. Sommerstein. 
523
 See above, pp. 101-102. 
524
 See above, p. 101. 
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translation is arresting only in the sense that ‘nachtumwittert’ (‘night-weathered’) is a 
neologism which conflates ‘exposure to bad weather’ and ‘at night time’ into one 
expression. In the Droysen, εὐνήν (‘bed’) has been converted into ‘Ruh‘ (‘rest’), as if the 
Greek term had been an index metonym to be literalised in translation. Like Wilamowitz, 
Droysen also introduces a newly coined compound adjective – ‘nachtgestörte’ (‘night-
disturbed’) – which likewise conflates ‘disturbed from one’s rest’ and ‘at night time’. In both 
cases, the adjective attracts the reader’s attention as a newly coined compound but the 
collocation is not so abrasive that we can speak of any metonymy. Only Humboldt offers 
anything approaching a verbatim translation, with the neologistic compound adjective 
‘nachtdurchirrend’ (‘wandering through the night’) transferred from the subject (who 
literally wanders during his night watch), to the bed.525 As this example shows, the capacity 
of the German to recreate Greek compound words does not in itself ensure that 
grammatical metonyms are preserved. On the contrary, while the novelty of the compound 
adjective is reproduced (variously) in all but one of the German translations, the 
grammatical metonym is only reproduced in one of them.  
 
Our next instance takes us back to the riddle of the sphinx and a notable tropical cluster: 
 τό θ᾽ ὑπέργηρων  φυλλάδος ἤδη  
 κατακαρφομένης τρίποδας μὲν ὁδοὺς 
 στείχει 
 While extreme old age, its leaves already  
 withering, walks its way 
 On three feet [lit.: walks three-legged paths]526  
a) Jenisch 
 stüzzen Kinderkraft hingeschwundener Körper 
 auf den Stäben des Greisen-Alters, nähren  
Mark, dem Säuglinge gleich im milchnen Busen – jede Blüthe der Jugendkraft hin – 
hin mit Zweig und mit Blatt! – der dürre Stamm nur  
 trocknet saftlos dem nahen Sturz entgegen.  
 Da – da schleichen wir nun auf dreyen Füßen ... einher. 
 They support the child-strength of bodies that have wasted away 
 with the canes of old-age, nourishing 
 marrow, like the infant at the milky bosom – every blossom of youth-strength gone - 
                                                        
525
 This is the case irrespective of the fact that Humboldt’s translation swaps subject and accusative object in 
the sentence compared to the source text. 
526
 A. Agam. 79-81; trans. Sommerstein. For a discussion of the various elements of this tropical cluster, see 
above, pp. 115-117. 
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 away with twig and with leaf! – only the arid trunk 
 dries, juiceless, towards its near collapse. 
 There – there we slink now on three feet  
b)  Humboldt 
 Was dem Alter erliegt, wenn herbstlich das Laub  
 hinwelket, das schleicht dreifüssigen Pfad  
 That which succumbs to old-age, when the foliage withers away 
 autumnally, that slinks down the three-footed path 
c)  Droysen 
 Wer dem Alter erliegt, wem herbstlich die Stirn sich entlaubet,  
 er wankt dreifüssigen Gang  
 He who succumbs to old age, whose forehead autumnally sheds leaves,  
 staggers in a three-footed walk  
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Und das letzte Menschenalter wieder,  
 wann das Laub am Lebensbaum vertrocknet,  
 wankt dahin, dreifüssig  
 And the last age of man, again, 
 when the foliage of the tree of life dries up, 
 staggers along, three-legged, weak and childish, 
e) Browning 
 ... but in oldest age’s case,  
 Foliage a-fading, why, he wends his way  
 On three feet  
The translations of this cluster vividly confirm that metaphors are more likely to be 
preserved and carried over into the target language than metonyms. Of all these five 
translations only one, Humboldt’s, gives a verbatim rendering that reproduces all the 
tropical elements of the source text: index metonym (the abstract ‘that which succumbs to 
old-age’ implying concrete ‘old persons’), metaphor (the defoliating tree implying human 
ageing) and metaphor conjoined with grammatical metonym (‘three-legged’: both the 
metaphorical walking with a cane as a third ‘leg’ and the metonymic transference from 
walking persons to path walked on). In all the other translations, the metaphorical adjective 
is reaffiliated to the subject as its governing noun, and no grammatical metonymy results. 
Droysen’s translation is the most literalising, as it removes all metonymic elements. 
Jenisch’s highly poetic paraphrase, by contrast, involves a change from one variant of 
metonymy to another: the index metonym (‘extreme old age’ implying ‘old persons’) is 
replaced by an amplification metonym (‘the child-strength of bodies that have wasted 
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away’). The limited, child-like strength left to the elderly is the metonymic vehicle in a 
compound within which the noun (and adjective) in genitive case spell out the metonymic 
tenor, on which the remainder of the sequence depends. In Jenisch’s version, the ‘withering 
tree’ metaphor is greatly elaborated and the ‘three leg’ metaphor maintained (although the 
metaphor’s tenor, ‘canes of old age’, is also literally present). But in all the translations, and 
in clear contrast to the changes or literalisations to which the metonymic elements of the 
source text are subjected, the ‘three leg’ metaphor and the ‘withering tree’ metaphor are 
reproduced.  
 
To conclude our analysis, let us consider one final example of amplification metonymy. 
Unlike those instances where translators introduce amplification metonyms themselves, the 
following passage contains an amplification metonym in the source text. Iphigenia is 
prevented from cursing the house of Agamemnon: 
 βίᾳ χαλινῶν τ’ ἀναύδῳ μένει 
 by force, by the silencing power of a bridle 
 [lit.: by force, by the speechless power of a bridle]527 
a) Jenisch 
 Auch die Diener des Opfers heißt er grausam  
 ihr die Lippen von Rosen dicht zu fesseln  
 mit verstummender Kraft!  
 And cruelly he orders the servants of the sacrifice  
 to bind her lips of roses firmly 
 with muting force. 
b)  Humboldt 
 mit Zaum, und sprachlosen Zwangs harter Kraft 
 with bridle, and speechless coercion’s hard force 
c)  Droysen 
 Sie schwieg dem Machtwort in lautlosem Zwang  
 She said nothing to the decree in soundless coercion 
d)  Wilamowitz 
 Die Fessel hielt. Stumm und starr lag sie da. 
 The fetter held. Mute and stiff she lay there. 
e) Browning 
 ... and the fair mouth’s guard  
                                                        
527
 A. Agam. 238; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 and frontage hold, – press hard  
 from utterance a curse against the house  
 by dint of bit – violence bridling speech. 
In the Greek, there is a metonymic shift, with an over-specifying metonymic vehicle 
(‘power’) acting as the noun governing the metonymic tenor in the genitive (‘bridle’).528 In 
addition, the adjective ἄναυδος is used here as a grammatical amplification metonym: it is 
the gagged Iphigenia who is without speech, not the force that is gagging her.529 
Interestingly, none of the translators gives a verbatim rendering of this verse. Wilamowitz 
literalises the sequence altogether, the others change it significantly; Droysen eliminates the 
concrete instrument used to gag Iphigenia (‘bridle’) but maintains the grammatical 
amplification metonym. While it might be imaginable that ‘soundless’ should qualify the 
‘coercion’ exercised on Iphigenia, what is at issue here is clearly not that the sacrificers act 
in silence but that Iphigenia is being silenced. The adjective is transferred away from the 
noun it would literally qualify, namely Iphigenia, who is ‘soundless’ as she hears her father’s 
decree in subjection to her sacrificers. Humboldt rearranges the word order, which allows 
‘bridle’ to be kept in the text (in ordinary, literal usage) but undoes the collocation that 
constitutes the source text’s metonym. Instead, his translation offers a less intense 
amplification metonym, ‘coercion’s hard force’: less intense, because both terms involved 
are abstract and the shift in semantic field is therefore less strong than in the Greek 
(concrete to abstract). In Humboldt, the affiliation of ‘speechless’ is ambiguous, as between 
reference to Iphigenia (the result of her gagging) or to the sacrificers (while gagging her). In 
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 On the amplification metonymy in the Greek, see above, p. 75.  
529
 LSJ s.v. gives ‘silencing’ as a denotative meaning of the term but can only cite this one instance here in 
support of the claim. The overwhelming majority of other verse occurrences show it denoting the absence of 
speech and/or of the ability to speak, i.e. ‘speechless’, ‘without speech’, ‘unable to articulate’; see Od. 5.456, 
10.378, Hes. Th. 797, A. Sept. 82, Pers. 577, S. OC 1274, 1404, El. 1284 and E. Med. 1183. But more reliable 
evidence for ordinary usage in any case comes from the Hippocratic corpus where the adjective clearly 
denotes the effect of speechlessness, as at Hp. Epid. 5.50: πάλιν ἐπετείνετο τῷ πυρετῷ, καὶ κατεφέρετο, καὶ 
ἄναυδος ἦν – ‘Again she was prostrated by the fever; she was depressed, speechless’; trans. Jones. Cf. also the 
term’s usage at Hp. Coac. 291, Mul. 2.110, Epid. 3.79. This conclusion finds further support in the usage of the 
adverbial form, ἀναύδως, at Hp. Prorrh. 1.90 where it denotes ‘without speech’ (αἱ ἐν πυρετοῖσι πρὸς 
ὑποχόνδριον ὀδύναι ἀναύδως, ἱδρῶτι λυόμεναι, κακοήθεες – ‘in a person who loses his speech, pains to the 
hypochondrium that occur during fevers and are resolved with a sweat are malignant’; trans. Potter) and of 
the nominal form, ἀναυδία, which denotes ‘speechlessness’ at Hp. Coac. 353 (ἐν τοῖσι σπασμοῖσιν ἀναυδίη ἐπὶ 
πολὺ, κακόν – ‘In convulsions, a longer loss of speech is bad’; trans. Potter). Against the background of this 
prose usage and the term’s predominant usage in verse texts, the usage of the term here is unmistakably 
deviant, tropical usage. This would also apply to the usage at S. Aj. 947, ὤμοι, ἀναλγήτων | δισσῶν ἐθρόησας 
ἄναυδ᾽ | ἔργ᾽ Ἀτρειδᾶν τῷδ᾽ ἄχει (‘Ah me, you named unspeakable [lit.: speechless] actions of the ruthless 
twin sons of Atreus when you voiced this grief’; trans. Lloyd-Jones), even if we see this as influenced by the 
related term ἀναύδητος (‘not to be spoken’, ‘unutterable’, ‘horrible’). 
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either case, the abrasive collocation of human terminology (‘speechless’) with abstract 
(‘coercion’) shows that the adjective has been transferred from its proper governing noun. 
Jenisch, finally, undoes the source text’s amplification metonym by turning its metonymic 
tenor (χαλινῶν, ‘of the bridle’) into the predicate in the target language (‘zu fesseln’, ‘to 
bind’). This has consequences for the grammatical amplification metonym, which is 
represented as ‘mit verstummender Kraft’ (‘with muting force’). The term that corresponds 
to the transferred adjective in the Greek here is the participle of a transitive verb. As such, it 
is affiliated to the following noun and at the same time qualifies Iphigenia without any 
deviant usage. At most, the noun ‘Kraft’, or indeed the combination of participle and noun, 
might be read as a metonym by association which evokes the bridle as the object through 
which this muting power is exercised without literally mentioning it. Then, as if to 
compensate for loss of defamiliarisation and without any prompting from the source text, 
Jenisch introduces a metaphorical cliché (‘lips of roses’): ‘transferred tropical replacement’, 
once again. 
 
Before we leave the Agamemnon and its translations, let us return once more to the way 
metonyms are sometimes introduced during the translation process. As we have seen, this 
phenomenon is attested in both ‘domesticating’ and ‘foreignising’ translations. The 
following passage illustrates the pattern: 
 στόλον  Ἀργείων χιλιοναύτην,  
 τῆσδ᾽ ἀπὸ χώρας   
 ἦραν, στρατιῶτιν ἀρωγὰν 
 launched the thousand-ship expedition of the Argives 
 from this land  
 as military backers for their suit530 
a) Jenisch 
 und tausend Schiffe  
 ins Schlachtgefild‘ hinreihten  
 and lined up a thousand ships 
 into the battle zone 
b) Humboldt 
 zu der Hülfe des Kriegs von dem heimischen Land  
 fern lösten den Zug  
 einst tausend Argeiischer Segel  
                                                        
530
 A. Agam. 45-47; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 once, as an aid to war, they released and sent  
 far from the homeland the expedition 
 of a thousand Argive sails 
c) Droysen 
 der Argiver tausendschiffigen Zug  
 Von jenem Gestad  
 Fortführten, Genossen des Krieges.  
 comrades of war led  
 the Argives’ thousand-shipped expedition 
 away from these shores 
d) Wilamowitz 
 der Hellenenflotte tausend Segel  
 aus den Häfen unsres Landes führten,  
 auszufechten ihren Rachekrieg 
 [they] led the Hellenic fleet’s thousand sails 
 out of our country’s ports 
 to battle out their war of revenge 
e)  Browning 
 Did from this land the aid, the armament dispatch,  
 the thousand-sailored force of Argives 
In the Greek, the Argives’ fleet is qualified by the compound adjective χιλιοναύτην 
(‘[consisting] of a thousand ships’). Both Droysen’s ‘domesticating’ and Browning’s 
‘foreignising’ use similar compound adjectives to represent this epithet, whereas Jenisch 
drops στόλον (‘expedition’, ‘fleet’) and splits the compound adjective into adjective and  
noun in literal usage. Humboldt’s ‘foreignising’ and Wilamowitz’s ‘domesticating‘, on the 
other hand, give metonymic renderings of this passage: Humboldt’s translation adds an 
index metonym, ‘a thousand Argive sails’ (implying the ‘thousand ships of the Argives’ 
fleet’); Wilamowitz’s adds an amplification metonym, ‘the Hellenic fleet’s thousand sails’ 
(focusing on the ‘sails’, when what is at issue is the ‘fleet’ itself). Both yield limited 
deviations from ordinary usage, because the context leaves little room for ambiguity, yet 
the feeling of a new trope clearly appeals to both translators as adequate reflection of the 
overall stylistic quality of the Greek.  
 
Generally speaking, it is Humboldt who uses metonymic elements to enrich poetic texture 
most strikingly. More than any other translator he adds metonyms to intensify the idiom. 
Three examples may suffice by way of illustration. Example one: 
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 βαρεῖα  δ᾽ ἀστῶν  φάτις  ξὺν  κότῳ  
 The talk of citizens, mixed with anger, is a dangerous thing531 
 Humboldt:  
 Des Bürgerzorns Schmähungswort lastet schwer 
 The reviling word of citizens‘ anger weighs heavily 
 [lit.: citizen-anger’s condemnation-word weighs heavily] 
Here, Humboldt juxtaposes two neologistic compound nouns (neither paralleled in the 
source text), which also introduce a number metonym, with ‘word’ invoking expressions of 
discontent denoted in the Greek by φάτις (‘talk’, ‘speech’).532 Example two: 
 ταχεῖα δ᾽ ἄτα πέλει. 
 Disaster comes swiftly533 
 Humboldt: 
 Denn rasch hin eilt Ate’s Fuss. 
 For Ate’s foot travels quickly. 
Humboldt’s translation to a certain extent preserves the ambiguity of the Greek term ἄτα, 
which can be taken to denote literally both ‘disaster’ or ‘ill-fate’ and Ate, the personified 
goddess of ruin. Regardless of whether we take  Humboldt’s ‘Ate’ as the goddess or the 
‘disaster’, his translation introduces an amplification metonym, ‘Ate’s foot’, thereby 
emphasising the swiftness of the movement, where what is at issue is the sudden arrival of 
the goddess and/or the ills she brings. This added element, which has no pretext in the 
Greek, is testimony to Humboldt’s familiarity with Greek poetic idiom. His translation 
echoes innumerable tragic foot-metonyms, from the chorus’s plea to Apollo in Antigone, 
μολεῖν καθαρσίῳ ποδὶ Παρνασίαν ὑπὲρ κλειτὺν (‘[Apollo,] come with cleansing movement 
[lit.: with purifying foot] over the slope of Parnassus!’),534 to Orestes’ invocation of Athena 
as a helper in Eumenides, τίθησιν ὀρθὸν ἢ κατηρεφῆ πόδα | φίλοις ἀρήγουσ᾽ (‘planting a 
straight or a covered leg [lit.: foot]’).535 And example three: 
 γνώσῃ  δὲ χρόνῳ  διαπευθόμενος  
 τόν τε δικαίως καὶ τὸν ἀκαίρως πόλιν οἰκουροῦντα πολιτῶν.  
                                                        
531
 A. Agam. 456; trans. Sommerstein. 
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 In this instance Browning also takes the singular of φάτις as pretext for a new metonym: ‘And grave with 
anger goes the city’s word, | And pays a debt by public curse incurred’. 
533
 A. Agam. 1124; trans. Sommerstein. 
534
 S. Ant. 1144-1145; trans. Lloyd-Jones. 
535
 A. Eum. 294-295; trans. Sommerstein. The exact interpretation of these verses is a matter of dispute (see 
e.g. Sommerstein ad loc.). As elsewhere, we would argue that uncertainty is built into the metonymic nature  
of the expression. It is not open to scholarly erudition to provide a definitive and unambiguous ‘explanation’. 
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 In time you will know by inquiry  
 which of the citizens has acted honestly when staying at home in the city, and which  
 inappropriately536 
 Humboldt: 
 In der Folge der Zeit kennst prüfend du leicht  
 wer billig und recht, wer sonder Gebühr  
 dir der Bürger die Mauern verwaltet. 
 As time goes by, you recognise easily by investigation 
 which of the citizens is supervising the walls for you 
 duly and justly, which improperly 
This is another case which illustrates how Wilamowitz may have reached his conclusion that 
one needed the Greek text to make sense of Humboldt’s translation. With or without the 
source text, ‘die Mauern’ (‘the walls’) will be taken as an index metonym, implying civic 
institutions rather than actual structures; but without the Greek text the overtones are 
likely to be more military, the inferred term more likely to be ‘the city’s defence’ or indeed 
even ‘the city’s fortifications’ rather than ‘the city’ itself, as the Greek has it. This instance 
may involve only a slight divergence from the source, but from an aesthetic point of view 
the cumulative effect of such defamiliarising divergences is not without impact. We should 
certainly acknowledge that Humboldt’s experimentation with Greek metres, his neologistic 
compounds, and his willingness to stretch German syntax are central to the overall 
‘foreignising’ and ‘defamiliarised’ impression of his translation. Nevertheless, his consistent 
deployment of metonymic devices throughout the translation surely adds to this impression 
and its role should not be underestimated. 
 
What happens to metonymy in translation? Our analysis of contrasting translations of 
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon has produced a series of important findings: 
1) It is in principle possible to give verbatim translations of all the variants of metonymy 
distinguished in Part I, with the exception of certain cases of cultural untranslatability 
(where the lexical link, on which a metonym is based, is not available in the target 
language) or linguistic untranslatability (where the semantic range of a term is 
different in source and target language). Both cases of untranslatability, and their  
outcomes in practice, validate per contrarium our fundamental definition of 
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 A. Agam. 808-809; trans. Sommerstein. 
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metonymy as a shift in a semantic field established through regular collocation in 
ordinary usage. 
2) While verbatim translation is often, still, a possible option, metonyms in practice elicit 
a wide range of responses. Literalisation is common, either in part or whole (to the 
entire elimination of defamiliarised language). There are two translation strategies 
through which partial literalisation can take place. In one, the source text’s metonymic 
vehicle is carried over into the target language but is explicitly supplemented with a 
term that would otherwise constitute the implicit metonymic tenor in the source; we 
refer to this as literalising supplementation. In the other, the source text’s metonym is 
literalised but a degree of defamiliarisation is maintained through the insertion of new 
tropical elements (metonymic or other), which create a comparable effect of 
intensified language without reproducing the original metonymic phenomenon. We 
refer to this as transferred tropical replacement.  
3) In our sample, translations serving an explicit ‘domesticating’ programme display a 
greater overall tendency towards literalisation, but there is no consistent or 
predictable equivalence between ‘domestication’ and ‘literalisation’ on the one hand, 
or ‘foreignisation’ and verbatim translation on the other. On the contrary, some of the 
most striking metonymic defamiliarisations are observable in translations that purport 
to be ‘domesticating’.  
4) Linguistic specificities, such as the degree to which a language is inflected or its 
propensity to create compound words, do not necessarily have a significant impact on 
the translatability of metonyms. As far as compound nouns are concerned, our 
samples show them used as index metonyms, as compressed amplification metonyms 
or merely as compressed discourse without any tropical element.  
5) The existence of diachronic or translingual traditions of poetic idiom means that 
metonymic clichés can sometimes be represented  verbatim or with equivalents from 
the target language and culture. In our sample, however, the fact that some 
translations offer literalised versions of clichés suggests that in such cases there 
remains a residual defamiliarisation that continues to be poetically effective. The same 
is true of metonymic association whose outcomes vary from translatability with 
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comparable effect to literalisation. Although neither metonymic cliché nor metonymic 
association can be said to involve tropicality in the narrow sense, the effects they elicit 
in translation vindicate our decision to count them among metonymic phenomena. 
Part II overall confirms our finding that metonymy can produce striking effects but that its 
overwhelming usage is of a refined or restricted kind. The pattern is one of relatively few 
intense outcomes, and relatively many less intense. Given the difference in the degree of 
poetic intensity between metonyms and metaphors,537 it is apparent why metonymy should 
have featured in literary scholarship for so long as ‘the forgotten trope’. This is surely the 
true explanation for the lack of attention given to metonymy – this, and not (for instance) 
Jakobson’s homoeopathic suggestion that the ‘meta-language’ of criticism is inherently 
metaphorical, so that critics are only equipped to interpret metaphors but have no 
adequate means to come to terms with metonyms.538 
 
Our analysis of translations of the Agememnon as literary texts in their own right has, we 
believe, demonstrated the value of the categories developed in Part I for practical literary 
criticism. These categories have proved to be reliable tools for the analysis and assessment 
of metonymic phenomena; they have made it possible to distinguish metonyms from other 
tropes and to compare the intensity of their respective poetic effects. They have enabled us 
to conduct an analysis that (inter alia) has shown how some of the most striking index 
metonyms of a source text may be eliminated in translation, while compensatory 
metonymic (or other) elements may be introduced. This finding in particular underscores 
the important role metonymy plays in enriching the poetic texture of texts – without 
necessarily attracting much attention.  
 
It goes without saying that (had it been a practical possibility) it would have been desirable 
to examine further German translations of other Greek texts from this period to confirm or 
qualify our results, for instance through a comparative evaluation of Sophocles’ Oedipus 
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 ‘Similarity in meaning connects the symbols of a metalanguage with the symbols of the language referred 
to. Similarity connects a metaphorical term with the term for which it is substituted. Consequently, when 
constructing a metalanguage to interpret tropes, the researcher possesses more homogeneous means to 
handle metaphor, whereas metonymy, based on a different principle, easily defies interpretation. Therefore 




Tyrannus and its translations by Friedrich Hölderlin (1804), Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger 
(1824) and Christian Graf zu Stolberg (1827). For the record: preliminary research suggests 
that a contrastive analysis of the translation of Pindar’s Odes by Friedrich Gedike (1777) and 
Hölderlin (1800) would have allowed us to shed more light on metonymy’s dependency on a 
stable syntactic environment, which is generally provided by Gedike but often on the verge 
of collapse (or beyond it) in the Hölderlin. One has the impression, also, that a comparison 
of translations of Sophocles’ Antigone by Martin Opitz (1636), Hölderlin (1804), Solger 
(1824) and August Boeckh (1843) would serve to illuminate the impact of classicising, 
Romantic and positivistic-philological aesthetics and stylistics on metonymy in translation. 
For lack of space, however, it has seemed best to confine ourselves to the examination of 
translations of a single text. While, therefore, it is necessary to end our study of metonymy 
in translation here, we can only hope that the theoretical framework established and the 
insights gained in this first exploration of a largely uncharted field will encourage further 





Metonymy – this much our investigation has made abundantly clear – is not a marginal 
phenomenon in literary texts. Whether adding to the poetic texture by elevating poetic 
idiom or creating intense effects of heightening in significant passages, metonyms play an 
important role in the formal-aesthetic conformation of literary works. Our analysis of 
metonymy in translation in the second part of this thesis has (it is hoped) demonstrated that 
the categories distinguished in Part I are valuable tools for critical practice, but our 
explorations in translation criticism from a tropological perspective have only scratched the 
surface of this field. Much awaits further investigation. There seems, for instance, to be no 
comparable study of how metaphor fares in literary translations. On the basis of such a 
study, it would be interesting to analyse how metaphor and metonymy fare relative to each 
other: how does the ‘survival rate’ of metaphors and metonyms in individual translations 
and/or translators compare? Likewise, in the general context of translations and translation 
strategy, one might well ponder how the translating of metaphors and metonyms relates to 
and is interlinked with other outcomes of domestication or foreignisation, such as 
modifications of syntax and vocabulary, explanatory paraphrase, word order and so on.  
 
Of course, it is not just translation criticism that the theoretical framework offered here 
promises to illuminate. Without a finely tuned critical apparatus it is impossible to 
appreciate how individual texts create their overall aesthetic impression. A case in point 
might be texts characterised as ‘Hellenising’ in terms of their content and style. As, 
admittedly, an unlikely pair of examples, consider, for instance, Schiller’s play Die Braut von 
Messina (‘The Bride of Messina’) of 1803 and Housman’s ‘Fragment of a Greek Tragedy’ of 
1883. Imitation of the poetic idiom of Greek tragedy lies at the core of both texts: in 
Schiller’s attempt to reconnect modern theatre with its ancient roots, in Housman’s aim of 
parodying over-literal translations (such as Browning’s), if not Greek tragic idiom itself. In 
both cases, criticism has explored the classical hypotexts quoted, imitated or alluded to, but 
little has been said about the actual stylistic features of the texts themselves. Arguably, the 
fact that source criticism has all too often eclipsed textual analysis stems not least from the 




In the case of Schiller’s play, much has been written (not least by the author himself) about 
the use of the chorus, the conflation of classical pagan and fatalistic worldviews with 
Christian and Islamic elements and the classical tragedies which are alluded to or have 
inspired individual passages, characters or plot lines of the play.539 The play’s most 
immediate ‘Hellenising’ feature, however, is without doubt its poetic idiom. This is duly 
acknowledged by Hibberd (in the only significant study of the play’s imagery) who argues 
that ‘Die Braut von Messina may be best understood and appreciated through its formal 
elements ... the motivation here is achieved through stylistic and rhetorical means.’540 His 
discussion begins with some interesting observations: 
The stylization of the play is not least apparent in its language. The pathos of the 
dramatic situations is expressed in imagery that is rarely startlingly original but is 
none the less dramatically effective. The play contains few neologisms, but a 
higher proportion of adjectives than any other of Schiller’s dramas ... Among the 
many traditional rhetorical devices, the explanatio and the Homeric simile figure 
frequently.541 
However, instead of shedding more light on which rhetorical devices are used where and 
how, Hibberd recalibrates his perspective and concentrates on ‘the preponderance of 
recurring images’,542 namely fire and water imagery. While such studies can indeed add to 
our understanding of particular texts,543 they are different in kind from stylistic analysis 
proper, since the focus here is on the conceptual content of imagery rather than on the 
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 As in both earlier scholarship, for instance, Gerhard 1919 and Clark 1937, and more recent contributions 
like Schadewaldt 1969, Janz 1984, Frick 1998, Guthke 1998, Ritzer 1998, Silk 1998 and Ewans 2005, 208-209. 
Gerhard’s study contains a section entitled ‘Griechische Elemente in Schillers Dramen, Kapitel 1: Form, a) 
Sprachliches’ (‘Greek Elements in Schiller’s Plays, Chapter 1: Form, a) Idiom’). However, Gerhard only dedicates 
15 out of 135 pages to this topic (see Gerhard 1919, 40-54) and, more important, confines herself to 
reflections on the general nature of tropical language rather than close, textual analysis. To give just two 
examples: ‘Schon an sich wird die Metapher einer toten Sprache leicht umgedeutet ... Man läuft Gefahr, 
Wendungen als Metaphern anzusprechen, die von dem Griechen nicht mehr als solche gefühlt wurden, oder 
umgekehrt‘ (‘Metaphors in a dead language are easily misinterpreted ... One runs the risk of taking expressions 
as metaphorical which are no longer felt by the Greeks as such, or vice versa’; Gerhard 1919, 41) or ‘der 
moderne Leser wird hier versucht sein, als Personifizierung oder Allegorie zu empfinden, was für den Griechen 
infolge seiner Religion durchaus konkret war ... Anwendungen griechischer Mythologie werden stets leicht in 
Allegorien oder Personifizierungen umschlagen‘ (‘the modern reader will be tempted to take as personification 
or allegory what for the Greeks was quite concrete, in line with their religion ... Uses of Greek mythology will 
always easily turn into allegory or personification’; Gerhard 1919, 42). While these are valid and relevant 
considerations, which have also informed our own theorising, they nevertheless fall short of a concrete 
examination of the specifics of the text. 
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 Hibberd 1967, 306. 
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 Hibberd 1967, 307. 
542
 Hibberd 1967, 307. 
543
 A prime example in the criticism of Greek tragedy is Lebeck 1971. 
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mechanisms through which images are deployed and the way they affect poetic texture and 
aesthetic effect.  
 
Housman’s parody, on the other hand, has attracted practically no critical attention in its 
own right, despite the fact that the text has become a common point of reference for 
classicists, especially in unfavourable reviews of translations,544 but also as a teaching tool to 
give Greek-less students a taste of Greek tragic diction. The latter prompted Marcellino to 
compile a commentary on the parody for those who ‘have read all of the Oresteia in 
translation, [yet] do not realise how clever it is, although they do find it hilarious.’545 Again, 
much effort is invested in tracking down hypotexts for individual passages, providing 
historical background information and (in this case) adducing classical witnesses for the 
stylistic peculiarities of the authors parodied. Yet, here too, very little is said about the 
stylistic devices of the text itself which, after all, create the ‘hilarity’ in the first place.  
 
Both texts serve to demonstrate how the theoretical framework established in this thesis 
enables us to reach a better understanding of aesthetic effects – in this case the effect of a 
‘Hellenising’ style. Right from the start, metonymy plays an important role. Compare the 
two opening sequences, beginning with Schiller’s play:  
Der Noth gehorchend, nicht dem eignen Trieb, 
Tret' ich, ihr greisen Häupter dieser Stadt,    
Heraus zu euch aus den verschwiegenen    
Gemächern meines Frauensaals, das Antlitz 
Vor euren Männerblicken zu entschleiern. 
 
Not following my own urge but obeying necessity 
I step out of the discreet rooms of my lady-chambers 
to you, elderly heads of this city, 
to unveil my countenance 
in front of your manly gaze.546 
The index metonym ‘elderly heads‘ for ‘elders’ is a literary cliché and, as such, elevates the 
diction from the outset.547 The grammatical amplification metonym ‘discreet rooms of my 
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 See, for instance, Bers 2000. 
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 Marcellino 1953, 171. 
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 Schiller, Die Braut von Messina, ll. 1-5. 
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 The expression is not a ‘dead’ metonym or indeed a ‘dead’ metaphor as ‘head’ is in English (e.g. in ‘head of 
school’); the equivalent denotative term in German is ‘Oberhaupt’ rather than just ‘Haupt’, which belongs to 
poetic idiom rather than ordinary language. Rather, when used as a form of direct address, this is a metonymic 
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lady-chambers’ (for ‘rooms in which discreet ladies live’) further intensifies the idiom and 
thus sets the tone for the dramatic poetry that is to follow.  
 
The famous opening lines of the chorus in Housman’s parody at once introduce a 
superficially comparable usage: 
O suitably-attired-in-leather-boots  
Head of a traveller, wherefore seeking whom  
Whence by what way how purposed art thou come  
To this well-nightingaled vicinity? 
The pseudo-compound adjective ‘suitably-attired-in-leather-boots’ imitates a specific type 
of adjective that features prominently in the idiom of Greek epic and (subsequently) tragic 
poetry, namely adjectives that assert the aptness or well-builtness of their governing noun. 
At the same time, it is evocative of Aeschylus’ special predilection for heavy compound 
adjectives. Likewise, the amplification metonym ‘head of a traveller’ reproduces a 
widespread metonymic cliché of Greek tragic idiom.548 Both expressions, needless to say, 
are comical in their own right by virtue of their sheer un-Englishness. The comic effect, 
however, is significantly enhanced by the abrasive juxtaposition of the metonymic vehicle 
and its qualifying adjective in tenor terminology: a head (MV) is said to be suitably attired in 
leather boots. It is precisely the metonymic shift within the amplification metonym, 
foregrounding the ‘head’ of the ‘traveller, that creates the absurd juxtaposition. 
 
This first impression of the two texts is borne out by a close reading of the respective 
‘Hellenisings’ that follow. Housman’s parody contains comical metaphors, such as the 
chorus’s question whether Alcmaeon arrived ‘Sailing on horseback, or with feet for oars’,549 
its mock-gnomic assertion that ‘Life, I say, is not a stranger to uncertainty’,550 as well as a 
metaphor taken over almost unchanged from Aeschylus (and, in its unchanged state, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
cliché equivalent to the pervasive φίλον κάρα (‘dear head’), vel sim., of Greek tragedy (see e.g. S. OC 1631 or 
A. Agam. 905). The metonymic impression is retrospectively enforced through the focus on facial features in 
‘countenance’ (‘Antlitz’) and ‘manly gaze’ (‘Männerblicken‘) in ll. 4-5. 
548
 See note above; compare also the famous opening verse of Sophocles’ Antigone: ὦ κοινὸν αὐτάδελφον 
Ἰσμήνης κάρα (‘o kindred sisterly head of Ismene’). 
549
 Housman, Fragment of a Greek Tragedy, l. 10; ‘feet for oars’ is arguably a simile rather than a metaphor, as 
Marcellino implies (see Marcellino 1953, 73), owing to the presence of ‘for’ which makes the analogy explicit. 
550
 Housman, Fragment of a Greek Tragedy, ll. 39-40. 
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presented as in itself ridiculous): ‘Mud's sister, not himself, adorns my shoes’.551 Two further 
metaphors occur in the lines, 
Yes even the palace appears  
To my yoke of circular eyes  
(The right, nor omit I the left)  
Like a slaughterhouse, so to speak,  
Garnished with woolly deaths  
And many shipwrecks of cows.  
The last two lines, however, derive their humorous force not least from the combination of 
an index metonym and a metaphor. Both tropes are equally far-fetched and mutually 
dependent on each other when it comes to making sense of the sequence. The index 
metonym implies the concrete ‘dead bodies’ through the abstract ‘deaths’ and uses the 
adjective ‘woolly’ to qualify the dead bodies, indirectly, as ‘sheep carcasses’.552 This instance 
illustrates how metonyms, too, can be quite startling, provided that the metonymic shift 
leads to a significant, abrasive terminological clash between metonymic vehicle (‘deaths’) 
and the tenor terminology of the surrounding context (‘woolly’). In metaphor, as 
‘shipwrecks of cows’ shows, this terminological clash is built into the trope itself.  
 
A further metaphor occurs in a passage that is otherwise dominated by metonyms:  
Nor did the Delphine tripod bark it out,  
Nor yet Dodona.  
Its native ingenuity sufficed  
My self-taught diaphragm.553  
The ‘Delphine tripod’ and ‘Dodona’ denote seats of oracles but not the actual oracles at 
these seats; they are index metonyms, albeit somewhat clichéd. The expression ‘[to] bark it 
out’ is arguably so close to conventional colloquial English that is constitutes a borderline 
case between metaphorical cliché and ‘dead’ metaphor. However, the juxtaposition with 
the metonymic vehicle, an object instead of a living being, re-invigorates the felt degree of 
defamiliarisation: a tripod is said to be barking. Once again, humour arises from a 
terminological clash, here between metonymic cliché and metaphorical cliché. The comic 
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 Housman, Fragment of a Greek Tragedy, l. 13; cf. A. Agam. 494-495: μαρτυρεῖ δέ μοι κάσις | πηλοῦ 
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 Cf. the similar construction in the opening stanza of Keats’s poem The Eve of St Agnes: ‘And silent was the 
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 Housman, Fragment of a Greek Tragedy, ll. 43-46. 
240 
 
effect of the last two lines, on the other hand, is based on the collapse of a Greek metonym 
in translation:554 the effect works, because the cultural-lexical link of contiguity that exists in 
Greek poetic idiom between ‘diaphragm’ and ‘intelligence’ has no equivalent in English. In 
effect, the sentence does nothing other than state the cultural assumption (and recreate 
the lexical connection) that lies behind the term’s usage in Greek, namely that the seat of 
ingenuity is the diaphragm. The humour arises from the terminological clash that occurs 
between ‘ingenuity’ and ‘diaphragm’ – by virtue of the unfamiliarity of this collocation in 
English (but also, prospectively, from the reader’s knowledge of Greek poetic idiom and the 
issues of untranslatability arising from it).555 Likewise, Housman transplants other classical 
metonymic clichés, as in the chorus’s question, ‘Beneath a shining or a rainy Zeus?’,556 as 
well as grammatical metonymy and metonymy by association.  
 
Consider now this passage from Housman’s mock-stichomythia: 
Alcmaeon: A shepherd's questioned mouth informed me that –  
Chorus:  What? for I know not yet what you will say –  
Alcmaeon:  Nor will you ever, if you interrupt.  
Chorus: Proceed, and I will hold my speechless tongue.  
Alcmaeon: This house was Eriphyle's, no one else's.  
Chorus:  Nor did he shame his throat with shameful lies.  
Alcmaeon:  May I then enter, passing through the door?  
Chorus:  Go chase into the house a lucky foot557  
 
The first line contains a prime example of a forceful amplification metonym. The metonymic 
shift from the ‘shepherd’ to his ‘mouth’ may be unremarkable in itself; after all, the 
shepherd as the metonymic tenor is co-present in the genitive case. Yet as the participle 
‘questioned’, which semantically belongs to the implied subject (the ‘shepherd’), is affiliated 
with the grammatical subject (the metonymic vehicle ‘mouth’), this collocation breaches 
ordinary collocation rules. The amplification metonym is thus combined with a grammatical 
amplification metonym (‘questioned’ transferred from ‘shepherd’ to ‘mouth’) which creates 
the comic image of a conversational exchange between a speaker and just a mouth. The 
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 On the metonymic nature of the Greek terms φρἠν and πραπίς (both ‘diaphragm’, ‘midriff’) in Greek poetic 
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next defamiliarised sequence in this passage, ‘I hold my speechless tongue’, is taken by 
Marcellino as an instance of prolepsis, in which the adjective is applied to a noun in 
anticipation of the results of the action denoted by the verb.558 Surely, though, what we 
have here is grammatical amplification metonymy with the adjective ‘speechless’ 
transferred from the subject ‘I’ (which can literally be said to be speechless) to ‘tongue’. The 
expression, ‘[n]or did he shame his throat’ is likewise metonymic; in ordinary usage the verb 
‘to shame’ only takes persons as direct objects, and it is ultimately the speaker (rather than 
‘his throat’) which was not shamed with lies. Thus understood, ‘his throat’ constitutes a case 
of amplification metonymy, since the metonymic tenor is present in the genitive (‘his’). In 
the final line, the chorus encourages Alcmaeon to ‘chase a lucky foot’, a comic image which 
has him running after his own feet (which also constitutes number metonymy, since clearly 
both his feet are at issue). The adjective ‘lucky’ adds to the impression of deviation: either it 
can be taken as a grammatical amplification metonym (transferred from Alcmaeon, the 
implicit addressee of the imperative, whom the chorus wishes to be ‘lucky’) or else it 
prompts an index-metonymical reading of ‘foot’ as ‘run’ (the sequence being understood as 
‘have a successful run into the house’). Throughout the mock-stichomythia, not only is the 
humour heavily dependent on individual metonyms; there is also a cumulative effect of 
almost grotesque physicality from the constant focus on organs: mouth, tongue, throat, foot 
– all in the space of eight lines, and all arising from the metonymic usage of the terms 
involved. 
 
Tropological analysis of Schiller’s play likewise illuminates its inner workings. Overall, Die 
Braut seems to be particularly rich in two poetic devices, metonymy and figura etymologica. 
From a classical perspective, the latter might be thought to evoke the style of Homer or 
Plato rather than Greek tragedy.559 However, the distribution of the two devices is 
interesting. As the play moves on from the first tableau-like scenes and the dramatic action 
gathers pace and finally reaches its climax, the language becomes increasingly more direct, 
and tropical language usage is reduced – and it is here that we find the most dense 
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 See Marcellino 1953, 174. 
559
 In more general terms, Gerhard notes: ‘Auch gehen die Spracheigenheiten Schillers oft wohl eher auf 
Homer als auf die Tragödie zurück.‘ (‘The idiosyncrasies of Schiller’s idiom can be traced back to Homer rather 
than to tragedy.’ Gerhard 1919, 41). For a general discussion of figura etymologica in Greek and Latin 
literature, with copious examples from Plato, see McCartney 1927. Detailed discussions of figurae 
etymologicae in Homer are provided by Reece 1997 and Clary 2009. 
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deployment of figurae etymologicae.560 It is as though this figure is deployed to maintain 
‘Greek’ colouring when, for dramatic reasons, stylised, tropical speech becomes 
inappropriate. The strategy did not convince all critics: it is arguably this shift that lies 
behind the rather vague comment by Schiller’s contemporary Solger that in this play ‘the 
diction is Schillerian, but unfortunately it becomes increasingly flowery and grandiloquent, 
and therefore less antique’.561 In the rest of the play, metonymy is more prominent and 
more frequently used. The text is saturated with index metonyms,562 amplification 
metonyms,563 as well as metonyms by association.564 Needless to say, the play also contains 
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 Instances of figura etymologica also occur earlier on in the play, as at ll. 809-810: ‘Als eine Fürstin fürstlich 
will ich sie | Einführen in die Hofburg meiner Väter’ (‘I shall give her as noblewoman a noble entrance into my 
forefathers‘ castle’). The vast majority, however, can be found in the second half of the play and with 
increasing frequency as the play reaches its finale: ‘Entsetzt vernehm' ich das Entsetzliche‘ (‘Shocked I hear the 
shocking news’; l. 1588), ‘Der liebend nur um deine Liebe warb‘ (‘who but lovingly wooed for your love’; l. 
1817), ‘Der sich gesät die tödtliche Saat‘ (‘who has sown himself a deathly sowing’; l. 2004), ‘Bis er die 
tödtliche That nun gethan‘ (‘until he finally did the deadly deed’; l. 2016), ‘Die Traumkunst träumt, und alle 
Zeichen trügen‘ (‘the art of interpreting dreams is dreaming, and all signs are deceiving’; l. 2393), ‘Du leugnest 
der Sonne leuchtendes Licht‘ (‘You deny the sun’s shining shine’; l. 2395), ‘Lebe, wer's kann, ein Leben der 
Zerknirschung‘ (‘Live, who can, a life of contrition’; l. 2721),  ‘Aufblicken muß ich freudig zu den Frohen’ (‘I 
must happily look upward to the happy ones’; l. 2725),  ‘Er lebt in deinem Schmerz ein selig Leben,| Ich werde 
ewig todt sein bei den Todten.‘ (‘He lives a blissful life in your pain, I will forever be dead among the dead’; ll. 
2815-2816). 
561
 ‘Die Diction ist schillerisch, aber leider wird sie immer blumiger und schwülstiger, und also immer weniger 
antik.‘ Solger 1826, 110. 
562
 E.g. ‘Denn auch das Wort ist, das heilende, gut. | Aber treff' ich dich draußen im Freien, | Da mag der 
blutige Kampf sich erneuen, | Da erprobe das Eisen den Muth.‘ (‘For also the word, the healing one, is good. 
But if I meet you outside in the open, there the bloody fight might start again, there iron may test courage’, ll. 
166-171; the last three lines are immediately repeated at ll. 172-174), ‘Und jeder Fußtritt wandelt auf 
Zerstörung‘ (‘And every footstep wanders on destruction‘, l. 403), ‘Eine Schwester | Dacht' ich euch 
zuzuführen; doch ich selbst | Soll jetzt sie eurem Heldenarm verdanken‘ (‘I thought I would bring you a sister; 
yet now I shall owe her to your heroic arm ‚ ll. 1618-1620; similarly l. 1806), ‘Weh, weh mir! O, 
entsetzensvolles Licht!‘ (‘Woe, woe me! Alas, dreadful light!‘, l. 2246), ‘Wie mir das Herz gebietet, will ich 
reden‘ (‘As my heart commands me, so I shall speak’,  l. 2381), ‘Du, Bruder, rette dein geliebtes Haupt‘ (‘You, 
brother, save your beloved head‘, l. 2806; similarly l. 2674). 
563
 To give just two examples: ‘Denn mit der nächsten Morgensonne Strahl | Ist sie die Meine‘ (‘For with the 
ray of the next morning sun she will be mine‘, ll. 657-658) or ‘Diese Zypresse laßt uns zerschlagen | Mit der 
mörderischen Schneide der Axt‘ (‘With the murderous blade of the axe let us smash this cypress‘, ll. 1975-
1976). 
564
 Representative instances: ‘Dein ist die Krone, | Dein ist der Sieg!‘ (‘Yours is the crown, yours is the victory!’, 
ll. 1176-1177), ‘Und das goldene Scepter in stetiger Reihe | Wandert vom Ahnherrn zum Enkel hinab’ (‘And the 
golden sceptre wanders in a steady line from forefather to grandson’, ll. 1187-1888), ‘ihrer stillen Zuflucht sie 
entreißend, | Zurück an meine mütterliche Brust | Sie führt und in die brüderlichen Arme‘ (‘snatching her from 
her quiet refuge, leading her back to my maternal breast and into brotherly arms’, ll. 1389-1390), ‘Bezähme 
der Zunge verwegenes Toben!‘ (‘Restrain the tongue’s audacious raging‘, l. 2377; similarly l. 2380), ‘In neuen 
Kampf willst du zurück mich stürzen? | Das Licht der Sonne mir noch theurer machen | Auf meinem Wege zu 
der ew'gen Nacht?‘ (‘You wish to throw me into a new fight? Making the light of the sun dearer to me while I 




metaphors, but these are rarely striking or new.565 In fact, the more potent tropical 
elements of the play are often tropical clusters involving both metaphor and metonymy or 
metonyms of different types.566 What is especially interesting, however, is that Schiller, 
much like Humboldt in his translation of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, predominantly uses low-
level metonyms and metonymic clichés to create the desired ‘Hellenising’ impression, 
repeatedly employing expressions that simultaneously elevate the play’s tone and connect 
the play with the traditional poetic idiom of Greek tragedy.567  
 
Is such usage at all representative of the literary style of Weimar classicism, or indeed even 
of European classicism as a whole?568 Only a fuller investigation could answer such a 
question – but surely it is essential to conduct such analyses on a larger scale before one can 
countenance sweeping statements about the characteristic style of literary movements. A 
prime example of top-down criticism that forgoes such analysis is Jakobson’s claim that ‘it is 
generally realized that Romanticism is closely linked with metaphor, whereas the equally 
intimate ties of Realism and metonymy remained unnoticed’.569 The posited affinity 
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 ‘Ausgeleert hab' ich | Der Worte Köcher und erschöpft der Bitten Kraft‘ (‘I have emptied the quiver of 
words and exhausted the power of petitions’, ll. 439-440) – an interesting metaphor but modelled on Pi. O. 
2.83-85: πολλά μοι ὑπ᾽ ἀγκῶνος ὠκέα βέλη | ἔνδον ἐντι φαρέτρας φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσιν (‘I have many swift 
arrows under my arm in their quiver I that speak to those who understand’; trans. Race). 
566
 Examples range from combinations of fairly clichéd expressions to more complex images. Consider, for 
instance: index metonym followed by metaphor in ‘Manch Segel rettet sich in diese Buchten | Vor des Orkanes 
Wuth—Wo ist das Schiff?‘ (‘Many a sail found refuge in these bays from a hurricane’s wrath – where is the 
ship?, ll. 1594) and ‘So unterwerf' ich mich, wie kann ich's ändern? | Der unregiersam stärkern Götterhand, | 
Die meines Hauses Schicksal dunkel spinnt‘ (‘How could I change it? So I submit myself, to the unswayable, 
stronger hand of the gods, which weaves my house’s fate in darkness’, ll. 1557-1559); metaphor followed by 
amplification metonym in ‘Und jetzt liegst du, dem Staube vermählt, | Von des Brudermords Händen entseelt 
(‘And now you lie, married to the dust, killed by the hands of fratricide’); amplification metonym combined 
with metaphor in ‘Und unter eines Joches Eisenschwere | Bog er vereinend ihren starren Sinn‘ (‘He united their 
stubborn wills,  bending it under a yoke’s brazen weight‘, ll. 37-38); amplification metonym combined with 
grammatical amplification and followed by an index metonym in ‘In eines Gartens abgeschiedner Stille, | Der 
von der Neugier nicht betreten wird‘ (‘In the secluded silence of a garden, which curiosity never enters.‘ ll. 794-
795). 
567
 In addition to the relevant examples cited in the three notes above, Schiller uses number metonymy, for 
instance, ‘Aber das Schönste | Erlebt mein Auge‘ (‘But my eye experiences  the most beautiful thing‘, ll. 1207-
1287; see also 535 and 2112) or ‘Und des Meers rings umgebende Welle, | Sie verräth uns dem kühnen 
Corsaren‘ (‘And the wave of the sea surrounding us makes us known to the daring corsair’, ll. 217-218) as well 
as mythological metonyms such as ‘Nicht, wo die goldene Ceres lacht | Und der friedliche Pan, der 
Flurenbehüter, | Wo das Eisen wächst in der Berge Schacht, | Da entspringen der Erde Gebieter‘ (‘Not where 
golden Ceres laughs and peaceful Pan, protector of meadows, but where iron grows in the depths of 
mountains, that is where the lords of the earth come from’ ll. 223-227). 
568
 The case for such studies as essential to a comprehensive understanding of literary history (rather than 
mere cultural history) was convincingly made (over sixty years ago) by Wellek/Warren 1949, 174-185. 
569
 Jakobson 1956, 259. 
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between particular movements and individual tropes may, or may not, be true – but the 
only way to prove or disprove any such claim would be to evaluate metonymic occurrences 
in a representative set of realist texts and to contrast the results with a comparable 
Romantic set. The theory and the categories of metonymy worked out in this thesis are 
intended to facilitate such evaluations. 
 
An additional aim of our theorising has been to clarify the general understanding of the 
order of tropical space, that is, the relationships between the different tropes, as well as to 
reassess (post-)structuralist re-appropriations of tropology. The chief deficiency of earlier 
attempts to theorise metonymy has been their recurrent failure to formulate a single, 
unifying principle behind metonymy. As the Groupe μ correctly notes, ‘ancient rhetoric was 
unable to formulate a satisfactory definition of metonymy, the majority of treatises 
contenting themselves with enumerating different types’.570 Landfester explains that the 
underlying problem is structural: ‘metonymy is the trope with the most variants; these often 
come with their own names which prevent the recognition of the inner relatedness of these 
variants.’571  
 
We have approached this issue by revisiting the concept of ‘contiguity’, which, under 
various names and forms, has long been suggested as a potential principle of metonymy but 
has rarely found explicit discussion and concrete definition.572 In order to do justice to 
metonymy as a phenomenon of poetic language, we have redefined contiguity as lexical 
contiguity and drawn on semantic-field theory to define metonymy as, precisely, a shift 
within a semantic field. This definition has two special advantages: first, it allows us to 
explain metonymy in both its unity and its diversity; secondly, it allows us to establish the 
relationship of metonymy to metaphor and to explain the respective differences in their 
poetic effect. We have defined semantic fields (pragmatically) as consisting of the terms 
that are collocatable with a given term in ordinary usage. Our assessment of different forms 
of metonymy has indicated that the characteristic metonymic shift within a semantic field 
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 ‘[L]a rhétorique ancienne a été incapable de formuler une définition satisfaisante de la métonymie, la 
plupart des traités se contentant d’en énumérer les espèces.’ Groupe μ 1982, 117. 
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 ‘Die Metonymie ist der Tropus mit den meisten Formen; diese haben häufig eigene Namen, die verhindern, 
die innere Zusammengehörigkeit dieser Formen zu erkennen.‘Landfester 1997, 92. 
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 Cf. pertinently Allen 2008, 12. 
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can be realised in two ways: either explicitly, by the re-organisation, within a syntactic unit, 
of terms that are otherwise collocatable in ordinary usage (amplification metonymy, 
grammatical amplification metonymy); or implicitly, by the effective requirement to infer a 
term from the semantic field (index metonymy, grammatical index metonymy, metonymy 
by association). The principle of lexical contiguity thus enables us simultaneously (a) to 
demonstrate the intrinsic connectedness of a number of tropes (metonymy, enallage, 
synecdoche) through their shared structural principle and (b) to trace their differences in 
structure and effect to alternative grammatical realisations of the metonymic shift and to 
explicit or implicit action. Moreover, on this basis, we can also explain and assess the 
aesthetic impact of the various forms of metonymy, both relative to each other and to 
metaphor.  
 
If, with Shklovsky, we take defamiliarisation to be the hallmark of poeticity (or, more 
cautiously, of poetic language), then it follows that the more an expression deviates from 
ordinary usage, the greater its prospective poetic effect (in formal-aesthetic terms). 
Metonymy’s basis in pre-existing links established through ordinary usage necessarily limits 
its potential to deviate from ordinary usage. Our analyses suggest that where metonymy 
creates significant effects, these are rarely caused by the primary effect of the metonymic 
shift itself, but instead stem from the interaction of the metonym with its context. It is on 
this interface that terminological interaction occurs. In metaphor, on the other hand, the 
underlying principle of analogy and similarity calls forth extraneous terminology and a 
terminological clash within the trope itself, prior and in addition to further terminological 
interaction with the context. It is for these structural reasons that metaphor’s potential to 
create startling terminological juxtapositions is higher than metonymy’s. The fact that 
metonymy has received so little scholarly attention and is so frequently dismissed as a 
‘lesser form of metaphor’ is surely a consequence of its basis in lexis rather than logic – 
which fails to excite critics trained in Aristotelian rationalism or in (neo-)Romantic 
aesthetics.573  
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 Despite their fundamental differences, both these major traditions of Western criticism share an admiration 
for the analogy principle at the heart of metaphor. While Aristotle made this explicit in a famous passage in his 
Poetics (Arist. Poet. 1459a5-8), more recent scholars have argued (along Jakobsonian lines) that ‘[a]nalogical 
thinking was dear to Hölderlin … and to the Romantic writers generally; it was their characteristic mode of 
thought’ (Louth 1998, 3); see also Abrams 1953, 47-69. In any case, our argument is surely more to the point 
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Explaining how metonymy came to be ‘the forgotten trope’ is important. More important, 
however, is that our proposed understanding of metonymy as based on lexical contiguity 
allows us to vindicate Jakobson’s proposition of a bipolar model of the tropical space and to 
substantiate his claim with reference to concrete, literary material. As we have sought to 
demonstrate, metaphor’s underlying principle of similarity or analogy is intrinsically verb-
centred, since it is actions or states which are being compared, whereas metonymy’s 
underlying principle of lexical contiguity is intrinsically noun-based, since (for linguistic 
reasons) nouns create stronger links with other nouns through ordinary collocation and 
thereby determine all metonymy’s variants. Metaphor and metonymy are thus indeed 
shown to be two distinct and independent forms of tropical language; furthermore, they are 
the two essential forms of tropical language under which other, supposedly separate, tropes 
should be subsumed. 
 
While our findings thus corroborate Jakobson’s understanding of the bipolar order of the 
tropical space, they also cast a new light on structuralist re-appropriations of tropology in 
the wake of his influential discussions. Although the transfer of metonymy from poetics to 
semiotics took place prior to any comprehensive theoretical understanding of metonymy as 
a literary phenomenon, these (‘metaphorical’) applications of the term ‘metonymy’ can now 
(we suggest) be scrutinised from a better informed perspective.574 Two studies, by De Man 
and Lodge, which were instrumental in popularising Jakobson’s structuralist tropology 
within the field of literature, may serve as illustrations.575  
 
In Allegories of Reading De Man presents his reflections as a ‘theory of reading’, based on 
consideration of Rilke, Proust, Nietzsche and Rousseau; and ‘[w]hat emerges is a process of 
reading in which rhetoric is a disruptive intertwining of trope and persuasion or ... of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
than the alleged lack of a specific critical language necessary to discuss metonymy (so Jakobson 1956, 258) or 
the self-contradictory assertion that easily decipherable ‘metonyms’ frequently occur in ordinary language 
(see Martin 1993, 783); the notion that ‘metonymies are common in ordinary usage’ (ibid.) is in itself 
nonsensical: whatever is common in ordinary usage is by definition not tropical and therefore a fortiori not 
pertinent to an understanding of the trope metonymy. 
574
 Earlier critiques of Jakobson-inspired studies lack this basis and are often witnesses to the twentieth-
century ‘theory wars’ in literary studies rather than detailed discussions of underlying presuppositions and 
lines of argument; see, for instance, Vickers 1988, 464-467, and Fowler 1990, 110-111. 
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 De Man 1979 and Lodge 1977. 
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cognitive and performative language.’576 Many of De Man’s central lines of argument here 
are intimately connected with the premises of ‘deconstruction’,577 and this cannot be the 
place to engage with such large reconsiderations of language, rhetoric and poetics. An issue 
worth raising, however, is De Man’s use of the terms ‘metaphor’ and ‘metonymy’. After all, 
even if both are given a much wider signification than ours and are used within a radically 
different theoretical framework, we are sure to find statements on their relatedness which 
can be compared and contrasted with the results of our own inquiry into their relationship.  
 
No matter how far-reaching his general redefinition of tropology in literary analysis, De 
Man’s fundamental understanding of tropes is based on the traditional (and outdated) 
notion of ‘substitution’.578 This leads to difficulties within his arguments which are 
exacerbated further by his persistent blurriness regarding the relationship of the ‘substitute’ 
and ‘substituted’ in metonymy. His remarks on synecdoche exemplify the problem. De Man 
appeals to synecdoche in two of his readings, and in both cases he associates it with 
metaphor. The first mention of synecdoche occurs in a discussion of the rhetorical question, 
with reference to a passage from Yeats’s poem ‘Among School Children’: 
O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer, 
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole? 
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,  
How can we know the dancer from the dance?579 
De Man comments: ‘one finds powerful and consecrated images of contiguity from part to 
the whole that makes synecdoche into the most seductive of metaphors: the organic beauty 
of the tree, stated in the parallel syntax of a similar rhetorical question, or the convergence, 
in the dance, of erotic desire with musical form.’580 While De Man’s main interest in the 
poem is the way it lends itself to a metapoetic, semiotic reading, his prima facie assessment 
of the technicalities of the passage (after all, the basis of his subsequent reflections)581 is 
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 Both quotations from De Man 1979, ix. 
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 As explicitly acknowledged in the preface; see De Man 1979, x. 
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 Many remarks throughout the book make this obvious. Thus e.g.: ‘All rhetorical structures, whether we call 
them metaphor, metonymy, chiasmus, metalepsis, hypallagus, or whatever, are based on substitutive 
reversals’ (De Man 1979, 113) and ‘Neither are we helpless when confronted with figures of speech: as long as 
we can distinguish between literal and figural meaning, we can translate the figure back to its proper referent’ 
(De Man 1979, 201). 
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 As cited by De Man 1979, 11. 
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 De Man 1979, 11. 
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 See De Man 1979, 11-13. 
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deeply problematic. Certainly, the two pairs of lines constitute rhetorical questions, but how 
far is his appeal to contiguity, synecdoche and metaphor legitimate? There is a ‘contiguous’ 
relationship between (on the one hand) the tree and its parts as well as (on the other) 
between body, music, dancer and dance – regardless of whether we understand this 
contiguity in conceptual or lexical terms. There is, however, no overt deviance from ordinary 
usage in these lines. The rhetorical question as such articulates a statement that conflicts 
with referential language in its most narrow definition as representational language that 
reproduces empirical reality in the code of linguistic signs. Nevertheless, the use of the 
individual terms does not conflict with ordinary usage: each term denotes what it denotes in 
common parlance.  
 
What these lines do, from a terminological perspective, is in fact proto-tropological: they 
unfold two semantic fields, enumerating terms which are linked by lexical contiguity and 
therefore have the potential to be used in metonymic expressions. It is only the parallelism 
of the rhetorical questions which prompts the thought that the individual terms might refer 
to the same signified. One might argue that the parallelism of the two paired lines, each 
comprising of apostrophe marked by ‘O’ followed by a rhetorical question, suggests an 
implicit analogy between the two rhetorical questions. On this basis, the four lines are (we 
must conclude) metaphorical by association as they conjure up, in this combination, the 
image of the chestnut tree swaying its leaves and blossoms in the wind like a dancer’s body 
swaying to music. It is, in other words, not the ‘contiguity of images’ that ‘makes 
synecdoche into the most seductive form of metaphor’ – the ‘images’ merely co-occur 
jointly here. It is the parallel syntactic structure of the lines which confers an impression of 
metaphor onto this sequence, and the ‘seductiveness’ results precisely from the absence of 
any felt abrasiveness (which would prompt a restructuring of the sequence or the inference 
of a term in order to make sense of the sequence). A metaphorical reading is merely 
suggested and arises as an additional layer, a further possible reading. And what De Man’s 
discussion of this passage shows, incidentally, is that appeal to synecdoche hardly 
illuminates the passage or his own argument. After all, is the ‘dancer’ really a ‘part’ of the 




Such confusions multiply as the discussion progresses. De Man cites a passage from Proust’s 
A la recherche du temps perdu, acknowledges the occurrence of concrete metaphors in the 
passage, then focuses on its ‘metafigural’ aspect and claims that a 
preference is expressed by means of a distinction that corresponds to the 
difference between metaphor and metonymy, necessity and chance being a 
legitimate way to distinguish between analogy and contiguity. The inference of 
identity and totality that is constitutive of metaphor is lacking in the purely 
relational metonymic contact: an element of truth is involved in taking Achilles 
for a lion but none in taking Mr Ford for a motor car.582 
The association of metaphor/analogy with ‘necessity’ and of metonymy/contiguity with 
‘chance’ is fraught with difficulties. From the perspective developed in this thesis, we can 
agree that there is a logical element to metaphor which can be (more or less) compelling, 
whereas metonymy is rooted in pragmatic collocations of ordinary language, but the radical 
opposition of ‘necessity’ and ‘chance’ adds nothing but obfuscation.583  
 
A more serious inconsistency here arises from the fact that if ‘identity’ and ‘totality’ are 
inferred because an actual inference is required to make sense of a sequence, then this is 
equally true for both metaphor and metonymy (or, to be precise, for certain variant forms 
of both tropes).584 The association of ‘truth’ with the logic of analogy is also problematic, 
considering that metaphors not only ‘reveal’ ‘truths’ by exploiting analogies but also suggest 
and create analogies. But unsustainable as De Man’s claims may be, they are certainly 
consistent with the pervasive neo-Romantic privileging of analogy over lexicon. From there, 
it is only a small step to denying metonymy its status as a trope altogether: ‘the superiority 
of the “symbolic” metaphor over the “literal”, prosaic, metonymy is reasserted in terms of 
chance and necessity.’585 Rather: our explanation of metonymy as rooted in semantic fields, 
established through collocation in ordinary usage, explains why metonymy is associated (by 
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 Inter alia, the semantic fields of any language at any given time are a necessary given for the individual 
speaker – regardless of how arbitrary the circumstances of their historical emergence may be. 
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 De Man himself would seem to admit this much when he writes a few pages later: ‘The crossing of sensory 
attributes in synaesthesia is only a special case of a more general pattern of substitution [sic] that all tropes 
have in common. It is the result of an exchange of properties made possible by a proximity or an analogy so 
close and intimate that it allows the one to substitute for the other without revealing the difference 
necessarily induced by the substitution. The relational link between the two entities involved in the exchange 
then becomes so strong that it can be called necessary’ (De Man 1979, 62; our italics). 
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 De Man 1979, 70. 
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De Man and many others) with ‘prose’ and at the same time clearly recognised as a trope – 
a problematic conjunction that haunts many structuralist studies. 
 
In De Man’s case, one outcome is the misleading association of synecdoche with metaphor, 
which he elaborates in some detail. Citing another passage from Proust that includes the 
metaphorical expressions ‘the flies executing their little concert, the chamber music of 
summer’,586 De Man argues:  
The relational link between the two entities involved in the exchange then 
becomes so strong that it can be called necessary: there could be no summer 
without flies, no flies without summer. The ‘necessary link’ that unites flies and 
summer is natural, genetic, unbreakable; although the flies are only one minute 
part of the total event designated by ‘summer’, they nevertheless partake of its 
most specific and total essence. The synecdoche that substitutes part for whole 
and whole for part is in fact a metaphor, powerful enough to transform a 
temporal contiguity into an infinite duration … Compared to this compelling 
coherence, the contingency of metonymy based on only the casual encounter of 
two entities that could very well exist in each other’s absence would be entirely 
devoid of poetic power … [Metonymy] may be able to stimulate memory in a 
mechanical way, but fails to lead to the totalizing stability of metaphorical 
processes. If metonymy is distinguished from metaphor in terms of necessity 
and contingency (an interpretation of the term that is not illegitimate), then 
metonymy is per definition unable to create genuine links …587 
One might perhaps be willing to accept (however grudgingly) De Man’s ‘scandalously loose 
and slippery’588 notions of metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche as specific to his reading 
of this passage in Proust and grant that, terminological infelicities aside, his remarks have 
their own merit as aids to interpreting the texts under discussion. But his further comments 
in a footnote to this passage make clear that he considers that these thoughts have a more 
general bearing:  
Classical rhetoric generally classifies synecdoche as metonymy, which leads to 
difficulties characteristic of all attempts at establishing a taxonomy of tropes; 
tropes are transformational systems rather than grids. The relationship between 
part and whole can be understood metaphorically, as is the case, for example, in 
the organic metaphors dear to Goethe. Synecdoche is one of the borderline 
figures that create an ambivalent zone between metaphor and metonymy and 
that, by its spatial nature, creates the illusion of a synthesis by totalization. 589 
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What we have here is ultimately a projection of De Man’s individual associative readings 
back onto the primary, rhetorical arena. His remarks on a text’s ‘metafigural’ dimension lead 
him to redefine ‘figures’ (sc. tropes). Of course, structuralism is based precisely on the 
premise that comparable structures occur on the various levels of verbal expression as well 
as in non-linguistic discourse. However, the comparability of structures can only ever be 
validly assumed if it is supported by analyses on each level (or in each discourse) in its own 
right. Where reflections on one such order are pitched against others without empirical 
validation, the fundamental comparability of structures is no longer an intrinsic given but an 
externally imposed perspective. In this particular case, our structural analysis of synecdoche 
and metonymy as they occur in poem after poem, passage after passage, points in the exact 
opposite direction to De Man’s.  
 
Although Lodge’s contribution to Jakobson-inspired literary scholarship is far less 
controversial than De Man’s, one nevertheless soon encounters similar paradoxes. Lodge 
explains that his objective is to reconsider ‘some fundamental questions of literary theory 
and critical practice’ and to develop ‘a comprehensive typology of literary discourse … 
capable of describing and discriminating between all types of text without prejudice’ by 
exploring ‘a theory of language upon which such a typology may be based – Roman 
Jakobson’s distinction between metaphor and metonymy’.590 Writing in the 1970s, Lodge 
can be credited with (and it is one of his main concerns) mediating new critical approaches 
developed in Russian, Czech and French literary theory to an initially less-than-receptive 
audience in the world of Anglo-Saxon scholarship. The more specific problem he addresses 
is the question of how to come to terms with ‘realism’, and in particular with the ‘realistic 
novel’, within the framework of essentially formalist criticism.  
 
The most fundamental tenet of formalism (certainly in its Russian heartland) is its 
characterisation of literature as art based on defamiliarised language. Realism, however, 
defies this definition: it defines itself precisely through its closeness to ordinary, familiar 
language and aims at concealing its artificiality. If realist literature neither requires 
suspension of disbelief (criterion of fictionality) nor contains literary devices (criterion of 
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stylisation), how can it be understood as ‘literature’ from a formalist perspective?591 Lodge 
points out that texts centred on realist aesthetics nevertheless remain representations of 
reality and that ‘[f]or obvious reasons, a verbal text can never be mistaken for the reality it 
refers to, as an object of visual or plastic art may be mistaken. Writing cannot imitate reality 
directly (as a film, for instance, can)’.592 Because the realist text is representational, it is 
bound to be partial, foregrounding certain aspects over others (through new perspectives, 
alternative view-points, leitmotifs and so on).593 This is the point at which Lodge invokes 
Jakobson, who had postulated (without much explanation) intrinsic connections between 
metaphor, symbolism and poetry, as between metonymy, realism and prose.594 Based on 
Jakobson’s association of metaphor with the ‘selection’ axis of language and metonymy with 
the ‘combination’ axis of language, Lodge views metonymy as the result of an omission of 
elements from an extended version of a kernel sentence.595 Realist literature is deemed to 
be ‘metonymic’ because individual elements are chosen over others, which are omitted, and 
because the text as a whole represents ‘a slice of life as it is’ but remains recognisable as a 
‘slice’ of a larger totality which it thus invokes.596 Lodge contrasts this with another ‘type’ of 
literature which operates in the ‘metaphorical’ mode and is understood as referring to the 
totality of reality not by representing it selectively but by implying that its discourse relates 
to it by way of analogy.597 Moreover, in addition to the way a text relates to referential 
reality, the way its internal progress is structured is also understood in terms of ‘metaphor’ 
and ‘metonymy’. Lodge now appeals directly to Jakobson’s notion that prose is ‘forwarded 
essentially by contiguity’598 and claims that linearity of progress is characteristic of prose 
(and ‘metonymic’, since it establishes a ‘contiguous’ line of one thing after the other), 
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whereas poetry establishes relations of similarity between elements through its formal rules 
(metre, rhyme, stanza, and so on) and is therefore ‘metaphorical’.599   
 
Lodge’s answer to the problem realism poses for formalist criticism entails serious 
complications. First, his notion of ‘metonymic’ and ‘metaphoric’ modes of writing suggests 
that both are options available on the same level. Yet, on reflection, it is clear that the 
selectiveness ascribed to metonymy is an unavoidable consequence of the representational 
nature of all verbal expression, whereas the presence of an element of analogy is specific 
only to certain verbal expressions. In other words, in one case we are dealing with the fact 
that something is represented (and is therefore inevitably selective: ‘metonymic’), in the 
other with how something is represented (by analogy: ‘metaphorical’). Lodge himself shows 
some awareness of these complications when he writes:  
if we interpret the formula … to mean simply that contiguity, or context, controls 
the field of selection, then we have nothing more than a simple description of 
the way ordinary referential discourse works. This is in fact what we might 
expect, since literature written in the metonymic mode tends to disguise itself as 
nonliterature. 600 
Once more we note the recurring tendency to deny metonymy its status as a trope. Lodge 
tries to get round this awkwardness by arguing that ‘metonymic’ texts are characterised by 
a ‘systematic internal foregrounding’601 and that 
[w]riting that emphasizes the differences between things in the world … will 
tend to operate mainly along the axis of combination or contiguity … This way of 
representing reality can be rhetorically heightened by metonymic devices which 
delete or rearrange contiguous items, and this is the method of realism …602 
Yet this does not resolve the problem but only reformulates it: ‘metaphoric texts’ are still 
seen as different in kind from ordinary, non-literary texts, ‘metonymic texts’ as different in 
degree. It is (to say the least) hard to reconcile this essentially a priori notion of the 
relationship between ‘metaphor’ and ‘metonymy’ with the results yielded by our analysis. 
 
In any case, it remains doubtful what, if anything, is gained by appealing to ‘metaphor’ and 
‘metonymy’ in this way and whether in particular it adds to the precision of our critical 
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apparatus. When Romeo and Juliet argue about whether they heard a lark or a 
nightingale,603 they have not suddenly discovered an ornithological interest: what is at issue 
is whether it is still evening or already morning, and although their conversation makes 
perfect sense on a literal level, the birds evoke these times of day through metonymic 
association. This is different in kind from the chorus’s assertion in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon 
that Helen had ‘bequeathed to her people the clang of shields and spears’.604 The difference 
lies in the fact that in the Shakespeare the sequence makes sense when taken literally but 
does not pertain to what really is at issue, whereas in the Aeschylus everything, if taken 
literally, is both comprehensible and pertinent to what is at issue. Lodge and many other 
scholars regularly refer to instances of both kinds as ‘synecdochic details’,605 but, again, one 
might ask: given the constraints of selectivity that apply to all representation in verbal 
expression, can any element of a text ever not be a detail? and can any detail ever not be 
‘synecdochic’? It is questionable whether our ability to describe and analyse literary texts 
gains from this radically extended use of rhetorical terms. Yet even if one is prepared to go 
along with this mode of commentary, it must be granted that the terminology used blurs 
the lines between stylistic analysis on the level of poetic idiom and criticism on the level of 
compositional structure. The outcome is such paradoxical statements as: 
the opening of A passage to India is not ‘poetic’ prose. It is metonymic writing, 
not metaphoric, even though it contains a few metaphors and no metonymies; it 
is metonymic in structure, connecting topics on the basis of contiguity not 
similarity.606  
 
Such a passage demonstrates that Lodge’s comments on the text’s structure are entirely 
dissociated from tropological-stylistic analysis. It thereby disproves Mosher’s view that ‘New 
Criticism, though somewhat maligned of late, is protean and survives apparently either by 
changing its name – literary stylistics, explication du texte, Structuralism – or by changing its 
language.’607 Quite the contrary: Lodge’s paradoxical claims suggest that structural analysis 
and stylistic criticism are actually incompatible, or only tortuously relatable. Whatever else, 
and regardless of the merit or validity of such structuralist analyses in their own right 
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(questionable though some may be), clarity of argument cannot be achieved by this use of 
critical terminology.  
 
The ensuing obscurity and lack of precision we have diagnosed here also affect other parts 
of Lodge’s discussion, for instance his reading of Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man. Lodge argues that  
in accord with the development of Stephen’s romantic, egocentric and literary 
sensibility, the prose becomes more “poetic”: metaphor is overt, and the 
progress of the syntagm is deliberately impeded by repetition of key words and 
elaborate rhythmical patterning … for example … ‘Her bosom was as a bird’s soft 
and slight, slight and soft as the breast of some darkplumaged dove. But her 
long hair was girlish: and girlish, and touched with the wonder of mortal beauty, 
her face.’608 
One notes immediately that the cited passage does not display a single metaphor – but two 
similes (as well as chiasmic sentence structure). Of course, if ‘metaphor’ is equated with all 
structures based on analogy, the distinction between simile (which explicitly states an 
analogy) and metaphor (which implies it) becomes irrelevant. However, this distinction is 
fundamental to metaphor, and if it becomes irrelevant for the purpose of structural 
analysis, then why not appeal directly to analogy in the first place? At the same time one 
wonders whether it could not be argued that the repetition of key words in the Joyce 
emphasises precisely the continuity of the movement in the passage from one element to 
the next – which would in that sense make it ‘metonymic’ rather than ‘metaphorical’. 
 
To avoid any misunderstanding: our critique is not meant to suggest that every appeal to 
metonymy or metaphor beyond stylistic analysis is illegitimate. Lodge himself, as a novelist, 
offers a more compelling application of the terms. When English literature lecturer Robyn 
tries to explain to engineer Vic the intricacies of structuralist semiotics in Lodge’s comic 
novel Nice Work, she refers to two different types of cigarette advertisements.609 The brand 
‘Silk Cut’, she explains, operates on the basis of metaphor: 
silk has nothing to do with tobacco. It's a metaphor, a metaphor that means 
something like, ‘smooth as silk’. Somebody in an advertising agency dreamt up 
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the name ‘Silk Cut’ to suggest a cigarette that wouldn't give you a sore throat or 
a hacking cough or lung cancer.610 
The advertisements for ‘Marlboro’ cigarettes, depicting a cowboy smoking in the great 
outdoors, on the other hand, are described as metonymic: 
The Marlboro ad ... establishes a metonymic connection – completely spurious 
of course, but realistically plausible – between smoking that particular brand and 
the healthy, heroic, outdoor life of the cowboy. Buy the cigarette and you buy 
the lifestyle, or the fantasy of living it.611 
It is important to point out that what is described in the metonymy example is the 
advertising strategy rather than the advertisement itself: the image of a smoking cowboy 
can hardly be deemed ‘tropical’ (and thus defamiliarising) in any meaningful way. What 
happens is that the advertisement creates a link of contiguity which is then ‘metonymically’ 
exploited. By repeatedly collocating the image of the cowboy with a particular brand of 
cigarettes on suitable visual sites, the cigarette acquires the potential to evoke the cowboy 
and his lifestyle ‘metonymically’. This example of metonymy as an advertising strategy is 
particularly interesting because it shows that the principle of collocation in ordinary usage 
(or ordinary experience) is transferable to other media. One of the familiar charges levelled 
against structuralism is that its suggestion that ‘everything is text’ makes it blind to the 
specific idiosyncrasies of different media.612 Our efforts to determine concretely what 
‘contiguity’ means in a literary context have led us from the theory of semantic fields to the 
principle of collocation in ordinary usage. It would, no doubt, be worthwhile to attempt to 
determine the media-specific expression of ‘contiguity’ in other arts, such as photography, 
film and drama. If all art forms can indeed be understood as semiotic systems, it should be 
possible to find equivalents to ordinary language collocation and to probe whether there, 
too, deviance from the ordinary collocation can take the form of an explicit or implicit 
metonymic shift based on such ordinary collocations. 
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Instead of concerning themselves with the specificities of particular media, however, let 
alone with comparative scrutiny of more than one, the majority of Jakobson-inspired 
scholars have adopted his top-down approach. Following Jakobson’s association of 
‘metaphorical’ with ‘similarity’, ‘selection’, ‘paradigm’, and ‘metonymy’ with ‘contiguity’, 
‘combination’, ‘syntagm’,613 structuralist studies tend simply to appeal to these notions as 
guarantors of a structural comparability of phenomena in different media and discourses. In 
consequence, they often arrive at hugely disparate conclusions. Take, for instance, two 
contrasting studies of metonymic and metaphorical structures in drama, by Dévényi and 
Osterwalder, both of whom accurately reproduce Jakobson’s lines of argument and terms of 
reference.614 On this basis, Dévényi calls plays ‘metonymic’ if they can be seen as a 
dramaturgical expression of an experience through a foregrounded fragment, whereas plays 
are deemed to be ‘metaphorical’ if they aim at dramaturgical presentation of an experience 
in its entirety.615 Osterwalder, on the other hand, suggests that ‘[e]very type of parallelism 
in the structure of a play is metaphoric’, whereas ‘[i]n a purely metonymic play the 
complete absence of structure, of an inner organizing design behind the outward action, 
would be the most striking characteristic’.616 Neither of them asks what ‘contiguity’, as the 
structural principle of metonymy, might mean in the context of dramaturgy. 
 
Dévényi’s study also illustrates once more the undesirable terminological blurriness we have 
observed in Lodge when she writes that 
[m]etaphor … is dear to Homer … He employs metaphor as the principle of 
narrative representation (Achilles’ revenge precipitates further violence just as it 
does in the cultural framework of Homer’s time) even if his descriptive terms are 
often metonymic (e.g., Nausikaa of the white arms or Hektor of the shining 
helmet).617 
Not only are Dévényi’s particular applications of ‘metaphor’ and ‘metonymy’ wholly 
unconvincing; the deployment of parallel critical terms (metaphor and metonymy) on 
different and unrelated levels (referential reality and poetic idiom) is surely unhelpful; and 
the resulting opacity is aggravated further by the fact that Jakobson himself had associated 
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the entire epic genre as such with metonymy.618 Worse still: Dévényi asserts that ‘whether 
dramatic or not, I consider metonymic structures just as poetic as metaphoric structure. As 
an artistic strategy, metonymy can be as powerful as metaphor can be’619 – in diametrical 
opposition to the demonstrable and explicable difference in degree between the poetic 
potency of metaphor and metonymy as literary tropes.620 
 
A more detailed discussion would be needed to do justice to either of these studies, but also 
to demonstrate their inadequacy in terms of the theory of metonymy put forward in this 
thesis. Yet what emerges, even after such a brief comparison, is the astonishing diversity of 
definitions of ‘metonymy’, implicit or explicit, in studies that invoke ‘metonymy’ as a 
structural principle. To put it bluntly: while it is just possible to formulate a general principle 
behind the traditional stock examples given for metonymy in ancient rhetorical treatises, it 
is often virtually impossible to deduce any one structural principle from a set of structuralist 
studies that appeal to it;621 and, to make it worse, most do not even feel the need to make 
their own definition of metonymy explicit – owing to the term’s wide-spread use in 
contemporary critical literature.  
 
It is true that metaphor has an important heuristic function in the creation of knowledge, 
and (to restate the point) our critique here is far from implying that ‘metonymy’ cannot or 
should not be used ‘metaphorically’ as an analytical tool to describe underlying structures. 
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The potential benefit of such technical metaphors, however, lies in the fact that they enable 
us to address what is new, unfamiliar and opaque through a framework of familiar, well-
defined and well-understood terms and concepts.622 As soon as one employs a technical 
metaphor that draws on an ill-defined term, any hermeneutic benefit vanishes. It would 
seem that the fate of metonymy in many of its structuralist re-appropriations has been 
shaped not only by Jakobson’s free associations in his seminal essay, but also by his teacher 
Peškovsky’s dictum, cited approvingly by Jakobson: ‘Let’s not quibble about terminology ... 
You may even call it “Ivan Ivanovich” so long as we all know what you mean’.623 While some 
structuralist studies may well make illuminating observations about their respective objects 
by elaborating patterns then referred to as ‘metonymic’, significant problems at once arise 
for interdisciplinary dialogue and criticism. The central purpose and objective of the 
‘semiotic turn’ (with its focus on structures that transcend any one medium, culture, 
language or form of expression) is seriously undermined by this lack of consistency and 
clarity regarding one of its fundamental points of reference: metonymy. Our brief discussion 
of just a few representative cases illustrates how easily a sensible-sounding appeal to 
metonymy achieves nothing but confusion in the event.  
 
Metonymy may not embody the logical break-through or the terminological ‘sparkle’ of 
metaphor, but its greater subtlety and closer connection to ordinary usage make for a 
strikingly frequent employment in literary texts and a stylistic impact that is far from 
negligible. Whether in stylistic analysis or in structuralist studies, we need a sound 
understanding of this forgotten trope before we can appeal to it – literally or even 
‘metaphorically’. 
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‘Speaking Organs’ –  Tropology, Intellectual History and Literary Lexicography 
Outside literary studies, a distinct awareness of the implications and idiosyncrasies of 
literary language is probably nowhere needed more, and yet probably nowhere less often 
seriously considered, than in the field of intellectual history. The inextricable 
interdependency of thought and language remains a notoriously unresolved battlefield in 
the philosophy of mind. Following the general principle that ‘[i]t would be methodologically 
fatal to consider the correlation of systems without taking into account the immanent laws 
of each system,’624 it is advisable to strive for as much clarity as possible over the 
constitutive elements, that is, language and thought in their own right, before jumping to 
conclusions about the nature of their relatedness or even to inductive statements about 
one, based on observations derived from the other. In Hellenic studies, the problematics are 
exemplified by the controversy over ‘speaking organs’ in Homer and other early poets. 
Although this thesis is not concerned with language as conceptual content but with non-
ordinary, poetic usage, ‘speaking organs’ seems, on the face of it, to involve an unexpected, 
initially startling combination of words. In what follows, we shall approach this topic from a 
tropological viewpoint in an attempt to demonstrate how a proper understanding of literary 
language is a methodological prerequisite for large-scale cultural studies that use literary 
texts as evidence.  
 
The starting point of the debate is the manifold instances in the Homeric epics and hymns 
(Jahn counts 1464 of them625) in which an ‘organ’ – ἦτορ, θυμός, κῆρ, κραδίη, πραπίδες or 
φρήν/φρένες – ‘acts’ like a person and appears to ‘speak’: they bid, ask, demand, shout or 
the like. The inverted commas already indicate that it is questionable whether these alleged 
‘organs’ are actual organs and whether their ‘speaking’ is actual speaking. In his influential 
work The Discovery of the Mind (1946), Bruno Snell took Homer’s words at face value. 
Following his larger narrative of ‘man’s gradual understanding of himself’626 and as part of 
his argument that ‘Homeric man’ had no concept of the self as one single, unified, self-
conscious entity, Snell argued that these organ-speech passages show a ‘conflict between 
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separate and autonomous entities instead: the person is in conflict with an actual thing or 
organ that he believes to be inside of him and which, like a separate person, can argue with 
him.’627 It is beyond our concern to discuss the precise nature of Homer’s mental concepts 
themselves and whether or how they embody a psychological conceptualisation of man that 
is different from ours.628 We limit ourselves to the literary-linguistic, or terminological, side 
of the argument. To make our discussion of this complex matter more manageable, we shall 
artificially separate two sets of questions that are, in practice, intrinsically connected: (a) 
does a given expression consist of primary denotative language or not? and if not, is its 
secondary status logically one of metaphor or metonymy? (b) does that expression deviate 
from ordinary usage or not? – i.e., if metonymic, is it ‘live’ metonymy, metonymic cliché or 
‘dead’ metonymy? That is to say, initially we foreground the way these organ terms are 
structured in their respective contexts and only then move on to assess their aesthetic 
status. It goes without saying that those concluding remarks are pertinent to the entire 
argument and retrospectively re-frame it. 
 
In its own way, Snell’s study is also concerned with matters of terminology. His analysis of 
the Homeric terms for ‘seeing’, the ‘body’ and the ‘mind’ underscores the importance of 
developing an understanding of individual Greek words from the contexts and syntactical 
constellations in which they occur, rather than seeking straightforward one-to-one 
translations which force Greek terms into a fallacious equivalence with our own idiom and 
concepts.629 While this is methodologically commendable in itself, Snell’s work and that of 
his followers also shows that this conscientiousness in the reconstruction of meaning comes 
with the risk of moving from critical distance and open-mindedness to the fallacy of a 
constant, literalistic, cultural-historical lectio difficilior. The fact is that a general 
presupposition of antiquity’s radical otherness (unless independently demonstrated) is no 
less simplistic, and no less distorting of our view of the past, than the projection of modern 
concepts and terms onto ancient texts.630 Snell’s reading of Homer is absolutely literalistic, 
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at least with regard to the ‘speaking organs’: when Homer formulaically says ἀλλὰ τίη μοι 
ταῦτα διελέξατο θυμός; (‘but why does my θυμός tell me that?’) then, according to Snell, 
this refers literally to an autonomous organ in actual discourse with a person, and what is 
more, it means that this represents how man was generally seen in Homer’s age: a ‘loose 
confederation of quasi-autonomous limbs and organs.’631 Snell’s literalistic understanding of 
these ‘organs’ in Homer and in early Greek lyric poetry, however, can easily be challenged 
by an assessment of the tropical status of the linguistic usage in such cases. 
 
At one point, Snell seems to distance himself from a physical understanding of these ‘organs 
of will’, and in two passages comes relatively close to a tropological perspective. This is the 
first: 
 As soon as we attempt to describe the mental concepts of Homer by means of 
the catchwords ‘organ’ and ‘function’ we are bound to encounter terminological 
difficulties such as always arise for anyone who wishes to reproduce foreign 
idioms and peculiarities within the terms of his own tongue. If I say that the 
thymos is a mental organ, that it is the organ of a psychic process, I find myself 
caught in phrases which contain a contradiction in terms, for in our eyes the idea 
of a soul and of an organ are incompatible. To express myself accurately I should 
have to say: what we interpret as the soul, Homeric man splits up into three 
components each of which he defines by analogy of physical organs. … The 
metaphoric use of words for organs which may be interpreted as abstraction, 
has its place on the most primitive level of speech, for it is precisely on that level 
that the organ is regarded, not as dead and concrete, but as participating in its 
function. 632 
 
‘Mental organ’ may indeed be ‘a contradiction in terms’ in the contemporary prose of 
medical or psychological journals; in ancient and modern poetry, however, ‘terminological 
difficulties’ such as physical ‘organ’ clashing with immaterial ‘mental’, are unproblematic, as 
indeed (prospectively) metaphors. Snell himself gives this away when, ‘accurately’ enough, 
he says that in Homer the components of the soul are defined ‘by analogy of physical 
organs’ which constitutes a ‘metaphoric use of words for organs’. Here, the supposed 
fragmentariness of the naïve and unselfconscious Homeric self is called into question by 
Snell’s own awareness of the difference between literal terminology for physical organs and 
constructions of the psychic self in tropical terminology (as Snell would have it, in 
‘metaphorical’ terms). Of course, Snell is quick to dismiss this as ‘the most primitive level of 
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speech’, notably on the philosophical grounds that such expressions ‘only’ indicate the 
abstract function and not the concrete reality of the respective ‘organ’.633 Nevertheless, it is 
apparent that Snell himself is, to an extent, aware that tropical language is at play here and 
that this fact is not without consequences for the validity of the far-reaching conclusions he 
seeks to draw from Homer’s poetry.  
 
Snell is also aware that already in Homer we find the word-formation ἄθυμος (albeit only 
once). In later Greek, this term denotes the negation of an abstract notion of θυμός: ‘faint-
hearted’, ‘without passion’. In Homer, however, as Snell rushes to point out, it describes the 
consequences of a θυμός that does not function.634 The context of the Homeric instance is 
that Circe offers food and drink to Odysseus and his comrades so that the θυμός in their 
breasts (θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι) may be restored to its state prior to their departure from 
Ithaca and they should no longer be withered and spiritless (ἀσκελέες καὶ ἄθυμοι).635 
Needless to say, ἄθυμος in this instance is a hyperbolic expression, but there is a case to be 
made for taking the usage here as implying organ terminology (‘withered and virtually dead 
[as if without a θυμός and, therefore, lifeless]’). Snell could have cited this instance to fend 
off the potential criticism that the existence of a compound word based on an ‘abstract’ 
notion of θυμός could suggest that the core element itself must have a signification that 
goes beyond that of a (literal) organ.636 Instead, he goes on to compare the Homeric case 
with contemporary notional examples – and thereby undermines his whole enterprise. He 
suggests that if one were to assume an abstract notion of θυμός one must also admit that 
‘heart’ and ‘head’ are abstracts too, for it is entirely feasible to say that someone 
is heartless, or has lost his head. If I declare that someone has a good brain, and 
I mean his thinking; or: someone has a soft heart, and I mean his feelings, I use 
                                                        
633
 Schmitt has shown that Greek thought from Homer to Plato and Aristotle takes the (necessarily) abstract 
ἔργον (‘work’, ‘function’) as the starting point for conceptualisation; conceptualisation based on the 
perception of empirical features (concrete, material prima facie appearance) first emerges in the new 
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this Hellenistic view continues to influence our own epistemological stance, owing to its extensive reception 
from the Renaissance onwards, including (and thus explaining) the reasoning behind Snell’s verdict. The 
argument is developed in extenso in Schmitt 2003 with summaries given ibid., 52-69 and 523-541 . 
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the name of the organ in place of that function. ‘Heartless’ and ‘brainless’, and 
ἄθυμος refer to the lack of a function.637  
 
Snell makes a valid point here, namely that the phenomenon of ‘speaking organs’, which we 
find in Homer and other early Greek poets such as Pindar,638 also occurs in modern 
languages and literatures. Translations of relevant passages from Greek literature make this 
obvious: Hölderlin’s literal translations of Pindar’s victory odes, for instance, show that the 
poet had no difficulty translating any of these organ terms with German equivalents, though 
not always with the same organ as ‘literally’ denoted by the Greek.639 He translates καρδίαν 
ἰαίνει at Pi. P. 1.11 as ‘erheitert das Herz’ (‘delights the heart’) but the same word, καρδίᾳ at 
Pi. P. 10.44, is also translated as ‘aus dem Busen’ (‘from the bosom’). That this translatability 
does not reflect any special effort to accommodate a Greek idiosyncrasy is shown by the 
many comparable instances of ‘organs’ seemingly ‘speaking’ and ‘acting’ of their own accord 
in Hölderlin’s own poetry: 
Denn so ordnet das Herz es an 
For thus the heart commands it640 
Fesselte nur nicht mehr ans gesellige Leben das Herz mich 
If only the heart enchained me no longer to social life641 
Confronted with examples like these, however, few of us would entertain the thought that 
Hölderlin experienced his heart, the actual corporeal organ, as a semi-autonomous entity in 
conflict with him, let alone take this to be the general view of Hölderlin’s contemporaries, of 
‘Hölderlinic man’ in eighteenth-century Germany.  
 
The main reasons why modern readers are unlikely to base a reconstruction of the 
psychological views of Hölderlin’s contemporaries on his poetry are of course (a) that we 
have a more extensive knowledge of the developing psychological concepts of the late 
eighteenth century and (b) that these are much more akin to our own concepts than the 
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 Following a detailed analysis, Pelliccia convincingly concludes his investigation into mind, body and speech 
in Homer and Pindar by stating that ‘for the most part Pindar’s use of the organs conforms precisely to the 
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medical-psychological views of the ancient Greeks. However, this does not affect our point 
here. It is true that in ancient Greece causal explanations by (later) medical-anatomical 
theories appear to correspond more directly to the organ-emotion correlation in poetry, 
although the Hippocratic corpus already challenges such (popular) notions.642 Nevertheless, 
even for speakers who subscribe to views closer to the expressions we find in Greek poetry, 
there is a profound difference between implying a sensation or a feeling or a faculty by 
stating the physical location which is taken to be its source or seat and expressing the 
sensation/feeling/faculty in straightforward denotative language. 643 
 
At first sight, all this may seem rather trivial, but it calls into question Snell’s entire 
argument. Ancient Greek poetic idiom, like late eighteenth-century German poetic idiom 
(and like contemporary idiomatic English), commands a vocabulary which allows for the use 
of organ terminology in a way that is not strictly speaking ‘anatomical’. Snell tries to re-read 
the evidence in his favour by implying that the modern equivalents in his colloquial 
examples are just as ‘primitive’ as he takes ancient thought to be, since neither use specific, 
denotative terms but rather imply functions through ‘organ’ terms – in his own words: ‘I use 
the name of the organ in place of that function’.644 This last sentence, however, is the key to 
a tropological understanding of the phenomenon of ‘speaking organs’.  
 
As we have seen, Snell supposes the usage of ‘organ’ terminology to be metaphorical. Yet 
what he describes in his notional examples are, in fact, metonyms: ‘brain’ for ‘thinking’, 
‘heart’ for ‘feelings’, ‘organ’ for ‘function’ – all these pairings are linked by contiguity and 
not by analogy or similarity, which would imply metaphor. It is apparent that links between 
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 Consider, for instance, Hp. Morb. Sacr. 20: διὸ φημὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον εἶναι τὸν ἑρμηνεύοντα τὴν σύνεσιν. αἱ 
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say the heart is the organ with which we think, and that it feels pain and anxiety. But it is not so; it is merely 
convulsed, as is the diaphragm, only more so for the following reason …’, trans. Jones). 
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feelings and parts of the physical body are not confined to any one language; this is a wide-
spread phenomenon, albeit with cultural variations regarding which body part or organ is 
associated with which feeling or abstract faculty. Extralinguistically, these links may be 
supported by physiological sensations that coincide with certain emotions (‘trust your gut-
feeling’), by knowledge of the functions of human anatomy (‘use your brain’) or by pure 
convention (‘follow your heart’);645 intralinguistically, it is clear that we are dealing here 
with contiguous relationships based on culturally and terminologically pre-established links 
that do not include any analogical conception. In short, they are metonymic and not 
metaphoric in kind. Likewise, there seems to be nothing in, or beyond, Homer’s poetry to 
suggest that the Greeks, whose advanced medical and anatomical knowledge is well 
documented, literally believed in the existence of additional physical ‘organs of will’. Nor 
does it seem plausible to point to a repertoire of supposed metaphors (for feelings or 
psychic faculties ‘conceptualised’ in analogy to physical organs) as proof of the primitivism 
of Homeric thought, while acknowledging that modern poets (and we ourselves) use organ 
terminology as a short-hand for complex psychological realities for which we have no 
‘proper’ terminology either – and certainly none that would be appropriate for the elevated 
language of poetry.  
 
Snell’s resistance to this line of thought follows from his main premise, a version of the 
notorious Sapir-Whorf principle.646 ‘[I]f they [sc. the Greeks] had no word for it, it follows 
that as far as they were concerned it did not exist.’647 It can, of course, be granted that the 
Greeks, and certainly Homer, had no word that denotes ‘psychic faculty that controls 
emotional responses’ – but neither do we, and such inelegant circumlocutions hardly suit 
the elevated diction of Greek poetry. In fact, our own situation rather conveniently 
demonstrates that one can have a concept without having one word for it. All in all, Snell’s 
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 Although rarely considered, our suggestion that such expressions are metonymic is not entirely without 
precedent: ‘But why then say you, have the Philosophers defined anger a boyling of the bloud about the hart?  
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reasoning is muddled, through and through. To conclude that Homer reveals a limited, naïve 
mindset, which can grasp psychological intricacies only as semi-independent natural forces, 
on the basis of the observation that psychic realities (for which no abstract terms are 
available) are poetically described by Homer in supposedly metaphorical organ terminology 
shows a complete disregard for the idiosyncrasies of poetic language; and even the 
observation itself is seen to be inaccurate once we acknowledge that the cultural-linguistic 
link between, for instance, ‘heart’ and ‘emotional faculty’ is one of contiguity, and not of 
analogy.  
 
Our argument will become clearer through a more detailed examination of the issues in 
Hölderlin’s poetry, where most of us (owing to the narrower chronological gap) will be 
inclined to assume a way of thinking more akin to our own, and where we have significantly 
better access to contemporary language usage, and can therefore determine ordinary and 
deviant usage with greater precision.  
 
By far the most prominent ‘psychic’ organ in Hölderlin’s poetry is the heart (‘das Herz’), 
followed by the chest (‘die Brust’). Others, such as the bosom (‘der Busen’) or blood (‘das 
Blut’), are less frequent. There are also a few instances in Hölderlin’s poetry where ‘heart’ is 
used literally to denote the anatomical organ. His recurrent, secondary use of the term 
displays recurrent structural features. It differs from contemporary primary usage of the 
heart as an anatomical organ in its non-ordinary collocation with verbs of ‘wishing’ or 
‘commanding’ (vel sim.) or with adverbs like ‘willingly’. Consider the following examples: 
… wie das Herz es wünscht …  
… as the heart wishes …648 
Denn so ordnet das Herz es an …  
For thus the heart commands it …649 
Dass williger mein Herz … 
 … mir sterbe.  
That more willingly my heart … 
… may die.650 
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It would take a stubbornly literalist reader to insist that these examples prove that Hölderlin 
views his heart, the actual corporeal organ, as a semi-autonomous entity. Rather, it is 
precisely the non-ordinary collocation of ‘heart’ with these verbs and adverbs that prompts 
the reader (even Snell) to ‘change gear’, as it were, from a literal to an effectively tropical 
reading – a reading, however, that cannot simply be labelled ‘metaphorical’.651 In the given 
examples (and many could be adduced from Hölderlin’s poetry), we observe the same 
recurring structure of a partly conditional tropical cluster.652 While ‘heart’ in itself is initially 
either literal or metonymic, a metaphorical component (verb, adverb, etc.) disambiguifies 
the potentially metonymic element of the cluster and renders it positively metonymic. The 
anatomical organ ‘heart’ does not ‘wish’; the ‘psychic faculty of emotional engagement’ 
does; hence the latter is taken to be implied here. The metaphorical component thus 
prompts a metonymic reading of the organ term, which is per se only potentially 
metonymic; it is the breach of collocation rules that necessitates opening up this potential 
of further, secondary meanings of the metonymic component so as to make sense of the 
sentence. Yet, regardless of this metonymic shift from the concrete to the abstract (organ to 
psychological abstraction), the metaphorical component continues to be metaphorical in 
attributing to the metonymic vehicle (‘heart’) a notion of agency (in analogy to the agency 
of a human subject) and thus creates an impression of metaphoricity for the whole tropical 
cluster.653 However, it is apparent that what is metaphorical here is not the organ term itself 
but only the verbal or adverbial vehicle that supplies the notion of agency to the organ term 
in analogy to human agency; the organ term itself is metonymic and contains no element of 
analogy as such.  
 
Consideration of the different readings which ‘heart’ prompts in the three examples given 
adds further weight to this argument. In the first two examples, ‘heart’ could be replaced, 
however clumsily, with ‘psychic faculty of emotional engagement’. To say that this faculty 
wishes, demands, and so on, is to make a literal statement: this is literally what this part of 
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the human being does just as the ear hears and the eye sees. And as soon as this metonymic 
tenor is supplied, the remainder of the sequence can be read ‘literally’. In its further 
context, however, the third example is seen to be more complicated: 
Dass williger mein Herz, vom süßen 
Spiele gesättiget, dann mir sterbe. 
That more willingly my heart,  
satisfied/fed with sweet play[/merriment], may then die. 654 
‘Heart’ here stands in relation to three elements which qualify it: (a) it can be more (or less) 
willing, (b) it is to be (metaphorically) satisfied/fed with sweet play and (c) it may at some 
point die. Of these three, only (a) allows for a reading in which ‘heart’ can be understood as 
‘psychic faculty of emotional engagement’, which, on the level of this supplied metonymic 
tenor, literally generates willingness. In (b) the ‘heart’ is metaphorically likened to a stomach 
(‘gesättiget’) that needs feeding (‘sweet play’ being likened to food). Even when the 
assumed metonymic tenor (‘psychic faculty of emotional engagement’ for ‘heart’) is 
supplied, the expression remains metaphorical because in either case the feeding 
terminology of the verb qualifies the nouns by way of (metaphorical) analogy. (c), on the 
other hand, is ambiguous and hovers between primary and secondary. Although a heart, in 
ordinary usage, cannot literally ‘die’, the anatomical organ at issue can fail, and thereby 
cause the entire body to die. Hence, although a distinction between the lyric subject and the 
‘heart’ is acceptable and a semi-literal reading just conceivable, the immediate context 
points to metonymy: in agreeing to the heart’s death the lyric subject necessarily agrees to 
his own death.  
 
Different metonymic notions are implicit in the following examples: 
Fesselte nur nicht mehr ans gesellige Leben das Herz mich 
If only the heart enchained me no longer to social life 655 
The ‘heart’, which ‘enchains’ the lyric subject to social life by analogy with manifest ties and 
bonds, is not so much the whole abstract psychic faculty but rather the more specific desire 
for sociability itself; it is only in the final instance the abstract psychic faculty as such. 
 
                                                        
654
 Hölderlin, ‘An die Parzen‘, 3-4. 
655
 Hölderlin, ‘Eichenbäume‘, 16. 
270 
 
Denn mein Herz gehört den Toten an 
For my heart belongs to the dead 656  
In this example, it would be equally absurd to read ‘heart’ as the anatomical organ or as the 
psychic faculty; neither can sensibly be said to ‘belong’ to the dead. The ‘heart’ here is the 
emotional self of the lyric subject: his love, passion and identity. 
 
Tief im Herzen hass ich den Tross der Despoten und Pfaffen 
Deep in my heart I hate the band of tyrants and priests 657 
Qualified by the adverb ‘deep’, ‘heart’ here is neither faculty nor feeling but the localised 
seat of emotions, and only ultimately the faculty that generates them. ‘Deep’ qualifies both 
the heart (where the emotion is hidden) and the hatred (which is profound, in a secondary 
sense). It is difficult to decide whether ‘heart’ itself is to be taken as primary or secondary: 
the whole sentence only makes sense on the basis of an existing link between the physical 
heart and the metonymic notion of it as seat of abstract emotions (a configuration that 
necessarily requires secondary language – can anything abstract otherwise have a ‘seat’?). 
 
… es füllen das Herz ihm  
ihre Freuden … 
… their pleasures  
fill his heart…658 
The metaphorical component here introduces a notion of spatiality and makes the ‘heart’ 
not so much a faculty that creates emotional responses as the faculty that experiences and 
stores emotions, which leaves ‘heart’ hovering between the experiencing subject itself (co-
present in the ethical dative ‘ihm’) and his storing memory. 
 
Auch verbergen umsonst das Herz im Busen, umsonst  
halten den Mut noch wir … 
And in vain we hide the heart in our bosom, in vain  
we hold up our courage  …659 
Again, both a primary and secondary reading are notionally possible. Here, neither ‘heart’ 
nor ‘bosom’ are immediately affected by any metaphorical element. Both can therefore be 
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read in their primary sense: the heart is ‘literally’ hidden in the chest. Yet the unusual active 
voice of the verb,660 and then the mention of ‘courage’ in the following line, will make the 
reader more inclined to pursue a secondary reading and read metonymically: ‘in vain we try 
to hold back our passionate emotional impulses inside ourselves.’ 
 
The usage associated with other named body parts in Hölderlin follows similar patterns. The 
use of ‘Brust’ (‘chest’), for instance, is often reminiscent of θυμός in Pindar and Homer. It is 
regularly collocated with adjectives that neither refer ‘literally’ to an anatomical body part 
nor qualify it on an analogical level. Consider the following lines: 
Der Vollendung Ahndungen erheben 
Über Glück und Zeit die stolze Brust 
The premonitions of perfection raise 
the proud chest above luck and time 661  
Pride is culturally linked with a physical posture that sees the upper body upright, with the 
stiffened chest given ostentatious prominence. This pre-established link brings ‘pride’ and 
‘chest’ into a contiguous, hence potentially metonymic, relationship. The chest can be the 
(seat of the) emotional faculty that generates the feeling of pride and at the same time 
(when stiffened) the outward sign of actively felt pride: the chest is literally ‘raised’ 
(stiffened) as a consequence of the feeling of pride, here as a result of ‘premonitions’. 
However, a chest itself cannot literally be ‘proud’. A conditional grammatical metonym 
(‘proud’ taken as transferred away from the subject) disambiguifies what is to be 
understood under ‘chest’ here. By association with ‘proud’, ‘chest’ is attributed with 
personal, human qualities which evoke the whole subject behind it (pars pro toto). At the 
same time, the adjective itself explicates the metonymic link between pars and totum: 
during the feeling of pride the chest becomes the prominent visible trait of the subject 
experiencing it. We might struggle to formulate a single metonymic tenor of ‘chest’, and it 
seems impossible to decide whether (a) the grammatical metonym transfers a feeling to a 
body part, (b) the adjective ‘proud’ is literal and conjoined with a noun-based index 
metonym which implies the subject experiencing pride or (c) the adjective ‘proud’ literally 
clarifies what is metonymically implied as contained in the ‘chest’ (the seat of emotions 
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understood as container of the feeling of being ‘proud’). The metonymic noun together with 
the (conditional) adjectival grammatical metonym form a compound in which ‘pride’, ‘visible 
consequence of pride’, ‘assumed seat of pride’ and ‘subject experiencing pride’ become 
one.  
 
This last example invites a restatement. If we were to translate Hölderlin’s poem into 
Homeric or Pindaric Greek, it would be difficult to decide whether to translate ‘chest’ as 
θυμός or as στῆθος – the contiguity, which Hölderlin opens up, extends to both. The same 
goes for the expression ‘die verschwiegene Brust’ (‘the reticent chest’)662 in another poem, 
with again a combination of grammatical metonym and/or noun-based index metonym. The 
meaning of ‘chest’ here hovers between the deeply affected but solemnly quiet subject, the 
subject’s emotional faculty (θυμός) and the seat of the emotions.663 And, from yet another 
poem, consider these lines: ‘glühte | Mut und Liebe dort in jeder Brust’ (‘bravery and love 
glowed there in every breast’).664 Here, ‘chest’ is understood as the seat of feeling, 
equivalent to στῆθος in Homer.665 Yet a sequence such as ‘Deine Brust verjüngten 
Siegsgefühle’ (‘Your breast was made young by feelings of victory’)666 would surely call for 
the Homeric θυμός – it is the spirit, will, and drive of the subject that is rejuvenated and not 
the (metonymically implied) seat of these emotions, let alone the literal anatomical body 
part itself. 
 
Consider, finally, the metonymic ‘blood’ in the following lines: 
Wenn im Heldenbunde meiner Brüder 
Deutsches Blut und deutsche Liebe glüht 
When in the heroic band of my brothers  
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German blood and German love glow 667  
The metaphorical ‘glow’ indicates consuming passion and energy (by analogy with glowing 
coal?). The metonymic ‘blood’, on the other hand, is more elusive. It can be read as pars pro 
toto, with ‘German blood’ simply implying ‘Germans’, though this would result in the 
awkward metaphor, ‘when the Germans … glow’. Accordingly, the reader may be more 
inclined to read ‘blood’ as evoking an essential identity, something that goes beyond mere 
physical corporeality as defined by ethnicity and rather draws on the notion of blood as the 
site of passionate emotion; perhaps something like ‘distinctly German passion, alive in true 
Germans, glowing like coal on fire’. The explicating paraphrase shows how much the 
assumed metonymic tenor depends on what the metaphorical component insinuates. The 
metaphor prompts a secondary reading of ‘blood’ in the first place (actual blood cannot 
‘glow’, either literally or metaphorically), then qualifies it so that it hovers between different 
metonymic tenors that are lexically contiguous to ‘blood’ (‘blood’ for ‘race’ or ‘blood’ as ‘site 
of passionate emotion’).  
 
Our analysis of organ terminology in Hölderlin shows that a sensitive close reading obviates 
premature assumptions on how a poet ‘conceptualises’ such ‘organs’. The evidence of 
structural patterns and the dynamics of language usage that underlie the individual cases 
can be summarised as follows: ‘organs of will’ are metonymic constructs that, given the lack 
of ‘proper’, i.e. denotative terminology, express various abstract concepts (ex inopia-
metonymy). They are based on a pre-established cultural/lexical link between an organ and 
an abstract concept. The metonymic tenor implied by ‘organ terms’ in each concrete 
instance does not depend on one specific, fixed and given concept behind each of these 
terms but, on the contrary, is determined by other elements (including metaphorical and 
conditional-metaphorical elements) in their immediate context. The metonymic tenor in 
itself is elusive and flexible. Rather than pointing to one specific ‘concept’ (including 
‘concepts’ for which no single, denotative term exists in the given language), metonymy 
involves a greater openness. Where analogy, as the operative principle in metaphor, often 
focuses on one or a limited number of points of comparison,668 contiguity as the operative 
principle in metonymy is not punctual but directional: it presupposes a line of linked and 
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associated terms without one definitive stop position (although the context may support 
one term over and above most others). In metonymy, it is the context (including 
neighbouring tropical components) which selects and identifies a virtual point (or points) on 
the line of contiguity as the metonymic tenor, which arises from the organ term as 
metonymic vehicle. As our discussion of conditional metaphors in the context of metonymic 
organ terms has shown, both the metonymic vehicle and tenor can supply the tenor term 
on which the analogy underlying a neighbouring metaphor is based. This last point 
illustrates the peculiar yet characteristic dialectic of this kind of cluster: one may need to 
read the potential metonym metonymically in order for the metaphor to make sense, yet 
one also needs the metaphor for the metonym to be perceptible as such in the first place.  
 
If our readings of Hölderlin’s organ terminology are convincing, how do they bear on the 
controversy on ‘speaking organs’ in Homer, Pindar and other early Greek poets? The 
configurations in the passages involving ‘organs of will’ in Homer and Pindar are so very 
similar to Hölderlin’s that one might be tempted to assume an outright identity. Snell writes: 
In Homer’s language, the thymos is eaten away or torn asunder by pain; the pain 
which hits the thymos is sharp, or immense, or heavy. The analogies are evident: 
just as a limb is struck by a pointed weapon or by a heavy stone, just as it may be 
corroded or torn to pieces, so also the thymos. As before, the concept of the 
spiritual is divorced from the corporeal, and the dimension of the spiritual 
receives no attention. … Here too the predicates of the soul remain completely 
within the bounds set for physical organs.669 
In the light of our own discussion, we can correct Snell’s literalist remarks by pointing out 
that, as in Hölderlin, the structure of organ terminology in Homer consists of an abstract 
concept which is qualified and specified by neighbouring (often metaphorical) elements. 
However, we are still faced with the difficulty of ascertaining the primary use of organ 
terminology in ancient Greek. We need to distinguish three different issues here that 
require elucidation: we need to determine (a) which (if any) body part is denoted by a given 
term, (b) whether evidence for ‘normal’ usage also points to a secondary sense in addition 
to an anatomical one and (c) whether individual instances show sufficient divergence from 
normal usage to constitute tropical usage or involvement in tropical clusters in the strict 
sense. While we can determine much of this with certainty regarding the usage of ‘Herz’, 
‘Brust’, ‘Busen’, and ‘Blut’ in Hölderlin’s German, the situation is more awkward with the 
                                                        
669
 Snell 1946, 18-19. 
275 
 
organ terms which appear, as we are suggesting, to be used metonymically in Homer, Pindar 
and elsewhere in ancient Greek texts. However, a distributional analysis of evidence for the 
usage of the individual organ terms in extant Greek literature yields significant results.670 
 
The most straightforward cases are πραπίδες and φρήν/φρένες. In addition to Homeric 
evidence for the usage of πραπίδες to denote ‘midriff’ and ‘diaphragm’,671 LSJ s.v. goes on 
to note: ‘this was deemed the seat of mental powers and affections’, and lists significantly 
more instances in which the term’s context in Homer (and later Greek) prompts a reading 
along the lines of ‘understanding’ and ‘mind’.672 φρήν/φρένες has a wider spread in authors 
indicative of literal usage, such as Aristotle and the Hippocratic corpus, and the available 
evidence here too confirms a primary sense of ‘midriff’ continuously from Homer 
onwards.673 The vast majority of literary usages, however, point again to a reading of the 
term as ‘“heart” as the seat of passions ... mind’.674 
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 As complement to the following, see also Thumiger 2007, 59-106. 
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 See, for instance, Il. 11.579: καὶ βάλε Φαυσιάδην Άπισάονα, ποίμενα λάων, | ἧπαρ ὑπὸ πραπίδων (‘struck 
Apisaon, Phausius’ son, shepherd of men, in the liver below the midriff’, trans. Murray); see also 13.412 and 
17.349. As confirmed by data in Dindorf 1831-1865, Bonitz 1870, Kühn/Fleischer 1986 and TLG, there is no 
evidence for the term’s usage in classical prose. 
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 See, for instance, Hes. Th. 656: ἴδμεν ὅ τοι περὶ μὲν πραπίδες, περὶ δ’ ἐστὶ νόημα (‘We too know ourselves 
that your thoughts are supreme and your mind is supreme’, trans. Most) where the parallelism implies 
similarity; see also 608 as well as, among many other passages, Il. 18. 430, Pi. O. 11.10, A. Agam. 380 and E. Ba. 
999. 
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 See, for instance, Arist. HA 2.15.506a7:ἔτι δὲ καρδίαν ἅπαντ’ ἔχει ὅσα αἷμα ἔχει, καὶ τὸ διάζωμα, ὃ 
καλοῦνται φρένες (‘Furthermore, all blooded animals have a heart, and a diaphragm (which is called midriff)’, 
trans. Peck); see also Arist. PA 3.10 and, among numerous other instances in the Hippocratic Corpus, Hp. Prog. 
4 and 12, Flat. 10 (see Kühn/Fleischer 1986 s.v. φρήν for a comprehensive list). Additionally, there is further 
evidence from poetic texts such as Od. 9.301, A. Eum.158 and S. Tr. 931.  
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 LSJ s.v.; for the term’s usage to refer to the seat of feelings see, for instance, Od. 8. 131: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ 
πάντες ἐτέρφθησαν φρέν’ ἀέθλοις (‘But when the hearts of all had taken pleasure in the contests’, trans. 
Murray) and as referring to the intellect A. Eum. 1017: ἴχνος τὸ πρόσθεν οὐ διαστρέψω φρενός (‘I will not 
deviate from the track my mind has followed till now’, trans. Sommerstein). Further examples of this kind can 
be found at Il. 10.45, Od. 3.266, Pi. P. 5.67, 8.82, A. Eum. 775, Choe. 266, S. OT 511, E. Alc. 775. Pelliccia points 
out that in Pi. P. 6.35-37: Μεσσανίου δὲ γέροντος | δονηθεῖσα φρὴν βόασε παῖδα ὅν (‘In panic, the mind 
[φρήν] of the old man from Messene shouted to his son’, trans. Race) φρήν could refer to both the literal 
anatomical organ and the abstract seat of emotions at the same time: ‘Pindar may identify φρήν with the 
lungs, i.e. as the physical source of the actual βοά. If the last point is true then Pindar is endowing the φρήν 
with a double function: seat of emotions and, in effect, physical organ of speech.’ Pellicchia 1995, 303. Either 
way, a metonymic shift occurs: in any ordinary expression, the subject of the shouting would be the old man 
himself, whereas he is here only present in the genitive. Whether syntactically subordinated to one of his 
abstract faculties (‘seat of emotions’) or to one of his body parts (‘lungs’), in either case we are dealing with an 




There is solid evidence that, in medical-physiological contexts, κραδίη refers to the ‘heart’ 
as an anatomical organ.675 There are also semi-literal references which express panic as a 
fear that one’s heart might be leaping out of one’s breast.676 Compounds such as 
καρδιαλγέω, καρδιαλγικός and cognate terms in the Corpus Hippocraticum confirm the 
anatomical reference. Nevertheless, a significant spread of instances has the word used in 
ways and contexts that imply ‘seat of feeling and passion, or rage and anger’ or ‘inclination, 
desire, purpose’.677 
 
The prevalence of non-anatomical over anatomical usage is even stronger with the other 
‘heart’ terms. The term ἦτορ is not used as a technical-medical term in either the 
Hippocratic or the Aristotelian corpus and only one instance in Homer approximates to 
literal usage in an anatomical sense.678 Only if we follow the suggestion of Authenried/Kaegi 
that the term is connected with ἦτρον (‘abdomen’), which is well evidenced in sober 
prose,679 do we find support for denotation of an anatomical body part. All other instances 
of ἦτορ, from Homer onwards, have the term referring to ‘the seat of life’ or, most 
frequently, ‘the seat of feeling, passion, desire’.680 The situation is even more 
straightforwardly one-sided when it comes to the verse word κῆρ: the only extant usage of 
this term as referring to an anatomical organ is one instance in Homer,681 in all other 
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 The earliest evidence is Il. 13.282: ἐν δέ τέ οἱ κραδίη μεγάλα στέρνοισι πατάσσει (‘and his heart beats 
loudly in his chest’, trans. Murray). Other examples include numerous instances in the Hippocratic corpus  such 
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of instances in the Aristotelian and Hippocratic corpora, see Bonitz 1870 and Kühn/Fleischer 1986 s.v., 
respectively). 
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 See, for instance, Il. 5.250: μή πως φίλον ἦτορ ὀλέσσῃς (‘lest perhaps you lose your life’, trans. Murray) and 
21.389: ἐγέλασσε δέ οἱ φίλον ἦτορ (‘and the heart within him laughed with joy’, trans. Murray); further 
examples include Il. 21.114, 13.84, Hes. Th. 139, Pi. O. 1.4 and A. Pers. 991. 
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about the throbbing heart’, trans. Murray). The term is not listed in either Kühn/Fleischer 1986 or Bonitz 1870 
and Dindorf 1831-1865 and TLG s.v. κῆρ list only references to non-anatomical usage. Compare also Ebeling 
1885 s.v. κῆρ. 
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instances the term refers to the seat of feelings, passions, mental power, life force and so 
on.682 
 
Altogether different is θυμός, and likewise νόος and ψυχή. These terms do not, and (as far 
as we know) never did, have any reference to anatomical organs. Although their respective 
etymologies are not without controversy,683 it can certainly be said that in extant Greek 
literature these terms literally denote concepts that are abstract in themselves, rather than 
implying abstract concepts secondarily. The fact that they are sometimes used in poetic 
texts with terminology that could also be applied to organs (as Snell points out, above) does 
not compromise their own status as denotative terms for abstract concepts. And on 
reflection, it is apparent that it is often difficult to use abstract terms at all, in any language, 
without ‘compromising’ them through association with verbs which either ‘metaphorically’ 
attribute agency to them, thereby implicitly likening them to human agents,684 or 
‘metaphorically’ objectify them and thereby make them seem physical.685 That this is a 
general feature of language, and not a peculiarity of early Greek thought, is sufficiently 
demonstrated by modern English usage in conjunction with ‘metaphorical’ language. From 
the personifying (‘my mind is wandering’ and ‘my thinking is misguided’) to the objectifying 
(‘to lose your mind’  and ‘to break his spirit’), contemporary English abounds in expressions 
that are structurally equivalent to what Snell takes as evidence for ‘primitive thought’ in 
Homer. 
 
The available evidence for the usage of πραπίδες, φρήν/φρένες, κραδίη and ἦτορ neither 
fundamentally challenges our suggestion of a metonymic relationship between literal 
organs and abstract faculties/feelings nor affects the seeming equivalence of the structural 
patterns in Hölderlin to those in early Greek poetry. What our findings do show, however, is 
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 See, for instance, Il. 6.523-524: κῆρ | ἄχνυται ἐν θυμῷ (‘my heart is grieved within me’, trans. Murray) or Il. 
15.52: μεταστρέψειε νόον μετὰ σὸν καὶ ἐμὸν κῆρ (‘bend his mind to follow your heart and mine’, trans. 
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 As at Od. 9.302: ἕτερος δέ με θυμὸς ἔρυκεν (‘but a second thought checked me’, trans. Murray; [lit: 
‘another/different θυμός pulled me away’]) θυμός here refers to a thought, a feeling or an impulse rather than 
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 As at Od. 17.603: πλησάμενος δ᾽ ἄρα θυμὸν ἐδητύος ἠδὲ ποτῆτος (‘when he had satisfied [lit.: filled] his 
heart [θυμός] with meat and drink’, trans. Murray); the faculty that produces the sensation of hunger is 
portrayed here in a spatial ‘image’: an empty container that is to be filled. 
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that we cannot exclude the possibility that some Greek terms, notably θυμός and to a lesser 
extent κῆρ, are in fact genuinely abstract, denotative terms for psychic phenomena, like 
νόος and ψυχή, for which modern European languages lack a direct equivalent.686 If this is 
the case, the only reason why they seem (to us) similar to organ terms that imply 
abstractions metonymically is the fact that in extant literary texts they frequently follow the 
same pattern of contextual specification and narrative embedding via ‘metaphorical’ 
attributions of agency or objectification. The limited lexical evidence available simply does 
not allow us to determine with certainty whether they literally denote organs or abstract 
concepts. Trying to reconstruct denotations from the evidence gathered in poetic texts, in 
the way that Snell and his followers have attempted, runs the risk of turning secondary 
qualifications into intrinsic core meaning. To illustrate the point: it is as if some future 
lexicographer of modern English attempted to establish the literal meaning of the 
expression ‘Prime Minister’ from instances where it is used jointly with live or dead 
metaphorical expressions such as ‘keeping course’, ‘making bills watertight’, ‘steering the 
country through difficulties’ and ‘preparing the economy for stormy waters’, and concluded 
on the basis of that ‘evidence’ that this office of state is somehow ‘conceptualised’ as having 
intrinsic nautical qualities. 
 
This methodological confusion also besets Pelliccia’s extensive study of the alleged speech 
capabilities of organs in Homer and Pindar.687 Written partly in response to Snell’s reading 
of organ terminology, Pelliccia tries to refute Snell’s theses with a combination of 
conceptual and usage-based arguments. Although his declared aim is to offer an ‘essentially 
literary study’ as a contribution ‘to ... literary history, not intellectual or psychological 
history’,688 throughout his study he pursues the implicit double objective of explaining the 
narrative function of organ terminology and, thereby, its conceptualisation in archaic 
Greece. This programmatic ‘thereby’ is riddled with methodological difficulties, for it 
effectively means that Pelliccia is prepared to make inferences about concepts and 
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 Pelliccia argues that ‘what we find in examining the use of θυμός is that rather than being a precisely or 
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conceptualisations from the narrative contexts within which the terminology occurs. This 
means that literature is taken to be fully representational, effectively a verbatim transcript 
of psychological reality without any allowance for artistic freedom of expression. 
Furthermore, in so doing, Pelliccia takes Snell’s position so seriously (perhaps too seriously?) 
that he commits himself to an even more extreme form of literalism than Snell’s own, and 
over the course of 354 pages carefully analyses where, to whom, in response to whom or 
what, and in whose presence,  the ‘organs’ (now understood wholly physically) ‘speak’, and 
whether they do so verbally or non-verbally.689  
 
Although Pelliccia’s detailed analyses and findings contribute greatly to our understanding 
of the role and narrative function of these ‘organs of will’690 in Homer, it seems at times that 
he does precisely what has been sketched in the Prime Minister example above. He sets out 
to shed light on organ terminology by comparing it with the way in which animals and gods 
are depicted and concludes that, since animals and gods in Homer are seen to ‘act’ in the 
same ways as the ‘organs’, they must all have been thought of as autonomous entities, 
conceptualised in a similar or interdependent way: ‘The organs and the gods resemble 
animals in that they behave like living creatures, and influence us, but they do not ordinarily 
explain themselves – they just work on us’,691 and elsewhere: ‘I think it is quite clear that an 
animal metaphor participated in the conception of the organs’.692 Rather than presenting 
his findings as a new interpretation of how these ‘organs’ were conceptualised in early 
Greek poetry, however, Pelliccia’s analyses seek to elucidate the role they play on the level 
of narrative technique (and this is where, in fact, the similarities to gods and animals lie). 
Feelings, psychological dynamics, and internal conflicts can be externalised and rendered 
visible through the use of organ terms when those are embedded in the action evolving 
around the characters. Pelliccia has indeed demonstrated in detail how this literary 
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technique provides Homer’s audience with access to the characters and their decision-
making process: not only does, for instance, the θυμός serve as substitute for the 
generically required addressee/audience,693 all the ‘speaking organs’ also form part of a 
coherent narrative system in which they and the gods take complementary but distinct roles 
as speaking and mute personae in deliberative or decisive moments of human character.694 
As such, they can be seen as ‘an example of Homer’s habitual externalization of 
psychology’.695 The ‘organs’ are used in this narrative function ‘as a kind of rhetorically and 
psychologically useful second self’ in which the θυμός in particular demonstrably functions 
‘as a scapegoat’.696 Homer uses the option to ‘hypostasize an independent organ of will to 
which action or behavior, now repudiated can be plausibly ascribed, after it has ceased. … 
The purpose of implying that the θυμός has “spoken” is to suggest that there is now a 
different (and superior speaker).’697  
 
Two conclusions follow. First, in so far as they are ‘speaking’ and/or ‘acting’, the ‘organs’ 
cannot plausibly be discussed on the level of their conceptualisation but rather on the level 
of the narrative technique used. A literary technique used by an author does not necessarily 
represent the psychological self-conception of his age.698 What we can analyse for sure are 
the effects of literary techniques and the usage of individual terms, provided that sufficient 
reliable evidence for ordinary usage is available to allow us to distinguish deviant, tropical 
usage. On a theoretical level, Pelliccia is aware of this, for instance when he (rightly) states 
that the ‘language used to characterize these [inner, psychological] events is the only 
evidence that we have for reconstructing the conceptualization of them’,699 but he 
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nevertheless persists in seeking to distil conceptual content from context-specific, possibly 
tropical, language. But we have no right to understand ‘Homeric man’ as the proverbial 
‘man in the street’ in Homer’s day and age. ‘Homeric man’ is better understood more 
concretely as the literary depiction of characters by Homer. On this, the literary scholar can 
make valid and indeed verifiable observations. Anything beyond that is likely to say more 
about our prejudices about antiquity than about antiquity itself. 
 
The second conclusion is more far-reaching. If it is possible for a narrative to functionalise 
organs like the θυμός as a ‘second self’, as argued by Pelliccia, then such an outcome surely 
has implications for the tropological status of organ terms in their various contexts. Rather 
like Snell, Pelliccia seems to sense that tropology has a significant bearing on this whole 
issue but, also like Snell, he does not go as far as making it fundamental to his arguments. 
Instead, whenever he wishes to make clear that the ‘organs’ may not have been 
conceptualised as actual anatomical entities, he imprecisely calls them metaphors. To give 
just one example:  
[I]t is wisest to think in terms of metaphor rather than to try to discover a 
substance or entity – an actual ‘organ’ (or ‘animal’), in fact – that is precisely 
conceived and to whose properties and capabilities all characterizations in the 
text can be traced back.700 
Let us confront the question again: why should we think of them in terms of metaphor? 
Metaphor would imply that two terminologically different elements (such as ‘organ’ and 
‘psychic event or ‘psychic faculty’) are linked logically by analogy and/or similarity. But what 
analogy or similarity could there be between heart and feelings, midriff and intelligence? 
Pelliccia himself points the right way when he writes: 
What we can say with confidence is that the Greeks experienced certain inner 
events, and that they perceived these events as sharing family resemblances 
that allowed or encouraged their conceptual unification and subsequent 
association with certain internal entities, some of which appear to have been (at 
times) thought of as physical organs, others of which may or may not have been 
so conceived.701 
The link between ‘organ’ and ‘psychic event’ or ‘psychic faculty’ in the poetic idiom of 
Homer, as in the idiom of Hölderlin, is one of pre-established association and therefore, 
since it is based on a link of contiguity and not of analogy, metonymic in kind. Our argument 
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that organ terminology is used metonymically finds further support from the fact that such 
usage is not only based on a pre-established link but also evokes a line of associations with 
these terms as their starting point. Otter’s suggestion that θυμός is to be understood as a 
mere reflexive pronoun, that is, as virtually identical with the subject to whom the 
respective θυμός belongs, illustrates this point.702 As it stands, however, Otter’s proposition 
is unacceptable. As Pelliccia points out:  
the θυμός functions, as it does elsewhere in the poems, as a kind of rhetorically 
and psychologically useful second self, with some usefulness lying in its marked 
tendency not to talk back, or to talk at all. It is the self, but it is also distinct from 
the self – otherwise it could serve no rhetorical or psychological purpose.703 
But let us now add: evoking the self while also being distinct from it, being a part yet 
inevitably summoning up the whole – this is surely the pars pro toto relationship that 
constitutes synecdochical metonymy.  
 
It follows that organ terminology, when based on terms that denote anatomical organs, is 
(potentially) metonymic in two ways: first, through the link between organ and psychic 
event or psychic faculty and, secondly, through the potential to continue the line of 
association behind the link to the subject as a whole. Other ‘organ’ terms (notably θυμός, 
νόος and ψυχή), which do not involve this first link and have traditionally been classified as 
organ terms only because they too are frequently used together with ‘metaphorical’ 
qualifiers, nevertheless display the second link since (like other terms) they always point to 
the subject as a whole beyond the psychic event or faculty which they foreground. Among 
much else, a proper, metonymic understanding of the terminology involved removes the 
need to invoke personification, which Pelliccia at one point considers as an alternative to a 
metaphorical understanding of the ‘organs’.704 Not only has our analysis shown that the 
personifying attribution of agency only qualifies the (metonymic) organ term externally; it 
now emerges that this attribution of agency also adds to the suggestiveness of a metonymic 
‘part-for-whole’ (organ for subject) reading: the metaphorically induced notion of agency 
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likens the ‘organ’ to a subject with agency, and thereby reinforces the implicit metonymic 
connection between the ‘organ’ and the actual subject (which it partly constitutes).  
 
One other issue touched on by Pelliccia needs reconsideration in our terms: the tropicality 
of the metonyms under discussion. Given the sheer quantity and frequency of metonymic 
organ terms, one well might wonder whether they are actually still tropical and not perhaps 
rather ‘normal’ usage. If ‘heart’ is used over and over, in contexts and collocations which 
make it refer to something like ‘self’, ‘feelings’, ‘emotional faculty’, and so on, are we then 
dealing with an extended meaning of a term rather than with a tropical usage? Pelliccia 
briefly considers this issue (while assuming that organ terminology is metaphorical), but 
despite addressing the difficulties of determining tropical and ‘normal’ usage in dead 
languages,705 he does not pursue this line of thought any further. As we have seen, the 
usage of organ terms in a non-anatomical way is very widespread and if, on pragmatic 
grounds, we treat Homeric usage as a norm for later Greek poetry, as Silk suggests,706 we 
might well conclude that in their non-anatomical ‘meanings’ these terms – or some of them 
– meet (or come close to meeting) the distribution criteria for ordinary usage. While this 
does not in itself undermine the argument that organ terminology is structurally metonymic 
(that is, ‘genealogically’ based on an underlying link of contiguity and not analogy), it 
challenges us to consider whether or not the examples discussed can fairly be seen as 
instances of tropical usage. 
 
Pelliccia ponders the idea that organ terminology might be a set of ‘dead’ metaphors which 
‘plug a semantic gap’ – and then dismisses the thought: 
But how can an expression that is the only way of expressing a given meaning 
(i.e., it ‘plugs a semantic gap’) be called ‘metaphorical’? I would prefer to say 
that … a literal use … has had its range of literal application extended: 
diachronically the use may be metaphorical, but synchronically it is literal. It 
seems to me that when dealing with ‘semantic gaps’ it is wrong, or at best 
unhelpful and at worst misleading, to call the unique available expression of the 
given meaning a ‘metaphor’. If it is the only way of expressing the meaning, then 
the expression designates it literally; what else does ‘literally’ mean?707 
                                                        
705
 See Pelliccia 1995, 35-37. 
706
 See Silk 1974, 41-44 
707
 Pelliccia 1995, 34-35; italics in the original. 
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The second part of this statement sounds persuasive but is seriously flawed. Thanks to the 
surplus in meaning created by the interaction of tenor and vehicle terminology, every 
metaphor expresses something in a unique way that could not be expressed any differently 
– why else would an author use a particular metaphor at all? Yet it makes no sense to say 
that, conversely, every original (‘live’) metaphor is ‘literally’ denoting something that cannot 
be denoted except by employing this particular metaphor. Pellicia here displays an outdated 
view of metaphor by implying that metaphors only represent and replace, in one to one 
equivalence, a literal statement. In this connection, one might indeed distinguish ‘dead’ 
metaphor ex inopia and ‘dead’ metaphor as literary cliché. In the first case, a denotative, 
‘proper’ term is not available; in the second case, a live metaphor has been and continues to 
be used so frequently that is has effectively entered standard usage and is no longer 
perceived as deviant usage. While in both cases the ‘dead’ metaphors do not (or no longer) 
have the aesthetic effect of live metaphors, they remain metaphorical in the sense that we 
can reconstruct the analogical principle which in historical terms lies behind them. In this 
sense, the notion of ‘extended meaning’ as an alternative to tropicality is only possible from 
a diachronic perspective; in synchronic usage, any momentary ‘extension’ of meaning in one 
specific instance constitutes deviation from ordinary standard usage, and is therefore 
necessarily tropical, either metaphorically (if it is an extension by analogy) or metonymically 
(if it is an extension by contiguity).  
 
The large quantity of organ terminology in the poetic idiom of Homer does not suffice to 
make every case one of straightforward referential language. Some of the expressions 
involved are surely clichés, like κραδίη of the feelings, even within Homer, let alone for later 
users – as when Pindar writes καρδίαν ἰαίνει (‘delights the heart’).708 Conversely, Pindar’s 
usage of the same term at P. 8.9., καρδίᾳ κότον ἐνελάσῃ (‘fixes hatred in his heart [lit.: 
drives hatred into his heart]’), re-activates the metonymic cliché by embedding it in a 
metaphorical compound which assumes both its (physical) vehicle and (abstract) tenor.709 
However, the regular occurrence of this type of expression in poetic texts does, of course, 
                                                        
708
 Pi. P. 1.11; trans. Race. 
709
 Gildersleeve ad loc. suggests that ‘[t]he figure is that of a nail’. In fact, ἐνελαύνω is used elsewhere, more 
generally, to refer to a weapon being driven into a wounded body part (see Il. 20.259 or Pi. N. 10.70; see also 
Silk 1974, 161). In this expression, then, καρδίᾳ has a double status as it supplies a suitable target for both the 
abstract (κότον, ‘hate’) and concrete (ἐνελάσῃ, ‘driving into’) onslaught on the subject. The impression of 
cliché is thereby greatly reduced, with καρδίᾳ making a significant contribution to the force of the passage. 
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have a general impact on their aesthetic effect. Looking back at a long-standing literary 
tradition, we do not find (even) the image of a ‘speaking heart’ particularly abrasive or 
startling; we know immediately and (relatively) unambiguously what is meant; and so these 
instances hardly stand out as striking tropes. Whatever else, though, all such terms 
constitute instances of elevated poetic language, that is to say, they belong to the 
conventional but still stylised idiom of poetry, rather than to ordinary referential language. 
As such, they add significantly to the poetic texture of the texts in which they occur and, 
depending on the wider context and the vehicle terminology of neighbouring metaphors, 
they can indeed be integrated in tropical clusters within which, as a whole, they effectively 
intensify a sequence.710 
  
                                                        
710
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